Continuity and Change in Support for Civil Liberties
After 9/11: Results of a Panel Study

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Abstract

This paper examines the durability of people’s willingness to trade off civil liberties for personal security a year and a half after the terrorist attacks on America. We argue that with the diminishing threat of terrorism, and an expected consequent retreat of patriotism and trust in government, citizens should have less reason to be concerned about their personal security than initially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, using a panel design in which respondents in a national survey conducted several months after the terrorist attacks were reinterviewed in 2003, we find that the support for civil liberties did not change very much a year later. Furthermore, the relationships between the support for civil liberties and several other attitudes and background factors have also scarcely changed. These results suggest that Americans are not ready to bury their fears of terrorism or to diminish their readiness to entrust the government with the power to conduct greater surveillance and aggressively pursue potential terrorists, even though they acknowledge some loss of personal liberty.
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As a result of the intense emotional reaction to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, there has been much speculation about how lasting the effects would be on citizens’ beliefs about security and civil liberties. With increases in trust in government, patriotism, charitable giving, religiosity, and social solidarity, American society has been said to be fundamentally altered by the events of 9/11. While American citizens possess a strong commitment to democratic freedoms in the abstract, they were forced to weigh them in balance against the need for national and personal security. According to several national surveys, a majority of the people were willing to concede many of their civil liberties for the sake of greater safety and security after the terrorist attacks. In our own survey conducted in the months after 9/11, a slight majority favored civil liberties over greater security.

While the willingness of many Americans to trade civil liberties for greater security was perhaps not surprising in the immediate wake of the terrorist attacks, if citizens continued to make such concessions a year and a half after the attacks it would denote a fundamental change in popular beliefs. However, if the willingness to trade civil liberties for security proved to be temporary and subsided with a diminishing sense of threat, then popular support for democracy could be said to be strong.

The central issue addressed in this study is: To what extent have people changed their willingness to trade off civil liberties for security between late 2001 and early 2003? To answer this question we examine the results of a two-wave nationwide random sample survey. The first wave

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1 See, for example, the Washington Post poll of September 25-27, 2001, in which between 75 and 95 percent of Americans said they would support several strong measures involving increased electronic surveillance, sharing of grand jury information with the CIA and security agencies, indefinite detention of foreigners who are suspected of supporting terrorism, and other measures: http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data092801.htm. In a later poll, two-thirds of Americans favored requiring national identity cards (http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data110701.htm).
was conducted between mid-November 2001 and mid-January 2002; the second wave between the end of January and the end of May 2003. We use both a panel, in which respondents from the first wave were reinterviewed in the second, and a control group who were interviewed only in the second wave. This allows us to examine how opinions changed both at the individual level and in the aggregate. In addition, comparing the second-wave results between the panel and the control group allows us to check for “testing effects” on responses caused by the first wave interviews.

Main Findings in the First Wave

Given the framing of the situation as one in which the government sought concessions of civil liberties in order to provide greater security against the terrorist threat, the test of citizens’ commitment to democratic norms after 9/11 was whether they sought to preserve their civil liberties or instead ceded them to the government. Unlike studies of political tolerance, in which the test is typically framed as whether citizens will tolerate the actions of a particular disliked group (such as the KKK holding a public rally), in our study the question is whether people are willing to cede rights to the government in order to gain greater security. Although the terrorists themselves posed a grave threat and inspired a sense of fear, the government also challenged the democratic resolve of its citizens by seeking increased authority to conduct searches, surveillance, preventive detentions, and other potential restrictions on individual rights.

Our first wave survey captured many aspects of the conflict between the need for security and support for civil liberties. We posed a series of questions that asked respondents to choose between a pro-civil liberties and a pro-security option. The format is reflected in the first, and most general, question:

CL1. Next I am going to read you a series of two statements. Please tell me which one you agree with most. The first is, in order to curb terrorism in this country, it will be necessary to give up some civil liberties. -or- We should preserve our freedoms above all, even if there remains some risk of terrorism?
Responses to our civil liberties questions provided insight into the support for civil liberties and how individuals react when the country is threatened. Overall, 55 percent of the respondents supported the civil liberties position in response to the first question (CL1). But the willingness to trade liberty for security varied with the issue (see the appendix for question wording). When the value trade-off was framed as the need to be safe and secure vs. judging people guilty by association – “people who belong to or associate with terrorist organizations should be considered a terrorist” (CL4) – 72 percent supported treating people as guilty based on such associations. Other applications of the value trade-offs revealed a similar but lesser willingness to concede civil liberties for personal security. Sixty-two percent thought that high school teachers should not criticize U.S. anti-terrorism policy but should instead promote loyalty to the country (CL7). In a trade-off involving the right to privacy, 54 percent supported requiring national identity cards (CL2).

While majorities of Americans were willing to concede certain civil liberties and freedoms, majorities also favored safeguarding certain others. In a *habeas corpus* issue framed as the government’s detention of non-citizens suspected of belonging to a terrorist organization indefinitely without formally charging them with a crime, 51 percent supported the civil libertarian position (CL5). In a trade-off of the right to privacy by allowing increased monitoring of telephone conversations and e-mail communications, 65 percent took the pro-civil liberties position (CL9). In a trade-off of Fourth Amendment rights by allowing law enforcement to conduct a warrantless search of a residence on suspicion that terrorist acts are being planned there, 75 percent gave a pro-civil liberties response (CL8). When the right to privacy issue was framed as racial profiling – the ability to stop and detain people of certain racial or ethnic backgrounds because they are thought to be more likely to commit crimes – 82 percent preferred to protect civil liberties (CL6). The greatest support for civil liberties – 90 percent – was found when the exchange involved freedom of speech and assembly, framed as whether non-violent protesters against the U.S. government should be investigated (CL10).
Our analysis of why citizens were willing to trade off certain civil liberties for greater security showed that the sense of threat and the level of trust in government interact with one another to determine the level of support for civil liberties over security (Davis and Silver 2004). The effect of trust in the federal government on support for civil liberties was conditioned by a sense of sociotropic threat – concern that the country will come under another terrorist attack – as well as personal threat. However, at every level of trust in the federal government, increased sense of threat led to greater willingness to concede some civil liberties in favor of security. And at every level of perceived threat of terrorism, the greater people’s trust in the government the more willing they were to concede some civil liberties for security.

Attitudinal measures also mattered. Political conservatives and those with greater national pride were also more willing to concede some liberties for the sake of greater security. In terms of a psychological response to the terrorist attacks, we found that high levels of dogmatism were associated with a greater concern for personal security.

