Relationships and Processes
States/Weak States/Sovereignty/Blood 13-47
Just War/War Crimes/Genocide 48-94
Human Aggression 95-131
Ethnic Conflict/Nationalism 155-184
Revolution/Internal Conflict 185-233
U.N./Peacekeeping/Humanitarian Intervention 247-259
Nuclear Weapons/Weapons of Mass Destruction 260-268
Kagan: article and Asmus & Pollack article 269-295
2 primitive communities--farmers
NOMADIC CATTLE HERDERS ARE MOBILE AND SKILLED FIGHTERS TO DEFEND THEIR HERDS FROM THIEVES AND WILD ANIMALS.
NOMADS ARE POORER & FEWER THAN PEASANTS BUT HAVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY
NOMADS ROB AND PLUNDER
PEASANTS LEARN TO SUBMIT, RATHER THAN FIGHT.
OFFER A BRIBE
NOMADS DON'T KILL
GOOSE THAT GIVES A GOLDEN EGG
RETURN TO ROB AND ROB AGAIN
Nomads must protect
"their peasants" from other nomads;
also seek additional villages for additional bribes
at first it is a supplement to income, but if control enough peasant villages they can live full-time on tribute
NOMADS BECOME ARISTOCRATS.
NPR Weekend Edition
Sunday 9 February 1997.
INTERVIEW WITH President YOWERI MUSEVENI, of UGANDA.
q. Why so many uprisings?
ans. Problem of many with ambition to be president; but there is a more fundamental problem. Think of Adam Smith and the Wealth of Nations. Indicates that wealth comes from production and work.
Prior theory was Bullionism [mercantilism]. Go to South America and steal their gold.
In Africa many believe government is the source of wealth. Take it from others. Try to be in gov't to be rich by stealing and looting.
Curse of Africa in not knowing where wealth comes from. Africa needs more copies of Adam Smith.
If you loot wealth you are not secure because someone can loot you.
SUZERAIN; SUZERAINTY= a dominant state controlling the foreign relations of a vassal state but allowing it sovereign authority in internal affairs.
DEPEND ON CONQUEST
-Conquer Peasants, or Other Aristocracies, and Make Them Pay Tribute
ELITE ARISTOCRACIES ARE A COMPLETELY SEPARATE CLASS FROM THE PEASANTS; WITH A DIFFERENT IDEOLOGY AND DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS.
WARRIORS, PRIESTS, AND GOVERNORS
--ELITE DOES NOT
DO PRODUCTIVE WORK
--SUPERIOR TO PEASANTS
GOVERNMENT IS AN
Not Representative Government
--take and Give No Reasons
--take and Return No Benefits
--tribute Becomes Taxes
Villages Left to Govern Themselves; Only Concern Is That They Pay Taxes.
REGIONS WILL BE GIVEN TO ARISTOCRATS WHO COLLECT TRIBUTE AND SEND PART OF PAYMENT TO CAPITAL.
CONQUEST ELITES CONSTRUCT A STATE. In much of the 3rd World the conquest elite was alien, from Europe. The colonial states were constructed by the imperialists and then handed over to the native elite.
[e.g. Guatemala is still ruled by a conquest elite descended from the Spanish. Ruthless Army control of the Maya-Queche indigenous peoples.]
"DICTATORSHIP, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT," APSR 9/93
HUNT AND GATHER
STAGE -- NO INCENTIVE TO SUBJUGATE
CAPTIVES CANNOT GENERATE ENOUGH SURPLUS
progression of human
hunt and gather band;
settled tribe or clan [peasants];
--each level requires a greater surplus and the ability to take it, that is, tax it. Progress [evolution] is in terms of technology and productivity--early and late stone age, sedentarism and pottery, Neolithic or farming, smelting and bronze and iron ages, urbanization, space age.
COMPETITIVE THEFT DESTROYS THE INCENTIVE TO INVEST AND PRODUCE
•both the population and the bandits are better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator
•a 'stationary bandit' who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes
BLESSING OF THE INVISIBLE HAND":
•the rational, self-interested leader of a band of roving bandits is led, as though by an invisible hand, to settle down, wear a crown, and replace anarchy with government.
•DICTATOR IS BETTER THAN Anarchy--but imposes high costs--far higher taxes than needed for public goods, high taxes that distort incentives.
A secure autocrat
provides a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity.
Long Live the King. Dynasties lengthen planning horizon.
