Americans' Perceptions of the Causes of Terrorism: Why Do They Hate Us?

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Abstract

In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, many Americans sought to answer the question, "Why do they hate us?" Few opinion surveys in the aftermath of 9/11 asked whether American foreign policy might have been partly responsible for motivating the attacks. Not did surveys at the time investigate more broadly Americans' perceptions of the root causes of the terrorist attacks. Using a national RDD telephone survey conducted in late 2001, this study finds that 53 percent of Americans attributed responsibility to the U.S. for the hatred that led to the attacks. Even among political conservatives, 42 percent saw the U.S. as at least somewhat responsible. To account for such results, the study examines the effects of demographic characteristics, political orientations (partisan ID and liberalism-conservatism), and orientations toward the political system (national pride and political trust). The study also examines perceptions of the "root causes" of the terrorist attacks and shows clear linkages between these perceptions and the readiness to attribute responsibility to the U.S. for motivating the attacks.

Americans' Perceptions of the Causes of Terrorism: Why Do They Hate Us?

> *Americans are asking, "Why do they hate us?"*
>
> *They hate what they see right here in this chamber: a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other .*
>
> – **President George W. Bush, Speech to the Nation before a Joint Session of Congress, September 20, 2001**

In the wake of the September 11, 2001, several well-publicized surveys of world public opinion revealed shocking evidence that America was not well liked, not just by terrorists but even by average people in many countries long considered friendly toward the United States. Underlying many of these perceptions was a belief that the U.S. had itself and its policies to blame for the hatred that led to the attacks. In surveys of opinion leaders around the world during December 2001, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (hereafter: Pew Research Center) found that while America was admired on the whole and its leadership in the war against international terrorism widely endorsed, people saw American foreign policy to be unilateralist and America's new vulnerability in the wake of the September 11 attack to be a good thing:

> Commenting on public sentiment in their countries, opinion leaders in most regions say U.S. policies are believed to be a principal cause of the Sept. 11 attack. And majorities in all parts of the world, including Western Europe, say that many or most of the people in their countries think it is good that Americans now know what it is like to be vulnerable.[1]

In its WorldViews survey conducted in May 2002, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) and German Marshall Fund (GMF) found that majorities of citizens of six European countries believed that U.S. foreign policy "contributed to" the September 11 terrorist

[1] Pew Research Center (Dec. 19, 2001), "America Admired, Yet Its New Vulnerability Seen As Good Thing, Say Opinion Leaders" at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=145.

attack.[2] The percentages of respondents who agreed with the statement were: France 63 percent, The Netherlands 59 percent, Great Britain 57 percent, Poland 54 percent, Germany 52 percent, and Italy 51 percent. In its published report, the CCFR/GMF characterized the responses as indicating that majorities in these European countries "blamed" the U.S. for the attack.

Would not the overwhelming majority of Americans reject the predominant European view, as they rallied around the flag after the September 11 attack? After all, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Americans symbolized their national feelings with pervasive displays of the flag, anger toward the perpetrators of the attacks, and strong approval of and support for the President's anti-terrorist initiatives. But does this mean they would automatically reject the view that America itself was partly responsible for the horrific attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon?

Some public opinion surveys conducted shortly after the terrorist attacks suggested that some American citizens did see a connection between the terrorist attacks and their government's behavior.[3] However, what is less certain is the factors that might encourage such a position and the underlying reasons why American citizens might think their government bears some of the responsibility. While it might be understandable for foreigners to attribute responsibility to the U.S. government, what is needed is more data to help understand whether and why Americans even at that time might have been willing to attribute such responsibility.

This study analyzes the results of a nationwide telephone survey conducted in the United States a few months after 9/11. It has two main purposes: (1) to assess whether the U.S. was perceived as responsible for motivating the terrorists, and(b) to understand how Americans perceived the root causes of terrorism, specifically whether they perceived American foreign policy, or mainly external factors or characteristics of the terrorists, to be the most important factors. If

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[2] *Q. 27: "Some say American foreign policy has contributed to the September 11 attacks. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? Strongly or somewhat?"* (CCFR 2002)

[3] See Pew Research Center (Sept. 27, 2001), "Military Action a Higher Priority than Homeland Defense" at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=2.

majorities of *Europeans* viewed America as partly responsible for the terrorist attack, how many *American*s assigned such responsibility, and which ones? Could they provide reasons for such judgments or were they mainly evaluating the behavior of American leaders based on ideological or partisan criteria?

Measuring Perceptions of U.S. Responsibility and the Root Causes of the Terrorist Attack

The first wave of the Civil Liberties Survey upon which the core of this study is based was conducted between November 14, 2001, and January 15, 2002. It was a nationwide random digit dialing telephone survey of 1,448 individuals age 18 and over. The sample was stratified to increase the proportion of African American and Latino respondents. The data are weighted in the analysis to be representative of the adult population of the country as a whole.[4]

Perceived U.S. Responsibility

We formulated a question that was designed to address the issue of responsibility for the terrorist attacks. We thought it would be counter-productive to ask directly whether the U.S. was to *blame* for the attacks. Although a few people might subscribe to the type of conspiracy theories that became popular in some circles in the U.S. and Europe (in which the FBI, the CIA, or "American interests" are said to have been behind the attacks (see Cave 2002, Corn 2002) or in the Middle East (in which Israel is sometimes said to be behind the attacks[5]), very few Americans would be likely to see the United States government or its agencies as directly responsible for the 9/11 attacks.

[4] For technical details see Hembroff (2002). The response rate for wave 1 was 52.3 percent, and the refusal rate 19.0 percent, using the AAPOR standard RR4. See AAPOR "Standard Definitions" at www.aapor.org/default.asp?page=survey_methods/standards_and_best_practices/standard_definitions. Information about wave 2 can be found in Hembroff (2004).

[5] In a widely cited survey in nine Moslem countries conducted by Gallup in February 2002, in most of the countries large majorities of the population did not believe the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were carried out by Moslems, in contrast to equally large majorities of Americans who did think Arabs or Muslims carried out the attacks (Benedetto 2002). For critiques of the Gallup Poll of Moslem countries, see Morin and Deane (2002) and Zogby (2002).

We thought it more likely, however, that a modest proportion of Americans would perceive a link between America's foreign policy behavior and the motivating emotion behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks, specifically, *hatred* toward America or its policies. We therefore formulated the question as follows:

> *How much responsibility do you personally believe the U.S. bears for the hatred that led to the terrorist attacks? Would you say a lot of responsibility, some, a little, or none at all?*

With this question we sought to tap the idea that even though the United States government did not attack itself and did nothing to justify such horrific terrorist attacks against its citizens, an important underlying motivation that led to such extreme acts was dislike or hatred toward America's policies or government. In other words, our question asked, "To what extent did the U.S. cause the underlying hatred, even if it did not deserve the attacks?" Our question was inspired by a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in mid-September 2001.[6] But we avoided the explicit assertion that the U.S. "did wrong" or "was unfair" in its dealings with other countries.

Perceived Root Causes

We also designed a set of questions that would tap people's perceptions of the underlying or root causes of the September 11 attack. Our goal was not to attribute blame but to see how many Americans had an opinion about the link between the attack and certain causes that had been widely discussed in the press after the 9/11 attack. The general introduction to the root causes questions was:

> *People have different opinions about the root causes of terrorism against the United States. As I a possible cause, please tell me whether you think it is a very important cause, somewhat important cause, not very important cause, or not at all important cause.*

The items included:

[6] First, *"Do you think there is anything the US has done wrong in its dealings with other countries that might have motivated the terrorist attacks, or not?"* Second, *"Q.13. Do you think there is any way that the U.S. has been unfair in its dealings with other countries that might have motivated the terrorist attacks, or not?"*

The U.S. government's support of Israel (Is this a very important cause, somewhat important cause, not very important cause, or not at all important cause of terrorism?).

