Challenging Overt Racial Prejudice
in the Survey Context

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ABSTRACT

Measures of racial stereotypes and racial attitudes in general have a difficult task distinguishing between respondents who are sincerely racially tolerant and respondents who answer in a racially tolerant fashion only because of their desire to conform to socially prescribed behavior. Because of the risk of treating individuals who possess racially intolerant attitudes but who have learned how to express them and individuals who are truly racially egalitarian as the same, the validity of responses to racial questions, in particular more overtly negative expressions, is called into question.

Through several experiments embedded in a public opinion survey, we challenge respondents’ beliefs about racial stereotypes, both racially tolerant and intolerant beliefs, by exposing them to information that contradicts their beliefs. It turns out that a substantial percentage of respondents who at first reject racial stereotypes are willing to support racist views of blacks when presented with a counter-argument. The respondent’s degree of dogmatism appears to drive their initial support for racist views and the extent to which they cave-in to information contradiction their racial beliefs. Contrary to simplistic assumptions, dogmatists are more readily persuaded to endorse racial stereotypes, which suggests that their initial stated positions may have masked their true feelings. Pursuing this idea, we then show how the information about response change and where individuals end up after counter-arguments can be used as a multi-item measurement approach to reduce the measurement error in initial responses.
Challenging Overt Racial Prejudice in the Survey Context

Although racially-motivated violence against blacks has not disappeared from American society, overt expressions of racism are commonly said to have given way to new and more subtle expressions of racial hostility. A generation ago, many whites in America indisputably not only thought that blacks were inferior and lazy but also thought that they could express their opinions publicly. Now public racial bigotry is widely deemed to be offensive and the overt expression of old-fashioned (so-called “red-neck”) racism is increasingly unfashionable. Whether this indicates a real reduction in racist attitudes or changing social norms about race and the public discourse on race is an open question, however.

One interpretation is that changes in social norms pertaining to racial intolerance are only superficial and mask a subtle or “symbolic” form of racism beneath the surface (Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay 1982; McConahay and Hough 1976; Sears 1988; Sears and Kinder 1971). This modern form of racism manifests itself in beliefs that blacks violate traditional values such as individual initiative, self-reliance, and hard work, and that blacks make illegitimate demands to alter the racial status quo, such as through promoting affirmative action. Modern racists are said to display a symbolic form of racism by focusing on such social values and beliefs about appropriate legal or social norms rather than overtly expressing racial bigotry.¹

However, if a change has occurred in what is considered to be socially acceptable speech about race, it is difficult to discern whether racist attitudes have eroded or whether there has instead merely been a change in the forms of public expression (Jackman and Muha 1984). Furthermore, modern racists may not only refrain from making overtly disparaging or negative comments about blacks but also be reluctant to endorse symbolically racist positions. Hence, despite the shift in focus from trying to measure overt expressions to symbolic expressions of prejudice, distinguishing individuals who have learned the appropriate responses to questions about race from those who possess sincerely tolerant

¹ Measures of old-fashioned racism often rely on questions concerning issues such as interracial marriage, having blacks as neighbors or coworkers, and whether civil rights leaders are pushing too fast.
racial beliefs remains very difficult (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). If racists trying to say the right thing by giving a socially desirable response to survey interviewers refrain from expressing their racism – they put “brakes on their prejudice” (Allport 1979, 332) – then even in measuring symbolic racism we may fail to find evidence of racism even when it exists. As a result, the apparent waning of old-fashioned racism could be prematurely interpreted to mean that racists are spent forces (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986). And measures of symbolic racism and racial resentment, though intended to capture this changing character of racial expression, may be unable to reveal the intentionally concealed racial beliefs of respondents who are sensitive to the social desirability of giving acceptable answers.

Only recently have researchers begun to acknowledge this problem. Kuklinski et al. (1997) suggest that censoring of racist beliefs may pose a measurement problem that rivals substantive explanations. Individuals may conceal their negative feelings and target their animosity to more subtle expressions. Peffley and Hurwitz (1998) also indicate that it is important to determine the extent to which racial attitudes and stereotypes are due to social desirability pressures of impression management. Krysan (1998) shows that social desirability bias indeed influences the extent to which respondents express liberal racial attitudes. However, traditional measures of racial prejudice (e.g., that blacks are more violent than whites) were not susceptible to social desirability biases. Responses by individuals with higher levels of education were more susceptible to social desirability bias than those by individuals with lower levels of education. McConahay, Hardee, and Batts (1981) maintain that when individuals could identify overtly racially insensitive positions (e.g., that black people are not as smart as whites) they were more likely to fake being less prejudiced.

Thus, the development of methods to improve the measurement of actual racial beliefs in a survey context remains a challenge. This study uses a series of survey experiments in which the interviewers attempt to coax respondents who give initially unprejudiced responses into giving prejudiced ones, and those who give initially prejudiced responses into giving unprejudiced ones. Previous survey experimental efforts to “persuade” respondents to change their initial answers have
focused mainly on the factors that affect the persuasibility of survey responses. In contrast, this study focuses on whether the answers that respondents give after the counter-arguments by interviewers are better indicators of their racial attitudes than their initial answers. To assess this, we examine the correlations between a set of racial policy attitudes and the answers to the initial and repeated questions about racial stereotypes.

We contend that if the answers that respondents give to racial stereotype questions correlate more highly with racial policy attitudes after the questions have been reiterated by the interviewers, then the later answers more accurately reflect the respondents’ underlying attitudes than did their initial answers. If Sniderman et al. (1996, 55) are correct that “where people start off politically matters, but what counts is where they wind up after the pushing and shoving of political argument” (see also Gibson 1998), this study may help to reveal the extent of lip-service individuals pay to questions of race. But more importantly, it may lead to improved methods of tapping people’s underlying beliefs through the use of counter-arguments and reiterated questions on race-related attitudes. We find that many apparently racially tolerant respondents are not completely committed to the idea. When pressed, these respondents back-off from initially racial egalitarian responses to accepting more prejudiced positions. Their later responses turn out to be more highly correlated with race policy attitudes than were their initial responses. These findings have significant implications for the study of racial attitudes and an overall assessment of racism among American citizens.