Consensus about next ruler is advantageous for society.
Olson p. 2
EXPECTS A BRIEF TENURE,
IT PAYS TO STEAL THOSE ASSETS WHOSE TAX YIELD OVER HIS TENURE IS LESS THAN THEIR TOTAL VALUE.
THERE IS NO
PRIVATE PROPERTY WITHOUT GOVERNMENT!
With roving bandits you may have possessions, but no one has a claim enforced by society. No reliable contract enforcement.
PROPERTY Rights: "gains from investment and from long-term transactions only if it has a government that is believed to be both strong enough to last and inhibited from violating."
THAT ARE NEEDED TO HAVE THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS NEEDED FOR MAXIMUM ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT ARE EXACTLY THE SAME CONDITIONS THAT ARE NEEDED TO HAVE A LASTING
"history provides not even a single example of a long and uninterrupted sequence of absolute rulers who continuously respected the property and contract."
VERY-LONG TERM CONTRACTS, Trusts for Great-grandchildren.
capital flees dictatorships to democracies.
contract-intensive activities--banks, insurance, capital markets--are mainly in democracies.
of democracy is due to historical conditions and dispersions of resources
that make it impossible for any one leader or group to assume all power."
•DISPERSED POWER and SCRAMBLED CONSTITUENCIES.
•Can't Subdue the Others or Segregate Followers into a Separate Domain,
•Then Either Fruitless Fighting or Truce and Toleration.
--HONOR AND GLORY
--DANGER AND RISK
--PEACEFUL SUBSTITUTES FOR WAR
--SERVICE AND DUTY [TO THE ELITE]
--CONTEMPT FOR WORK AND PRODUCTION
--RANKS, TITLES, INSIGNIA
PEASANTS TAUGHT TO BE SUBMISSIVE, PEACEFUL, CAUTIOUS.
ELITES AND MODERNIZATION
ELITES THAT MODERNIZE THEMSELVES FROM WITHIN ARE LIKELY TO SURVIVE
FROM THE OUTSIDE ARE LIKELY TO BE
"After all, who
makes violent revolution inevitable if not those
who make peaceful evolution impossible."
of elite ideology are wrong for modernization.
•Many Elites Are Irrelevant to Their Society's Progress.
•Won't Do Productive Work.
•Avoid All Signs Similar to and Identification with Peasants.
POWER AND AUTHORITY
STRENGTH = THE STRONG GET THEIR WAY BY USING FORCE
POWER AND AUTHORITY ARE RELATIONSHIPS of LEGITIMACY, WITH A MORAL, POLITICAL, SOCIAL, and/or CULTURAL CONTENT
1) POWER = POSSESSION OF CONTROL, AUTHORITY, OR INFLUENCE OVER OTHERS; ABILITY TO ACT OR PRODUCE AN EFFECT; LEGAL OR OFFICIAL AUTHORITY, CAPACITY, OR RIGHT; POLITICAL CONTROL OR INFLUENCE.
2) AUTHORITY = POWER TO INFLUENCE OR COMMAND THOUGHT, OPINION, OR BEHAVIOR; PERSONS IN COMMAND; A GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY; A CONCLUSIVE STATEMENT OR SET OF STATEMENTS; A DECISION TAKEN AS A PRECEDENT.
3) INSTITUTION = A SIGNIFICANT PRACTICE, RELATIONSHIP, OR ORGANIZATION IN SOCIETY OR CULTURE
POWER OF AN INSTITUTION IS THE ABILITY TO INVOKE BINDING OBLIGATIONS, COMMAND AND INFLUENCE, ABILITY TO HAVE YOUR OWN WAY
AUTHORITY IS A SPECIAL
FORM OF POWER
AN INSTITUTIONAL POWER TO INFLUENCE OR COMMAND.
members accept an impersonal process in which binding decisions are made without their direct participation
AUTHORITIES HAVE A LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO USE POWER OR FORCE
CIVIL SOCIETY HAVE SHARED VALUES AND SOCIAL/POLITICAL INTERACTION BASED
ON TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
"in a moral community most of the fundamental questions of how to organize social action have been settled, at least temporarily, and members can therefore get on with the daily business of life"
MILITARY, JOINT CHIEFS, PENTAGON
CONSTITUTION, FRAMERS, FOUNDERS
TRUST OF THE INSTITUTION
LOYALTY TO THE SYSTEM
TYPES OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY
1. • TRADITIONAL
1- TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY: KINGS, CHIEFS, SHAH, SHEIK, POPE, ARISTOCRACY [see patrimonial authority below]
AUTHORITY: LEGALITY OF RULES;
elected & appointed officials within an established selection system.