The U.S. not providing enough economic aid to poor countries.

The Islamic religion

The U.S. pursuing only its own economic interests in its dealings with other countries.

Terrorists believing that it is the only way that their grievances will be heard.

The U.S. meddling too much in the affairs of other countries.

Feelings of revenge by terrorists for harms done to their people.

These causes were not intended to be exhaustive but rather to reflect the variety of factors that were discussed in the popular press after the September 11 attack. In some cases, they also reflect widely held views of the United States abroad. For example, in surveys in August 2001 (before the September 11 attack), large majorities of Europeans expressed dislike for America's foreign policies and a belief that the U.S. was too unilateralist.[7] Long after the September 11, 2001 attacks, America continued to be viewed in other countries as unilateralist. For example, the "What the World Thinks in 2002" survey by the Pew Research Center found widespread support (except in the Middle East) for America's leadership in the war on terrorism, but simultaneously a widespread belief that United States foreign policy does not take into account the views of other countries and that the United States exacerbates the gap between rich and poor countries.

In writing both the U.S. responsibility and root causes questions, we sought to avoid politicizing the survey as a whole. Also, unlike the CCFR/GMF survey, which devoted a lot of attention to U.S. foreign policy, including specifically President George W. Bush's actions and alleged motivations, our survey asked only a couple of questions about the President, and, aside from the questions about the causes of terrorism, no other questions about U.S. foreign policy.

[7] Pew Research Center (Aug. 15, 2991), "Bush Unpopular in Europe, Seen As Unilateralist" at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=5. Similar views of American foreign policy were found in surveys in Europe taken six months later. See Pew Research Center (April 17, 2002), "Americans and Europeans Differ Widely on Foreign Policy Issues. Bush's Ratings Improve But He's Still Seen as Unilateralist" at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=153.

Theoretical Expectations

Not only is the Attack on America unprecedented in its audacity and its toll of lives lost, but it is outside the range of topics that are ordinarily included in studies of foreign policy attitudes, in particular the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy (cf. Holsti 1996). Because we focus on one attitude rather than a set of attitudes or an attitude domain, we do not adopt methods that would be especially appropriate to the study of such domains (cf. Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Peffley and Hurwitz 1993). Nonetheless, we expect not only that the number of Americans who hold America responsible for the attack will be small but also, based on previous literature, that some groups of Americans will be less likely to hold America responsible than others. People's opinions on this matter should be anchored in and predicated upon their (1) social location, (2) political orientations or location on the political spectrum (liberal-conservative ideology and partisan identification), and (3) general attitudes toward the political system (trust and national pride).

The rationale for examining the effects of both demographic background and political orientations has been well established in the literature on foreign policy attitudes (Holsti 1996, ch. 5). Although the relevance of partisanship and ideology to the structuring of policy attitudes remains an area on which past scholarship has disagreed, that such attitudes are systematically anchored in broader political orientations has been convincingly demonstrated (e.g., Holsti 1966, Peffley and Hurwitz 1993).

Ethnicity and Race. With respect to demographic background, we have strong prior expectations only with respect to race and ethnicity. While no doubt sympathetic to the victims, African Americans have lower levels of trust in the federal government than do whites. Not only did 90 percent of African Americans vote against George W. Bush in the 2000 election (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2002) but on the whole they can also be expected to take a more sympathetic attitude toward the underdog against an American government that has in the past oppressed and

discriminated against African Americans. Thus more African Americans than whites should hold the U.S. government responsible for motivating the terrorists.

We also expect Hispanics, on the whole, to take a more critical view of American foreign policy than whites. To be sure, roughly one-third voted for Bush in the 2000 election (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2002), they display strong support for core American values (de la Garza 1996) and strong civic identification with America,[8] and they are socially conservative on some issues (Pew Hispanic Center 2002). On the whole Hispanics are not actively engaged in foreign policy (Pachon, de la Garza, and Pantoja 1998), though immigration issues are very salient (Uhlaner and Garcia 2002). Furthermore, they do travel frequently to Latin America and share ethnic and other ties to that region, and for that reason we conjecture that Hispanics are more likely than whites to regard American foreign behavior as often harmful and likely to generate resentment in the third world.[9]

Ideology and Party ID. In the current study, we expect ideology and partisan identification to matter for the evaluation of U.S. responsibility for the terrorist attacks – despite strong rally effects that might dampen partisan and ideological differences – because the issue of responsibility itself focuses on the performance of American elected officials. Democrats and liberals should more readily attribute responsibility to the U.S., and few Republicans and conservatives should do so. Democrats and liberals, few of whom voted for President Bush in 2000 and some of whom because of the constitutional contestation over the outcome may regard Bush's victory as tainted,

[8] For example, 74 percent of Hispanic respondents in the Civil Liberties Survey say they are "very proud" to be an American, compared with 84 percent among non-Hispanic whites and 67 percent among African Americans. Given that some of the Hispanic respondents are not American citizens, and some not born in the United States, this is a very high level of "national pride." Among Hispanics born in the U.S., 84 percent say they are "very proud" to be an American – the same percentage as among white non-Hispanics.

[9] Because of the small number of Hispanic respondents in the survey, we cannot differentiate Hispanics further by national origin or identification. It is well known, however, that Cuban Americans in particular are much more supportive of the Republican Party than are other major Hispanic groups – even among those who identify themselves as politically liberal (see Uhlaner and Garcia 2002).

might more readily criticize the international conduct of the President.[10] Republicans and conservatives, on the other hand, might more readily acknowledge that in the conduct of international affairs, and in defense of the American national interest, political leaders may have to make unpopular or difficult choices. Conservatives in general can be expected to give greater deference to established political authority than liberals (McClosky 1958).

Liberalism-conservatism is assessed in this study using the following standard question used in the American National Election Study: *"Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a conservative, a moderate, or a liberal? Would you consider yourself very conservative (very liberal) or somewhat conservative (somewhat liberal)? If moderate, do you generally think of yourself as closer to the conservative side or the liberal side?"* Only the first answer is used to classify the respondents here. Party identification was determined by also using a standard American National Election Study question: *"Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, an Independent, a Democrat, or something else?"* Only the answer to this question was used, not the follow-up questions designed to assess further partisan leanings within the initial categories.

National Pride and Political Trust. Inclusion of general orientations to the system as a whole as an independent factor in foreign policy attitudes has not been standard, although the ability of political leaders to mobilize public sentiment behind foreign and military policy initiatives has long been recognized (Campbell and Cain 1965, Rosenberg, Verba, and Converse 1970) but not always considered as reflecting a fundamental orientation underlying foreign policy opinion, as opposed to a factor that might be mobilized in the event of international threats or hostilities.

Other surveys have revealed a sharp increase not only in national pride but also in expressed trust toward the federal government as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, reversing a long-term secular trend (Alford 2001, Smith *et al.* 2001, Chanley 2002, Rasinski *et al.* 2002, Hether-

[10] On partisan and ideological divisions of the year 2000 Presidential vote, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (2002), Jacoby (2004), and Erikson and Tedin (2001).

ington and Nelson 2003).[11] It would be normal for Americans to rally around the flag – and increase their support for national political leaders – in defense of the country against an external enemy. Further, this was an attack with a heavy loss of life by Americans on American territory, not a hypothetical threat of the sort that is often manipulated in word experiments in surveys. More than three-fourths of Americans professed to be angry over the attacks.[12] Nonetheless, those who profess greater national pride and political trust are less likely to attribute responsibility to the U.S. for the hatred to led to the terrorist attacks, independently of partisan or ideological inclinations.

