Relationships and Processes
States/Weak States/Sovereignty/Blood 13-47
Just War/War Crimes/Genocide 48-94
Human Aggression 95-131
Ethnic Conflict/Nationalism 155-184
Revolution/Internal Conflict 185-233
U.N./Peacekeeping/Humanitarian Intervention 247-259
Nuclear Weapons/Weapons of Mass Destruction 260-268
Kagan: article and Asmus & Pollack article 269-295
Walzer Man, the State and War
MAN - HUMAN NATURE
- Lorenz, Freud
RELIGION - Christianity, human nature is not basically good, original sin
THE STATE - DEMOCRACY
TROUBLEMAKERS - Wall St, CIA, Merchants of Death, Mil-Ind Complex.
THE SYSTEM - SOVEREIGNTY
BALANCE OF POWER
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
ALWAYS PRESENT, DOES NOT EXPLAIN WAR
PRINCIPLE OF SELF-HELP
ONE OF THE BASIC RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN HOSTILE STATES IS THE THREATENED USE OF FORCE
THE BEHAVIOR OF
STATES IS REGULATED BY THE THREAT OF THE USE OF FORCE
PRINCIPLES FOR USE OF MILITARY
1. COMBAT FORCES ONLY AS A LAST RESORT
2. SELECTIVE. not engaged in every one of the world's conflicts.
3. NATIONAL INTEREST. threat to our interests. vital to our national interest
4. CLEAR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES. clearly defined mission. clear political strategy along with a military strategy. clearly defined political and military objectives.
5. OVERWHELMING FORCE. forces commensurate with the objectives. resources available.
6. PLAY TO WIN. clear intention of winning. likelihood of success.
7. AVOID OPEN-ENDED MISSIONS. know how to get out. exit point identified. endgame.
8. PUBLIC SUPPORT. support of the American people and Congress. clear expression of support from Congress.
about slippery slope; mission creep; quagmires; body bags; an obsession
with mission security; avoidance of casualties; deadlines; avoiding a fuzzy
LESSONS OF VIETNAM
•Endgame; know how to get out.
•Multilateral action - do it through the UN, spread the risks and responsibilities.
•Avoid use of US ground troops in warlike conditions. Lesson of both Vietnam and Lebanon. Can use in Kuwait when goal is clear and overwhelming force can be used.
•Clear goals and objectives. What is force expected to do.
•No more 'old college
try.' Only play to win. Doubtful validity in the PCWE; we can afford half-measures
14 April 1988 - NYT - Weinberger's six criteria for applying military power.
• troops should be committed only when "vital to our national interest"
•and "with the clear intention of winning."
•the US "should have clearly defined political and military objectives"
•and the forces must be commensurate with those objectives
•"There must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress" [there are times when you have to move military forces in advance of public support.]
•Finally, combat forces should be used only as a last resort.
the United States should never commit forces unless our vital national
interest is at stake, and then only with the clear intention of winning.
The undertaking must have the support of the American people and Congress
and even then force should always be the last resort.
9/28/93 nyt - "Clinton, at UN, Lists Stiff Terms for Sending U.S. Force to Bosnia."
Clinton foreign policy and UN speech: 'vision' of PCWE foreign policy: policy of enlargement of the family of free-market democracies. American predominance and leadership. But in practice a minimalist policy of self-containment, involved only in crises that are containable, manageable, cheap and closed-ended, except in cases of mortal threats to American security. [Ambivalence in public and Congressional moods - a handful of casualties in Somalia leads to reexamination]
•the UN has to be much more selective about where it sends such peacekeeping troops in the future and define more clearly its mission in the post-cold war world - is there a real threat to international peace? does the proposed mission have clear objectives?
• how much will the mission cost?
• the UN has to avoid open-ended missions, clear timetable for first review, can an exit point be identified?
• a clear understanding about command and control, establish a c&c center at hq to keep track of 80,000 troops in 17 ops on 4 continents [PK grew in 5 years from 10 to 80,000 from $300m to $3b.
• the right to terminate American involvement [Eagleburger - "a clear exit point ... is like telling all the parties in advance that when our people get killed, we will leave. . . . It invites attack."
• a clear political strategy along with a military strategy
• a clear expression of support from the US Congress.
"The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts. If the American people are to say yes to UN peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no."
George Kennan, "Somalia, Through a Glass Darkly," NYT 30 Sept 93. 1992 diary entry when Bush sent troops to Somalia. "Why is our action undesirable?"
• treats only
a limited and short-term aspect of what is really a much wider and deeper
•Highly doubtful and uncertain we can just deliver the food, withdraw, and then leave it to the UN to takeover.
•root of situation
is people of Somalia wholly unable to govern themselves.
•If we withdraw these determining conditions will remain exactly as they were before.
•dreadful situation cannot be put to rights other than by establishing a governing power, a ruthless one, nondemocratic.
expensive effort, gives Bush halo of glory, "
•no defensive American interest is involved."
•No prior discussion, no preparation of the public.
of emotional reaction to suffering shown by the media
[Almond] AMERICA HAS A MOODY FOREIGN POLICY
SPLIT AND SWINGING BETWEEN TWO POLES:
1. ISOLATION, WITHDRAWAL
2. INTERVENTION, INVOLVEMENT, CRUSADE
found League of Nations, then don't join.