**Importance of Valid Measures of Overt Racial Prejudice**

While the debate over the relevance of the “new racism” thesis persists, the meaning and measurement of overt racial prejudice has received considerably less attention. By “overt racial prejudice” we mainly refer to the expression of negative stereotypes. The empirical evidence on the relationship between overt racial prejudice and whites’ opposition to policies designed to narrow racial inequalities is mixed. For instance, Bobo and Kluegel (1993) show that measures of racial stereotypes
are inconsistent and weaker than measures of perceived discrimination against blacks in explaining whites’ support for race-targeted policies. Similarly, Sears et al. (1997) indicate that racial stereotypes have a weak correlation with attitudes towards federal assistance for blacks, affirmative action, and equal opportunity for blacks. Moreover, when racial stereotypes are considered conceptually distinct from old-fashioned racism, Virtanen and Huddy (1998) discover that while whites who believe that blacks are lazy, prefer to live off welfare, or are unpatriotic are more likely to oppose social welfare programs than whites who do not attribute these values to African Americans, such negative stereotypes of blacks have no impact on white support for individualistic programs.

Other research seems to contradict the limited effects of racial stereotypes on other attitudes. Kinder and Mendelberg (1995) find that racial prejudice influences white’s opinions on a range of issues, from inter-racial marriage, to opposition to providing college scholarships for black children with good grades, to the death penalty. But the influence of racial stereotypes is reduced as whites began to associate with blacks. Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman’s (1997) indicate that whites who embrace negative racial stereotypes offer far more harsh judgements of blacks than similarly described whites when responding to questions about welfare mothers, welfare recipients with poor work history, or drug suspects. Peffley and Hurwitz (1998) show that whites who possess negative stereotypes hold discriminatory double standards toward black welfare recipients: they object to welfare only when it applies to blacks. Sniderman and Piazza (1993) show that white racial policy attitudes correlate more strongly with beliefs about blacks’ willingness to work than with other aspects of racial stereotypes, such as the perception of blacks’ hostility, neighborliness, intelligence, or ability. Gilens (1995, 1996) finds that racial stereotypes (e.g., blacks are lazy) better predict welfare attitudes than economic self-interest, egalitarianism, and attributions of blame for poverty. Carmines and Layman (1998) show that the impact of racial stereotypes on racial policy preferences is greater among Democrats than Republicans. Prejudiced Democrats are not only more conservative than unprejudiced Democrats, but are virtually indistinguishable from Republicans.
The mixed evidence of the influence of racial stereotypes calls into question their measurement and meaning. Although the time and circumstances under which the racial stereotypes are recorded and the fact that there is no generally agree-upon measure of overt racial prejudice may account for the mixed empirical findings, we argue that the validity of the measures of stereotypes themselves should also be considered. To the extent that respondents are playing it safe by moderating their racial beliefs, the evidence of overt racial prejudice and its effect on policy preferences may be stronger than is commonly recognized.

The Meaning of Response Inconsistencies in Survey Experiments

We are interested in the meaning of changes in responses to racial stereotype questions in survey experiments when respondents are presented with information challenging their stated racial beliefs. Converse (1970) proposed that respondents who change their position over time hold no true convictions, but instead express random responses or nonattitudes. Based on the assumption that the length of time between surveys is irrelevant for assessing the extent of consistency, respondents are charged with having no real preferences if they offer different opinions on an issue in successive surveys. Similarly, Zaller (1992) suggests that inconsistencies result from differences in the accessibility and saliency of information at the moment of the survey, which may be influenced by the survey itself. According to Zaller and Feldman (1992: 610), “individuals typically do not develop ‘true attitudes’ of the type that opinion analysts routinely assume, but possess a series of autonomous and often inconsistent reactions to the questions asked by pollsters.” People possess multiple and often conflicting opinions, and any change may be a function of a combination of chance and the accessibility of beliefs at the moment of the survey. Achen’s (1975) and Erikson’s (1979) measurement error position shifts the blame for response instability from respondents to the survey questions themselves. Simple survey questions may not sufficiently capture complex attitudes.
Although extant explanations for discrepancies in responses remain important, inconsistencies in survey experimentations in which attitude change occurs over a matter seconds (as opposed to months in the early response effects literature, or years in Converse’s analyses) may be more meaningful. We base this on the idea that people strive for cognitive consistency in the context of a single conversation or interview, and hence to the extent there is a bias in asking people the same or similar questions in the same interview, the direction of the bias is likely to be against change. Because respondents are likely to be aware of potential discrepancies in their responses when they occur over a matter of seconds, they are likely to understand when their responses conflict. To the extent that respondents’ opinions are uninformed or answers come off the top of their heads without much thought, there would also be pressure to be consistent.

However, the argument that all “change” in survey experiments is meaningful can only be taken so far. Because the normal approach in experimental designs in surveys involves a presentation of new information to respondents, there is usually no way of knowing how respondents would have answered if they had been asked the same question with full information initially. In this situation, response change in reaction to new information or a counter-argument may not deserve to be treated as persuasion. In our approach, we do not claim the respondents are being persuaded by new information; rather we use the approach of presenting additional information and counter-arguments in order to examine the extent to which individuals defend their initial positions. That is, we ask how stable responses to racial stereotype questions are when respondents are presented with information that challenges their initially stated beliefs.

**Research Design**

We develop two approaches to measuring response instability: counter-arguments, and repeating the original questions. The first involves three experiments to explore the effects of counter-arguments on modifying initial responses to questions on racial stereotypes. All survey respondents were
asked initially whether they support a racial stereotype of blacks. Respondents were asked in separate questions whether blacks are more violent, less responsible, or lazier than whites. These stereotypes are among the current salient descriptions of blacks (Devine and Elliot 1995; Peffley and Hurwitz 1998).

Follow-up questions were framed to suggest that their beliefs about race were rationally determined, justified, and consisting of kernels of truth. Among the various ways of handling this conflict (e.g., denial and attitude change), “the most obvious way to buttress one’s prejudices, and therefore to preserve them from conflict is to marshal evidence in their favor” (Allport 336). To each question, the respondents were offered five possible responses, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. If respondents initially rejected a particular racial stereotype (disagreed or strongly disagreed), they were presented with a counter-argument containing information that justified the given stereotype. For instance, those who rejected the stereotype of blacks as more violent were presented with the justification: “Would you still feel that way if there is more violent crime in black neighborhoods and more blacks are going to prison than whites, or would that change your mind?” Those who rejected the idea that blacks were less responsible were presented with the justification: “Would you still feel that way if blacks have more children out of wedlock and the fathers are not around to help raise their kids, or would that change your mind?” And those who rejected the idea that blacks are lazy were presented with the justification: “Would you still feel that way if there are more black people on welfare and who don’t have jobs, or would that change your mind?”