We use indicators of "national pride" and "trust in the federal government" to reflect the degree of affect or diffuse support for the political community and for the authorities, respectively (Easton 1957, Klingemann 1999). People who have greater affect toward both of these aspects of the political system should be less likely to view the U.S. as responsible for the hatred that motivated the terrorist attacks. Our use of political trust as an independent variable is consistent with the argument by Hetherington (1998), but we extend his argument to include national pride.

We use the standard World Values Survey (WVS) question to assess the level of national pride, which is commonly interpreted to as a measure of psychological or affective attachment to the political community: *"How proud are you to be an American?"* We did not attempt to measure national pride as a multidimensional attitude (cf. Smith and Jarkko 1998), nor to measure patriotism, whether formulated as chauvinism, "blind patriotism" (Schatz *et al.* 1999), "symbolic patriotism" (Sullivan *et al.* 1992), or some other related affective or cognitive orientation. However, using the standard WVS national pride question we did expect to find people's judgments of U.S. responsibility for the hatred that led to 9/11 attack to be inversely related to the strength of people's general pride in

[11] For over-time comparisons, which reveal an upward spike in popular trust in the federal government and in symbolic expressions of national pride after the 9/11 attacks, as well as substantial dissipation of this effect a year later, see "Washington Post Poll: September 11 Anniversary," *Washington Post*, September 8, 2002 (www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data090802.htm).

[12] See Pew Research Center (Oct. 4, 2001), "Americans Open to Dissenting Views on the War on Terrorism" at http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?PageID=4.

larger political community.

We use one of the standard questions from the American National Election Study to assess political trust: *"How much of the time can you trust the government in Washington to do what is right?"* Support for the government, or the political authorities in office, is distinct from national pride or support for the political community. In wave 1 of our national survey, the product-moment correlation between national pride and political trust is .24.

Information about the 9/11 Events. This is one international event of which almost all Americans were highly aware, even if they were uncertain or less informed about the event's antecedents. The 9/11 attack was not the type of international event that generates concern from only a few Americans who are politically engaged or highly attentive to the mass media. A survey taken a few days after 9/11 indicated that the terror attacks were among the most intensely watched major events, with 96 percent of adults following the story either very closely (74 percent) or fairly closely (22 percent).[13] Hence, differential exposure to the mass media was not likely to be a critical variable that might cause differential mobilization of support for the federal government and the President (Brody and Shapiro 1991, Edwards 1997).

Because of this high media exposure, we assume that most Americans were exposed to the variety of explanations for the terrorist attacks that were discussed in the mass media shortly after the attacks, ranging from Islamic fundamentalism and feelings of retribution by terrorists for harms that they felt were done to their countries, to poverty and underdevelopment, to U.S. policy toward Israel and the Middle East, to U.S. meddling in the affairs of other countries, America acting on its own in international affairs, and other issues.

At the same time, it is important to note that during the period in which our initial survey was conducted, there was comparatively little media attention to whether American intelligence or

[13] Pew Research Center (Sept. 19, 2001), "American Psyche Reeling from Terror Attacks" at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=3.

investigative agencies, or the Presidential administration more broadly, had missed key signals that might have led them to prevent the 9/11 attacks. Although the identities of the hijackers were quickly discovered, and the President and Congress moved quickly, with broad public support, to retaliate against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, only in May and June of 2002 was it revealed publicly that FBI headquarters had not followed up on appeals from agents in its own regional offices in Phoenix and Minneapolis in summer 2001 to investigate foreigners enrolled in flying schools in the U.S. (Risen 2002, Lewis 2002, Johnston and Becker 2002, Sisk 2002).

In sum, we expect forces that produce a rally effect in time of war, in this case a rally that was "extraordinary in its size and duration" (Hetherington and Nelson 2003: 41), to lead to few Americans seeing the U.S. itself as responsible for the terrorist attacks. However, we expect perceptions of U.S. responsibility to be constrained by political orientations and sociodemographic differences that commonly shape opinions about government policy and performance. At the same time, we speculate that most people will be able to rationalize their judgment of U.S. responsibility by referring to specific "reasons," not just relying on their ideological or partisan predilections.

Results

U.S. Responsibility

Our prior expectation that few Americans would say that the U.S. bears responsibility for the hatred behind the terrorist attacks was immediately dashed by the survey results: 20 percent said that the United States bears a lot of responsibility; 33 percent, some responsibility; 25 percent, little responsibility; and 23 percent, "none." In all, 53 percent said that the U.S. bears at least some responsibility for the hatred that led to the terrorist attacks. The percentage of Americans who assigned at least some responsibility to the United States was very similar to the percentage of *Europeans* in the CCFR/GMF survey who reported that U.S. foreign policy "contributed to" the terrorist attacks. Our result is especially surprising when we consider that the 9/11 attacks evoked

such strong rally effects in support of the federal government and the President's leadership (Hetherington and Nelson 2003; Schubert, Stewart, and Curran 2002).

Robustness of Finding. The unexpectedly high percentage of respondents who reported that the United States bears some or a great deal of responsibility for the terrorist attacks raises concerns about the possible influence of the survey timing and context. First, in the months immediately after the 9/11 attacks on America, people might have been more inclined to say that the United States bears responsibility for the hatred that led to the attacks than they would at a later time. Second, by asking this question midway through a survey whose main subject is the Attack on America, we might have artificially affected the responses. Third, the question on U.S. responsibility was asked after the series of questions about the root causes of terrorism, so that the root causes questions might have influenced or primed the answers to the U.S. responsibility question.

We conducted what is tantamount to a test for all three factors by asking the identical question about U.S. responsibility in telephone surveys conducted in the state of Michigan in 2002 through early 2004. None of the Michigan statewide surveys focused on terrorism as a major theme, and none included the root causes questions as possible contaminants. Furthermore, we replicated the U.S. responsibility question in wave 2 of our national survey conducted between February and May 2003, but with the questions on root causes and U.S. responsibility randomly ordered with respect to one another.

Table 1 reports the distribution of responses to the U.S. responsibility question in waves 1 and 2 of the national Civil Liberties Survey and in five State of the State (SOSS) surveys in Michigan conducted between November 2001 and early March 2004.[14] Most noticeable is the stability of the

[14] The State of the State Survey (SOSS) is a quarterly 20-minute RDD telephone survey with a typical *N* of 1,000 respondents, based on a stratified sample of persons age 18 or over in Michigan. The data are weighted to be representative of the adult population of the state. The surveys are conducted by the Institute for Public Policy and Social Research (IPPSR) at Michigan State University. For methodological details see http://www.ippsr.msu.edu/soss/SOSSdata.htm.

distribution of responses across the five independent random samples of Michigan's population. In each case, a majority responded that the United States bears a lot or some responsibility for the hatred that led to the terrorist attacks. Although Michigan is not a microcosm of the United States, it is large and politically diverse, and the SOSS surveys are based on representative samples of Michigan adults.

[Table 1 About Here]

It is extremely unlikely, therefore, that our findings on U.S. responsibility in our national survey conducted in November 2001-January 2002 were mainly an artifact of the date of the survey. Furthermore, in the second wave of the national survey conducted in January-May 2003, we randomized the ordering of the U.S. responsibility question and the set of questions on root causes. The overall the distribution of responses in wave 2 remained virtually unchanged from the wave 1 of the national Civil Liberties Survey and hardly differs from the SOSS in Michigan.

Who Assigns Responsibility to the U.S.?

We hypothesized that the willingness to assign responsibility for the hatred that led to the terrorist attacks would depend on or be anchored in three kinds of factors: social background, in particular race and ethnicity; locations on ideological and partisan political spectrums; and degree of diffuse support or affect for the political system as a whole.

Figure 1 shows the percentages of respondents in the first wave of the Civil Liberties Survey who stated that the U.S. bears some or a lot of responsibility for the hatred that led to the terrorist attacks, broken down by demographic and attitudinal factors.