Power exercised in accord with a legally defined structure towards a publicly acknowledged goal.
Goals are widely accepted.
Structures are accepted as efficient means
strict division betw public "office" and private roles,
in office you are an 'official' accepting the roles and restraints of the office.
Going by the
book, Justice is Blindfolded
Constitution defines legal objectives, structure, framework of legal-rational system; accountability
TYPES OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY [continued]
TRADITIONAL ELITE AUTHORITY
3- PATRIMONIAL AUTHORITY: VESTED IN A PERSON RATHER THAN AN OFFICE, BUT THAT PERSON IS FIRMLY ANCHORED IN A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORDER SUCH AS FEUDALISM or father's authority in family
IS FEUDAL --Somali clan leaders
Those lower down are not subordinates, rather are vassals or retainers
•you exercise authority on behalf of the leader.
•oath of loyalty, kinship ties
•assumes one is superior to those below.
•assume an elite has the capacity to do a job.
WITH VERY AUTHORITARIAN TONES.
Obey Above; Order Below
offensive to place one of lower rank above one of high rank [except when young]
Leader will not consult and share decisions,
--will not delegate,
--intervenes personally in anything in his jurisdiction
--lower won't decide matters belonging to a superior
--independent action is a insult or challenge to boss
Decisions congregate at a high official chosen on basis of assumed ability, who then decides without advice.
But, traditional decisions are your guide.
ANOTHER STRONGMAN IN ZAMBIA
Thursday, May 3, 2001; Page A20
TEN YEARS ago, Zambia's Frederick Chiluba offered Africa a lesson in how to peacefully and democratically depose one of the continent's reining autocrats. Now Mr. Chiluba badly needs a dose of his own medicine. Last weekend the two-term president launched a campaign to change the constitution so that he can serve a third term; since most of the country and even his own ruling political party oppose him, he has quickly resorted to bullying. Three government cabinet members were beaten and another threatened with rape at a party convention Saturday. Now Mr. Chiluba is trying to have a total of 10 cabinet members and 62 members of parliament, including his vice president, expelled so that he can force through the constitutional change.
This coup-in-the-making can still be stopped. Zambia's political elite and its 10 million people learned the downside of one-man rule all too well during the 27 years Kenneth Kaunda ran the country -- which is why they rallied behind Mr. Chiluba when he ran against Mr. Kaunda in 1991. More than 80 of the 158 members of parliament have now signed a petition vowing to oppose Mr. Chiluba's power grab, and students have begun organizing street demonstrations. Western donors, led by the United States, also have leverage, because they provide half of the Zambian government budget. Last week the donor states delivered a letter to Mr. Chiluba asking him to stick to the two-term rule.
At first Mr. Chiluba promised to comply. But evidently his attachment to the power structure he has created is not easy to break. The president won praise and Western support early on, especially after he decided to privatize more than 200 state-owned companies and open Zambia's economy to foreign investment. But privatization led to crony capitalism, as well-connected officials and presidential friends grabbed hold of state companies. Corruption is now widespread. A former labor leader, Mr. Chiluba lives in a palace and wears monogrammed shoes; last year he spent more on building guest villas for an African summit conference than he did on the nation's health system, even though AIDS is ravishing the country.
The United States long tolerated rulers such as Mr. Chiluba in Africa if they were friendly to U.S. foreign policy and business investors. But with the continent facing a health emergency and rapidly falling behind economically, Washington can no longer afford to countenance dictators. The Bush administration should make clear to Mr. Chiluba that, if he remains in power through extra-constitutional or undemocratic means, the flow of aid that has financed his all-too-comfortable presidency will cease.
© 2001 The Washington Post Company
TYPES OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY [continued]
THIRD WORLD STATES ARE NOT FEUDAL
PATRIMONIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN AN APPARENTLY RATIONAL-LEGAL SYSTEM; with politics, bureaucracy, administration.
Authority is maintained thru personal patronage rather than thru ideology or law.
•the 'big man' and his clients.
•external dependence & internal institutional weakness. Fear economic dev which might put resources in hands of rivals
on personal loyalty rather than bureaucratic authority are susceptible
to institutional collapse when patronage resources run out.