If respondents initially supported a racial stereotype (agreed or strongly agreed), they were presented with counter-arguments intended to negate the stereotype by attributing the causes to societal circumstances rather than to individual or group characteristics. For instance, respondents who initially accepted the stereotype of blacks as violent were presented with the rationalization: “Would you still feel that way if when reporting news, newspapers and television frequently report negative images of blacks?” Respondents who initially agreed that blacks are less responsible were presented with the rationalization: “Would you still feel that way if living in poverty makes it difficult for blacks to raise their children?” Respondents who initially
concurred that blacks are lazy were asked: “Would you still feel that way if social conditions and lack of job opportunities make it difficult for blacks to go to school and to find jobs, or would that change your mind?”

Respondents who initially endorsed a negative stereotype but who moderated their stated opinion in the face of a counter-argument can be regarded as less racist than those who did not change their position. Respondents who initially rejected the negative stereotype but who moderated their view in the face of a counter-argument can be regarded as more racist than those who did not change their position. That is, acceptance of the counter-arguments is racist in itself because it imputes negative characteristics to a race of people based on the occurrence of phenomena among a few.

Our second approach involves repeating the racial stereotype questions again at the end of the survey. In the repeated racial stereotype questions, respondents were made aware that they had been asked the stereotype questions before. The repeated racial stereotype questions followed this introduction: “I just have a couple more brief questions that I would like to ask you. I have already asked you these questions earlier, but I need to ask them one more time to verify your responses.”

Data

The Institute for Public Policy & Social Research at Michigan State University conducted the survey over a two-month period in the Fall of 1997. The survey was conducted by telephone and used a stratified random sample of English-speaking adults age eighteen and older. The sample was stratified by region of the state. In addition, there was an oversample of telephone exchanges in which at least 20 percent of the population was black. Post-sampling weights adjust both for the regional stratification, the oversample of certain telephone exchanges, and unequal probabilities of selection in the household (Hembroff and Silver 1997). The results reported are based on weighted data. Interviews were completed with 1,009 persons, of whom 230 were self-identified as black or African American, 697 as white, and 82 as “other.” The completion rate among eligible households was 60.2%. This analysis is based primarily on respondents who were self-identified as white.
The 20-minute survey was conducted using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI). This survey was designed specifically to study racial attitudes. Because the experimental techniques employed in this survey are simple functions of computer programming, respondents are unaware of any manipulation in the interview schedule and questions.

**Results**

**Initial Endorsement of Racial Stereotypes**

Inferences concerning the extent of racial bigotry and old-fashioned racism typically rely on racial stereotype questions such as those reported in Table 1. To the extent that the responses are sincere and valid, we can conclude that only modest proportions of the white respondents endorse racial stereotypes or blatant forms of racial prejudice. Even smaller proportions of African American respondents endorse such stereotypes. White respondents do not generally support the characterization of blacks as violent, lazy, or less responsible. Combining the “strongly disagree” and “somewhat disagree” responses, over two-thirds of the white respondents reject each stereotype. Compared to the support for racial stereotypes a generation ago, racist attitudes could indeed be considered to be waning (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). Most respondents more than simply reject each racial stereotype; a substantial percentage “disagree strongly” with them. For instance, 42.1 percent of white respondents “strongly disagree” with the blacks-are-violent stereotype, 57.1 percent “strongly disagree” with the blacks-are-lazy stereotype, and 47.8 percent “strongly disagree” with the less blacks-are-less-responsible stereotype. We take these answers as the “opening bid.”

[Table 1 About Here]

Support for racial stereotypes is correlated across the three indicators. The Pearson correlation ranges between .469 and .522 in the paired comparisons (the Kendall’s tau-b ranges between .443 and .551). While this implies that there is some overlap between those who hold one type of stereotype and
those who hold another, the respondents are differentially attracted to the three stereotypes and only a quarter of them endorse two or more of the stereotypes.

If we divide each of the scales into two classes of respondents, those who oppose the stereotype (strongly disagree or somewhat disagree) and those who do not oppose the stereotype (strongly agree, somewhat agree, or are neutral), then we can calculate how many respondents endorse particular combinations of stereotypes. In Table 2, we see that only 6.9 percent endorse all three stereotypes – less than what one would find (12.5 percent) if the respondents had chosen randomly between endorsing or rejecting each stereotype. Only 26.9 percent endorse two or more of the three stereotypes, which is only about half as many as one would expect by chance alone. In fact, 61.0 percent of the respondents reject all three stereotypes, substantially in excess of the proportion one would find by chance alone (12.5 percent).

If overt expressions of racial stereotypes are now less socially acceptable, the results shown so far could mean only that most respondents have learned that public expressions of racist beliefs are impolite and offensive. Respondents who have learned to put “brakes on their prejudice” (Allport 1979, 332) are likely to be mistaken as individuals who are sincerely tolerant. Hence, the proportions who reject each stereotype shown in Table 1, and the proportions who reject all three stereotypes shown in Table 2, may be inflated by measurement error – specifically by social desirability bias.

The Effects of Contradictory Racial Information

The experiments reported in Table 3 attempt to discern sincere responses from socially desirable responses. Again, we argue that truly egalitarian individuals cannot be talked into any form of

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2 The probability of each of the combinations occurring by chance is .50 to the third power, or .125.

3 There are four combinations, each with a .125 probability of occurring by chance, in which two or more stereotype responses occur. Thus, by chance alone one would expect 50 percent of the respondents to endorse two or more stereotypes, and 50 percent to endorse no more than one stereotype.
Racist statements, and that those individuals who can be induced to make a racist statement might be more prejudiced than their initial response would indicate. While most respondents who initially reject the stereotypes of violent, lazy, and less responsible blacks do not change their responses after the interviewers present justifications for doing so, many respondents do change their responses. Nearly instantaneous, such alterations in responses are influenced by the strength of initial attitudes (Bishop, 1990; Gibson 1998; Krosnick and Schuman 1988), as is indicated by the differences in the percentage of changers among those who initially expressed a strong opinion (strongly disagree with the stereotype) and those who initially expressed a less intense opinion (somewhat disagree with the stereotype). Among the respondents who at first strongly disagree with the racial stereotypes, between 13.8 and 20.3 percent alter their responses to support the racial stereotypes after listening to counter-arguments. The proportion of those who at first disagree somewhat who alter their responses ranges from 27.7 to 37.3 percent. These shifts show that initial responses to racial stereotype questions, if unchallenged, may mask an underlying dynamic or instability in the survey responses. This is especially so among those who do not express a strong opinion initially.