[Figure 1 About Here]

Demographic Differences. While women are somewhat more likely than men to say that the U.S. bears at least some responsibility (though less likely than men to say that the U.S. bears *a lot* of responsibility), and we also observe some differences by education and age, the most remarkable

demographic differences in the responses are those associated with race and ethnicity.[15]

Whereas 49 percent of white respondents say that the U.S. bears at least some responsibility for the hatred that led to the terrorist attacks, 57 percent of African Americans and 66 percent of Latinos hold this view. On the one hand, this means that even among whites, almost half hold the U.S. at least somewhat responsible (though only 15 percent say the U.S. has a lot of responsibility). On the other hand, clear majorities of African Americans and Latinos assign responsibility to the U.S. for the hatred that led to the attacks.

We expected African Americans and Latinos to take a more critical view of America's international role and image than whites because of their experience of discrimination and sense of "difference" from the white and Anglo population. Although it is true of our respondents that members of these two groups are more likely than whites to be liberals and Democrats, we expect African Americans and Latinos to hold a less favorable view of American policy than whites even after partisan and liberal-conservative attachments are taken into account.

We were not able to include a sufficient number of respondents from other major ethnic groups to assess their perceptions of who is responsible for the terrorist attacks. The Hamilton College Poll, conducted with Zogby International in April 2002, found that only one-third of Muslim Americans assigned responsibility to Osama Bin Laden. In contrast, more than 44 percent offered "no opinion" on who was responsible.[16] However, this poll did not ask whether the United States was responsible.

Two surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center confirm race differences in the readiness to hold the U.S. responsible for the terrorist attacks. In a survey in September 2001, in answer

[15] The questions on ethnicity and race follow the procedure of the U.S. census, with one question asking whether the respondent is Latino or Hispanic, and a second question asking the respondent's race. We treat black, white, and Hispanic/Latino as mutually exclusive categories. "Whites" here are non-Hispanic whites; "blacks" consists of both white and Hispanic blacks; and "Hispanics/Latinos" are white Hispanics. The small number of persons of other races (Native American and Asian) are excluded from the breakdowns by race and ethnicity but are included in overall or summary figures for the respondents as a whole.

[16] "The Hamilton College Muslim America Poll": www.hamilton.edu/news/muslimamerica/analysis.html.

to Q. 12 (*"Has the U.S. done anything wrong in its dealings with other countries that might have motivated the terrorist attacks?"*), while 34 percent of white respondents said "yes," 60 percent of African Americans said "yes."[17] Similarly, in its survey in August 2002, in answer to Q. 64 (identical to Q. 12 in the earlier survey), while 40 percent of white respondents said "yes," 53 percent of African American respondents said "yes." In both surveys, Latinos were more likely to say "yes" than were whites, though the differences were considerably smaller between Latinos and whites than between blacks and whites.

In replications of the same question used in the national Civil Liberties Survey, we also consistently find in the SOSS survey in Michigan sizeable racial and ethnic differences in the assignment of responsibility for the hatred to the U.S. Combining the five SOSS surveys in order to achieve an adequate base number of Latinos, we find that whereas 52 percent of whites in Michigan said that the U.S. bears at least some responsibility for the hatred that led to the attacks, 59 percent of Latinos and 70 percent of African Americans held such a view. In Wave 2 of the Civil Liberties Survey, we find that 52 percent of whites attributed responsibility for the hatred to the U.S., as did 61 percent of Latinos and 79 percent of African Americans (suggestive of growing alienation of African Americans from U.S. policies since Wave 1). At the same time, among the small number (26) of Asian Americans interviewed in Wave 2, 87 percent attributed responsibility to the U.S. Similarly, in the cumulative set of five SOSS surveys in which the US responsibility question has been asked we find that 88 percent of Asian Americans attribute responsibility to the U.S. (*N*=41).

Orientations to the System: National Pride and Political Trust. As expected, greater national pride is negatively correlated with assigning responsibility to the U.S. for the hatred (see Figure 1). While a large majority of Americans profess to be very proud to be American, and among those individuals 49 percent see the U.S. as at least somewhat responsible for the hatred, among

[17] These breakdowns by race were calculated from the original data, which are available on-line from the Pew Research Center at http://people-press.org/dataarchive/.

those Americans who claim just to be proud 55 percent hold the U.S. responsible for the hatred, and among the one in ten Americans who claim to be only somewhat proud or not proud to be an American, 91 percent hold the U.S. responsible for the hatred.

People are more ready to express distrust in the authorities than they are to profess a lack of national pride. At the same time, differences in national pride have a greater impact than differences in political trust on whether people see the U.S. as responsible for the hatred that led to the terrorism (Figure 1). Nonetheless, both pride and trust thus operate in the theoretically expected direction: lower psychological attachment to the system means that people assign greater responsibility to the U.S.

Political Orientations: Ideology and Partisan Identification. As expected, political orientations make a big difference in whether people assign responsibility to the U.S. Although even among self-identified conservatives, 42 percent say that the U.S. bears at least some responsibility for the hatred, among self-identified moderates 57 percent, and among liberals 58 percent, say that the U.S. bears some responsibility. Similarly, while 46 percent of Republicans see the U.S. as responsible, among independents this percentage rises to 52 and among Democrats to 58.

The differences associated with ideology and partisanship are not proxies for differences by race. Even among whites, while 40 percent of conservatives hold the U.S. as least somewhat responsible, 57 percent of liberals percent hold such a view. Furthermore, as we shall see, both political ideology and partisan identification independently make a difference for how people view the extent of U.S. responsibility.

Multivariate Analysis. To summarize the effects of the demographic and attitudinal factors we use logistic regression analysis, in which the dependent variable is converted into a binary variable, with a lot or some responsibility for the hatred scored as 1, and little or no responsibility

scored as 0.[18] Thus, we are seeking to predict the probability that people say the U.S. bears some or a lot of responsibility.

[Table 2 About Here]

Model 1 in Table 2 depicts the relationships between U.S. responsibility and several demographic variables. As in the bivariate context in Figure 1, those with advanced degrees, Latinos, blacks, and the young are more likely to attribute responsibility for the hatred to the U.S. (though the age effect is not statistically significant at $p \leq .05$).

Model 2 adds the variables measuring national pride and political trust, each as a multi-point scale.[19] Consistent with the bivariate relationships, lower national pride and lower trust in the federal government are associated with increased likelihood of attributing responsibility to the U.S., even after demographic differences are taken into account. Furthermore, the stronger tendency of Latinos to attribute responsibility to the U.S. for the hatred that led to the attacks holds up. That is, it is not just a product of their affect toward the system or the political community as a whole.[20] On the other hand, once political trust and national pride are taken into account, the difference between whites and blacks in the probability of attributing responsibility for the hatred to the U.S. disappears.

Model 3 confirms that the relationships between ideological orientations and the attribution of responsibility to the U.S. hold up even after we take demographic differences and overall levels of support for the political system into account. Those who identify themselves as political moderates or liberals are significantly more likely than political conservatives (the reference or omitted category) to attribute responsibility to the U.S.

Model 4 shows that partisan identification does not matter for how people view U.S.

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[18] An analogous procedure using ordinary least squares regression analysis on the full 4-point scale yields substantively identical results.

[19] Although for Figure 1 we collapsed the categories, in the regression analysis we treat national pride as a 5-point scale, and trust as a 4-point scale. See the notes to Table 2. Nonlinear transformations, or breaking the scales into ordered dummy variables, did not improve the overall fit.

[20] Nonadditive effects between race (and ethnicity), pride, and trust are statistically negligible.

responsibility once political ideology is taken into account. However, had the equation only included partisanship, and not ideology, partisanship would work in the expected direction, with Democrats being more likely to attribute responsibility to the U.S. (b=.387, s.e.=.146, $p<.01$). Bear in mind that the question on U.S. responsibility did not explicitly mention any political leader or political party, just "the U.S." However, people's attitudes concerning the motivation or responsibility for this event are nonetheless related to ideology and partisanship.