Race was also an important determinant of the trade-off between civil liberties and personal security. African Americans were less willing to concede civil liberties for greater personal security than whites and Latinos. African Americans were more of supportive of civil liberties than whites and Latinos at every level of threat.

**Explanations of Change in Civil Liberties Responses**

In the absence of another major event like the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil, there are reasons to expect an increase in support for civil liberties between our first and second wave surveys. This increase could be related to a diminished perception of threat, perhaps because of the government’s success in preventing another attack. Or it could occur because of a dissipation of the surge in patriotism and trust in the government that occurred in the emotional environment in the weeks and months immediate after the 9/11 attack (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). Support for civil liberties
might also increase if people perceive negative consequences of trading off civil liberties for personal security.

Because of the central importance of the sense of threat and the level of trust in government to the willingness to trade civil liberties for security that we observed in our first wave survey, we focus here on three factors that could account for changing levels of support for the willingness to exchange civil liberties for greater security: perceptions of security and threat, trust in the government, and measurement error.

**Perceptions of Greater Security?**

In the 15 months between the first and second rounds of the Civil Liberties Survey, not only did the war on terrorism proceed both in the U.S. and abroad, but people had an opportunity to distance themselves from the immediate post-9/11 period. No major terrorist attacks occurred inside the U.S. after 9/11. There was no recurrence of the anthrax murders.

Governments at all levels developed “homeland defense” departments and programs. The federal Department of Homeland Security was officially inaugurated in January 2003. New investigative and preventive procedures allowed law enforcement agencies to expand their surveillance. Several individuals, groups or “sleeper cells” in the U.S. were identified and in some cases prosecuted and convicted, including the so-called “Lackawanna 6” and the “Portland 7.” Immigration and visa regulations were toughened. A new system of airport security was implemented.

By early 2003, all of these events and measures may have given Americans a stronger sense of security from terror than they had shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Furthermore, people could well have perceived that it was the strong antiterrorist measures that the government had taken that accounted for the diminished immediate threat. If so, then people might continue to be willing to sacrifice some of their civil liberties to the government in exchange for greater security.
In our research based on the first wave survey, on the other hand, we found signs that initial preferences for personal security over civil liberties may be slow to dissipate. For citizens to deactivate their sense of threat and fear may not be easy to do (LeDoux 1996). The images of airplanes crashing into buildings may have been indelibly imprinted on people’s minds. Furthermore, threat and fear were not experienced only vicariously or at a great distance; rather the attacks occurred on American soil and thousands of innocent citizens were killed. Subsequent anthrax deaths in fall 2001 created widespread concern about bioterrorism and risks associated with such normally mundane activities as opening the daily mail. Hence, unlike most other war-type situations Americans have faced, the context created a greater opportunity for threat to be personalized (Davis and Silver 2003a).

Even in early 2003, emotional reactions to threat might still lead to substantial support for personal security and the government’s efforts to reduce the risk of future terrorist attacks. That threat tends to increase support for restrictions on civil rights and liberties is a consistent finding in the literature on political tolerance. Nonetheless, we expected that on the whole the initial sense of threat would decline over time. And we therefore also expected that support for limiting civil liberties would also decline.

As we shall show, on average people did not feel less concerned about the threat of terrorism in the second wave survey than they did in the first. While in principle this could lead some people to question the need to give up rights for security in practice it likely means that most people have come to accept the federal government’s efforts to combat terrorism.

Declining Trust in the Government?

The immediate “rally effect” after the 9/11 attack on America raised people’s sense of national pride and patriotism and their trust in government (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). If these levels have declined since then, however, then we might expect people to be more reluctant to cede liberties to the government. Revelations of missed signals or of a lack of coordination by federal law
enforcement and security agencies prior to 9/11 began to come out in the spring of 2002, and have occurred episodically thereafter. These may have caused greater concern among citizens that law enforcement and anti-terrorist agencies do not deserve full public confidence. Even with the creation of a terrorism warning system and the Department of Homeland Security, Americans may have had less reason to feel confident about security from terrorism and the competence of agencies designed to protect it.

At the same time that the security and law enforcement regimes changed, the civil liberties regime itself also changed. Although some proposed government anti-terrorism programs were abandoned or not implemented, such as the TIPS program designed to place service personnel such as meter readers and cable installers on the look-out for terrorists in our neighborhoods, federal prosecutors and investigative agencies aggressively applied new and existing tools to prevent terrorism or to pursue organizations and individuals who were alleged to have financial or other ties to international terrorist organizations. In the interval between our two surveys, some charitable organizations with apparent ties to terrorist organizations in the Middle East were shut down or had their funds frozen. Public libraries and bookstores were required by law to provide the FBI with access to records containing the names of patrons who have checked out or purchased certain items, while forbidding the librarians or store owners to reveal to the patrons that their records have been examined. This stimulated a vigorous protest from the American Library Association and civil liberties advocates.  

In addition, a series of court cases, especially at the federal level, backed up provisions of the Patriot Act that give law enforcement agencies greater powers of surveillance as well as the ability to use extant executive powers to detain noncitizens (and hold their names from the public) and to deny legal counsel to citizens and noncitizens alike who are accused of being “enemy combatants.” Such

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measures, as well as the creation (but not yet the use) of military tribunals outside the U.S. court system, alarmed civil libertarians. Several dozen U.S. cities and communities also declared their opposition to the Patriot Act. A scheme devised in the Pentagon to dredge through massive amounts of electronic records of private citizens in search of patterns that might identify terrorists – the Total Information Awareness (TIA) Program, later renamed the Terrorist Information Awareness Program before apparently being abandoned in summer 2003 – may also have raised people’s concerns about privacy. While nothing akin to 1950’s style witch hunts have occurred, it is nonetheless possible that many Americans would feel less favorably disposed to ceding some of their civil liberties to support the government’s efforts to pursue potential terrorists than they were in fall 2001.

After our second wave survey was completed in May 2003 there was increased discussion in the popular media, as well as in some government circles, of revising or even revoking certain provisions of the U.S.A. Patriot Act. The U.S. Attorney General also launched a public speaking campaign, and a new website, to defend the Patriot Act. But these events were not common topics of discussion when our second wave survey was in the field earlier in 2003. Thus, readers should be careful not to project the mood and discussions that occurred later to the period when our second wave survey was in the field from February to May 2003.