[Table 3 About Here]

A similar pattern is found among respondents who initially support stereotypes of violent, lazy, and irresponsible blacks (Table 4). Once they have endorsed a racial stereotype, most respondents do not alter their answers in the face of counter-arguments; but among respondents who strongly agree with the stereotype, between 20.0 and 22.2 percent alter their answers; while among respondents who initially agree somewhat, between 20.4 and 41.2 percent alter their answers after the counter-arguments.4

[Table 4 About Here]

4 The force of this conclusion is mitigated somewhat by the small N that involved in the various experimental treatments. We were not able fully to anticipate what the initial distributions of responses would be but were bound to an overall sample size by the study design. However, the patterns of responses that we report are very consistent, so that we feel confident in our interpretation of these patterns even if not in the exact numerical estimates.
Multivariate Analysis: Effects of Psychological and Demographic Factors

There is reason to expect the initial responses to the stereotype questions and their undoing to be related to respondent characteristics, including psychological and socio-demographic characteristics, as well as characteristics of the survey itself. Following the relationships identified by Gibson (1998), we develop a model to assess the support for racial stereotype and the willingness to alter racial beliefs.

We expect individuals who are more dogmatic to be more likely to hold racial stereotypes and less likely to alter their responses. Dogmatism implies a closed cognitive structure, which inhibits individuals from considering alternative beliefs and is directly related to racial prejudice (Ehrlich 1973; Maykovich 1975). According to Rokeach’s (1960) formulation, individuals with open belief systems, who are not typically prejudiced, are less hostile to beliefs that differ from their own (Adams and Beatty 1977; Cronkite and Goetz 1971). Whereas the less dogmatic the individual, the more open-minded he is in evaluating new information or ways of thinking, dogmatic individuals have difficulty assimilating new information and often reject conflicting information (for a similar argument, see Gibson 1998). To capture this psychological predisposition, the survey incorporated six items adapted from Rokeach’s dogmatism scale. To each question, respondents were offered five response categories, from strongly agree to strongly disagree (see the Appendix).

Another factor that could affect the response change of the counter-arguments is the intensity of the respondent’s initial responses. The intensity of the respondents’ prior attitudes produces systematic distortions in the way they perceive information intended to persuade. Individuals who lack established or strong attitudes should be more receptive to new information than individuals with more intensely held beliefs. The uninvolved person is less personally engaged and is more likely to encode attitudinal information in a detached, objective, and factual manner (Sherif and Hovland, 1961). Less intense attitudes, having less anchoring in the protection of self, are less resistant to change. By contrast, individuals with more intense attitudes perceive their stands as part of what they are and what they claim
to be than individuals with less intense attitudes. Their personal identity and the stability of their conception of self depend on the stability and perpetuation of their beliefs. Because of this need to maintain and protect the self-concept, individuals with more intensely held attitudes become highly engaged in attitude-relevant tasks and encode attitudinal information in a highly personalized and self-protective manner.

Interviewer characteristics are another factor that could affect the level of agreement with racial stereotypes. Examinations of white racial attitudes have generally ignored the role of the race-of-the-interviewer and thereby overlooked a possible major source of social desirability bias in the survey responses of whites. In contrast, there is a large literature on race-of-interviewer effects on black respondents (e.g., Schuman and Converse 1971; Anderson, Silver, and Abramson 1988a, 1988b; Davis 1997).

In general, we expect whites to be less likely to support a racial stereotype if the interviewer is black and more likely to support it if the interviewer is white. We do not an *a priori* expectation about how the race-of-the-interviewer might come into play in the face of counter-arguments. On the one hand, we might expect whites who initially stereotyped blacks to be more readily persuaded to change their initial position by a white interviewer who offers a counter-argument – through seeing that perhaps such a stereotype is “not acceptable” in white society. On the other hand, we might expect black interviewers to be more likely to persuade white respondents to moderate an initially negative stereotype so as to be “less offensive” to the polite stranger who is conducting the interview (Schuman and Converse 1971).

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5 Part of this difficulty has involved the reliance on white interviewers to interview white respondents in academic surveys that have regularly employed measures of racial attitudes.

6 Measures of “closeness” to different racial groups are also affected by the race of the interviewer (Anderson, Silver, and Abramson 1988b).
Stereotyping. In Table 5, each stereotype is taken as the dependent variable, on a scale ranging from 5 (strongly agree with statement) to 1 (strongly disagree). Multivariate regression analysis indicates that respondents endorse or reject racial stereotypes in a predictable way. First, older individuals are more supportive of racial stereotypes than younger ones, perhaps reflecting socialization during a time when negative characterizations about blacks were more common. This relationship holds up even with level of education held constant. Indeed, although educational level is negatively correlated with stereotyping, only for the blacks-are-more-violent stereotype is the effect of education statistically significant. Males are also more likely to endorse racial stereotypes, though the sex difference is not statistically significant on the blacks-are-lazier stereotype.

For all three stereotypes, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between dogmatism and the approval of racial stereotypes. Dogmatism can be viewed as a measure of people’s amenability to influence by social desirability norms. Our evidence clearly shows that dogmatists tend to be more racist. Thus, from a social-psychological perspective, racism appears to exist partly because people possess closed cognitive structures, which block the individuals from learning from or adapting to changed social norms.

We find that the interviewer’s race has a strong and consistent influence across each racial stereotype. Whites are less supportive of racial stereotypes when interviewed by a white interviewer (or more supportive of racial stereotypes when interviewed by a black interviewer). Whatever the underlying mechanism may be, the interviewer’s race is a significant factor biasing the expression of support for racial stereotypes. That we find such effects in a telephone survey, in which the race of the interviewer was not explicitly mentioned to the respondent, is important. Because of the magnitude of the effects, this factor needs to be considered explicitly in future analyses of white racial attitudes.