Thus, as hypothesized, people's views of U.S. responsibility for the hatred are structured by their social location, diffuse support for the system as a whole, and ideological and partisan locations. Because of the special character of the attitude that we are studying, generalizing from our finding to foreign policy attitudes broadly would be inappropriate. But we believe our focus on three sets of factors has been useful in highlighting the independent effects each type.

Based on Model 4, we show in Figure 2 the predicted probabilities of saying that the U.S. bears some or a lot of responsibility for the hatred as a function of race-ethnicity and political ideology, with the effects of the other variables held constant. While political ideology makes a difference, at least among whites and African Americans, the most distinctive differences are due to ethnicity: whatever their ideological position, Latinos are much more likely to assign responsibility to the U.S. than are either whites or African Americans. In fact, when the probabilities are plotted in this way (with the effects of trust, national, pride, party ID and other factors taken into account), African Americans are very similar to whites in their assignment of U.S. responsibility.

This does not mean, of course, that African Americans are just as likely as whites to attribute responsibility to the U.S. Rather it suggests that an important factor that accounts for this race difference is that African Americans trust the government a lot less than do whites (Davis and Silver 2004). In the face of increased concern about another terrorist attack Latinos, African Americans, and whites all displayed increased national pride; African Americans and whites maintained a strong commitment to democratic regime norms; and Latinos and whites displayed increased trust in the

government. But African Americans displayed *decreased* trust in the government. For African Americans 9/11 appears to have stimulated heightened concern about the loss of civil liberties and may have intensified memories of discrimination and terrorism in their experience in America.[21]

[Figure 2 About Here]

We find a similar pattern when we examine the relationships between race-ethnicity, party ID, and the assignment of responsibility for the hatred (Figure 3). Latinos remain distinctly more likely to assign responsibility to the U.S. than either whites or blacks, regardless of their party identification. Furthermore, party ID clearly matters for all three groups. In contrast to this ethnic difference, the partisan effects are small (with ideology held constant). We would assert that the greater readiness of Latinos to attribute responsibility to the U.S. is a result of their greater ability to view U.S. foreign policy from the perspective of how it is viewed abroad. Consistent with this idea we find that Latinos who were born in the U.S. are less likely to attribute responsibility to the U.S. than Latinos who were born elsewhere (though the differences is not statistically significant), while Latinos who speak Spanish at home are much more likely to attribute responsibility to the U.S.[22]

[Figure 3 About Here]

The differences associated with trust in government are on roughly the same order as the differences associated with liberalism-conservatism and partisan identification (Figure 4). More telling are differences associated with levels of national pride. With other factors taken into account, pride in the country as a whole matters a great deal for whether people assign responsibility to the U.S. To be sure, as is evident from Figure 1 (above), only a small percentage of people do *not* profess to be very proud or proud to be American, but even those who give an unqualified proud in answer to the question are substantially more likely (65%) than those who say *very* proud (47%) to

[21] This conclusion is based on data analyses not shown here.

[22] Using a version of Model 4 in Table 2 run separately for Latinos, we find for a dichotomous variable "speak a language other than English at home" that b=2.417, s.e.=.620, $p<.01$. We find a similar relationship for non-Latinos. However, much smaller percentages of non-Latinos than Latinos speak a language other than English at home (76 percent of Latinos vs. 10 percent of non-Latinos).

assign responsibility for the hatred to the U.S. Thus, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, when flag-waving and overt demonstrations of patriotic commitment became commonplace, those who rallied around the flag with less than maximum fervor were more likely to believe that the U.S. had indirectly motivated the attacks.

[Figure 4 About Here]

Perceptions of the Root Causes of 9/11

How important are various factors perceived to be as root causes of the terrorist attacks? We approached this question in two ways, first through a series of closed-ended questions; and second, as a validity check, through an open-ended followup question in one of the SOSS surveys.

The Civil Liberties Survey included a block of questions that asked each respondent to say how important a given factor was as a root cause of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Not only were these factors that had been mentioned widely in the media shortly after the attacks but, as we have seen, they were factors that many respondents probably had in mind when they first answered the question about U.S. responsibility for the hatred that led to the 9/11 attacks.

Figure 5 shows the percentage distribution of responses to the root causes questions. The items are ordered according to the percentage of respondents who say that a given cause is a somewhat important or very important cause (the original order of the questions was given in the text above). U.S. support of Israel is said by 85 percent of the respondents to be at least a somewhat important root cause. The next two are "feelings of revenge" and "terror the only way to express grievances," which 79 percent and 77 percent of the respondents say are somewhat or very important root causes. At the other end of the spectrum, that just over half (56 percent) of the respondents see "the Islamic religion" as a root cause ranks relatively low. That "U.S. doesn't give enough

aid" ranks at the bottom may be due to the common misperception among Americans that the U.S. gives far more foreign aid than it actually does.[23]

[Figure 5 About Here]

The correlations among the answers to the root cause questions are small, especially given that the questions are identical in format and asked in a single block. Even the "U.S. support of Israel" and "Feelings of revenge" questions are correlated at just .218; and "Feelings of revenge" and "Only way to express grievances" are correlated at .364. Of course, there is measurement error in survey responses, but the fact that these correlations are low means that each may capture a different aspect of what people feel about the root causes.[24]

Democrats are more likely than Republicans to say that the given reason was important or very important on six of the seven items. The exception is "Islamic Religion," which 60 percent of Republicans said is an important or very important root cause, compared with 56 percent of Democrats. Furthermore, the partisan differences in these proportions are statistically significant ($p \leq .05$) for five of the seven items. The exceptions are for "Islamic Religion" and "Only way to express grievances." Nonetheless, Republicans and Democrats give identical rank orderings of importance to the seven items, with the highest percentage saying "U.S. support of Israel," and the lowest saying "U.S. doesn't give enough aid." Thus, while Democrats are more inclined to attribute importance to almost all the different root causes than are Republicans, the two groups of partisans view the relative importance of the causes quite similarly to one another.

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[23] See www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_SeptOct_2001/kullnotesold.html and the CCFR "WorldViews 2002" survey: www.worldviews.org/detailreports/usreport/public_topline_report.pdf.

[24] Exploratory factor analysis suggested an underlying structure to the responses, with a two-factor solution in which "feelings of revenge," "Islamic religion," and "U.S. meddles" are mainly associated with one factor, while "not enough aid," "U.S. support of Israel," "U.S. pursues own economic interests," and "only way to express grievances" are mainly associated with the other. However, the structure is very sensitive to the inclusion of particular items, such as "only way to express grievances." Therefore, rather than develop factor scores for underlying dimensions, we conducted the analysis using the individual items.

Qualitative Analysis of Open-Ended Responses. To gain further insight into whether people's answers to U.S. responsibility question were informed by people's more active awareness of specific U.S. behavior or actions, one round of SOSS included a follow-up question addressed to those respondents who had said the U.S. bears "a lot" or "some" responsibility for the hatred that led to the attacks:

> *When you say the United States bears responsibility for the hatred that led to the 9/11 attacks, what do you have in mind?*

This SOSS round was fielded in April-June 2003, shortly after the coalition forces drove Saddam Hussein out of Baghdad. That timing led to a few respondents mentioning the 2003 "invasion of Iraq" as a reason for the hatred that led to the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. And in some other respects the responses may have been influenced by post-9/11 events. Nonetheless, the results suggest that people were not just expressing off-hand opinions when they answered the question on U.S. responsibility. Most readily came up with a reason for their answer. Of the 505 respondents who initially said the U.S. bears some or a lot of responsibility, 13 refused, 9 did not answer the follow-up question, and 66 responded "don't know" or "not sure." The remaining 417 respondents provided 477 "reasons," counting multiple responses. A summary of these responses is given in Table 3.