•final showdown when can't pay military.
"Neopatrimonial regimes invariably encounter an endemic fiscal crisis because of the abuse of public office for personal gain has a deleterious effect on economic development."
crisis undercuts the capacity of rulers to manage the process of political
•political crisis when unable to pay civil servants.
Neo-patrimonial leaders resort erratically to coercion.
Legitimacy crisis can lead to social protest.
defined powers but use them not as a public service but as private property
•officials are personally subordinate to the leaders; use office to give personal favors
•inability to distinguish betw the private and official
•state is a private instrument of those powerful enough to rule
IN THE PERSONAL MANIPULATIONS OF DICTATOR
MORE LIKELY TO GENERATE BROAD OPPOSITION;
•many groups are exploited and threatened:
•middle class, elites, landlords, business, clerics, professionals
•allows no stable group prerogatives in the polity
•not even for military or middle/upper classes
•monopolize significant sectors of economy
•control flow of ideas and info; schools; press
•use family connections to monopolize govt & business & opportunities
•grant special privileges to foreign capitalists
•blindly serve geopol interests of great powers in exchange for foreign aid [which is stolen rather than reach the people]
•armed forces corrupt
•greater concern with prevent personal overthrow than create effective fighting force
•prevent military - civilian contact [threat of coalitions]
•purge reform-minded officers
military disintegrates at end of regime
CENTRALITY OF THE
The state is itself by far the dominant source of organized power.
the state by any agency external to it is extremely difficult.
•[in a military coup the state is taken over by its officials and servants.]
modern state: there are other prizes beyond the state
•a career in business or industry-walmart, gm, ge, microsoft.
Modern state: there
are countervailing power centers:
•Wall Street, Military-industrial Complex, Unions, Ivory Towers, Hollywood, The Media, Oil, . . .
NIGERIA TO RECOVER $1 BILLION FROM THE FAMILY OF A LATE DICTATOR
By ELIZABETH OLSON April 18, 2002
GENEVA, April 17 -- The family of the late Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha, who has been accused of looting national assets during his military rule, will return $1 billion to Nigeria, the Swiss government said today.
The out-of-court arrangement allows the family to keep $100 million, which the Swiss Federal Office of Justice described as funds "acquired prior to Abacha's term in office and which, according to Nigerian authorities, demonstrably do not derive from criminal acts."
The settlement also requires the Nigerian government to drop some criminal charges against Mr. Abacha's son, Muhammad Sani Abacha, and an associate, Bagudu Abubakar. Nigeria had been seeking to recover as much as $4 billion from Abacha accounts in various European banks.
Other banks that have Abacha accounts -- in Britain, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein and Jersey, in the Channel Islands -- are expected to detail their shares of the settlement soon. Mr. Abacha, who died in office in 1998, and his family and colleagues have been accused of plundering on a grand scale during his five-year rule. In one case, he was accused of stripping $500 million out of a state-owned steel plant. In 1998, Switzerland enacted legislation to quell accusations that its banks were turning a blind eye to deposits of wealth stripped from poor countries.
Switzerland has been repeatedly embarrassed by disclosures that its banks held enormous sums believed to have been looted by dictators and top politicians, among them Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia, Jean-Claude Duvalier of Haiti, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan.
The settlement today does not affect murder charges in Nigeria against Mr. Abacha's son Muhammad, who is in jail in Lagos, where he is undergoing trial.
A NIGERIAN MIRACLE By FLOYD NORRIS April 21, 2002
As a dictator, Sani Abacha got a lot of bad reviews. There was talk of immense brutality and widespread corruption during his tenure running Nigeria from 1993 until his death in 1998. There were charges that Nigeria's oil revenues were diverted to his personal fortune.
Yet perhaps Mr. Abacha, a career military officer, simply missed his calling: his previously untold success as an investor appears to have been truly amazing..
The agreement provides that $1 billion will be returned to the Nigerian government in an implicit admission that there was a lot of corruption. But another $100 million will be kept by Mr. Abacha's family. The Swiss said the funds were "acquired prior to Abacha's term in office" and "according to Nigerian authorities, demonstrably do not derive from criminal acts."
The unanswered question is just how those funds were obtained in ways that "demonstrably do not derive from criminal acts." Mr. Abacha was private about his personal life, but it does not appear he had wealthy parents growing up in the northern Nigerian state of Kano. As for his career, he was commissioned an Army lieutenant in 1963, at the age of 20, and seems to have had no adult employment other than as an officer.