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7 The polarity is thus reversed from what was presented in earlier tables, so that a positive coefficient represents greater tendency to endorse the stereotype.
**Information Effects.** Because responses to the racial stereotype questions are predictable, the persuasibility of racial attitudes and the willingness of respondents to back-off from initial racial stereotypes should also follow coherent patterns. Support for racial stereotypes and the willingness to change one’s mind about race do not occur randomly, and there is considerable overlap in their explanatory mechanisms.

The logistic regression estimates reported in Table 6 indicate that respondents alter their stated attitudes toward racial stereotypes in coherent and predictable ways, particularly respondents who initially reject the stereotype but are persuaded by the counter-arguments to accept racist justifications (columns 4 through 6). The intensity of the initial attitude and the level of dogmatism are the most consistent predictors of the acceptance of racist rationalizations: people who initially manifest more intensely tolerant attitudes (who strongly disagree with the stereotype) are less likely to be persuaded to accept racist counter-arguments than individuals who have less intense attitudes. This is also consistent with the literature on attitude persuasion.

[Table 6 About Here]

More relevant to understanding the effects of social desirability on persuasibility is the impact of dogmatism. If we focus on respondents who initially rejected the stereotype (columns 4 through 6), we find that dogmatists are more likely to accept racist counter-arguments than are more cognitively flexible respondents – despite having started off with seemingly racially tolerant attitudes. Thus, being dogmatic substantially increases the likelihood of being persuaded to endorse racist characterizations of blacks.

Our finding that dogmatists are more malleable is analogous to Gibson’s (1998) finding that dogmatic Russians are more readily persuaded to endorse intolerant views. Gibson conjectures that dogmatists may have incompletely processed information initially and hence be more susceptible to persuasion. While we cannot rule out such an explanation, we would favor one that focuses on the dogmatists’ initial hidden racism (or intolerance). Furthermore, we need to keep in mind that dogmatists
were more likely to endorse the stereotype initially. Whatever the psychological mechanism may be, that very similar and superficially anomalous results have been found in surveys conducted in very different populations and in very different settings suggests the robustness of the result.

In contrast to our finding that dogmatists are more easily persuaded toward accepting stereotypes, dogmatism has a significant negative effect in the experiment in which blacks are characterized as violent and the respondent initially agrees with that characterization (column 1). In this case, dogmatists are not willing to back off from their initially racist attitudes or accept the contextual explanations of racial stereotypes. However, the other two experiments do not show the same result (columns 2 and 3); had they done so, we would have stronger evidence that dogmatists behave predictably but differently depending on how they initially deal with social desirability pressures.

None of the other factors has as strong or as consistent an effect on persuasibility as do dogmatism and attitude intensity. In two of the persuasion-to-racist-beliefs experiments (columns 4 and 5), higher levels of education contribute to the rejection of racist counter-arguments. In four of the experiments, the older the respondent the more likely that counter-arguments are persuasive; but in one experiment there is no effect and in another the effect is significant but of opposite sign.

**Repeating the Initial Series of Stereotype Questions**

The relationship between the characterization of blacks at the beginning of the survey and at the end of the survey using the same questions is quite strong (see Table 7). The Pearson correlations for the stereotypes of blacks as violent, lazy, and irresponsible are .81, .77, and .79, respectively (using the original 5-point scale for each stereotype). Also, even though respondents who alter their responses after the counter-arguments differ somewhat from other respondents in the correlation between the first and second responses to the initial stereotype questions, for both switchers and stand-patters initial responses on the racial stereotype questions highly predict responses to the same questions at the end of the survey.
If we consider the distributions of responses to the five-point stereotype scales, we find little net change on average between the first and second responses: only about one-tenth of a point on any one of the three five-point stereotype questions, with a net change against stereotyping on two of the three questions ("more violent" and "less responsible") and a net change toward greater stereotyping on the third question ("more violent"). However, there are changers in both directions on all three questions. On the blacks-are-violent question, while 72.9 percent of the respondents did not change their position, 9.8 percent moved in a stereotyping direction and 17.3 percent moved in a less stereotyping direction. On the blacks-are-lazier question, 77.5 percent did not change their position, while 14.2 percent were more likely to endorse the stereotype, and 8.3 were less likely to do so at the end of the survey than they had earlier. On the blacks-are-less-responsible stereotype, 79.7 percent did not change their position, while 8.6 percent were more likely to endorse the stereotype and 11.7 percent were less likely to endorse the stereotype at the end of the survey.

On the whole, then, although the experiment induced many respondents to switch their positions temporarily in response to counter-arguments, the net change as a result of the twenty-minute experiment was small if we compare the distributions of responses to the first and second iterations of the stereotype questions.

In addition, it is noteworthy that on each question, if we examine persons who initially chose an extreme response (1 – Strongly agreed with stereotype, or 5 – Strongly disagreed with stereotype), it was the more racially prejudiced respondents who were more likely to moderate their views, mainly by moving to the “somewhat agree” category. For example, on the blacks-are-more-violent stereotype, fully 50 percent of those who initially strongly agreed moderated their views when asked the same question later in the survey; in contrast, only 10.5 percent of those who initially strongly disagreed with

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8 The statistical results mentioned in this paragraph are not shown in a table.
the stereotype moderated their views by the end of the survey. Similarly, on the blacks-are-more-lazy stereotype, 48.6 percent of those who initially chose “strongly agree” moderated their views, compared to 15.7 percent of those who initially chose “strongly disagree.” And on the blacks are less responsible question, 48.7 percent of those who initially strongly agreed moderated their views later on; while only 10.0 percent of those who initially strongly disagreed moderated their views later on.

Despite the small magnitude of the overall shift in the responses to the stereotype questions, it is important to determine whether the use of counter-arguments may have helped to unmask hidden racists or, more generally, helped encouraged respondents to offer opinions the second time that are closer to their true beliefs about race.

Re-Classification of Initial Responses

The consistency of responses in survey experiments reveals important information about the validity of initial responses. Whereas consistent responses reflect a crystallized and coherent belief system, transitory responses are generally treated as indicating an unstructured and a weak set of beliefs. We argue that the information regarding response consistency, and more importantly, where respondents end up after a series of counter-arguments, not only informs respondents’ initial responses, but such information can be used as a multi-item measurement approach to reduce measurement error.