[Table 3 About Here]

In all, 77 percent of the responses referred either to U.S. foreign policy in general (e.g., "some foreign policies," "the United States has done wrong to other countries"), specific U.S. government behavior or attitudes (e.g., "sticking our nose in," "arrogance," "meddling," "trying to dominate," "the way they try to go in and rule everyone"), business or economic interests (e.g., "greed," "American corporations abroad," "big bureaucracy, money," "it's all over money and oil"), U.S. policy in the Middle East (either in general or specifically with reference to Israel, e.g., "unequal

treatment of Arabs and Israel"), or the insufficiency of U.S. foreign aid.[25] Of the remaining answers, some were not responsive to the specific wording of the question about U.S. responsibility for the hatred that motivated the 9/11 attacks (e.g., "missed signals," "let our guard down," or "let too many aliens come here"). Some spoke more to underlying causal factors for the terrorism (e.g., anger, jealousy, or culture differences in the world) than to U.S. foreign policy behavior. And a few referred to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which occurred 18 months after the 9/11 attacks.

That so many respondents gave unambiguous answers and referred to specific attitudes or behavior by the U.S. government suggests that in answering the U.S. responsibility questions they were not indicting the U.S. only out of partisanship but instead were thinking about the relationship between U.S. behavior and the underlying motivations for the terrorist attacks.

Perceived Root Causes and Attribution of U.S. Responsibility. The closed-ended root causes questions can be regarded as proximate reasons why people might be inclined to place responsibility on the United States for the hatred that led to the attacks. Also, as noted earlier, in Wave 1 of the Civil Liberties Survey the respondents were primed to think about the possibility of U.S. responsibility by the preceding series of questions about possible root causes of the terrorist attacks. However, based on the results of the SOSS surveys and Wave 2 of the Civil Liberties Survey, the unexpectedly high percentage of Americans who attributed responsibility to the U.S. was not just a priming effect.

We depict the relationship between the root causes and U.S. responsibility for the hatred that led to the terrorist attacks through logistic regression analysis. Each root cause is treated as an interval level 4-point scale. Model 1 in Table 4 shows the results using just these root cause variables without any further controls. Model 2 adds the variables from Equation 4 of Table 2.

[Table 4 About Here]

[25] To avoid double-counting, if a respondent mentioned a specific foreign policy behavior or attitude (such as "arrogance") as well as "foreign policy" in general, only the specific mention was coded. Multiple mentions of the same behavior or attitude were only counted once.

Both as a group and individually, the "root cause" items perform very well in accounting for variation in the probability of assigning responsibility to the U.S. (see Model 1). Not surprisingly, considering our earlier discussion, the effect of "U.S. aid" is not statistically significant. But the coefficients for most of the other causes are statistically significant, and in a plausible direction. For all except "Islamic religion," greater endorsement of a given cause is associated with a substantial increase in the probability of stating that the U.S. bears responsibility.

For "Islamic religion," the more important a cause this is said to be, the less the U.S. is held responsible. However, "Feelings of revenge" and "Only grievance outlet" – which speak directly to the motivations of the terrorists rather than to U.S. actions – also work in a positive direction: the more people perceive that the terrorists were motivated by revenge or a sense that they had no other outlet to express their grievances, the more people attribute responsibility for the hatred to the U.S.

When we add to the equation the demographic and attitudinal variables that were included before (see Model 2 in Table 2), several of the root causes variables continue to have substantial independent relationships with U.S. responsibility (the coefficient for the "Feelings of revenge" is significant at p=.105, which is just short of $p \leq .05$ using a 1-tailed test). Furthermore, the effects of the other attitudinal variables that are central to our analysis, in particular orientations toward the system as a whole – national pride and political trust – remain independently significant.

The effects of party identification and ideology, however, apparently inconsistent and difficult to interpret. This is not just a result of collinearity between the partisanship and ideology variables. If we were to include just the partisanship variables and not the ideology variables in Equation 2, we would find that independents are significantly less likely than Republicans to assign responsibility to the U.S., while Democrats are not distinctive from Republicans; and if we include just the ideology variables and not the partisanship variables, moderates are estimated to be significantly more likely than conservatives to assign responsibility to the U.S., while liberals are not distinctive from Democrats. These results suggest that the coefficients for the root cause variables

are picking up a substantial part of the variance that would otherwise be attributable to partisanship or ideology. Overall, the fit of the model has been improved. The combined model – Model 2 in Table 4 – correctly predicts 68 percent of the cases, as against the original baseline of 53 percent and the 62 percent predicted by Model 4 in Table 2.

The perceived root causes of terrorism are more than just proxies for support for the political system and political ideology. While the general orientations are definitely important in accounting for whether people assign responsibility for the hatred to the U.S., the specific reasons or perceived root causes also independently capture a substantial amount of the sentiment that leads people to assign responsibility to the U.S. Model 1 in Table 4 correctly predicts 66 percent of the cases, a substantial improvement over the baseline of 53 percent. To illustrate what this means in terms of the probability of assigning responsibility to the U.S., among those who think U.S. support for Israel is "not at all" a root cause (with other attitudinal and demographic factors held constant) only 26 percent say the U.S. is responsible, while among those who tink U.S. support for Israel is a "very important" cause, 55 percent say the U.S. is responsible. Analogous percentages are shown for all the root cause variables.

[Figure 6 About Here]

Perhaps surprisingly in light of the distributions shown in Figure 5, U.S. policy toward Israel is not the root cause that is associated with the largest range of probabilities of assigning responsibility for the terrorism to the U.S. The widest ranges are associated with "U.S. acts in own economic interests" and "U.S. meddles in the affairs of other countries." Interestingly, the differences in probability associated with "Islamic religion" as a cause are negligible. Not only do few respondents identify Islam as a root cause of the terrorism, but even if they do identify it as a cause it makes little difference in their attribution of responsibility for the attacks to the U.S.

To summarize, even after adjusting for the effects of support for the system, party identification and ideology, perceptions of specific root causes matter a great deal. Americans'

perceptions of U.S. foreign policy behavior matter for how they evaluate the role of our government in promoting the hatred that led to the terrorist attacks.

Variation vs. Level in Perceptions of U.S. Responsibility

Although we have provided systematic explanations of the *variation* in people's willingness to attribute responsibility to the U.S. for the hatred that led to the 9/11 attacks, the overall high percentage who say the U.S. bears responsibility needs further explanation. After all, most people express great pride in the country, and trust in the federal government rose dramatically among most citizens as part of the post-attack rally effect. Although people's view of U.S. responsibility also depends on their political ideology and partisan attachments, even among political conservatives and Republicans the percentage who attribute responsibility to the U.S. is high (see Figure 1): 46 percent of Republicans, and 42 percent of conservatives attribute at least some responsibility to the U.S.

One reason for this high level may be the misalignment between American foreign policy behavior and the preferences of most people on a key dimension: multilateralism vs. unilateralism. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government had come under increasing criticism abroad for unilateralism, as symbolized by the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and the stated intention to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.[26] At the same time, a large majority of Americans were multilateralist and saw that the solution to many important issues required international cooperation (Kull and Destler 1999; CCFR 2002). We therefore conjecture that those Americans who prefer a multilateralist approach to solving major issues are more likely to attribute responsibility for the hatred that led to the terrorist attacks to the U.S.

