(1)a.  " xyz [persuade (x, y, z) -> decide (y, z)]
b.  " xy [decide (x, y) -> intend (x, y)]
On the other hand for the word cat the issue is exactly whether or not it can be adequately decomposed into components, one of which is animal, or whether the meaning postulate in (2) belongs to the semantics of English.
(2)  " x [cat (x) -> animal (x)]
So we have an evident contrast between persuade, which seems clearly to enjoy semantic relations with other words of English, whether via semantic components or meaning postulates, and cat, for which the case is not so clear.
The first two thirds of Quine's classic paper 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' explores various explicational cul-de-sacs (meaning, synonymy, definition, 'semantical rules') en route to his conclusion that analyticity is not a notion which can be clarified to his satisfaction. The examples most often chosen by Quine to illustrate this futile path use the word bachelor, e.g. No bachelor is married (p. 23), All and only bachelors are unmarried men (p. 29). Although not a relational term or a verb, bachelor has often been the prototype of words with a comfortably tidy analysis into semantic components (human, adult, male, not married) or for which uncontroversial meaning postulates, as in (3), can easily be devised.
(3)  " x [bachelor (x) -> ¬married (x)]
Given that 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' is universally acknowledged as the most forceful statement opposing the analytic/synthetic distinction, the suggestion of Chomsky's bolded in the opening quotation would seem to be simply wrong. However there is more to the matter than this.
The main issue is whether there are analytic sentences or not. In his classic paper Quine pursued three lines of argument to the effect that there are not. The first line was that alluded to above, in which Quine tracked successive analyses of the notion of analyticity, only to observe that each time the analysis crucially included notions like meaning, synonymy, or necessary truth, which were themselves equally problematic from his point of view. This is not a demonstrative argument against the existence of analytic sentences, but only an argument that the concept of analyticity is as unclear as the other concepts. One who found the other concepts relatively clear would not be persuaded by this line.
For a moment we will skip from Quine's first argument to his third, which requires a bit of background. Reductionism, part of the then widely received verificationist theory of meaning, was the other dogma of empiricism which Quine was determined to defeat in 'Two Dogmas'. Reductionism is 'the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience' (Quine 1953, 20). In the last two sections of his paper Quine brought the two dogmas together and asserted that they 'are, indeed, at root identical' (p. 41). The idea is that both dogmas require that the truth of statements be divisible into a linguistic portion (the meaning, which states the experiences necessary to confirm or disconfirm the statement) and a factual portion (the confirmatory experiences). But this analysis of a single statement in isolation from all others was inconsistent with Quine's holistic view of knowledge and belief -- his confirmation holism; and assertion of the latter constituted Quine's third line of argument against analyticity. '[O]ur statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body' (Quine 1953, 41).
This argument against analyticity, unlike the first one, is intended to be demonstrative. However, also unlike the first one, this argument depends on a particular view of what meaning is. Here we see that Quine is not opposed to the essence of verificationism, the idea that meaningfulness consists in being subject to confirmation or disconfirmation on the basis of experience, but only its application to language sentence by sentence. Indeed, a broadly verificationist view of meaning is necessary to making this argument at all, since only then would we get the necessary conflict between confirmation holism and sentence meaning. One opposed to verificationism in all its forms would not be convinced by this argument.
In laying out the first and third lines of argument against analyticity Quine moves from the point of view of a myopic bookkeeper to that of God. Wedged between the two, and visible only for a brief moment, we see Quine as an ordinary human being.
I believe that it is significant that when Quine slips into the position of the ordinary human being who is genuinely puzzled about meaning, a position which could perhaps have the most force with the most readers, he switches examples. Green is a word that seems to be more like cat than it is like bachelor or persuade in the relevant respects. For one thing, it is an observational term, whose denotation would typically be learned by ostension rather than explanation. So it seems that Chomsky may be right, that attention to the difficult cases may have carried more weight in the argument against analyticity than it should have.
If we could give a good account of Quine's green example perhaps we could (hypothetically of course) convince him that there really are analytic sentences. That is too much to attempt for this paper, but a few things can be mentioned briefly. One is that color words were included among the natural kind terms argued by Kripke (1972, 1980) to be nondescriptional -- that is to have their reference secured without the mediation of something like a Fregean sense. Such words -- green, cat, gold -- denote things of a kind that exist in nature but whose real essence has historically been unknown to speakers of languages. It happens to be typical of such terms that some properties may hold necessarily of their referents, without nevertheless constituting a part of their meaning. Thus Cats are animals was argued by Kripke to state a metaphysically necessary truth, but not an analytic one. One who thought that the notions of necessity and analyticity were roughly coextensive, such as the author of Quine 1953 appears to be, might well be puzzled over such examples.
Everything green is extended strikes my intuitions as being like Cats are animals in stating a necessary synthetic truth. On the other hand it is difficult to put through the same kinds of thought experiments that Kripke used for Cats are animals; it is easier to imagine discovering that cats are actually mechanical creatures than discovering that the green things which we thought were extended actually are not. Whatever the upshot of these cases (which I have argued elsewhere are relatively rare (Abbott 1989)), Chomsky's point remains. Hard cases make bad law.
[*] I am very much indebted to Gene Cline, Rich Hall, Larry Hauser, Myles McNally, Paul Rusnock, and Carol Slater for reading an earlier draft and providing me with many helpful comments which have substantially improved this paper.
 Perhaps I should explain these square brackets. This passage which I am quoting comes from lectures originally presented to a Spanish-speaking audience. I have replaced Chomsky's Spanish language examples with the corresponding English words. The square brackets above in the third line of the quote are because of a misprint in the original.
 In getting clearer on Quine's argument here I am indebted to Chapter 2 of Fodor & Lepore 1992. Boghossian 1997 has also been a useful source on Quine and analyticity.
 This achievement is hypothetical for several reasons, one of which is the fact that Quine has already admitted the existence of analytic sentences (see e.g. Quine 1974, 78-80).
 The term 'nondescriptional' in this sense was introduced in Salmon 1981.
 This example (Cats are animals) had appeared earlier in Putnam 1962 but Putnam's views on it are slightly different from Kripke's. See the discussion in Kripke 1972, 1980, 122-6.
 But cf. Quine's careful statements concerning the relation between analyticity and necessity on pp. 29-30 of 'Two dogmas'. I am grateful to Rich Hall for pointing these out to me.
 There is widespread disagreement over the extent of nondescriptionality in the lexicon of a typical language. This issue bears a close relation to the question of the existence of analytic sentences, and one which needs to be looked into.
Boghossian, Paul Artin. 1997. Analyticity. In Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, eds., A companion to the philosophy of language, Oxford: Blackwell, 331-68.
Chomsky, Noam. 1988. Language and problems of knowledge: The Managua lectures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry & Ernest Lepore. 1992. Holism: A shopper's guide. Oxford: Blackwell.
Grice, H. Paul & P.F. Strawson. 1956. In defense of a dogma. The Philosophical Review 65:2, 141-58. Reference is to the reprint in Jay F. Rosenberg & Charles Travis, eds., 1971, Readings in the philosophy of language, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 81-94.
Kripke, Saul A. 1972, 1980. Naming and necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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Quine, W.V. 1953. Two dogmas of empiricism. In From a logical point of view, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 20-46.
Quine, W.V. 1974. The roots of reference. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Salmon, Nathan U. 1981. Reference and essence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.