As a multi-item approach to measuring political and social attitudes, the information obtained through survey experiments may improve on the measurement of initial responses. That is, respondents who cave in to information challenging their beliefs about racial stereotypes may not deserve their original placements nor do they deserve to be included in the same initial response category as those who do not cave in to new information. Relative to respondents who did not alter their responses, respondents who moderate their responses are less committed to their initial beliefs and are willing to moderate them.
Regardless of the reason underlying response instability – a sampling of choices from a pool of responses, the lack of a crystallized belief, or an informed response to additional information conveyed in the counter-argument – moderating their beliefs based on information challenging their responses sets them apart from respondents who do not alter their responses. Our analysis shows that such change is not random and that respondents who alter their responses are systematically different from individuals who do not alter their responses. For instance, people who back off from an initially negative perceptions of African Americans are not as dogmatic as individuals who did not alter their response, a seemingly reliable indicator that they may not be racial bigots or a different brand of bigot. Based on this logic, we examine three different measurement approaches under which respondents’ initial responses may be reclassified based on their moderated positions in counter-arguments. Each approach reflects a different meaning of change in the course of the survey experiment.

Under the first approach, a willingness to change an initial response is assumed to indicate a softening or moderating view of racial stereotypes. As illustrated in Figure 1, we separate the switchers from non-switchers by moving them one unit toward the moderate or middle position. Assuming equal distance in the response categories, respondents who gave an initially strongly disagree response but who also caved-in to the contradictory information in the counter-argument are reclassified one unit in a moderate direction from respondents who did not cave-in. It seems most reasonable to take advantage of the respondent’s willingness to back off from the initial response to “recode” the respondents to a more moderate position but not to assume a more radical change in opinion. This approach is represented as Version 1 in Figure 1.

[Figure 1 About Here]

For the second approach, shown as Version 2 in Figure 1, instead of changing the response to represent a substantively moderated position, we model change as adoption of a neutral position. Given the acceptance of contradictory information, it seems somewhat plausible for change in the first response to reflect an essentially “uncertain” response. A neutral position is considered to represent a
greater distance from the non-switchers who originally gave “strongly agree” responses to the original questions.

The third approach, Version 3 in Figure 1, assumes a more extreme meaning of change than the previous two measurement approaches. Caving-in to contradictory information is considered to indicate an adoption of that argument. If respondents are going to change, they may not stop at a more moderate or a neutral position, but such change may reflect an acceptance of the counter-argument and a rejection of their initial position.

Perhaps a more definitive test of the effects of the counter-arguments is to examine the respondents’ answers to the initial stereotype questions when these questions are asked again near the end of the interview. In general, we would expect respondents to display a strain toward consistency in their initial and final responses to these stereotype questions. Indeed, we even remind them that they answered the question earlier. However, to the extent that they do change their answers from their initial ones, they are likely to move in the direction of more accurately expressing their true beliefs.

To explore the extent to which counter-arguments unmask response errors and reduce the error in initial responses, we examine both how the various recoding schemes fit the data and the convergent validity with a set of questions on racial policy. Based on the factor analytic results and the standard errors of an equation predicting racial policy attitudes reported in Table 8, when using the three different revised versions of the scale, recoding respondents who back off of their initial answer one position in a moderating direction (Version 1) improves the fit of the items to the data. That is, using the information from the counter-arguments to moderate respondents’ first responses results in a larger eigenvalue (an increase from 1.92 to 1.98) and higher individual loadings for each recoded stereotype measure. But recoding the responses to a neutral position (neutralizing responses of changers – Version 2 of the recoding) produces a poorer fit to the policy variables. And recoding the changers to a “reverse” position, i.e., Version 3 of the recoding, produces an even poorer fit.

[Table 8 About Here]
Counter-arguments thus appear to help to reveal underlying attitudes. Responses to counter-arguments can also be used after the fact to reclassify individuals on the initial scale, as long as the recoding is not taken to an extreme.

Furthermore, when we compare the explanatory power of the initial stereotype responses to the explanatory power of the responses of the repeated stereotype questions (at the end of the survey, after the counter-arguments have been administered), we find that the final stereotype responses produce a much better fit. The eigenvalue increases from 1.92 to 2.22, and the variance accounted for by the first factor increases from 64 percent to 74 percent. The individual variables also all load more highly on the first factor in the repeated stereotype questions than in the original questions. Therefore, it appears that the counter-arguments allowed respondents a “sober second chance” to think about their positions and in some cases to revise them in a way that produces a better fit than the scaled items.9

In an exploration for further evidence that the counter-arguments helped to reveal the respondents’ attitudes more clearly, we examine the relative strength of the different versions of the stereotype responses in predicting attitudes toward affirmative action and toward government spending on programs to help blacks. As the independent variables, each version of the stereotype questions is represented by a factor score. The dependent variables are dichotomous variables measuring support for the given policy. Although this logistic regression approach is a tough test for showing the relative strength of each stereotype scale, the results suggest that the information generated about attitude consistency may help to reduce some of the error in initial responses. As shown in Panel II of Table 8, all of the scaled measures of racial stereotypes result in a positive and statistically significant predictor of affirmative action attitudes and spending for programs to help blacks. However the initial racial stereotypes perform slightly better in predicted affirmative action attitudes than re-scaled versions. And

---

9 This conclusion can be only taken so far, as the distinctions in the measurement approaches are not evidenced in the standard error of the estimates for racial policy attitudes. Version 1 of the reclassified scales and the repeated racial stereotype measures do not produce noticeably smaller standard errors in separate models predicting racial policy attitudes.
the repeated (final) iteration of the stereotype questions produces a better fit (higher $\chi^2$) than the original iteration in predicting one of the two racial policy responses, but a worse bit in the other. On the whole, this further test provides mixed support for reiterating the questions. However, we believe further tests along this line are warranted, with different policy measures, especially in light of the promising factor analytic results in Panel I.

Although the regression results may diverge slightly from the factor analytic results, one thing is clear. Attitudes on overt racial prejudice, and perhaps racial attitudes in general, are quite robust. Even using the information on response consistency to alter respondents’ initial responses to the even more neutral (Version 2) or extreme positions (Version 3) continue to result in positive and significant explanations of racial attitudes. Even in the factor analytic results, Versions 2 and 3 result in a similarly high explained variance and coherent factor structure. This may reflect Kinder and Sanders’ (1996) declaration that “when policies become entangled with race, nonattitudes tend to disappear, replaced by the real thing.”