Although the Civil Liberties Survey did not address broader issues of foreign policy, the State of the State Surveys conducted in March-April 2002 (SOSS25) and April-June 2003 (SOSS 30)

[26] Pew Research Center (August 15, 2001), "Bush Unpopular in Europe, Seen as Unilateralist" at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=5. Large majorities in several European countries were critical of the U.S. dropping the Kyoto Protocol and intending to abandon the ABM Treaty.

permit a test of this hypothesis based on the state of Michigan. In addition to the U.S. responsibility question, these waves of SOSS included the question:

> *If there is a dangerous situation somewhere in the world, do you think the U.S. should first try to get other countries to help, such as through the United Nations, or instead should the U.S. first try dealing with these situations on its own?* (US15)

Overall, 82 percent of the respondents to these surveys favored "first getting other countries to help," while 12 percent favored "U.S. dealing on its own," and 5 percent volunteered that "it depends." Between SOSS25 and SOSS 30, i.e., from before and after the invasion of Iraq and the fall of Baghdad, there was a small decline from 84 percent to 79 percent in the percentage who favored "getting other countries to help."

In Table 5, we find that among those who said that the U.S. should try first to get others to help, 57 percent said that the U.S. bears at least some responsibility for the hatred that led to the terrorist attacks; while among those who said that the U.S. should first try to deal with the situations on its own, 48 percent said that the U.S. bears at least some responsibility. Thus, people who are "multilateralist" are more likely to hold the U.S. responsible.

[Table 5 About Here]

Another question in these two surveys asked:

> *All in all, what kind of leadership role should the United States play in the world? Should it be the single world leader, or should it play a shared leadership role, or shouldn't it play any leadership role?* (US16)

To this question, too, the overwhelming majority – 81 percent – favored a multilateral approach, the "shared leadership role," while 12 percent said the U.S. should be the "single world leader," and 5 percent that the U.S. should play "no leadership role." There was virtually no change in the distribution of responses between SOSS25 and SOSS30.

We find that 48 percent of those who said the U.S. should be the "single world leader" held the U.S. responsible for the hatred that led to the attacks, while 57 percent of those who preferred that the U.S. play a "shared leadership role" held the U.S. responsible, and 62 percent of those who

thought the U.S. should play "no leadership role" held the U.S. responsible. Once again, the large majority who favor a multilateralist – shared leadership – position, as well as the small number who think the U.S. should not play any leadership role, are more likely to hold the U.S. responsible.[27]

Thus, our conjecture that the unexpectedly large percentage of Americans who hold the U.S. responsible for the hatred that led to the 9/11 terrorist attacks may be due to the fact that most people prefer a multilateralist foreign policy finds some support. This implies that if the predominant popular preference were unilateralist, many fewer Americans would hold the U.S. responsible.

Conclusion

People's perceptions of U.S. international behavior matter for their willingness to attribute responsibility to the U.S. for the hatred that led to the terrorist attacks. That a majority of Americans attribute responsibility to the U.S. is at first very surprising given the widespread mobilization of patriotic sentiment and resurgent trust in the federal government after 9/11. We have offered a plausible, empirically supported account for our finding. The American public uses a lot more information than just broad cues based on partisanship, liberal-conservative ideology, and a sense of attachment to the political system. But those cues also matter.

We have also offered a conjecture, backed by some empirical evidence, that our finding that 53 percent of Americans attribute at least some responsibility for the hatred that led to the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the U.S. is a result of the fact that a large majority of Americans are multilateralist. Because American citizens can observe from the mass media that their own country may not be well liked abroad, and because they are highly aware of U.S. policy toward Israel and that the U.S. acts

[27] The SOSS question is similar to one in the "WorldViews 2002" survey (CCFR 2002). In that national survey, 71 percent said that the "U.S. should do its share to solve international problems together with other countries," while 17 percent said the "U.S. should continue to be the preeminent world leader in solving international problems," and 9 percent said the "U.S. should withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems." Michigan residents are typical in that the overwhelming majority are multilateralist.

self-interestedly in the international arena, they are able to draw the conclusion that the U.S. bears some responsibility for the terrorists' hatred.

This does not necessarily mean that Americans think U.S. behavior *justified* the 9/11 attacks or think the U.S. should change its policies. A majority of Americans support U.S. policy toward Israel, for example.[28] But it means that many Americans are realists about U.S. international behavior and acknowledge that the government's actions abroad may have undesired consequences, including stimulating hatred by political extremists.

At the same time, our content analysis of the responses to a open-ended follow-up question clearly shows that many Americans believe the U.S. is responsible because its foreign policy is arrogant, bullying, self-interested, and imbalanced. As one respondent said, "We have to take into consideration that we can't always have our own way. Being a superpower doesn't mean you can push everyone else around." Another stated, "We're a little too bold. We push our size and strength a little too much overseas." Many others used the words "bully," "arrogant," "meddling," and "nosy" in explaining why U.S. foreign policy is responsible for the hatred that led to the terrorism. A few decried American economic motives, such as the respondent who stated "Imperialist policies abroad, the way we make and sell products. We are arrogant to the world," and another who stated "Putting profits or gains ahead of people. The Enron type of thing where the guilty say they are not guilty. They are driven by profit . . . greed." And many said that our policy in the Middle East ought to be "more balanced," while some offered a more detailed judgment such as:

[28] Gallup Polls show that a plurality or majority of Americans consistently support Israel as opposed to the Palestinians (as summarized by Polling Report at www.pollingreport.com/israel.htm). In our wave 2 survey (2003), when asked "Whose position to you favor more, the Israelis or the Palestinians?" 60 percent favored Israel, 22 percent neither side, and 18 percent the Palestinians. However, in Gallup Polls when people are asked whether our government should support the Israelis or the Palestinians more, nearly three-quarters prefer a balanced approach, while among the remaining respondents more support a pro-Israeli position than a pro-Palestinian one.

"One reason is our unmitigated defense of Israel after displacing all those Arabs from their homes after WWII. . . ."

These are not all just neutral attributions of cause-and-effect between American policy and the motivations of terrorists but are often also attributions of blame.

To extend the analysis here, it should also be possible to explore other explanatory factors. For example, certain psychological factors might help to account for differences in willingness to attribute responsibility to the U.S. One of these is fear. Perhaps people's willingness to judge the U.S. as responsible is related to the high levels of fear of another attack. Examination of the Civil Liberties Survey results, however, reveals that people's anxiety and sense of threat in the wake of the 9/11 attacks is not correlated with their views of U.S. responsibility.

Another psychological orientation that has been shown to be related to certain international attitudes is interpersonal trust or social trust. Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) find that more cynical individuals tend to be more isolationist, and less internationalist. How this attitude might affect views about who is responsible for the terrorism is less clear. We might conjecture that those who display greater interpersonal trust will be less likely to judge the U.S. as responsible for the hatred that led to the terrorism because more trusting persons are less likely to be cynical about the motives or behaviors of political leaders. Preliminary analysis supports this conjecture.

Another potentially relevant psychological indicator is dogmatism (Rokeach 1960). Because dogmatism is linked theoretically to deference to authority as well as to holding more conservative political views, we might expect dogmatists to be more likely to reject the suggestion that the U.S. is responsible for the terrorist acts on 9/11. But our data show evidence of an opposite relationship: dogmatists are more likely to subscribe to the view that the U.S. bears responsibility for the hatred that led to the terrorist attacks. Perhaps this suggests that dogmatists are more likely to hold people responsible for their actions.

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Table 1. "How much responsibility does the U.S. bear for the hatred that led to the terrorist attacks?"

Survey	Civil Liberties Survey, I (USA)	SOSS24 (MI)	SOSS25 (MI)	SOSS27 (MI)	Civil Liberties Survey, II (USA)	SOSS 30 (MI)	SOSS33 (MI)
Dates	Nov. 14, 2001-Jan. 15, 2002	Jan. 11, 2002-Feb. 19, 2002	Mar. 8, 2002-Apr. 29, 2002	Aug. 15, 2002-Oct. 26, 2002	Jan. 31, 2003-May 2, 2003	Apr. 25, 2003-June 16,2003	Jan. 31, 2004-March 12, 2004
A lot	20%	18%	20%	19%	21%	16%	19%
Some	33	34	38	36	34	38	37
A little	25	22	21	22	22	25	21
None	22	26	22	23	23	21	22
Total Percent	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%	100%	99%
Base *N*	1421	967	924	921	1,915	942	895

Question: "How much responsibility does the U.S. bear for the hatred that led to the terrorist attacks? Would you say a lot, some, a little, or none?"