But during the next 30 years he somehow accumulated assets that by now have grown to $100 million. In that period, he participated in three coups, the first in 1983, the second in 1985 and the third -- which put him in power -- in 1993. If one assumes his wealth came from legal activities, that would seem to rule out corruption while he was an Army officer, earning salaries that were not very large.
So how did he do it? If one assumes that he saved $10,000 a year from 1963 until he took control in 1993, and that he invested it so well that it earned 21 percent a year every year, after taxes, then by 1993 his stake would have grown to $21 million. If it kept growing at that rate, by now it would have reached $100 million.
Such performance is not, let it be noted, impossible. Warren E. Buffett took over Berkshire Hathaway in 1965, a couple of years after Mr. Abacha got his commission. Since then, the book value of Berkshire Hathaway has grown at a compound annual rate of over 22 percent, earning Mr. Buffett the sobriquet "Wizard of Omaha."
If only we had known what a great investor Mr. Abacha was, he might have been known as the "Wizard of Kano."
NELSON MANDELA'S GIFTS
June 2, 1999
NELSON MANDELA'S gifts to his country have been many and incomparable: his leadership in the fight against apartheid, his courage in captivity, his forgiveness of his enemies, his dignity and wisdom as president after apartheid. But perhaps no contribution will prove more significant than his willing ceding of power and his deliberate preparation of a new generation to take over. CHARISMATIC LEADERS who can move from revolution to governing are rare enough; those who can do so and then gracefully retire are even rarer.
South Africa today holds its second election in which adults of every race may vote. In the first, five years ago, the African National Congress swept to victory, making Mr. Mandela president. Once again the ANC is favored to win easily. But this time Mr. Mandela, 80, will step aside and his vice president, Thabo Mbeki, 56, is expected to be elected president when the new parliament convenes later this month.
The routinization of democracy is a great accomplishment, but it does not foretell easy times for the next administration. In five years, the Mandela administration posted significant accomplishments, both in reconciliation and in practical matters such as providing water and electricity hookups. But the government fell short in other ways, and inevitably left huge problems.
The ANC's continuing dominance on the political scene also poses a challenge. One-party states inevitably slide toward corruption and arrogance. It is not in the makeup of any party, particularly not one with revolutionary roots, to willingly cede power. But just as Mr. Mandela has set an example by removing himself to his small hometown, so the African National Congress must do what it can to encourage political competition.
The Washington Post Company
TYPES OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY [continued]
5- CHARISMATIC (PERSONAL) AUTHORITY: BASED ON DEVOTION TO THE INDIVIDUAL LEADER AND TO THE NORMATIVE PATTERN HE REVEALS
• very rare. Inherent in a virtuous individual.
•CHARISMATIC LEADERS ARISE OFTEN IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES DUE TO THE WEAKNESS OF THE OTHER TYPES OF AUTHORITY
INITIALLY CONSIDERED IMPORTANT IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES PARTICULARLY AFTER END OF COLONIAL OR NEO-COLONIAL PERIOD
MANY LEADERS WANT TO DEVELOP AN AURA OF CHARISMA
CHARISMA = GIFT
the gift of leadership
CHARISMATIC = ONE
WHO THE PEOPLE ARE DEVOTED TO; WHO THEY WILL FOLLOW.
•DIFFERS FROM OTHER LEADERS IN THAT HE INSPIRES LOYALTY AND DEVOTION.
•REGARDED AS HAVING SUPERNATURAL OR EXTRAORDINARY POWERS
•LARGER THAN LIFE
COLONIAL OR NEO-COLONIAL ERA
[also applies to Soviet and Communist control]
DUAL AUTHORITY SYSTEM:
BOTH TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE COLONIAL-IMPOSED LEGAL AUTHORITY FUNCTION SIDE-BY-SIDE
COLONIAL POWER RULES
THRU THE OLD ELITE.
DEFEATS THEM BUT
DOES NOT DESTROY THEM.