Data

Samples and Field Dates

This study draws on the results of two nationwide random digit dialing (RDD) telephone surveys. Some characteristics of these surveys are summarized in Table 1. The first wave interviewed 1,448

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4 The government’s “Preserving Life & Liberty” website can be found at www.lifeandliberty.gov.
individuals, using a stratified sample to increase the number of African American and Latino respondents. The second wave consists of two samples. The recall or “panel” cases are the 679 first wave respondents who were reinterviewed in the second wave. We sought to interview all first wave respondents who had agreed at the end of the first survey to be recontacted. We were successful in reinterviewing 53.2 percent of them. In addition to the panel cases, a fresh national RDD sample, using strata similar to that in the first wave, was interviewed in the second wave, amounting to 1,284 respondents. The completion rate for these new second wave cases was 41.1 percent. When combined, the panel and new cases amount to 1,963 second wave respondents.

[Table 1 About Here]

The data from each wave are weighted to adjust the samples to fit the U.S. adult population by US census region, race/ethnicity, sex, age, and education. After extensive use of the new data, we concluded that it was reasonable to combine the two second wave samples for many purposes. A set of weights for the combined second wave respondents is applied when we do this.

The field period of the first wave was November 15, 2001, through January 14, 2002. One fourth of the interviews were completed by November 27; half by December 12, 2001; and three-fourths by December 27. The field period for the second wave (the panel and new cases were interviewed at the same time) was January 31 through May 28, 2003. One-fourth of the interviews were completed by February 17; half by March 17; and three-fourths by April 12. The median interview dates of wave 1 and wave 2 occurred just about 15 months apart.

The first survey occurred during and after the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan but also at a time when the government was focused on implementing the Patriot Act (passed at the end of October

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6 See Hembroff (2002) for a description of the original weighting procedures from wave 1. After the second wave was completed in 2002, new weights were calculated both for wave 1 and wave 2, to take into account the greater detail that is now available about the region x gender x education x age distributions within ethnic groups. All weights are based on 2002 population data reported by the U.S. Census Bureau.
2001) and on reducing the threat of terrorism in the U.S. The second survey was in the field at a time when the war in Iraq was a major focus of U.S. foreign policy, including both preparation for the war, the coalition’s first bombing of Baghdad on March 20 and the U.S. takeover of Baghdad on April 9, 2003.\footnote{In designing our survey during Fall 2002, we decided not to conflate the fight against terrorism in the United States with the fight against terrorism abroad, in particular the looming war against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. The questionnaire did not refer to Iraq. In our training meetings with the interviewers, we emphasized that the questions referred to people’s concern about terrorism and civil liberties in the United States.}

The survey instruments were developed using extensive pretests prior to each round. The first wave survey took 26 minutes on average to complete; the second wave, 28 minutes. Whereas the first wave was conducted only in English, the second wave was conducted in both English and Spanish.

Our use of a panel design allows us to make both aggregate-level and individual-level comparisons. While we are interested in whether, in the aggregate citizens have become more supportive of civil liberties over time, we are also concerned with whether individual change in support for civil liberties is predictable and systematic. For example, are individuals who decreased their concern about terrorism between the first and second surveys less willing to trade civil liberties for security? Are those who increased their concern about terrorism more willing to trade civil liberties for security? This part of the analysis focuses only on the panel of wave 1-wave 2 respondents, for whom we can measure individual-level change.

We also make use of the control group, those interviewed only in the second wave, to check for a potential source of bias in our results. It is possible that when we reinterviewed respondents the second time, our initial interview had already affected them in some way. That is, there could be either a “test effect” or a selection process, and as a result people in the panel were not representative of the broader population. To address this issue, we look for differences between the aggregate responses of the panel who were interviewed in both wave 1 and wave 2 and the new respondents or a “control group” who were interviewed only in wave 2.
Aggregate Change on Key Variables

Personal and Sociotropic Threat

The first and second waves of the Civil Liberties survey asked a series of questions about people’s concern about a terrorist attack (see the appendix for the wording of the questions). Two of these (SEC4 and SEC5) address what we label “sociotropic” threat, a sense of threat to the country or to the area in which people live. Five address what we label “personal threat,” a sense of threat felt directly by the respondent. In the individual-level analysis later in this paper we will combine the personal threat indicators into an index. In the preliminary aggregate analysis, however, it is instructive to look these variables separately.

In Table 2 the percentage of respondents who say they are “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned” in response to each threat item can be compared for all wave 1 respondents (line 1), the wave 1-wave 2 panel (lines 2 and 3), the new wave 2 respondent control group (line 4), and all wave 2 respondents combined (line 5). Looking at the first two lines, we see very little difference in the first wave survey responses between the full set of wave 1 respondents and those who were reinterviewed in the second wave, i.e., who were in the 2-wave panel. This suggests that there is no selectivity of panel respondents based on their initial levels of perceived threat of terrorism.

When we compare the answers of the panel respondents over time in lines 2 and 3, not surprisingly the percentage who expressed concern about opening their mail declined substantially from 33 percent to 19 percent (F2), reflective of the anthrax scare at the time of the first wave. In contrast, the percentage who expressed concern about being in large crowds or stadiums increased substantially between the two waves, from 42 to 55 (F5). We do not have a ready explanation for the latter increase, except perhaps for events that occurred abroad after September 11th, such as the terrorist
attack in Bali on October 12, 2002. On the other threat questions, the differences in aggregate responses between the two waves are negligible.

By comparing the second wave responses of the panel (line 3) with the second wave responses of the new respondents (line 4), we are also reassured that participation in our first wave survey did not produce any “test effect” that makes the panelists different from the cross-section of new respondents interviewed in wave 2. Based on this kind of comparison, we concluded that we could safely combine both groups of wave 2 respondents (line 5) and thus conduct some analyses of attitude change over time by comparing all wave 1 respondents (line 1) with all wave 2 respondents (line 5).

Aside from what we have learned about the consistency of answers between the 2-wave panel and the larger sets of wave 1 and wave 2 respondents, that the extent of sociotropic threat (SEC4 and SEC5) is so similar over time suggests that Americans’ basic sense of the threat of terrorism did not attenuate over time. Indeed, the high percentage who continued to express concern about a terrorist attack on the USA suggests that Americans retained a very high sense of threat to the country (over 80 percent still felt concerned that another attack would occur in the next few months) and a moderate sense of threat to the area in which they live (over 40 percent felt that way). While we cannot attribute the persistence of high levels of concern about terrorism to particular events, that Americans did not lessen their concern about terrorism over the 15 month interval between our surveys is notable.  