•20 years in Vietnam, sign Paris Peace accords 1973, abandon 1975
•Lebanon 1982, save, bombed, withdraw
•Somalia 1992, save, 18 marines die, withdraw
Apathy and isolation;
Followed by intervention;
Followed by disenchantment;
Followed by apathy
U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARDS
NATIONAL POWER & NATIONAL INTERESTS
1- DEPRECATE [DOWNPLAY]
ROLE OF POWER POLITICS
BELIEVE: WAR IS ABNORMAL AND AVOIDABLE
WAR IS DUE TO MISUNDERSTANDINGS
END WARS QUICKLY
US is multiethnic society--hard for us to comprehend level of ethnic hatred in other societies
a. DEMOCRACY - PEOPLE
ARE MORAL & RATIONAL; SETTLE DISPUTES PEACEFULLY
unable to see others point of view
b. HISTORY - INEXPERIENCE
c. ONE CLASS SOCIETY - FEW SHARP CONFLICTS
d. ECONOMICS - MATERIALISM IS FIRST
e. IGNORANT OF OTHER COUNTRIES - LACK HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE & PERSPECTIVE
U.S. WAR A MISTAKE - not involved for vital interests
PEARL HARBOR, HIROSHIMA A-BOMB
TRICKED BY EVIL
National security council
2- PREFERENCE FOR FRONTAL ASSAULTS, CRUSADE, MISSION
RELIGIOUS AND MORAL OVERTONES
"CONTRAS ARE MORAL EQUIVALENT OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS"
MORALISM LEADS TO
--difficult to fight limited wars
--the good & just & powerful should win
--hunt for scapegoats & traitors
5- RELUCTANT LEADER
GREAT RISKS, NO
UNITED NATIONS AND AGGRESSION
CHARTER 2(4) - all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.
1970 - EVERY STATE HAS A DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM ORGANIZING OR ENCOURAGING THE ORGANIZATION OF IRREGULAR FORCES OR ARMED BANDS, INCLUDING MERCENARIES, FOR INCURSION INTO THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE
DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM ORGANIZING, INSTIGATING, ASSISTING OR PARTICIPATING IN ACTS OF CIVIL STRIFE OR TERRORIST ACTS IN ANOTHER STATE
OR ACQUIESCING IN
ORGANIZED ACTIVITIES WITHIN ITS TERRITORY DIRECTED [AT ANOTHER STATE]
1974 UN DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION; LOOPHOLE:
NOTHING IN THIS DEFINITION COULD IN ANY WAY PREJUDICE
THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE OF PEOPLES FORCIBLY DEPRIVED OF THAT RIGHT,
PARTICULARLY PEOPLES UNDER COLONIAL AND RACIST REGIMES OR OTHER FORMS OF ALIEN DOMINATION;
NOR THE RIGHT OF
THESE PEOPLE TO STRUGGLE TO THAT END AND TO SEEK AND RECEIVE SUPPORT, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER."
AGGRESSION - THE USE OF FORCE OR THREAT OF FORCE AGAINST ANOTHER STATE'S RIGHTS.
STATUS QUO - between hostile states there is a mutually perceptible distribution of rights over which war may be provoked.
"Ours" - "Theirs"
"Not ours" - "Not theirs"
MUTUALLY PERCEPTIBLE - states know what other states possess and control.
POSSESSION AND CONTROL IS A THRESHOLD OVER WHICH WAR MAY BE PROVOKED.
AGGRESSION: AN ATTEMPT TO VIOLATE THE STATUS QUO, TO TAKE WHAT IS THEIRS.
DEFENSE: UPHOLDING THE STATUS QUO, PROTECTING WHAT IS OURS.
APPEASEMENT: LETTING THEM TAKE WHAT IS OURS.
Violations of the
status quo are
Causes of war. [causus belli]
State's rights become
mutually perceptible thru:
(1) POSSESSION AND USAGE.
TERRITORY is the
basis of the status quo.
A clear threshold.
STATUS QUO APPEASEMENT:
Letting them take what is ours.
APPEASEMENT was seen as a "policy of being conciliatory in the face of justified demands."
APPEASEMENT "To buy off [an aggressor] by concessions usually at the sacrifice of principles"
to gain goodwill by pleasing acts; to make compatible; to become friendly
PACIFY: to allay the anger or agitation of; to restore to a tranquil state; to reduce to a submissive state; subdue.
RULES OF THE STATUS QUO
(1) IMMEDIATE REACTION - counter violations immediately or lose your rights. [but you can lie]
- react by violating their status quo
[two wrongs do make a right]
Reprisals must be proportionate & in the same geographic area.
(4) ALLIANCE RESPONSIBILITY
- [Great] powers are responsible for the acts of their allies because they
back them up.
SUBJECTIVE STANDARDS ARE NOT PART OF THE STATUS QUO
1- MORALITY AND JUSTICE
2- NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC RIGHTS
4- HOW THE STATUS QUO CAME ABOUT
Robert McNamera, "ONE MINUTE TO DOOMSDAY," NYT. Oct 1962 Cuban missile crisis. PCWE-- meetings of decision-makers.
DECISION-MAKING DISTORTED BY MISINFORMATION, MISCALCULATION AND MISJUDGEMENT.
1. SOVIETS AND CUBANS
BELIEVED US INTENDED TO INVADE
we had no such intention.
2. THE US BELIEVED
THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT MOVE NUCLEAR WARHEADS OUT OF THEIR TERRITORY
they never had before, but they did.
3. THE SOVIETS BELIEVED THEY COULD DO IT SECRETLY, DISCLOSE IT AND US WOULD NOT RESPOND.
4. THOSE WHO URGED JFK TO ATTACK MISSILES BY AIR, PERHAPS FOLLOWED BY INVASION, BELIEVED THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT RESPOND, ALMOST CERTAINLY WRONG.
LESSON: Crisis management
of high tech weapons is difficult, dangerous and uncertain; so avoid crises.
link to Prof.
Stein's home page
link to ISS 325 War and Revolution syllabus email@example.com