**Conclusion**

These experiments point to the utility of counter-arguments combined with information about respondent personality traits for discovering hidden racists and, more generally, improving the measurement of racial attitudes. Respondents who (a) are dogmatic, and (b) initially reject racial stereotypes often change their stated opinion toward accepting racist stereotypes. This result is predicted by the theory of cognitive dissonance but not at all by a simple notion of the meaning of dogmatism. A simple notion of the effects of dogmatism would imply that the more dogmatic the respondents would be less likely to be persuaded by any counter-argument, regardless of the initial position that they may stake out. On the contrary, we find that among persons who at first rejected racist attitudes, it is the dogmatists among them who can more readily be persuaded to adopt racist stereotypes.
We propose two explanations for this phenomenon. First, dogmatists are more likely to be racist in the first place (as we saw in Table 6). If for some reason they do not stake out a racist position initially (i.e., their racism is hidden from view), a little persuasion can induce many of them to adopt a more racist position. Second, on the theoretical level we note the consistency between these results and what we would predict from the idea of dissonance reduction. It is not their cognitive flexibility or inclination to adopt socially desirable positions that gets dogmatists to move in a more racist direction, but rather the fact that the position they adopted initially in the survey was inconsistent with their underlying beliefs.

It is noteworthy that at this stage in the question sequence, the other social desirability indicator had no effect on persuasibility. In contrast to the effect of the race-of-the-interviewer on people’s initial responses to the stereotype questions, race-of-interviewer has no distinct effects – in one direction or the other – on the effectiveness of the counter-arguments in inducing respondents to change their positions on the racial stereotype questions. We conjecture that this is because the respondents had already weighed the information about the race of the interviewer when they gave their initial response. At that stage in the interview (after five to seven minutes had elapsed), the respondents had probably already formed a judgment about the interviewer’s race and hence took this information into account when first answering the stereotype questions. For those respondents who had already taken this cue into account in forming their answers to the stereotype questions, there was no reason later to modify their position on account of the interviewer’s race.

Further experimentation with the effects of interviewer race may help to reveal how well-founded this conjecture may be. One approach might be to split the interviewing session up and have the first iteration of the questions administered by interviewers of one race, and the second iteration administered by interviewers of the other race. Alternatively, the test could use a call-back or a follow-up survey to determine the impact of a change in the race-of-the-interviewer on the survey responses.
In any case, our results (especially in Table 5) make clear that the race of the interviewer must be directly taken into account in the data analysis, even if it was not “controlled” at the interviewing stage.

Based on the consistency of responses and where respondents end-up after being exposed to information contradicting their racial beliefs, we use this information to reclassify respondents’ initial responses. Given that the change is not random, the counter-arguments probably unmask more valid and moderate attitudes than were initially given. Assigning those who back off their initial position a more moderate score on the stereotype measures, but not assigning them to a neutral or to the opposite position, produces a better fit of the recoded responses to the data. Because many things may influence respondents to back off of their initial answers, we cannot be sure if it is only hidden racists who moderate their expressed views in response to counter-arguments. Nonetheless, whether we rely on the moderate recoding (Version 1) or the repetition of the initial items at the end of the survey, we capture people’s racial beliefs better after counter-arguments than before.
Appendix

Wording of Survey Items

**Dogmatism.** The dogmatism items are adapted mainly from Rokeach but have a 4-point agree-disagree response scale, with a middle position (“neither agree nor disagree” recorded if the respondent volunteered this response – very few responses were coded in to this neutral category).

“Next I want to ask you some questions that are completely different from ones I just asked. For each, please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with each statement.”

1. “Of all the different philosophies that exist in the world there is probably only one that is correct.”

2. “There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against it.”

3. “Most of the ideas that get printed nowadays are not worth the paper they are printed on.”

4. “To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.”

5. “A group which tolerates too many differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.”

Items 1 through 5 were combined into a simple dogmatism scale, with each item weighted equally by calculating the mean score across the five questions. The scale runs from 5 (most dogmatic) to 1 (least dogmatic). The mean is 2.58, the standard deviation 0.97. Cronbach’s alpha of this scale is .70. Factor analysis of these items resulted in a single factor solution with an eigenvalue of 2.29, explaining 46 percent of the variance.

**Attitude Intensity.** On the racial stereotype questions, “ego involved” individuals are those who initially give a “strongly agree” or “strongly disagree.” In the regression analysis, responses are scored as binary variables, with 1 being “high involvement” (agree or disagree “strongly”) and 0 being “low involvement” (agree or disagree “somewhat”).

**Racial Stereotypes and Persuasive Counter-Arguments.** These are all presented above in the main text.
References


Table 1. Distribution of Initial Responses to Racial Stereotype Questions

“**Do you think blacks are more violent than whites?**”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean on 5-point scale: 3.82
Std. Dev.: 1.34
N: 682

“**Do you think blacks are lazier than whites?**”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean on 5-point scale: 4.24
Std. Dev.: 1.15
N: 680

“**Do you think blacks are less responsible than whites?**”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean on 5-point scale: 3.98
Std. Dev.: 1.27
N: 669