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8 In a series of surveys conducted in the state of Michigan, the State of the State Survey (SOSS) showed persistent levels of sociotropic threat, at a level at or above that reported in the Civil Liberties Survey, from late 2001 through early 2003. Thus, we do not attribute the high levels of perceived threat in our second wave Civil Liberties survey just to perceptions of the threat from Iraq.
National Pride and Trust in Government

In the immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks, public opinion researchers recorded a sharp upsurge in trust in government and national pride and patriotism (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). That this is substantially a rally effect rather than a permanent change in people’s orientations toward the government and the political system is shown by declines in both attitudes several months after the attacks in other surveys.

However, we find using our own indicator that the level of national pride remained unchanged between wave 1 and wave 2 (Table 3). Whether we compare all wave 1 and wave 2 respondents, the wave 1-wave 2 panelists, or the panelists in wave 2 with the new cross-section of respondents at wave 2, 79 to 80 percent of the respondents said that they are “very proud” to be an American. There is no evidence of either a testing effect or a net aggregate change in the levels of expressed national pride over the 15-month interval between our surveys.

[Table 3 About Here]

Similarly, we find no dissipation in expressed trust in the federal government (GT1) over time, either among the two-wave panelists (compare lines 2 and 3) or in the two cross-section samples (lines 1 and 5). A consistent 48 to 50 percent of all respondents report that they trust the federal government to do what is right “just about always,” or “most of the time” (GT1). When asked, however, whether the government is run by a “few big interests,” there is a 5 point increase in the percentage of respondents in agreement. This increase perhaps should not be surprising in light of the corporate financial scandals that have been exposed over the past few years.

We find a much stronger decline in trust in the authorities when the question focuses on “law enforcement.” Whereas in the first wave 75 percent said they trusted law enforcement “just about always” or “most of the time” (GT3), in the second wave only 63 percent of the new respondents and panel respondents expressed that opinion.
We can conjecture that this decline is not due to a loss of confidence in local law enforcement but instead to revelations about mistakes or missed signals among federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the weeks and months immediately prior to the 9/11 attacks. Although we did not ask about confidence in the FBI or the CIA in the first wave, among wave-2 respondents, 54 percent reported that they trust the FBI to do what is right “just about always” or “most of the time,” and 49 percent expressed the same level of trust in the CIA. Thus, those agencies were less trusted than law enforcement in general (63 percent) and the federal government in general (79-80 percent).9

Security vs. Civil Liberties

All of the civil liberties trade-offs questions from wave 1 were replicated in the wave 2 survey (Table 4). On the whole, we find little change in the aggregate either among the panel respondents or between the wave 1 and wave 2 respondents as a whole. There are some exceptions, however. One of these is in the general question about trade-offs (CL1): it is necessary to give up some civil liberties vs. we must preserve civil liberties above all. Whereas in the first wave 54 percent endorsed the latter position, in the second wave this declined to 43-46 percent. Hence whereas a majority had favored civil liberties over security in late 2001, a majority favored security over civil liberties in early 2003.

[Table 4 About Here]

When we examine the results for the items that reflect specific aspects of civil liberties, however, we find very little net movement in either direction. On two of the items, however, we find greater support for the civil liberties option: on the question whether noncitizens suspected of belonging to a terrorist organization should be arrested and detained indefinitely (CL5), the initial 51

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9 To put these figures into a broader context, however, the level of trust in the FBI was roughly on a par with trust in “courts and judges” (55 percent), while the level of trust in the CIA was roughly on a par with trust in “state government...”
percent support for the pro-civil liberties position increased to 57 percent; and on whether high school teachers should criticize the government’s policies toward terrorism (CL7), the 38 to 40 percent supporting civil liberties grew to 48 percent.

Both of these changes may be due to events since the 9/11 attacks. Frequent media stories about the detention of noncitizens, including restricting their access to legal counsel, may have induced some respondents to become more sympathetic to protecting the civil liberties of the suspects. The shift in sentiment regarding allowing school teachers to criticize government antiterrorism policy may be a result of the public discussion and open criticism of the government’s policy toward Iraq. During the wave 2 survey, the Bush administration sought to connect the fight against Al Qaeda with the need for regime change in Iraq to reduce the threat of terrorism. In answering the question about teachers being critical of the government, some respondents may have had in mind the open criticism of the government’s Iraq policy.

In sum, when asked a general question, our respondents appear to have shifted in the direction of supporting security over civil liberties. But when asked about specific trade-offs of civil liberties for greater security, the respondents either did not change their views or they changed toward greater support for civil liberties.

What does this mean for people’s acceptance of restrictions on civil liberties? When asked in a new question in the second wave survey “how likely is it that you personally will have to give up some of your civil rights and liberties in order to curb terrorism” (AT15), 66 percent said that it was either somewhat likely or very likely that they would have to give up some of their rights, while 34 percent said that it was either somewhat unlikely or very unlikely. And when asked further “how willing would you personally be to give up some of your rights and liberties in order to curb terrorism” (AT19), 71 percent said they would be somewhat willing or very willing to give up some rights and liberties.
These results, too, suggest that while on specific trade-offs the majority of Americans tend to choose civil liberties over security, a majority has also accepted the general idea of giving up some of their own rights and liberties to fight terrorism. However, their support for such an exchange continues to vary considerably with the specific issue. Furthermore, in response to a new civil liberties trade-off question asked in the second wave (CL11 – Table 4), 60 percent favored keeping public access to information about the government’s activities in fighting terrorism. Yet when asked whether they favor or oppose the FBI having access to public library records in order to learn what people are reading, 49 percent strongly favor or somewhat favor that policy.

**Individual Change in Support for Civil Liberties**

Underlying the over-time consistency in the aggregate responses is a similar consistency in the individual-level of support for civil liberties. Some movement in individual responses is expected as a result of three factors: issues change in importance over time, new information becomes available, and measurement error. Nonetheless, the individual distribution of second wave responses across the civil liberties items mirrors the distribution of the first wave responses.

Figure 1 shows the consistency of the distribution of pro-civil liberties responses across eight specific value trade-off items by first wave and second wave respondents. This figure omits the general trade-off question (CL1) as well as the freedom of information question (CL11), which was asked only in wave 2. The three lines are for the entire set of first wave respondents, the entire set of second wave respondents, and the new independent sample collected simultaneously with the second wave.