•conquest elites are used to the idea of paying tribute and being obedient to conquerors
COLONY RULED INDIRECTLY THRU OLD ELITE
•old elite seen as "collaborators"
•tradition is weakened because it could not stop exploitation
SYSTEM IS WEAKENED BECAUSE IT IS FOREIGN IMPOSED BY CONQUERORS
•goal of independence struggle is throw out the foreigners;
•that includes their rules & laws & system & institutions
WEAKNESS OF OTHER
SYSTEMS CREATES A GAP
THAT MIGHT BE FILLED BY A CHARISMATIC LEADER;
OR A NEO-PATRIMONIAL LEADER OR BY NO LEADERS
CONDITIONS ARE RIPE FOR DISORDER
NEW INDEPENDENCE ELITE
NOT IN SENSE OF UNFIT,
--but they do not fit in their society
--they bridge between traditional and modern.
OFTEN WESTERN EDUCATED
--do not fit at home & are not fully accepted in the European modern world
--HUMILIATION OF THEIR SOCIETY.
HAVE A DEEP SENSE OF ANGER AT TREATMENT OF THEIR COUNTRY.
•RACISM, DISRESPECT TO THEIR TRADITIONS.
•MANY COLONIES HAVE ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS
LEADERS ARE A PART
OF SMALL GROUP OF MODERNIZING ELITE
--INTELLECTUALS, MILITARY, STUDENTS, PRIESTS
--RISES TO LEADERSHIP OF GROUP
--APPEAL TO PUBLIC AT LARGE
PUBLIC IS SPLIT BETWEEN MODERN AND TRADITIONAL. BOTH FOCUS ON INDEPENDENCE LEADER
COMMON ENEMY APPEAL
--SPECIFIC GRIEVANCES OF EACH GROUP
--ENTIRE POPULATION WANTING A NEW ORDER
COMMON ENEMY IS THE COLONIAL RULER
IN THE WEST:
TRADITIONAL ARISTOCRACIES - THE LANDLORDS VIOLENTLY OVERTHROWN BY RISING BUSINESS ELITES
•Middle Class, Bourgeoisie, Entrepreneurs, Capitalists
•Revolutions; Civil Wars
•1600s to 1800s
A STRONG NATIVE
BUSINESS CLASS DID NOT DEVELOP IN MOST COLONIES
•Exploitation by Imperial Business
•Alien Middle-man Minorities in The Third World;
•The New Modernizing Elite:
•Has a Western Education
•Professional: Law, Medicine, Priest, Military, Labor
HIGH POLITICAL &
PROPAGANDA & MILITARY SKILLS
•Able to Mobilize Masses
•Conduct Guerrilla Warfare
•Lead Strikes & Protests
LACK TRAINING IN
•WEAK EXECUTIVE ABILITIES
TO TAKE POWER THAN TO USE IT
•Politics Centers on Power And Personality Rather Than National Policy
THIRD WORLD STATE is FRAGILE. POWER with FRAGILE ROOTS
-VERY WEAK LEGITIMACY for the government
-LACK OF ORGANIC UNITY OR SHARED VALUES BETW STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY
-LACKS PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS.
Military Councils or Junta,
Representation of The Principal Branches of The Military
--LIBERATION OR INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE
OPEN CONTROL - GENERALS & JUNTAS
MASKED CONTROL -
•"CIVILIAN" LEADER [PRESIDENT] IS EX-GENERAL or
•CIVILIANS RULE AT MILITARY "PLEASURE"
MILITARY ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICS
Emphasis on Obediance, Esprit Des Corps, Discipline, Efficiency, Honesty And National Unity.
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT POLITICS
THE THEORY OF RIGHT ORDERS:
•objective to be achieved is clear and generally agreed
•structure responsible for carrying out orders is disciplined and efficient
•objective is within the structure's capacity to achieve
FIX THINGS BY GIVING THE RIGHT ORDERS.
[unlike politicians, generals are not used to selling ideas & programs to other politicians, the public, media, other countries.]
"THE CLASS OF 19__"
Tendency of military hierarchies to fall into GENERATIONAL SETS.
GENERATIONS DIFFER BY
Prewar, Wartime, Post-war
Colonial, Post-colonial, Liberation, Independence.
HUNTINGTON'S CATEGORIES OF COUPS:
COUP: Junior Officers & NCOs Frustrated by Rule by 'An Outmoded And
Ineffective Traditional Elite'
•New Bureaucratic Elite With Focus on Rapid Modernization
•Radical Regime Confident of Its Legitimacy
(2) 'GUARDIAN' COUP:
HIGHER RANKS=LESS RADICAL CHANGE
•To Maintain Public
No Shift in Structure
•One Ethnic Group Replaces Another,
•One Military Group Replaces Another.