**p<.01; *p<.05.**
Table 2. Percent of Respondents Who Endorse Combinations of Stereotypes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combination Endorsed</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None of Stereotypes</td>
<td>61.0%</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks Are Violent (only)</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks are Lazy (only)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks Are Irresponsible (only)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent and Lazy</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent and Irresponsible</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy and Irresponsible</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent, Lazy, and Irresponsible</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Percent</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base N</td>
<td></td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Persons who answered “agree strongly,” “agree somewhat,” or “neither agree nor disagree” are classified as endorsing a given stereotype. Those who answered “disagree strongly” or “disagree somewhat” are classified as rejecting the stereotype.*
Table 3. The Effects of Persuasive Communications on Initial Opponents of Racial Stereotypes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counter-argument</th>
<th>Initial Attitudea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opponents of blacks are more violent stereotype</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Would you still feel that way even if there is more violent crime in black neighborhoods and more blacks are going to prison than whites, or would that change your mind?”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, Still Feel Same Way</td>
<td>86.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, Change Mind</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman-Kruskal gamma</td>
<td>-.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base N</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opponents of blacks are lazier stereotype</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Would you still feel that way if there are more black people on welfare who don’t have jobs, or would that change your mind?”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, Still Feel Same Way</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, Change Mind</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman-Kruskal gamma</td>
<td>-.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base N</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opponents of blacks are less responsible stereotype</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Would you still feel that way if blacks have more children out of wedlock and their fathers are not around to help raise their kids, or would that change your mind?”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, Still Feel Same Way</td>
<td>79.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, Change Mind</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman-Kruskal gamma</td>
<td>-.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base N</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The responses “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree” are interpreted as “strong”; responses “strongly disagree” and “somewhat disagree” are interpreted as “weak.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counter-argument</th>
<th>Initial Attitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters of blacks are more violent stereotype</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Would you still feel that way if when reporting news, newspapers and television frequently report negative images of blacks?”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, Still Feel Same Way</td>
<td>79.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, Change Mind</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman-Kruskal gamma</td>
<td>-.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base N</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters of blacks are lazier stereotype</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Would you still feel that way if social conditions and lack of job opportunities make it difficult for blacks to go to school and to find jobs, or would that change your mind?”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, Still Feel Same Way</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, Change Mind</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman-Kruskal gamma</td>
<td>-.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base N</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters of blacks are less responsible stereotype</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Would you still feel that way if living in poverty makes it difficult for blacks to raise their children, or would that change your mind?”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, Still Feel Same Way</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, Change Mind</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman-Kruskal gamma</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base N</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5. Regression of Stereotypes on Socio-Demographic Background, Dogmatism, and Race-of-the-Interviewer (unstandardized regression coefficients; t-ratios in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: a</th>
<th>More Violent</th>
<th>Lazier</th>
<th>Less Responsible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education b</strong></td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>-.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.839)</td>
<td>(-.377)</td>
<td>(-1.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>.007**</td>
<td>.011**</td>
<td>1.227**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.387)</td>
<td>(4.441)</td>
<td>(4.324)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td>.206**</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.371**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.019)</td>
<td>(.272)</td>
<td>(3.858)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dogmatism c</strong></td>
<td>.215**</td>
<td>.406**</td>
<td>.288**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.883)</td>
<td>(8.898)</td>
<td>(5.457)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black Interviewer d</strong></td>
<td>-.356**</td>
<td>-.316**</td>
<td>-.243**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.440)</td>
<td>(-3.740)</td>
<td>(-2.495)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>1.907**</td>
<td>.429</td>
<td>2.013**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.349)</td>
<td>(1.196)</td>
<td>(5.691)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEE</strong></td>
<td>1.25**</td>
<td>1.02**</td>
<td>1.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adjusted R²</strong></td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>606</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<.01; * p<.05.

a The dependent variables are 5-point stereotype questions, with the polarity reversed so that higher scores represent greater stereotyping.

b Years of formal education attained.

c Ranges from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). See Appendix.

d Binary variable: 1 if interviewer was African American; 0 if interviewer was white. Cases where interviewers were of other racial-ethnic groups were excluded from the analysis.
Table 6. Logistic Regression of Factors Predicting Whether Counter-Argument Persuaded Respondent to Change Initial Opinion on Racial Stereotypes\(^a\)  
(t-ratios in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Initially Supported Stereotype</th>
<th>Initially Rejected Stereotype</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More Violent</td>
<td>Lazier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>-.169</td>
<td>.344*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.597)</td>
<td>(1.905)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>.026*</td>
<td>.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.926)</td>
<td>(1.484)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td>-1.574**</td>
<td>-.367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.984)</td>
<td>(-.646)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dogmatism</strong></td>
<td>-.712**</td>
<td>.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.682)</td>
<td>(.909)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitude Intensity</strong>(^b)</td>
<td>.702</td>
<td>-.507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.190)</td>
<td>(-.744)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black Interviewer</strong></td>
<td>-.258</td>
<td>-.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.533)</td>
<td>(-.208)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>2.447</td>
<td>-7.095**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.198)</td>
<td>(-2.193)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Pseudo-R\(^2\)**  | .248         | .144   | .063            | .222         | .163    | .110            |
| **N**                | 125          | 73     | 114             | 447          | 503     | 401             |

**\(p<.01\); *\(p<.05\).

\(^a\) The dependent variables are dichotomous: whether or not the respondents changed their opinion after the counter-argument.

\(^b\) Respondents are scored as 1 if initially they “strongly” agreed or disagreed with the stereotype, and 0 if initially they “somewhat” agreed or disagreed with the stereotype.
Table 7. Percentages and Correlations Between First and Second Responses to Stereotype Questions\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All R’s</th>
<th></th>
<th>Switchers</th>
<th></th>
<th>Stand-Patters</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks More Violent</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>.811</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>.612</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>.860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks Lazier</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>.773</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>.803</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>.779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks Less Responsible</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>.793</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>.736</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>.814</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} Switchers are respondents who changed their positions in response to counter-arguments. Stand-patters are respondents who did not change their positions in response to counter-arguments.
Table 8. Comparison of Different Measures of Racial Prejudice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Original Questions</th>
<th>Repeated Questions</th>
<th>Recoded Scales&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ver. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Factor Analytic Results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance Explained of First Factor</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor Loadings:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Responsible</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. ( \chi^2 ) and Predicted Probabilities (in parenthesis) of Support for Pro-Black Policies, Using Scaled Stereotype Items as Predictors&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges should reserve openings for black students</td>
<td>17.21</td>
<td>14.98</td>
<td>16.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(61.13)</td>
<td>(61.44)</td>
<td>(61.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government should increase spending for programs to help blacks</td>
<td>24.24</td>
<td>29.33</td>
<td>23.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(56.73)</td>
<td>(58.02)</td>
<td>(56.30)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> See Figure 1 for information on how the three versions of the scales are derived from the responses to the original questions and the counter-arguments. Persons responding affirmatively to the counter-argument had their responses to the original stereotype items recoded according the three versions.

<sup>b</sup> Based on Logit regression equations in which each of the racial policy issues is taken in turn as the dependent variable and the three stereotype indicators are represented by a factor score. The questions are dichotomized into those who favor the policy and those who are neutral or oppose it.
Figure 1. Reclassification of Respondents Based On Their Responses to Counter Arguments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Scale</th>
<th>Response to Counter-Argument</th>
<th>New Measurement Scales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>Ver. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - Neither</td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - Strongly Agree</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - Strongly Agree</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>