With all three distributions approximating a normal distribution with a slightly negative skew, there is a small overall preference for civil liberties over security. The independent sample and the re-interview responses closely resemble the first wave civil liberties responses. Hence, the preference for civil liberties over personal security is not a matter of individuals agreeing with only a
few items, but rather a matter of their supporting a wide range of elements of civil liberties. Fewer than 1 percent endorse a pro-personal security position across all of the items, and only 8 percent consistently prefer a civil liberties position. The mean number of pro-civil liberties responses is 4.9 among both first wave and second wave respondents.

[Figure 1 About Here]

We find larger differences when we consider the separate civil liberties items. With the exception of three items – the general civil liberties question, requiring national identification cards, and making it a crime to belong to a terrorist organization – our respondents appear to have strengthened their support for civil liberties over personal security between the first and second waves of the survey.

Although we do not propose that all movement in individual responses between wave 1 and wave 2 is real rather than due to random change and measurement error, the results are consistent with citizens learning about the consequences of governmental policies and the extent and form of the threat of terrorism. We examine change in individual civil liberties responses in Table 5, using the 679 respondents in the two-wave panel. Column 1 reports the percentage of initially pro-security respondents who adopted a pro-civil liberties position in the second wave, and column 2 reports the percentage of initially pro-civil liberties respondents who adopted a pro-security position in the second wave. Column 3 reports the overall percentage of respondents who altered their civil liberties responses from one side to the other.

Among respondents who at first supported the government being able to detain non-citizens indefinitely, 39 percent later adopted the pro-civil liberties position, but 21 percent continued to take a pro-security position. Of those respondents who initially considered teachers disloyal for criticizing the government’s terrorist policies, 35 percent later supported the right to criticize government policy. Another notable change involves government monitoring of telephone and
email communications. Among respondents who at first supported expanded governmental wiretaps, 36 percent reversed their position in wave 2; but only 20 percent of those who at first opposed this policy adopted a pro-security position in wave 2.

Some government policies to combat terrorism received greater support in wave 2 than in wave 1. Among respondents who at first considered national identification cards to violate individual freedom, 30 percent reversed their position in wave 2. Among respondents who thought initially that it was wrong to consider it a crime to belong to a terrorist organization, 52 percent adopted a pro-security position on this issue in wave 2.

After 9/11, we noticed that few citizens endorsed racial profiling as a means to combat terrorism. The pro-civil liberties position on this strengthened. Many of those who initially favored profiling later opposed it.

**Replicating Aspects of the Multivariate Model from Wave 1**

Although we observe little net change in support for civil liberties in the aggregate, Table 5 reveals so much individual change in responses to the civil liberties items raises the question whether the relationships between underlying explanatory factors and support for civil liberties have changed between the two waves of the survey. Accordingly, we now turn to replicating a key part of the explanatory model that we developed to account for levels of support for civil liberties in wave 1. Do we find the same relationships in wave 2?

In our analysis of the first wave survey, we found that threat and trust did not uniformly lead to favoring one set of values over another, but instead they interactively determined the support for civil liberties over security (Davis and Silver 2004). The effect of trust in the federal government on support for civil liberties was conditioned by a sense of sociotropic threat – concern that the country will come under another terrorist attack – as well as personal threat. However, at every level of trust
in the federal government, increased sense of threat led to a greater willingness to trade off some civil liberties in favor of security and order.

Attitudinal measures, such as political ideology, pride in the country, and faith in people, influenced how citizens react to the government’s efforts to combat terrorism. These attitudes may either promote or weaken the support for civil liberties. African Americans’ distrust of government and their history of struggle for civil rights led to a greater support for civil liberties in the wake of the terrorist attacks. Whites, who are generally not as skeptical of government, were more willing than African Americans, but less willing than Hispanics, to concede some civil liberties for security. Hispanics were more concerned about maintaining order than African Americans and whites.

Here we model the core aspects of threat, trust in government, and race and ethnicity on the support for civil liberties.

**Threat.** The effects of threat on the support for civil liberties can be manifested in several different ways. For instance, one emotional response to threat is to try to reduce the discomfort by increasing personal security, increasing physical and psychological distance, or eliminating the threatening stimuli. Emotional reactions to threat may lead to greater support for personal security and the government’s efforts to reduce the risk of future terrorist attacks. That threat tends to increase support for restrictions on civil rights and liberties is a consistent finding in the tolerance literature (Gibson 1998, Marcus *et al.* 1995; Sullivan *et al.* 1982).

In a different way, threat perceptions can exert a *cognitive* influence on the willingness to trade civil liberties for personal security. According to LeDoux (1996), Marcus and MacKuen (2001, 1993), and Marcus *et al.* (2000), the perception of threat enhances attention to contemporary information and to the source of anxiety. It also promotes political learning and decreased reliance on habitual cues (Marcus and MacKuen 1993). Following this logic, if a heightened sense of threat releases people from standing decisions, habits, and ideological predispositions, then people may rely
less on social norms protecting civil liberties and come to favor increased governmental efforts to
combat terrorism. This would be consistent with experimental research after the 9/11 attacks,
which shows that fear enhanced support for cautionary public policy measures (Lerner et al., 2003),
which, we argue in this case, could involve granting greater authority to the government to take
measures to prevent terrorism.

Threat, in particular sociotropic threat against society or cherished values and norms, usually
outweighs the sense of personal threat in leading people to act in anti-democratic or intolerant ways.
Nonetheless, when a threat is personalized the response may become overwhelmingly intolerant
toward perceived outgroups or threatening groups.

**Trust in Government.** Support for civil liberties is typically connected to a larger set of
beliefs about democratic institutions and processes. If the willingness to exchange civil liberties for
security translates into a concession of power to government, then trust and confidence in
government should take on great importance. Trust in government may be thought of as a resource
upon which government can draw when it needs latitude from its citizens in tolerating restrictions
on their civil liberties. We expect citizens to make a distinction between the government in general
and law enforcement agencies when asked about their willingness to trade off rights. It is the law
enforcement agencies at all levels that are perhaps the most immediate guardians of people security
yet also potential threats to their civil liberties.

It seems reasonable to expect that high levels of perceived threat among those who are more
trusting of government may create a greater willingness to adopt a pro-security position than what
would be expected based on their level of trust alone. A similar condition may apply to people who
are the least trusting in government but also perceive less threat from terrorism. Such individuals
may be even more concerned about protecting individual rights.