•Reacts Against Predecessor's Policies.
• Same as Prior Govt, Only Better.
• 'Corrective Govt:' Cleanups And Cures.
(3) 'VETO' COUP: [SENIOR OFFICERS]
COUP VETOES MASS
PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL MOBILIZATION FAVORING DRASTIC SOCIAL CHANGE
•Has to Confront And Suppress Large-scale And Broadly-based Opposition.
•Repressive And Bloody.
PAKISTAN'S GENERALS DO IT BY THE BOOK October 13, 1999
It was, according to the experts, a "textbook coup d'état".
Within minutes of General Pervez Musharraf being dismissed as chief of Pakistan's military, his troops had launched their takeover.
As with any coup, their aim was to seize power suddenly, forcibly and illegally from the existing civilian government.
No mean task in Pakistan, a country with a population of 140 million and a democratically elected prime minister.
But, coups have been common in Pakistan. Planning for them forms part of the military's "institutional memory".
It might be summarised in the following steps:
Seize the political leader you plan to depose
Take control of main government offices and other senior politicians
Seize control of public communications channels - television, radio, telephone networks and, now, the Internet
Shut down all ports, airport and land borders
Deploy troops on the streets
Close the banks
Capturing the political
leader usually means surrounding his home with firepower and putting him
under house arrest, says Mr Smith.
"Killing him might make a martyr of him and you don't want to parade him though the streets and make a spectacle of him."
Taking control of the television output is not an act of supreme vanity on behalf of the incoming military ruler, rather an established tactic for stemming dissent. The idea is to strip the opposition of any means of organising a counter-attack.
"There's going to be opposition to the new regime, so you remove the opposition's ability to communicate, which inevitably falls to the TV or radio, or telephone," "It enables you to tell your story and means that no one else can tell theirs."
In getting their message across, Pakistan's military masters fell back on the classic ploy of casting themselves as a praetorian guard. Their aim - to portray themselves as sole defenders of the nation's interests rather than power-crazed despots.
In Pakistan, officers also shut down all mobile telephone networks since poor landlines there mean cellphones are de rigeur among the rich and powerful.
Coup by the Book p. 2
The evening timing
of the Pakistan coup was also a calculated move. "By that time everybody
has gone home. It's very difficult to get crowds on the streets to protest
against you . "You consolidate power overnight so that when people wake
up in the morning, they wake up to a fait accompli."
Sealing airports, ports and cross-border road links is crucial in order to prevent opponents from leaving the country and forming a government in exile.
"It also stops foreign corespondents from getting in,"
Given the constant threat of hostile opposition taking to the streets, the need for a visible military presence would seem clearly apparent. However, reports from Pakistan on Wednesday reveal a notable lack of soldiers in the open. But again, this is all part of protocol, says Mr Heyman.
"What you want to avoid is exhausting your soldiers in the early hours. But you have a large number of soldiers close so that if trouble stirs you can deploy them in a hurry."
The final step in this first wave of action comes the following morning, when the coup leaders will order the closure of all banks.
The aim is to prevent bankrupting the country through an immediate outflow of foreign currency. When the banks do reopen, says Mr Smith, it will be made very hard for investors to withdraw their capital.
The actual transfer of constitutional power is most likely done through declaring a state of emergency, which tends to suspend the everyday laws of government.
But even with all these bases covered, a successful coup is not necessarily a done deed. It is often said, though not always true, that while the army may have a monopoly on force, it also has to act in the people's interests.
Initially, it seems, this may be the Pakistani generals' trump card.
- ELITE & ARISTOCRATIC HERITAGE
SOMETIMES - PROGRESSIVE, DYNAMIC, RADICAL
IN ALL COUNTRIES - OFTEN INACTIVE, INCOMPETENT, CORRUPT
1- HERITAGE OF COLONIAL
Well-trained During Colonial Period, But Brutal Towards Own People
Old Elite Military Tradition & Collaboration
2- GENEROUS, AMPLE
Gov'ts Afraid to Cut Military Budget
3- EASIER TO CREATE
"MODERN" ARMY IN A TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY THAN TO CREATE OTHER MODERN INSTITUTIONS
ROUTINE & RITUAL FIT TRADITION
HIERARCHY & TRADITION
1. Impatient W. Civilians
2. Power Hungry, $$$ Greedy
3. Resist Change,
4. Chaos, Vacuum - Military May Be Only Effective Group That Can Hold Power