Table 2. Logistic Regression of U.S. Responsibility on Demographic and Attitudinal Characteristics[a] (standard errors in parentheses)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Demographic Variables				
Age 18-29	**.242**	**.030**	**.023**	**.009**
	(.137)	(.144)	(.154)	(.155)
Advanced degree	**.444***	**.404**	**.349**	**.330**
	(.220)	(.232)	(.240)	(.242)
Latino	**.680****	**.597****	**.638****	**.638****
	(.186)	(.192)	(.217)	(.117)
African American	**.345***	**.157**	**.046**	**-.049**
	(.170)	(.179)	(.189)	(.194)
System Orientations				
Trust in government[b]		**-.366****	**-.407****	**-.402****
		(.083)	(.087)	(.087)
National pride[c]		**-.638****	**-.646****	**-.658****
		(.110)	(.116)	(.117)
Political Orientations				
Moderate ideology[d]			**.609****	**.569****
			(.128)	(.134)
Liberal ideology			**.443****	**.450***
			(.187)	(.198)
Independent party ID[e]				**-.054**
				(.152)
Democrat party ID				**.173**
				(.157)
Constant	**1.623****	**5.145****	**4.780****	**4.700****
	(.345)	(.614)	(.662)	(.672)
N	**1,376**	**1,337**	**1,257**	**1,245**
Nagelkerke R^2	**.023**	**.090**	**.122**	**.124**
χ^2	**23.890**	**95.923**	**122.131**	**122.829**
Significance of Model	**<.001**	**<.001**	**<.001**	**<.001**
Correct Predictions (base 52.5%)	**54.0%**	**60.0%**	**61.8%**	**61.7%**

***** Significant at $p \leq .05$ (2-tailed test). ****** Significant at $p \leq .01$ (2-tailed test).

[a] Dependent variable: **U.S. Responsibility** (some or a lot of responsibility =1, very little or none=0).

[b] **Trust in Government** is a 4-point scale of trust in the federal government, with "always" scored as 4, most of the time as 3, some of the time as 2, and never as 1.

[c] **National Pride** is a 5 point scale, with very proud scored as 5, proud as 4, somewhat proud as 3, not very proud as 2, and not proud at all as 1.

[d] **Ideology** is based on the respondents' self-classification as liberal, moderate, and conservative.

[e] **Party Identification** is based on the standard National Election Study wording. For this study, apoliticals are recoded as independent.

Table 3. Open-Ended Responses to "U.S. Responsibility" Question (SOSS 30 – Michigan)

	N Responses	Percent of: Responses	Percent of: Respondents
1. US Behavior			
Foreign Policy (general)	76	16.4%	18.2%
Arrogance, Meddling, Bullying	124	26.7	29.7
Business interests, Greed, Oil	31	6.7	7.4
Middle East Policy (general)	20	4.3	4.8
Favors Israel (specific)	33	7.1	7.9
Insensitivity to other nations or cultures	17	3.7	4.1
Not Enough Foreign Aid, Poverty	20	4.3	4.8
2. US Lack of Preparedness	51	11.0	12.2
3. Non-US Cause			
Culture, Religious Differences in Society, World (Islam vs. Christianity, West-East)	11	2.4	2.6
Jealousy (of U.S. wealth, freedom, power)	21	4.5	5.0
Anger (ungrateful, taught to hate us)	7	1.5	1.7
U.S. Invasion of Iraq	12	2.6	2.9
4. Other (not germane or not codable)	41	8.8	9.8
Totals	**464**	**100.0%**	**111.3%**

Note: 417 respondents offered verbatim answers other than "refuse to answer" and "don't know."

Table 4. Logistic Regression of U.S. Responsibility on Perceived Root Causes[a] (standard errors in parentheses)

	(1)		(2)	
	b	exp(b)	b	exp(b)
Root Causes				
U.S. Israel policy	.235**	1.265	.243*	1.275
	(.090)		(.101)	
Feelings of revenge	.055	1.057	.143	1.154
	(.077)		(.089)	
Only grievance outlet	.238**	1.269	.264**	1.303
	(.069)		(.080)	
U.S. meddles	.414**	1.512	.484**	1.623
	(.075)		(.087)	
U.S. own interests	.502**	1.651	.334**	1.396
	(.074)		(.087)	
Islamic religion	-.190**	.827	-.187**	.829
	(.060)		(.068)	
U.S. not enough aid	.056	1.058	.161*	1.175
	(.069)		(.079)	
Demographic Variables				
Age 18-29			.182	1.200
			(.187)	
Advanced degree			.198	1.219
			(.289)	
Latino			.481	1.618
			(.295)	
African American			-.381	.683
			(.242)	
System Orientations				
Trust in government			-.339**	.712
			(.108)	
National pride[c]			-.695**	.499
			(.146)	
Political Orientations				
Moderate ideology			.541**	1.717
			(.168)	
Liberal ideology			.412	1.510
			(.245)	
Independent party ID			-.511**	.600
			(.186)	
Democrat party ID			-.165	.848
			(.189)	
Constant	-3.888**	.020	-.271	.763
	(.431)		(.852)	
N	1,133		1,024	
Nagelkerke R^2	.186		.283	
χ^2	168.575		241.241	
Significance of Model	<.001		<.001	
Correct Predictions (base 52.6%)	65.6		68.2	

* Significant at $p \leq .05$ (2-tailed test). ** Significant at $p \leq .01$ (2-tailed test).

Table 5. Relationship between Support for Multilateralism and Whether the U.S. is Responsible for the Hatred that Led to the Terrorist Attacks

Based on SOSS 25 [3-08-02 – 4-29-02] and SOSS 30 [4-25-03 – 6-16-03]

	In a Dangerous Situation The U.S. Should[a]:			*U.S. Leadership Role Should Be*[b]:		
	Deal on Its Own	**Get Other Countries To Help**	**Depends** *(volun-teered response)*	**Single World Leader**	**Shared Leader-Ship**	**No Leader-Ship Role**
U.S. Responsible for the Hatred that Led to 9/11 Attacks?[c]						
A Lot	**17.3%**	**18.0%**	**13.9%**	**18.9%**	**16.6%**	**32.3%**
Somewhat	**30.9**	**39.0**	**37.6**	**28.8**	**40.1**	**29.2**
A Little	**21.8**	**23.3**	**21.8**	**20.3**	**24.0**	**10.4**
None	**30.0**	**19.7**	**26.7**	**32.0**	**19.3**	**28.1**
Total Percent	**100.0%**	**100.1%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
(Base *N*)	**(220)**	**(1,495)**	**(101)**	**(222)**	**(1,470)**	**(96)**

[a] US15. "If there is a dangerous situation somewhere in the world, do you think the U.S. should first try to get other countries to help, such as through the United Nations, or instead should the U.S. first try dealing with these situations on its own?"

[b] US16. "All in all, what kind of leadership role should the United States play in the world? Should it be the single world leader, or should it play a shared leadership role, or shouldn't it play any leadership role?"

[c] CG1. "How much responsibility do you personally believe the U.S. bears for the hatred that led to the terrorist attacks? Would you say a lot of responsibility, some, a little, or none at all?"

Figure 1. How Much Responsibility Does the U.S. Bear for the Hatred that Led to the Terrorist Attacks?

(Percent Who Say "Some" or "A Lot")