Table 6 reports the results of OLS regression models exploring the effects of threat and trust
on the percent of pro-civil liberties responses among wave 1 and wave 2 respondents. The analysis is based on the 679 respondents who participated in both stages of the two-wave panel. The dependent variable is the percentage of responses that are in the pro-civil liberties direction. Model 1 establishes the independent and additive effects of threat and trust in government on support for civil liberties in wave 1; model 2 tests for interaction effects. For the first wave respondents, the interaction effects between trust and threat are inconsequential.

Model 3 uses an additive specification of the same independent variables for the wave 2 respondents; and model 4 tests for interaction effects for the same wave 2 respondents. Again the interaction effects are not statistically significant.

It is difficult to interpret the regression coefficients in the different models just by inspection of the numbers. To aid interpretation, we use the additive models (1 and 3) from Table 6 to estimate the slope of the relationship between trust in the federal government (on the horizontal axis) and support for civil liberties (on the vertical axis), controlling for the effects of other variables in the models. To calculate the regression lines between civil liberties and trust in the government, we set the values of the other variables in the models at their means. The results are shown in Figure 2. In addition to showing the predicted percent pro-civil liberties at each level of trust in the government, we show in parentheses the standard error for each predicted value.10

The differences between wave 1 and wave 2 in the slope of the relationship between trust in the federal government and support for civil liberties are very small. The differences in the predicted percent pro-civil liberties between wave 1 and wave 2 are within the range of the confidence intervals of the coefficients. For all intents and purposes, trust in the federal government has no effect on support for civil liberties.

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10 The standard errors are generated using the CLARIFY program (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).
government has the same effect on the level of support for civil liberties in the second wave as it did in the first (with other factors taken into account). The greater people’s trust in the government, the more willing they are to concede civil liberties for security. If people “never” trust the federal government, they prefer civil liberties to security on 66 to 71 percent of the specific civil liberties items. If people “always” trust the federal government, they prefer civil liberties to security on just 50 to 52 percent of the items.

When we calculate the slopes of the relationships between sociotropic threat and support for civil liberties in the two waves of the panel, we find some difference at the extreme ends of the distribution (see Figure 3). The slope was somewhat steeper in wave 1 than it is in wave 2. But the effects remain very similar. With other factors taken into account, if people are “not at all concerned” that the U.S. might suffer another terrorist attack in the next few months, they prefer the civil liberties alternative to the security alternative between 62 and 69 percent of the time. And if people are “very concerned” about another terrorist attack, they prefer the civil liberties alternative between 43 and 50 percent of the time. Not only was support for civil liberties highly contingent on both people’s level of trust in the federal government and their concern about another terrorist attack, but the relationships between support for civil liberties, trust in the federal government, and concern about another terrorist attack did not change much in the time between late 2001 and early 2003.

**Modeling Individual Change**

Despite the fact that there is very little aggregate change in support for civil liberties between the first and second waves of our survey (and despite the fundamentally similar effects of underlying explanatory factors on the level of support for civil liberties between the two waves), many individuals changed their positions between the two waves. This raises the question whether it is possible to predict individual-level change on the basis of the types of explanatory factors that we
have identified as accounting for varying levels of support for civil liberties in our cross-sectional analyses. In other words, is change in stated support for civil liberties at the individual level systematic or random?

To answer this question, we calculate as our dependent variable the difference between the percentage of pro-civil liberties responses at wave 2 and the percentage of pro-civil liberties responses at wave 1. We focus on whether change in perceptions of sociotropic threat and personal threat, as well as change in the level of trust in the government and in law enforcement, accounts for the change between wave 1 and wave 2 in the level of support for civil liberties. We also incorporate a set of control variables (race, age, gender, and education).

Table 7 reports the OLS results. Unlike the cross-sectional models reported in Table 6, this model does poorly in accounting for change in individual-level support for civil liberties. Change in support for civil liberties is essentially randomly related to change in sociotropic threat and change in trust in the authorities. Although initial support for civil liberties and trust in the federal government in the first wave account for some of the variance in change in civil liberties over time, the effects of the remaining factors are negligible.

[Table 7 About Here]

Thus, the large amount of gross individual-level change in support for civil liberties between the two waves is not related to individual-level change in the underlying factors of threat and trust. Change in support for civil liberties at the individual level was largely random.

Conclusion
On the first anniversary of the Sept 11 terrorist attacks, American citizens were invited to contemplate how their lives were affected by the terrorist attacks and government’s effort to provide for their safety and security. With the diminishing threat of terrorism, many of the initial reactions, such as increased anxiety, faith in governmental institutions, patriotism, presidential support, religiosity, charitableness, and solidarity, were destined to dissipate but likely to re-intensify if there were another terrorist attack on American soil. Media reports suggested that the American way of life was back to normal in many respects and that citizens had recovered from the shock of the terrorist attacks.

In some ways this generally upbeat response was justified by what has been accomplished since the attacks. With the invasion of Afghanistan, and the eventual war with Iraq, the fight against terrorism was perceived to be successful or at least succeeding, despite the fact that Osama Bin Laden (and now also Saddam Hussein) is still at large. The military and police presence in airports and sporting arenas was no longer as obvious, or perhaps as jarring to people’s sense of normality, as it was in the months immediately following the 9/11 attacks. Anthrax mailings and the biological threat seemed to disappear over night, though the specter of such attacks by Saddam Hussein seemed to be suggested by American leaders in the weeks leading up the 2003 Iraq War. Most importantly, however, no other terrorist attacks targeting American citizens at home had occurred by mid-2003.

Underneath this seeming recovery we find a sense of vulnerability. Perhaps the greatest impact of the terrorist attack on America is not in how citizens’ emotions and beliefs were altered by the events on 9/11. Instead, a more lasting impact of the terrorist attack appears to involve altered attitudes and beliefs about the need to sacrifice some civil liberties to the government in order to gain greater security against terrorism. We find very little net movement in support for civil liberties in the 15-month interval between our surveys. Moreover, a majority of people have come to accept
the idea that a sacrifice not just of liberty in general but of their own liberty is necessary in the post-9/11 era.

It is well to bear in mind, however, that Americans do not adopt sacrificing civil liberties across the board. What we have noted is very little change in either direction in their support for civil liberties. But on balance Americans have adopted flexible responses to different issues. On most specific civil liberties trade-offs Americans adopt a moderate position; where they are not moderate, such as on the issue of racial profiling, they are likely to endorse the protection of civil liberties. If there has been little net change in the aggregate, the fact that people’s views are sensitive to the issues and conditions specified in the questions suggests that people are far from monolithically adopting an anything-goes position. Nor are they willing to defend civil liberties to the hilt at the cost of their security.

Appendix

Wording of Key Survey Items

Civil Liberties Trade-Offs (CL11 in Wave 2 only)

CL1. Next I am going to read you a series of two statements. Please tell me which one you agree with most. The first is, in order to curb terrorism in this country, it will be necessary to give up some civil liberties. -or- We should preserve our freedoms above all, even if there remains some risk of terrorism?

CL2. Everyone should be required to carry a national identity card at all times to show to a police officer upon request. -or- Being required to carry an identity card would violate people’s freedom of association and right to privacy.

CL4. Some people say it should be a crime for anyone to belong to or contribute money to any organization that supports international terrorism. Others say that a person’s guilt or innocence should not be determined only by who they associate with or the organizations to which they belong.

CL5. Some people say the government should be able to arrest and detain a non-citizen indefinitely if that person is suspected of belonging to a terrorist organization. Others say nobody should be held for a long period of time without being formally charged with a crime.

CL6. Some people say that law enforcement should be able to stop or detain people of certain racial or ethnic backgrounds if these groups are thought to be more likely to commit crimes. This is called racial profiling. Others think racial profiling should not be done because it harasses many innocent people just because of their race or ethnicity.
CL7. Some people say high school teachers have the right to criticize America's policies toward terrorism. Others say that all high school teachers should defend America’s policies in order to promote loyalty to our country.

CL8. Some people say that law enforcement should be free to search a property without a warrant solely on the suspicion that a crime or a terrorist act is being planned there. Others say that protection against searches without a warrant is a basic right that should not be given up for any reason.

CL9. Some people say that government should be allowed to record telephone calls and monitor e-mail in order to prevent people from planning terrorist or criminal acts. Others say that people’s conversations and e-mail are private and should be protected by the constitution.

CL10. Some say that people who participate in non-violent protests against the United States government should be investigated. Others say that people have the right to meet in public and express unpopular views as long as they are not violating the law.

CL11. (Wave 2 only) Which of the following comes closer to your own view. The federal government should place greater restrictions on the public’s access to information on what the government is doing in the fight against terrorism – or – Public access to information is essential to making government officials responsive to the people?

Threat

Sociotropic
SEC4. I’d like to start by asking you some questions about your feelings since the terrorist attacks on September 11th. All in all, how concerned are you that the United States might suffer another terrorist attack in the next 3 months? Very concerned, somewhat concerned, not very concerned, or not at all concerned?

SEC5. How concerned are you that the area in which you live might suffer a terrorist attack in the next 3 months? Very concerned, somewhat concerned, not very concerned, or not concerned at all?

Personal
SEC8. How concerned are you that you or someone in your family might become a victim of a bio-terrorist attack (such as anthrax or smallpox)? Very concerned, somewhat concerned, not very concerned, or not concerned at all?

F1. How concerned are you about flying on an airplane?
F2. How concerned are you about opening your mail?
F3. How concerned are you about the safety of food and drinking water
F5. How concerned are you about going into tall buildings?
F6. How concerned are you about being in large crowds or stadiums?

Trust in Authorities
GT1. The next set of questions are about trust. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right? Would you say just about always, most of the time, some of the time, or never?

GT2. Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all people?

GT3. How much of the time do you think you can trust law enforcement to do what is right? Just about always, most of the time, some of the time, or never?
National Pride

P1. How proud are you to be an American? Would you say very proud, proud, somewhat proud, not very proud, or not proud at all?

Literature Cited


Davis, Darren W., and Brian D. Silver. 2003b. “Americans’ Perceptions of the Causes of Terrorism: Why Do They Hate Us?” unpublished manuscript.


Table 1. Specifications from First and Second Waves of Civil Liberties Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Dates</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Samples</th>
<th>Completion Rate</th>
<th>Language of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wave 1</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>National RDD, Oversamples of Latinos and African Americans(^a)</td>
<td>52.4 percent of RDD Sample (AAPOR RR4)</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 2</td>
<td>1,963</td>
<td>Panel: 679(^a), New Wave 2: 1,284, National RDD, Oversamples of Latinos and African Americans(^a)</td>
<td>46.9 percent of 1,448(^b)</td>
<td>English and Spanish</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) The data from each wave are weighted to correct for the oversampling of Latinos and African Americans, as well as to adjust for differences by education, age, and sex between the respondents and the US population for the year 2002. In the unweighted data, in Wave 1 the numbers of respondents by race are 891 White (non-Hispanic), 201 Hispanic (not black), 322 African-American, and 34 Other. In wave 2 (including the panel and the new respondents), the numbers are 1,115 White (non-Hispanic), 413 Hispanic (not Black), 385 African-American, and 50 Other.

\(^b\) Reinterviews were attempted only with respondents from the first wave who agreed to be recontacted (93 percent of the respondents). Of the 1,298 who agreed, second wave interviews were completed with 53.2 percent. Most of the fall-off was due to respondents who could not be located for reinterviews.
Table 2. Percent “Very Concerned” or “Somewhat Concerned” about Given Terrorist Threat, Wave 1 (2001-2) and Wave 2 (2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SEC4 Attack on USA</th>
<th>SEC5 Attack on Area</th>
<th>SEC6 Bio-Terrorism</th>
<th>F1 Flying in Airplane</th>
<th>F2 Opening Mail</th>
<th>F3 Safety of Food and Water</th>
<th>F4 Being in Tall Buildings</th>
<th>F5 Being in Stadiums or Crowds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Wave 1 Respondents</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Wave 1</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Wave Panel Respondents</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Wave 1</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Wave 2</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Wave 2 Respondents</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Wave 2</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Wave 2 Respondents (panel and new)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(5) Wave 2</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note About Weights: All figures are based on the first or second wave of the Civil Liberties Survey, and are weighted to make the respondents representative of the adult population of the country as a whole.

The All Wave 1 respondents are those interviewed in first wave, whether or not they were reinterviewed in the second wave, using the weight USAWT1RV.

The 2-wave panel respondents are the 679 individuals who were interviewed in both the first and second waves, using the weight USAWT2RC.

The New Wave 2 respondents are those interviewed for the first time only at wave 2, using the weight USAWT2NC.

The All Wave 2 respondents are those interviewed in the second wave, whether as reinterviews or for the first time, using the weight USAWT2CC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(P1)</th>
<th>(GT1)</th>
<th>(GT2)</th>
<th>(GT3)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Govt.</td>
<td>Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Run by</td>
<td>Few Big</td>
<td>Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct. Very</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Proud</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Always,</td>
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<td>Most of</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Wave 1 Respondents
(1) Wave 1 79.9 50.7 47.8 75.2

2-Wave Panel Respondents
(2) Wave 1 79.8 49.3 49.6 82.2
(3) Wave 2 77.5 46.8 54.8 63.3

New Wave 2 Respondents
(4) Wave 2 80.4 48.0 53.9 63.0

All Wave 2 Respondents
(5) Wave 2 79.1 47.6 54.4 62.6
Table 4. Percent of Responses in Pro-Civil Liberties Direction, Wave 1 (2001-2) and Wave 2 (2003)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CL1 Overall</th>
<th>CL2 National ID Card</th>
<th>CL4 Crime to Belong to Terrorist Organiz.</th>
<th>CL5 Indefinite Detention of Non-Citizens</th>
<th>CL6 Racial Profiling</th>
<th>CL7 H.S. Teachers Criticize Anti-Terrorism Policies</th>
<th>CL8 Search on Suspicion, without Court Warrant</th>
<th>CL9 More Surveillance of Email, Phones</th>
<th>CL10 Investigate Protestors</th>
<th>CL11 Limit Freedom of Information about Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Wave 1 Respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Wave 1</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>89.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Wave Panel Respondents</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Wave 1</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>89.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Wave 2</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>90.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Wave 2 Respondents</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Wave 2</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Wave 2 Respondents (panel and new)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Wave 2</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>89.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Wording of the survey questions is given in the appendix.
Table 5. Change In Individual Civil Liberties Responses From Wave 1 to Wave 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 1 Response</th>
<th>Wave 2 Response</th>
<th>Total Percent Who Changed in One Direction or the Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wave 1 Response (1)</td>
<td>Wave 2 Response (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Give up civil liberties (general) (CL1)</td>
<td>Give up civil liberties 28.9%</td>
<td>Protect civil liberties 28.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Require National ID Cards (CL2)</td>
<td>Require ID Cards 20.1%</td>
<td>Cards violate freedom 30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Crime to belong to terrorist org. (CL4)</td>
<td>Consider terrorist 23.3%</td>
<td>Innocent 51.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Detain non-citizens indefinitely (CL5)</td>
<td>Detain 39.3%</td>
<td>Do not detain 20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Racial Profiling (CL6)</td>
<td>Allow profiling 48.0%</td>
<td>Oppose profiling 13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Teachers criticize terrorist policies (CL7)</td>
<td>Develop loyalty 35.2%</td>
<td>Allow to speak against 21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Search without warrant, on suspicion (CL8)</td>
<td>Allow search 57.5%</td>
<td>Oppose search 13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Monitor telephone and email (CL9)</td>
<td>Allow wiretap 36.4%</td>
<td>Oppose wiretap 20.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Investigate protestors (CL10)</td>
<td>Investigate protestors 70.8%</td>
<td>Right to assemble and speak 5.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This analysis is based on the 679 respondents in the two-wave panel.
Table 6. Regression Effects of Threat and Political Trust on Percent of Responses Favoring Civil Liberties, Wave 1–Wave 2 Panel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First Wave</th>
<th>Second Wave</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic Threat(^a)</td>
<td>-7.16**</td>
<td>-1.98</td>
<td>-4.67**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(7.05)</td>
<td>(1.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Personal Threat(^b)</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>-3.50*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.37)</td>
<td>(7.44)</td>
<td>(1.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Federal Government(^c)</td>
<td>-3.98</td>
<td>11.35</td>
<td>-8.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.49)</td>
<td>(9.51)</td>
<td>(1.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Law Enforcement(^c)</td>
<td>-5.01**</td>
<td>-5.11**</td>
<td>-1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.66)</td>
<td>(1.66)</td>
<td>(1.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>6.43*</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>13.71**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.12)</td>
<td>(3.26)</td>
<td>(3.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>-6.62*</td>
<td>-6.83*</td>
<td>-3.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.14)</td>
<td>(3.20)</td>
<td>(3.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic × Trust in Fed Gov</td>
<td>-3.22</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.82)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal × Trust in Fed Gov</td>
<td>-1.96</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.75</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.92)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic × Personal Threat</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.54)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>67.58**</td>
<td>104.38**</td>
<td>103.72**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(31.64)</td>
<td>(5.96)</td>
<td>(18.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root MSE</td>
<td>23.61</td>
<td>23.59</td>
<td>23.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>654</td>
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</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** Significant at \(p \leq .01\). * Significant at \(p \leq .05\).
\(^a\) Sociotropic Threat (concern about attack on the U.S.) is scored as “very concerned” = 4, “somewhat concerned” = 3, “not very concerned” = 2, and “not at all concerned” = 1.

\(^b\) Personal Threat is the mean across the 5 personal threat questions, with “very concerned” = 4, and “not at all concerned” = 1.

\(^c\) Trust in Federal Government and Trust in Law Enforcement are scored as “just about always” = 4, “most of the time” = 3, “some of the time” = 2, and “never” = 1.
Table 7. Regression Results of Change in the Support for Civil Liberties
(Dependent variable: Difference in Proportion of Pro-Civil Liberties Responses, Wave 2 minus Wave 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>S. E.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for civil liberties in W1</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic Threat in W1</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Sociotropic Threat (W2 - W1)</td>
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<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal Threat in W1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in Federal Government in W1</td>
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<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Trust in Federal Government (W2 - W1)</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in Law Enforcement in W1</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Trust in Law Enforcement (W2 - W1)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<td>National Pride in W1</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
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<td>Age 30-39</td>
<td>.05*</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<td>Age 40-49</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<td>Age 50-59</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<td>Age 60-64</td>
<td>-.04</td>
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<td>Age 65+</td>
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<td>Gender (1=Male)</td>
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<td>.02</td>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.01</td>
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R^2  .17
Adj. R^2 .14
Root MSE .19
N 644

Note: ** Significant at p ≤ .01. * Significant at p ≤ .05.
Figure 1. Distribution of First Wave and Second Wave Pro-Civil Liberties Responses (Maximum possible: 8)

NOTE: Based on CL3, CL4, CL5, CL6, CL7, CL8, CL9, and CL10.
Figure 2. Effects of Sociotropic Threat on Support for Civil Liberties - Wave 1 and Wave 2 Predictions

How concerned are you that the U.S. might suffer another terrorist attack?
Figure 3. Effects of Trust in Government on the Support for Civil Liberties - Wave 1 and Wave 2 Predictions

How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington?