The promulgation of the Fifth Lateran Council decree *Apostolici regiminis* (1513) traditionally is understood as having been motivated by opposition to teachings on the soul, taught by Pietro Pomponazzi and certain secular Aristotelian philosophers of the day. The decree is also construed as representing the Catholic church's formal dogmatic declaration of the individual immortality of the rational soul. This article argues that while Pomponazzi and his colleagues are likely to have been the decree's primary antagonists, *Apostolici regiminis* is not a dogmatic declaration on immortality but rather a dogmatic condemnation of the so-called doctrine of the double truth. Building upon this notion, the article proposes certain revisions to the traditional understanding of the decree and its historical context.

PROMULGATED ON 19 DECEMBER 1513 at the Eighth Session of the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–17), the papal bull *Apostolici regiminis* stands out as one of the few doctrinal decisions of that predominantly political and reform-minded council. It has traditionally been understood that the teachings on the soul by Pietro Pomponazzi and certain other secular Aristotelian philosophers instigated this decree. Furthermore, this decree has commonly been understood as representing the Catholic church's formal dogmatic declaration of the individual immortality of the soul. In this essay I shall argue that *Apostolici regiminis* is not a dogmatic declaration on...
immortality but rather a dogmatic condemnation of the so-called doctrine of the
double truth. Building upon this notion I shall propose certain revisions to the tradi-
tional understanding of the bull and its historical context.

Without naming specific offenders, *Apostolici regiminiis* begins by stating that
there recently has been the spread of some “very pernicious errors,” especially on
the nature of the soul, and that there were some careless philosophers who held
these erroneous doctrines as “true, at least according to philosophy.” The bull then
condemns all who would deny the individual immortality of the human soul or
suggest doubts on these matters. The decree states that the human soul not only
exists of itself and is the form of the human body, citing the 1311 Council of
Vienne, but that the soul is also immortal and that it is multiplied, for each man,
instead of being one among all men. Because “truth cannot contradict truth,” the
bull then states that every statement contrary to the truth of faith is totally false,
strictly forbids anyone to teach otherwise, and orders that anyone who clings to
such erroneous statements be considered a heretic and punished accordingly. Next,
the bull proposes two remedies for these errors. The first requires philosophy pro-
fessors to clarify the truth of the Christian religion when explaining the doctrines
of other philosophers that are known to contradict church doctrine, and to refute
such contradictory doctrines as far as they are able. This first remedy is regarded as
only a short-term solution; *Apostolici regiminiis’s* long-term solution mandates that all
those in sacred orders, religious or otherwise, who wish to study philosophy or
poetry for longer than five years must also study theology or canon law at the same
time, thereby allowing the “infected sources of philosophy and poetry” to be
cleansed. Following its main text, *Apostolici regiminiis* is followed by a short passage
which indicates that the decree was passed nearly unanimously, with only two
members of the general assembly expressing any reservations.

In his 1849 work, *Averroës et L’Averroïsme*, Ernest Renan viewed *Apostolici regini-
inis* as being aimed directly towards the Italian “Averroïst” philosophers,
because of their views on the soul. During the latter half of the fifteenth century

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2Christopher Martin, “On a Mistake Commonly Made in Accounts of Sixteenth-Century
argues against the commonly held view that *Apostolici regiminiis* dogmatically declares that the
immortality of the soul could be demonstrated philosophically. Martin argues that the text of the bull
makes no such claim. While in some ways related to Martin’s position, the argument in this essay is
different. Martin argues that the bull makes no claims for philosophical demonstrability, but does not
address the position that the bull makes a dogmatic declaration on immortality in a religious sense. My
position is that *Apostolici regiminiis* issues no dogmatic declaration concerning any aspect of the
immortality of the soul—in either a philosophical or religious sense.

3This passage on the voting and objections is not included in Tanner, *Decrees.* See Mansi, *Sacrorum

generally avoid using the term “Averroists” to refer to the antagonists of the bull except when describing
other works that use the term or when it otherwise seems appropriate. John Monfasani has pointed out
some of the difficulties in using the terms “Averroism” and “Averroists” to describe Renaissance
philosophy. In one sense all secular Aristotelian philosophers of the time might be considered Averroists
since they all read Averroës and in large part read Aristotle through Averroës. However, even if we nar-
row our focus only to Averroës’ doctrine of the unity of the intellect, difficulties remain. For example,
Constant / Reinterpretation of “Apostolici regiminis” (1513) 355

and into the sixteenth, a number of secular Aristotelian philosophy professors, centered at the University of Padua, had been teaching a number of controversial philosophical doctrines, often following the commentaries of Averroës or Alexander of Aphrodisias. While Renan closely associated with the decree the later controversy surrounding Pietro Pomponazzi’s De immortalitate animae (published in 1516, three years after the promulgation of the bull), he did not make the claim that Pomponazzi was individually the council’s target and felt that the condemnations were directed towards the Averroists collectively. Ludwig von Pastor, however, recognized that Pomponazzi’s teachings on the soul were probably well known for some time prior to the publication of his De immortalitate animae, and therefore, definitely could have incited the bull. Thus, Pastor argued that the bull was aimed not only at the Averroists (and Alexandrists) as a group, but was likely directed specifically at the teachings on the soul of that group’s most famous member, Pietro Pomponazzi. Agreeing that Apostolici regiminis was likely directed against the teachings on the soul by these Italian secular Aristotelians, Paul Oskar Kristeller suggested en passant that Platonism, particularly through the influence of Marsilio Ficino, may have been a significant factor leading up to the decree.

In 1967 an alternate line of interpretation was suggested by Felix Gilbert. Although he recognized that Platonist elements may have contributed to the decree, Gilbert argued that the decree was primarily a mandate against humanism and was not to be regarded as directed towards any particular philosophical school, individual, or single doctrine. He proposed that certain churchmen were reacting to what they regarded as humanist laicizing tendencies, which they perceived to have promoted the growth of a number of errors that contradicted or expressed

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implicit doubt in church doctrine. Gilbert thus suggested that the bull's condemnation regarding the soul may have been incited by the 1500 Aldine printing of Lucretius (which contains arguments against immortality), and that the bull's disciplinary passages were directed against the humanist educational curriculum. On this basis Gilbert concluded that Vincenzo Quirini and Tommaso Giustiniani, two influential reformers suspicious of humanism as well as most pagan literature, were the most probable instigators or even authors of the bull. Although Gilbert's view has had some adherents, the majority of scholars who have addressed this decree have agreed in varying degrees with the views of Renan and Pastor as well as those of Kristeller.

Another standard understanding of the bull, largely related to views concerning its historical genesis, is that Apostolici regiminiis represents the church's formal dogmatic declaration of the individual immortality of the soul. This is the stated position of Pastor, Kristeller, Hubert Jedin, Martin Pine, and Richard Schoeck, and it is a standard view commonly presented by general studies, whether of church history or Renaissance philosophy. The argument here, however, is that the bull is not in fact a dogmatic pronouncement on the individual immortality of the soul. Instead, it dogmatically declares that every statement contrary to the truth of faith is false, thereby condemning as heresy any conception or use of the so-called doc-

9 Gilbert, "Cristianesimo," 976-79. Although Pastor, History of the Popes, 8:390, does seem to have regarded the bull as being primarily directed towards Pomponazzi and the Italian "Averroists," he proposes that it was partly an attack against humanism as well.


trine of the double truth. This position becomes apparent when the historical circumstances surrounding the promulgation of the bull are informed by a close reading of the text of the decree.

Whether or not the bull is seen as a dogmatic pronouncement on immortality, it can nevertheless be established that Florentine Platonism and its doctrine on the soul was probably a major factor in the creation of *Apostolici regiminiis*. From the work on Giles of Viterbo by John O'Malley and from John Monfasani's work on philosophical liberty in pre-Reformation Italy, it is possible to reconstruct much of the process through which *Apostolici regiminiis* was drafted and promulgated. This reconstruction confirms Kristeller's suggestion by demonstrating, independently of any interpretation of the bull's content, that the decree was likely profoundly influenced by Platonism and particularly by Ficino's doctrine on the soul.

The process through which *Apostolici regiminiis* was created consists of three main stages: (1) the initial decision to proceed with such a bull, (2) the drafting of the bull, and (3) the debate, final changes, and general approval of the bull. Although not much is known concerning the specific procedures or discussions that preceded the drafting of the decrees, it is clear that it was almost exclusively the province of the pope and his inner circle to decide not only what topics were to be considered at the council but also to outline in detail what was to be enacted in each session. Because of this papal domination of the council, it is quite significant that the pope at the time of the Eighth Session had particularly strong ties to Florentine Platonism. First, Leo's father, Lorenzo de' Medici, had been the patron of Ficino. While Leo may have been too young to have studied under Ficino, it is known that Leo was personally close to and perhaps studied under Ficino's student, the Platonist teacher Francesco da Diacceto. As a young man, the future pope Giovanni de' Medici was also on friendly terms with Georgius Benignus, a Franciscan Scotist theologian who had been greatly influenced by Ficino and Platonism.

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13 O'Malley, Giles of Viterbo. Monfasani, "Aristotelians, Platonists."
15 The papal control over the topics to be discussed reflects a general theme of papal dominance at the Lateran Council. With the failure of the Pisan conciliarism, the papacy seized the opportunity to reassert its dominance over the church. Pope Julius's bull that called the council advanced the position that only the pope could rightfully summon a general or ecumenical council. Held in the pope's own basilica, this position of papal supremacy and dominance continued throughout the course of the council. See, for instance, Schoeck, "Fifth Lateran Council," 122–24, and Minnich, "Paride de Grassi's Diary," 451.
Furthermore, as Pope Leo X seems to have greatly admired Giles of Viterbo, the prior general of the Augustinian Hermits during the order’s most prestigious era, Giles of Viterbo was held in high esteem at the papal courts of both Pope Julius II and Pope Leo X. Giles had been a trusted personal advisor to Julius, was entrusted by both Julius and Leo with a number of important diplomatic and religious missions, and in 1517 Leo would make him a cardinal. In addition to his political connections, Giles was also a highly respected theologian and philosopher. Particularly influenced by Florentine Platonism, Giles of Viterbo was bitterly opposed to certain “Paduan” and “Averroist” positions, and it was well known that he was particularly scornful of Pomponazzi. Giles had been urging that actions be taken against the Paduan Aristotelians for at least a year prior to Apostolici regiminiis. With his intellectual reputation and position of influence at the Roman Curia, Giles of Viterbo seems to have had the ear of the pope, and thus it would not be at all unlikely that it was in large part through his urgings that Leo instigated this decree.

Under Julius II the Lateran Council’s decrees were formulated and drafted under very tight curial control. However, upon his election to the papacy, Leo X decided that while the Curia would still determine what was to be decreed, the actual drafting of the decrees would be entrusted to small, fairly representative subcommittees. While this arrangement was somewhat more accommodating to episcopal interests than the procedure under Julius II had been, Leo was still able to maintain significant control over the makeup of each committee and the drafting of the decree. It is not surprising that the committee responsible for drafting Apostolici regiminiis had a significant element that was receptive to Leo’s Platonism and his philosophical views on the soul. First, Leo’s old friend Georgius Benignus, at that time titular bishop of Nazareth, sat on the committee. A Greek émigré, Alexius Celadenus, who was the bishop of Molfetta and an apostolic secretary,
and who was also associated with Cardinal Bessarion, sat on the committee as well. Furthermore, another Franciscan Scotist theologian, Antonio Trombetta, who had held the Scotist chair of metaphysics at Padua and who had been made bishop of Urbino in 1511, was appointed to the committee. Although apparently not directly associated with any Platonist circles, Trombetta was one of the more aggressive and prominent members of a movement among Scotist thinkers which had begun to argue against Scotus that the immortality of the soul was philosophically demonstrable. Trombetta, an important participant in some of the debates on the soul at Padua near the end of the fifteenth century, was influential in a 1489 edict issued by the bishop of Padua, Pietro Barozzi, against the Paduan secular Aristotelians, and in 1496 Trombetta published a refutation of these same Paduan philosophers, entitled *Quaestio de animarum humanarum pluralitate Catholice contra Averroym et sequaces in Studio Patavino determinata.*

After being drafted by its commission, *Apostolici regininis* would have been read out before the general congregation of bishops and churchmen gathered at the council's session. Presided over personally by the pope, this general congregation publicly debated and voted on each decree. Reflecting the papal dominance over the drafting process, the final form of approved decrees were promulgated as papal bulls, each opening with the formula "Iulius [or Leo] episcopus servus servorum Dei, ad perpetuam rei memoriam, sacro approbante concilio." In the case of *Apostolici regininis*, the general congregation passed the decree with near unanimity (app., 378–79, nos. 17–19).

Despite his probable role in the genesis of the bull, Giles of Viterbo was not appointed to the commission that drafted *Apostolici regininis*, though he was present at the general congregation which approved the decree. As one of the more prominent churchmen in attendance, his influence may have been a significant factor in the general congregation's nearly unanimous acceptance of the decree. Whether his role was in the formation of the decree or in its final approval or both, the combination of Giles of Viterbo's intellectual allegiances, political influence, and role at the council has led John O'Malley to conclude that "there is every


28The standard procedure for the council was for credula or drafts of the decrees to be read out to the council fathers for debate and ratification. Interestingly for the council's Eighth Session, Leo presented the assembled fathers not with credula but with final bulls. Although Leo in this case did promise to revise any bull if the general assembly found it necessary, it is difficult to determine if or to what extent any bull was revised; see Minnich, "Paride de Grassi's Diary," 456.

reason to believe that he supported, or even promoted, the Fifth Lateran Council's condemnations which were attributed to this school [Padua].

While Monfasani certainly acknowledges the important role of certain individuals at the council, particularly Leo X, Giles of Viterbo, Benignus, and Trombetta, the decree's nearly unanimous passage has led him to conclude that a growing common hostility among the Italian educated class to philosophical doubts about the immortality of the soul was also key to its passage. This common hostility was largely due to the influence of Florentine Platonism and Ficino's doctrine on the soul. The movement increasingly permeated Italian intellectual circles throughout the latter half of the fifteenth century, and it gained important institutional force upon Giovanni de' Medici's ascension to the papal throne as Leo X. Citing also the absence of any significant Italian Ockhamist theological tradition which might have opposed such a measure, Monfasani sees the Platonists and the revisionist Scotists joining forces with the Thomists to overpower the secular Aristotelians and secure the passage of *Apostolici regimini*.

Having established that Platonism was likely a significant factor in the creation of this bull, let us turn to the text itself. *Apostolici regimini* consists of two main sections; the first is doctrinal and the second is disciplinary. After a few formulaic opening passages, the doctrinal portion of *Apostolici regimini* begins with a lament that the faithful are being afflicted by the "sower of cockle, the ancient enemy of the human race," who "has dared to scatter and multiply in the Lord's field some extremely pernicious errors, which have always been rejected by the faithful" (app., 377, no. 3). Among these errors, the most troubling are those concerning the nature of the rational soul, such as the claims that it is mortal or that there is only one soul among all men. Largely responsible for promoting these errors are "some, playing the philosopher without due care" who assert that these things are true, "at least according to philosophy." Wishing to apply suitable remedies against this "pestilence," the council fathers then "condemn and reject all those who insist that the intellectual soul is mortal, or that it is one among all human beings, and those who suggest doubts on this topic." This first passage then continues, first repeating the 1311 Council of Vienne decree that had declared that the soul truly exists of itself and is the form of the body, followed by a confirmation that the soul is in fact immortal and individual, being multiplied for each body. These doctrines, the

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31 Monfasani, "Aristotelians, Platonists," esp. 269–70. Price, "Origins," 471–72, similarly observes that while there was an important Platonism element behind the decree, there was also a significant Thomist and Scotist Aristotelian element present on the drafting commission.
32 This twofold division was recognized by the council itself; in the Mansi text, the passage containing the vote and the objections just following the bull's main text refer to the last portion of the decree as the second part of the bull; see app., 379, no. 19.
33 For the Council of Vienne decree to which this passage refers, see Tanner, *Councils*, 1:360–61; and app., 377, no. 4.
bull claims, are clearly established from the scriptures, and indeed from the words of Christ himself. If the soul was not individually immortal, the council fathers argue, then of what benefit would be the Incarnation or Resurrection or the other mysteries of Christ?

This passage from the doctrinal section provides strongest support for the standard interpretation that with *Apostolici regininiis* the church dogmatically declared the doctrine of individual immortality against the teachings on the soul by certain philosophers. It is clear from this passage that the council fathers certainly regarded the individual immortality of the soul as dogma. While determining what specifically constitutes dogma can be somewhat tricky, at its most basic level it can be said that a dogma is an official church teaching on faith or morals understood to represent revealed truth and solemnly proclaimed in a manner that is clearly intended to be binding on the full community of faithful and expressed in such a way as to be clear that denial is heresy. Thus, when *Apostolici regininiis* states, "hoc sacro approbante concilio damnamus et reprobamus omnes asserentes animam intellectivam mortalem esse, aut unicum in cunctis hominibus et haec in dubium vertentes" (app., 377, no. 3), it is clearly indicating that the doctrine of individual immortality is considered to be a dogma.

While there is no doubt that individual immortality is presented as a dogma in *Apostolici regininiis*, this bull cannot be seen as a dogmatic proclamation on the soul because it makes no statement concerning the soul that can be understood as constituting an intended declaration of dogma. With regard to the soul, nowhere does *Apostolici regininiis* employ terms such as "define," "decree," or "declare"—terms one should properly expect to find in a statement intended to issue a declaration of church dogma. If there is any statement from the entire bull that could be seen to declare personal immortality dogmatically, it would have to be the text that reads:

with the approval of the sacred council, we condemn and reject all those who insist that the intellectual soul is mortal, or that it is one among all human beings, and those who suggest doubts on this topic. For the soul not only truly exists of itself and essentially as the form of the human body... but it is also immortal; and further, for the enormous number of bodies into which it is infused individually, it can and ought to be and is multiplied. (App., 377, nos. 3–4)

This statement is not a dogmatic pronouncement, because it is neither in the form of nor does it contain the language of a solemn dogmatic proclamation. Although the phrase "damnamus et reprobamus" indicates that this doctrine is con-

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34 See, for example, Daniel Coghlan, "Dogma," *Catholic Encyclopedia*, 5:89–91; E. Dublanchy, "Dogme," *Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique*, 4:1574–1650, esp. 1575–79, and Ludwig Ott, *Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma*, 4th ed., trans. Patrick Lynch (Rockford, Ill.: TAN Books, 1974), 3–10. It might be argued that the specific criteria for determining what constitutes dogma was not officially defined until the First Vatican Council (1869–70). The definition presented here, however, is quite basic and seems reasonable for determining whether a doctrine was considered dogma, even when applied to the early-sixteenth-century church.
The council fathers did not here issue the dogmatic declaration of that doctrine because they assumed that personal immortality already existed as a dogma of the church. This is clearly expressed through the language in this first passage of *Apostolici regiminiis*. Employing *semper* along with a perfect participle, the denial of immortality is described as being among those most wicked errors recently being spread "which have always been rejected by the faithful" (*errores a fidelibus semper explosos*) (app., 377, no. 3). Moreover, the bull states that immortality is "clearly established from the gospel" and indeed by Christ's own words (app., 378, nos. 5-6). The council fathers also seem to consider personal immortality as being necessarily presupposed by such crucial doctrines as the Resurrection of the Dead and eternal rewards and punishments. The bull's passages on the soul should at most be understood as the confirmation of an ancient dogma restated in terms designed to counter the current philosophical challenges to the doctrine.

Although it may be true that there was no official church decree prior to *Apostolici regiminiis* that so explicitly or directly states the doctrine of individual immortality, it is not difficult to see how the council fathers might nevertheless have regarded it as a doctrine that already existed as dogma. As the bull itself indicates, the individual immortality of the soul has obvious scriptural bases. The bull also indicates that immortality can be seen as a necessary prerequisite for such fundamental Christian doctrines as the Resurrection of the Dead and eternal rewards and punishments. These fundamental tenets of Christianity were clearly established as dogma by the earliest ecumenical councils, particularly at Nicea and Constantinople, and were regularly expressed as part of the liturgy. Thus, it seems reasonable for the council fathers to have understood the immortality of the soul...
to be official dogma, at least by virtue of its perceived necessity for those other doctrines. Furthermore, individual immortality could be seen as being supported by various authorities, particularly that of Saint Augustine in his De immortalitate animae.

The manner in which *Apostolici regiminiis* presents individual immortality as a dogma having been already defined, particularly the absence of terms such as “define,” “decree” or “declare” in passages describing immortality, is all the more striking when we turn to the next passage of the doctrinal section of the text. Following the condemnations and statement of the doctrine of immortality in the first passage of the doctrinal section, *Apostolici regiminiis* continues:

And since truth cannot contradict truth, we define (definimus) that every statement contrary to the enlightened truth of the faith is totally false and we strictly forbid teaching otherwise to be permitted. We decree (decernimus) that all those who cling to erroneous statements of this kind, thus sowing heresies which are wholly condemned, should be avoided in every way and punished as detestable and odious heretics and infidels who are undermining the catholic faith. (App., 378, nos. 8–9)

Here is an almost ideal model for a formal declaration of dogma. As in the condemnation on the soul at the beginning of the bull, this passage clearly describes a dogma since it indicates that anyone who rejects this doctrine is to be considered a heretic and punished accordingly. Unlike the condemnation on the soul, however, this statement is clearly intended to be a formal declaration. Here the terms *definimus* and *decernimus* are both used, clearly indicating that this second passage is meant to be seen as a new, formal, and solemn decision of the church. Thus, *Apostolici regiminiis* declares as a dogma of the Catholic faith that “every statement contrary to the enlightened truth of faith is totally false.”

By specifying the “truth of faith” and thus implying that other “truths” were perhaps being proposed, this dogmatic proclamation refers to the so-called doctrine of the double truth. According to this idea, one might maintain that a certain position, such as the mortality of the soul, was true according to philosophy yet at the same time false according to Catholic doctrine. Although some scholars have argued that the double truth should be respected as a legitimate intellectual posi-
Many have suspected that the "double truth" was more often than not a shield devised by philosophers to hide their belief that only philosophic truth represented genuine Truth, especially when that "truth" of philosophy contradicted religious doctrine.

However, even if held in full sincerity and not intended as a shield, any conception of a double truth represents a genuine threat to the church. If one claims that a philosophical position that contradicts religious doctrine is only true according to philosophy, this still creates a rival truth. Since Truth is by definition absolute, having such a rival truth would destroy the very nature of the original truth. Thus, the existence of multiple and competing truths would have the effect of debasing and ultimately destroying the legitimacy of church dogma. By corrupting the absolute nature of Truth, any notion of a double truth attacks the church's authority to represent genuine and absolute Truth and can essentially legitimize belief in heretical doctrines.

However, for a philosopher to hold or teach a philosophical position that contradicted religious dogma—even one such as the mortality of the soul—was not in itself automatically considered heresy because church authorities generally permitted a certain degree of liberty to philosophers. While philosophy might very well lead to an understanding of Truth and thereby supplement religious faith, unlike the divinely revealed truth of faith, philosophy was susceptible to error because its conclusions were the products of fallible human reasoning. Thus, provided that he clearly acknowledge the inferiority of philosophy and acknowledge that the doctrine of faith necessarily represents Truth, there were several ways in which a Christian philosopher was permitted to maintain a philosophical conclusion contrary to religious doctrine or dogma and remain an entirely orthodox Christian. Perhaps the most recommended of these means was to present such contrary philosophical conclusions only as the historical position of a particular philosopher or school. It was also generally permissible for such a Christian philosopher to maintain that philosophy rejects or is unable to demonstrate a particular doctrine of faith. Such academic liberty for philosophers had become the standard practice in academic environments from at least the early thirteenth century. However, because it sets up a rival "truth" (and thus does not genuinely recognize the supremacy of faith) any conception of a double truth violates this normally accepted orthodox separation of reason and faith.

From a doctrinal standpoint Apostolici regiminis has several aims. First, it issues a specific condemnation of errors in regard to the soul and confirms the ancient dogma of the individual immortality of the soul in the terms with which it was cur-

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44 *Apostolici regiminis* itself says as much; see app., 378, no. 11.

rently being challenged. These actions were intended only to snuff out the most glaring and immediately visible errors. In order to eliminate what was regarded as the fundamental, underlying cause of these errors, the council fathers issued their dogmatic proclamation. An occasional annoyance in the past, it seems that the double truth idea was now seen to represent a clear and present danger to religious orthodoxy, and this error, rather than particular philosophical doctrines, is the fundamental concern of *Apostolici regiminis*. If the conclusion *veni vidi vici contra
dicat* was not enough, by affirming the supremacy of faith and dogmatically declaring any statement contrary to the truth of faith to be totally false, *Apostolici regimenis* renders impotent any conception of a double truth for the orthodox Christian.

With this understanding of the doctrinal section, the disciplinary section of the bull comes into sharper focus. Like the doctrinal section of the bull, the disciplinary section of *Apostolici regiminis* appears to consist of two primary passages. The first of these concerns philosophers who teach in public, whether in universities or in other places. It states that whenever they explain or lecture on those conclusions or principles of philosophers that are known to contradict or deviate from the conclusions of faith (here the decree cites as specific examples the mortality or unicity of the soul and the eternity of the world), they must clarify the truth of the church’s doctrine by the best arguments possible and also refute the arguments for the contrary philosophical position (app., 378, no. 10). While this measure is obviously meant to deter intentional use of the double truth, it is probably also intended to eliminate possible confusion or misinterpretation in the case of professors who may not have intended to employ the double truth, but who might nonetheless have been seen as doing so by their students.

It should be pointed out that neither this restriction on philosophers nor the bull’s dogmatic condemnation of the double truth fundamentally altered the intellectual freedom and liberties traditionally afforded to philosophers. The decree clearly allows a philosopher to teach an error about the soul as a historical position or even to assert that the error was not philosophically demonstrable. It might

46 This “doctrine of the double truth” is most generally associated with the University of Paris condemnations of 1277. It is unlikely, however, that the “double truth” was actually held by any philosopher at Paris in the thirteenth century, and in that case it seems to have been more a creation of the condemnation than of any position actually advanced. Although the “double truth” was sporadically condemned throughout the Middle Ages, its condemnation does not seem ever to have been ratified by the universal church during that time. Thus, this dogmatic declaration of 1513 appears to be the first universal pronouncement (and was apparently regarded as such by the Fifth Lateran fathers) against the “double truth.” On the 1277 Paris condemnation of the “double truth” see especially Dales, “Origins of the Doctrine of the Double Truth.” For the text of the condemnation see H. Denifle and A. Chatelain, eds., *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1889–97), 1:543–55.

47 App., 378, no. 10. Grendler, “Intellectual Freedom in Italian Universities,” 36, points out that the disciplinary portion of the decree, by demanding Christian philosophers to demonstrate philosophically the truths of faith only “so far as this is possible” (*et persuadeo pro posse docere*), provides philosophers considerable latitude and shows that the council fathers recognized the view of some philosophers who felt that certain truths of faith could not be demonstrated philosophically. Additionally, Martin, “On a Mistake Commonly Made,” shows that *Apostolici regimenis* does not declare that the immortality of the soul is philosophically demonstrable.
possibly be argued, however, that the bull's condemnation regarding the soul forbids philosophers from arguing that an error was philosophically demonstrable or even forbids any doubt over its possible demonstrability. However, the text of the decree's condemnation need not necessarily be interpreted in this manner. The letter of the text clearly condemns only those who assert the mortality or unicity of the soul absolutely or without any acceptable qualification. In this way Apostolici regimini provides philosophers fairly considerable latitude; as long as he treated a contrary philosophical doctrine as only a probable conclusion or a philosophical theory and stopped short of asserting it as any sort of truth (or double truth), a philosopher could possibly argue for even the apparent philosophical demonstrability of a philosophical position contrary to the teaching of faith.

Although in practice Apostolici regimini might make it more difficult or controversial for a philosopher to assert certain errors regarding the soul even as the mere conclusions of philosophy, there is nothing in this bull that truly prevents philosophers from maintaining or teaching philosophical positions that contradict religious doctrine. In fact, rather than forbid any contrary philosophical teachings per se, the bull's restriction on philosophy professors legitimizes their instruction. It sets limits for philosophers, and it even suggests an appropriate manner in which to teach such philosophical conclusions within the framework of religious orthodoxy. In this respect the bull does little more than officially recognize and define what had been more or less the accepted practice for centuries. Provided they recognize and clearly acknowledge the proper relationship between religion and philosophy, philosophers who taught philosophical conclusions that did not agree with religious doctrine could be and were still considered orthodox Christians, even following Apostolici regimini.

This disciplinary portion of Apostolici regimini is in a spirit similar to an episcopal decree issued by the bishop of Padua Pietro Barozzi in 1489. That episcopal decree seems to have been primarily motivated by pastoral concerns. Rather than condemn any philosophical doctrines per se or take sides in the strictly philosophical debate, Barozzi's decree sought primarily to protect the unlearned and vulnerable faithful by suspending public philosophical disputations on the unity of the intellect and other controversial Averroist topics. Public scholarly disputations were...
important events in the intellectual life of the university community. Held at irregular intervals and before an audience gathered in a public place (often a church), scholarly disputations featured a student or professor who would defend a number of propositions against anyone in attendance who might wish to argue against him. A showplace for the oratorical and rhetorical skills of those involved, disputations had the potential to attract crowds and to generate significant interest among the laity. This format could easily encourage lively debate, and participants were likely to defend their positions in the strongest of terms. Particularly because some of those positions might include the eternity of the world and the unity of the intellect it is not difficult to see why ecclesiastical authorities might be wary of such public disputations.53

In certain respects a sequel to the 1489 Paduan episcopal decree—indeed even involving a common figure, Antonio Trombetta—Apostolici reginini seems to issue its disciplinary orders largely out of similar pastoral concerns.54 Like the 1489 Paduan decree, Apostolici reginini reaffirms the religious doctrine but does not attempt to resolve the purely philosophical debate.55 However, unlike the 1489 decree, Apostolici reginini does not condemn public philosophical disputations outright. While the council fathers recognized and allowed for the academic liberties traditionally granted to philosophers, such liberties could not be permitted to threaten the faith of the unlearned laity. Thus, attempting to safeguard the faith of the vulnerable laity while still preserving academic liberties, the bull issues its disciplinary order enjoining Christian philosophers—whether teaching in universities or debating in public disputations—to make clear and to defend the truth of religious doctrine against contrary philosophical positions.

A close reading of Apostolici reginini's first disciplinary passage also provides further support for the position that the council fathers regarded the doctrine of individual immortality of the soul (as well as the noneternity of the world) to exist already as church dogma. Here the bull states that philosophers must defend church doctrine and refute the philosophical position whenever they teach the conclusions


54 Very similar pastoral concern for protecting the vulnerable faithful from errors—even utilizing some of the same metaphorical imagery—is also found in the Fifth Lateran Council's later decrees against the printing of scandalous books opposed to the faith, and against illicit preaching: Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum, vol. 32, cols. 912–13, 944–47; Tanner, Decrees, 1:632–38.

55 Minnich, "Function of Sacred Scripture," 326–27, and Siro Offerelli, "Il pensiero del concilio lateranense V sulla dimostrabilità razionale dell'immortalità dell'anima umana," Studia Patavina 1 (1954): 7–40, at 39–40, cited by Minnich, "The Function of Sacred Scripture," 327 n. 22. Minnich points out that Apostolici reginini appeals to sacred scripture instead of philosophical arguments for proofs of immortality. In this way, Minnich continues, the Lateran decree is able to affirm church doctrine without interfering in philosophical debates and thus avoids offending any major Christian schools of thought or the religious orders that promoted them. This is because Apostolici reginini, like Barozzi's 1489 decree, was ultimately motivated by religious and not philosophical reasons, and it did not intend to resolve philosophical debate on the soul.
of philosophers “where these are known to deviate from the true faith—as in the assertion of the soul’s mortality or of there being only one soul or of the eternity of the world and other topics of this kind” (app., 378, no. 10). For how would it be possible for the mortality and unicity of the soul and eternity of the world to be among those doctrines which “are known to deviate from the true faith” if individual immortality had only just been defined in the same document a few lines above? By its usage of the present tense of the verb in the passive voice (noscuntur) to describe these errors, this passage implies that the denial of individual immortality was known to be heresy at the time that the bull was written, thus implying that it was already regarded as dogma prior to the promulgation of the bull.

Although the bull’s statute, that ordered philosophy professors to clarify the truth of faith, was a significant measure for quashing the double truth and the errors which it was thought to have produced, the council fathers believed it insufficient. Following this first statute, the disciplinary section of the bull continues with a second passage: “But it does not suffice occasionally to clip the roots of the brambles, if the ground is not dug deeply so as to check them beginning again to multiply, and if there are not removed their seeds and original causes from which they grow so easily.” The “seed” or “original cause” of the error of the double truth is the prolonged study of humanas philosophia, when that study lacks the “flavoring of divine wisdom and the light of revealed truth.” Citing the authority of the Apostle, the council fathers state that God has made such study “empty and foolish”; therefore, such study is sometimes more prone to error than to the discovery of Truth. Thus, “in order to suppress all occasions of falling into error with respect to the matters referred to above,” Apostolici regiminiis issues its second disciplinary statute. Rather unexpectedly adding restrictions on the study of poetry, this second order speaks to all those in sacred orders, “whether religious or seculars or others so committed.” The decree here suggests that, when one wishes to continue a program of study after finishing grammar and dialectic, he may study philosophy or poetry for up to five years without committing some time to the study of theology or canon law. But after this five year period one is permitted to continue the study of philosophy or poetry only if at the same time he actively devotes himself to studying theology or canon law. This, the bull states, allows for the “Lord’s priests,” through the “holy and useful occupations” of theology and canon law, to “cleanse and heal the infected sources of philosophy and poetry.”

Perhaps a way to understand the text of Apostolici regiminiis, taken in full, is to view it in terms of the metaphors that the bull itself employs. Drawing on the gospels’ parables of the sower and of the cockle, the decree calls upon the imagery of

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56 App., 378, nos. 11-12. Here, Tanner, Decrees, translates originalesque caussas as “root causes”; I translate more literally as “original causes,” because the use of “root causes” tends to confuse and interfere with the metaphor of sowing plants in a field, a metaphor that the bull employs by its use of the image of vegetative roots (radices). In the bull, radices represents the “double truth.” Originalesque caussas, on the other hand, are the seeds (sentina) of this root instead of the roots themselves. On this metaphorical imagery see below, 368-69.
a sower of cockle scattering weeds throughout the fields of the Lord. The weeds sprouting up and multiplying in the fields of the Lord here represent various doctrinal errors taught by certain philosophers, particularly the mortality and unicity of the soul and the eternity of the world. Although bothersome, these weeds need not always be detrimental if they are regarded merely as the imperfect conclusions of philosophy. When combined with the double truth, however, they become very dangerous and more difficult to kill. Thus, *Apostolici regiminiis* represents the double truth as the common root from which many of these doctrinal errors stem, and it, more than any weed, poses the greater threat in the fields of the Lord.

The condemnations and the confirmation of the dogma of immortality at the beginning of the bull are aimed towards trampling the weeds that lie on the surface of the Lord's fields. To get beneath these weeds and cut away at their common root, the bull dogmatically declares that there exists no other truth than the truth of divinely revealed religious faith. Additionally, the bull orders that all philosophers clarify and defend the truth of faith whenever they teach philosophical conclusions contrary to religious teachings. However, the seed from which the double truth took root still remained, buried deep within the soil. In the decree this seed represents the prolonged study of philosophy or poetry when such study lacks the enlightenment of religious disciplines. Therefore *Apostolici regiminiis* decrees that such programs of study are to be supplemented by courses in theology or canon law.

Certainly, the bull's condemnation of the double truth has not gone unnoticed; indeed, a number of scholars have described it as being among the noteworthy elements of the decree. Ludwig von Pastor even regarded the decision concerning the double truth as a dogmatic declaration, although it should be pointed out that he regarded most of the bull's measures as "dogmatic constitutions" and assigned the decree on the double truth only secondary importance to what he saw as the bull's dogmatic definition of the individual immortality of the soul. Felix Gilbert recognized that by legislating against the double truth the decree had broader concerns than just a single philosopher or particular philosophical doctrine. Moreover, in an article treating Martin Luther's attitudes toward the Fifth Lateran Council, John Headley makes several observations concerning this decree which anticipate the argument advanced here. However, as far as I am
aware, the particular argument presented in this essay, that the bull was primarily a
dogmatic condemnation of the "double truth" and that it was not any sort of dog-
matic proclamation on immortality, has not previously been advanced. 62

Why is this? Much of the confusion that surrounds the bull can be explained,
at least in part, by the influence of certain interpretations of Apostolici regiminiis
during the years immediately following its promulgation. In particular, by com-
ounding the bull's possible ambiguities, Martin Luther's reactions to the bull and
the bull's use in the controversy surrounding Pomponazzi's De immortalitate animae
have clouded the original meaning of the bull. While Luther viewed the entire Fifth
Lateran Council with contempt, he was particularly scornful of the decree Apostolici
regiminiis. Although he seems to have attacked the decree on several grounds, Luther's
most vehement criticisms were marked by his apparent assumption that Apostolici
regiminiis had declared as dogma the immortality of the soul. In Luther's mind, the
bull had made philosophical theory an article of faith, the implications of which he
found particularly troubling, and in this regard criticism of the bull was repeated
throughout his career in his polemic against the Catholic church. 63

Perhaps most influential on later interpretations of the bull was the debate sur-
rounding Pomponazzi's 1516 treatise De immortalitate animae and its 1518 sequel,
the Apologia. 64 Pomponazzi and his treatises were denounced from the pulpit, pub-
licly banned and burned, and were met by a number of books that attack his argu-
ments. While many of his detractors condemned the apparent irreligiousness of the
works, the main battles of the debate were fought primarily among philosophers
on largely philosophical grounds. The nature of the debate might help explain why,
in the few cases in which the bull Apostolici regininiis was specifically referred to
during the controversy, it was often appealed to as a sort of proof for the philosoph-
ical demonstrability of immortality. Although Pomponazzi's apparent lack of faith
was cited by a few as breaking the decrees of the Apostolici regininiis, this is largely

of immortality is merely a pretext for the Church to rule against a philosophy that is disengaging itself
from the Church" (here Headley cites Gilbert's argument that the laicizing tendencies of humanism
were the bull's primary concern). Headley continues, describing the bull as "a statement that involved
such complex issues as the relation of faith to reason, theology to philosophy, the problem of immortal-
ity and even the nature of man...."

62 A possible exception may be the annalist Odorico Raynaldi, writing in 1663. As noted,
Raynaldi recognized that the bull's condemnations on the soul were not a dogmatic declaration, but
instead that the "ancient dogma of orthodox faith" was only "confirmed" by the decree. Moreover,
Raynaldi does recognize the importance of the bull's condemnation of those arguments that claim a
teaching to be true according to philosophy, while at the same time false according to theology. It
should be pointed out that Raynaldi does not seem explicitly to claim that this condemnation of the
"double truth" represents a dogmatic declaration; see Raynaldi, Annales Ecclesiastici, no. 92.

63 Luther certainly believed in the doctrine of the Resurrection. However, Luther's thought
concerning the immortality of the soul, particularly in the philosophical sense, as well as his attitude
toward Apostolici regininiis are rather complicated matters. These issues are briefly treated by Schoeck,
"Fifth Lateran Council," 112, and Vas, "Immortality of the Soul," 275-88, but see Headley, "Luther and
the Fifth Lateran Council," esp. 68-77.

64 For an excellent and thorough treatment of the controversy surrounding Pomponazzi's treatise
see, Pine, Pietro Pomponazzi, 124-234.
overshadowed by charges (often by the same individuals) that his proof for mortality was illicit or even heretical.

The radical nature of Pomponazzi's treatise on the soul seems to have led many of his detractors to interpret and apply the bull *Apostolici regiminiis* in ways it was perhaps not originally intended. The public attacks at Mantua, Venice, and Bologna prompted even Leo X, in 1518, to issue a warning to Pomponazzi that seems to stretch the original meaning of the bull. It should be pointed out, however, that after consulting with Cardinal Bembo and perhaps with others, Leo quickly revoked this warning and halted any potential proceedings before they could begin. It would seem that, at least in the eyes of the pope, Bembo’s intervention secured Pomponazzi’s acquittal from charges of heresy. Not only did Pomponazzi not suffer any negative personal consequences; he was allowed to continue teaching unmolested at Bologna (the major university of the papal state), and with an increase in salary to boot.

The modifications to the traditional understanding of *Apostolici regiminiis* made here would be significant if only for how they affect our understanding of the text of the bull. However, because many interpretations concerning the bull’s milieu have been influenced, at least in part, by the traditional understanding of the text of the bull (particularly with regard to its dogmatic content), the modifications to that understanding here suggested hold the potential to alter our understanding of *Apostolici regiminiis*’s historical circumstances as well. First, these modifications do nothing to discredit the majority view that *Apostolici regiminiis* is primarily directed against the secular Italian Aristotelians as a group, and because he was that group’s most prominent member, Pietro Pomponazzi in particular. While the bull does not single out particular offenders, unspecified “careless” philosophers are charged with the spread of errors, and the condemnations from the first passage of the doctrinal section of the bull describe with precision the philosophical doctrines most associated with the Italian Averroist and other secular Aristotelian philosophers.

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68 Monfasani, "Aristotelians, Platonists," 266. Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola, an observer who was present at the council, also indicates that the bull was directed at these “Averroists” and “Alexandrists” and he specifically charges such philosophers with maintaining the “double truth” that was condemned by the bull. As cited by Charles B. Schmitt, "Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola and the Fifth Lateran Council," *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 61 (1970): 161–78, at 164–65, "nec desunt nostra tempestate qui blaterent eorum opinionem secundum philosophiam veram esse, quasi Averrois et Alexandri schola sit universa philosophia, et quasi verum posse esse adversum vero; quorum errorem etiam nuper Leo decimus Pontifex Maximus in Laterano Concilio condemnavit;..."
over, a specific concern with philosophers and philosophy runs throughout the whole of the text. It is probably not a coincidence that several among the churchmen who were influential or directly involved in the drafting of the decree—including Giles of Viterbo, Tommaso de Vio Cajetan, and Antonio Trombetta, as well as the Venetian cardinal and protector of the Franciscans, Domenico Grimani, who was the head of the drafting commission—had been associated in some way or another with the University of Padua during the Averroistic controversies of the 1480s and 1490s, and it is quite likely that several knew Pomponazzi personally. While the inclusion of aut poesis near the end of the disciplinary section may indicate that perhaps some sort of antihumanist sentiment had crept into the decree, the text of the bull does not seem to support Felix Gilbert's assertion that Apostolici regimiinis was primarily directed towards humanists or that it was most directly triggered by the 1500 edition of Lucretius. There is simply too much emphasis on philosophy and philosophers and much too little on poetry or literature to accept the conclusion that the bull was directed primarily at humanists or classical literature. Although in some sense Apostolici regimiinis might seem to represent a remand of a particular philosophical school by its philosophical opponents, the decree ought not to be regarded as an arbitrary use of ecclesiastical authority solely toward this end. The problem of the double truth was a legitimate and serious religious concern. Moreover, there is evidence to show that accusations concerning the double truth were indeed reasonable. For example, if the council fathers suspected Pietro Pomponazzi of holding the double truth, or of maintaining a position that bordered the double truth, there is evidence to suggest that such a suspicion would not have been unfounded. In his published works, which variously attack immortality, the reality of miracles, and predestination, Pomponazzi is very careful to give the standard disclaimer that his positions are merely uncertain conclusions of philosophy and that the teachings of religion on these matters represent genuine truth. However, Martin Pine has argued that Pomponazzi's conclusions defy his disclaimers and that his professions of belief are probably only a device to protect him from persecution for his true beliefs. Pine advances the position that Pomponazzi even went beyond the normal conceptions of the double truth, and in fact believed that only philosophy represented genuine truth. According to Pine, Pomponazzi regarded the doctrines of religion as mere fables, completely devoid of rational content and invented by religious lawmakers in order to lead to virtue those men who were unable to fully understand philosophy. Not

69See Price, "Origins," esp. 472, and O'Malley, Giles of Viterbo, 7, as well as the discussion below.
only is this position found in each of Pomponazzi's three major published works, but, Pine argues, it is stated even more explicitly by Pomponazzi in one of his lectures in which he gave a commentary on Averroës's similar position concerning the relationship of philosophy and religion. 

While Pine's conclusions are interesting and insightful, there are also compelling arguments for Pomponazzi's religious sincerity. Inevitably it probably remains impossible to know Pomponazzi's actual religious sincerity, and scholarly debate on this topic will no doubt continue. However, if there is sufficient evidence to persuade certain modern historians, who are professionally committed to objectivity, that Pomponazzi (or others) crossed the accepted boundaries of orthodoxy, it is certainly not surprising that certain churchmen of the time, many of whom were likely already predisposed against Pomponazzi and others because of their philosophical positions, might have suspected such philosophers of this heresy.

To address another matter, the bull's statute that theology or canon law supplements the prolonged study of philosophy or poetry appears to reflect certain characteristics of late medieval Italian academic institutions. In the northern European universities, theology faculties generally held a position superior to that of the philosophers (who were members of the lower faculty of arts). However, Italian professors of theology—generally Dominican and Franciscan friars who usually taught in their convent houses of study in university towns—held a much weaker position relative to the philosophers in their universities as compared to their northern counterparts. Whereas the theology faculties of northern Europe had the power and authority to create institutional conflict and to act as a check on the philosophers at those universities, Italian theology professors usually had no such authority to oversee the activities of the philosophers. Such an arrangement in the Italian universities provided philosophy professors greater liberties, and this may help explain the daring of some of these professors on certain delicate topics. This lack of institutional conflict meant that any meaningful censure of illicit philosophy in Italy generally had to come from sources outside the university. Thus, the circumstances of the Italian universities may also help explain, at least in part, why, as opposed to the 1277 Paris condemnation, the 1513 condemnation of the double truth was enacted through a universal church council and perhaps thereby also why it took the form of a formal dogmatic declaration. 

74 For example, see esp. Kristeller, "The Myth of Renaissance Atheism," and idem, Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance, 84–90. See also the discussion above.
75 The relation of theology and philosophy in and the makeup of the Italian universities is a rather complex matter, too complicated to be addressed here in any detail. See Pine, Pietro Pomponazzi, 41–43, 110–11; Monfasani, "Aristotelians, Platonists," 252–56; and Paul F. Grendler, The Universities of the Italian Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). A telling indicator of the difference between the Italian and northern European universities in this regard comes from the records of censures on philosophy professors by theology faculties. Such censures are common documents from the northern European universities; however, none from any Italian universities exist prior to the Protestant Reformation. On such censures see Monfasani, "Aristotelians, Platonists," 252.
Seeing *Apostolici regiminiis* as being a dogmatic declaration against the double truth may also help explain Leo X's selection of Tommaso de'Vio Cajetan to serve on the committee that drafted the decree. The selection of Cajetan, a prominent Thomist philosopher and then general of the Dominican order, has been somewhat of a mystery. The problem with Cajetan's appointment is that in 1509 he had written a commentary on Saint Thomas's *De anima* in which he broke with his fellow Thomists and concluded that the individual immortality of the soul was not demonstrable according to the philosophy of Aristotle. Why would Leo X appoint such a philosopher to the commission entrusted with drafting this decree if the goal of the decree was to condemn the very error he had at least partially supported?

Rather than present a mystery, Cajetan's appointment should instead be regarded as indicating the true nature of this decree. Although Cajetan's commentary on Saint Thomas's *De anima* supported a philosophical position that clashed with Leo's probable philosophical views, Cajetan expressed his conclusions in a manner which properly observed the approved separation of religion and philosophy. Cajetan clearly pointed out that this view was merely an uncertain conclusion of philosophy, and even so was only valid according to Aristotelian principles—thereby suggesting that philosophy, if not Aristotle, might still be able to demonstrate immortality. In his work he made it clear that he believed that the religious doctrine of immortality represented unquestionable truth and his conclusions do nothing to contradict this. It is here suggested that Leo X appointed Cajetan to the drafting commission because he felt the Dominican philosopher would support his decree. This is precisely because *Apostolici regiminiis* was not a condemnation of any philosophical conclusion per se, but was a condemnation of the double truth, and was aimed to establish the appropriate way for a philosopher to teach philosophical doctrines that contradicted religious teaching. Cajetan represented the ideal model of just how a philosopher should teach such philosophical conclusions and in fact had done so in the case of the very doctrine on which improper teaching and the use of the double truth had so troubled many of the council fathers. Although Cajetan expressed some reservations, Leo was right to select him, since he did for

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76 Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum*, vol. 32, col. 797.
77 For example, Monfasani, "Aristotelians, Platonists," 269, suggests that the selection of Cajetan to the drafting committee may represent fair-mindedness on the part of Leo X.
78 Neither before nor after the bull was Cajetan's Catholic orthodoxy seriously questioned, even by the most aggressive defenders of the philosophical demonstrability of the soul. In fact, Cajetan was made a cardinal by Leo X soon after the council in 1517; the church relied upon Cajetan to be one of the most important defenders of Catholic orthodoxy during the first half of the sixteenth century. Concerning the orthodoxy of Cajetan's commentary on Saint Thomas's *De anima* and its attackers, see, Pine, Pietro Pomponazzi, 109, 134, 184–86; also Etienne Gilson, "Autour de Pomponazzi," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Lituanne du Moyen Age* 28 (1961): 163–279, esp. 173–83. On his role in the church following the Lateran Council, especially with regard to Martin Luther, see for instance Jedin, *Council of Trent*, esp. 1:170–75. For a good general treatment of Cajetan and his thought, see Jared Wicks, "Thomism between Renaissance and Reformation: The Case of Cajetan," *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 68 (1977): 9–31, and idem, *Cajetan Responds: A Reader in Reformation Controversy* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1978), 1–46.
the most part support the majority of the decree. Only objecting to the section that orders philosophers to publicly explain Christian doctrine, which he probably felt imposed too burdensome or distracting a duty upon professional philosophers, Cajetan seems to have accepted the rest of the bull, including the condemnation of those who held the mortality and unicity of the soul as truths of philosophy as well as the dogmatic condemnation of the double truth.  

The final difficulty concerning the decree is how to understand its denunciation of poetry. Poetry is not specifically mentioned until the final passage of the disciplinary section, and yet Felix Gilbert argued that this sanction reflects the decree's antihumanist character. He proposes that the bull was instigated and perhaps even authored by Vincenzo Quirini and Tommaso Giustiniani and their circle. Gilbert admits that such a measure against humanism might seem strange coming from the court of Leo, a pope renowned as one of the great Renaissance patrons of humanism. However, Gilbert argues that the influence of Quirini and Giustiniani at the papal court may have been strong enough to compel the new and relatively young pope to allow the decree. Still, the text of the decree is clearly targeted primarily at philosophers: Averroist errors are described with precision, and a concern with philosophy, in particular with the double truth, runs throughout the bull. Except for the inclusion of aut poesis near the end, *Apostolici regininis* is nowhere concerned with literature at all. Neither Quirini nor Giustiniani, both Venetians who had recently entered the Camaldolese order, sat on the commission that drafted the decree; and while they did in 1513 present to the pope their famous *Libellus ad Leonem* recommending reforms, nowhere in that comprehensive and long work did they ever mention concern for heterodox teachings on the soul.

The sanction on poetry, however, is a part of the text and thus the problem remains as to why it is present. Poetry is mentioned only twice in the text of the bull and when it is mentioned it reads almost as if an afterthought (aut poesis and et poesis). Perhaps the decree can be read as though poetry was not an original or primary concern of the drafters; perhaps sanctions on poetry were inserted at some time during the drafting process. Without making them the authors or even significant instigators of the bull, it seems reasonable to suggest that Vincenzo Quirini and Tommaso Giustiniani (and their circle) could very well have used their influence with the pope, as described by Gilbert, to effect such an addition to the...

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79 App., 379; no. 19. Cajetan objects only to the "second part," or disciplinary section of the bull, and more specifically to the mandate that required philosophers to teach religion when publicly teaching philosophy. Cajetan is one of two recorded prelates to have objected to any portion of the bull; Nicolo, the bishop of Bergamo, was the other.

80 Gilbert, "Cristianesimo," 976–79.


82 Gilbert, "Cristianesimo," 986–90.

83 Monfasani, "Aristotelians, Platonists," 266 n. 105, similarly criticizes Gilbert's view.


85 Monfasani, "Aristotelians, Platonists," 266 n. 105.
Concerning Leo's support of humanism, it should be pointed out that the bull's sanction on poetry is not an attack on humanism per se. Rather, it prohibits (at least for those in sacred orders) any program of study, including but not limited to a humanist curriculum, that does not also include the study of divine things. Certainly such an addition (indeed if that is what it is) would have been acceptable to Leo X and indeed to most other humanists of the day.

With Apostolici regiminiis we have a bull which seems to have been greatly influenced by a common hostility to certain secular Italian Aristotelian professors and their doctrines that either contradicted or expressed doubt about the philosophical demonstrability of the individual immortality of the soul. Primarily influenced by Florentine Platonism, this movement gained important institutional force with the ascension to the papacy by Leo X. Although Leo X and those who shared his views may have been philosophically opposed to the secular Aristotelians' teachings on the soul, it was understood that those teachings in themselves did not constitute heresy. However, Leo X and his circle feared that the Italian university structure, with its secular curriculum and politically weak theological faculties, had allowed certain secular Aristotelian philosophers to teach these philosophical doctrines in a way that overstepped the accepted bounds separating religion and philosophy. Some of these philosophers, perhaps including Pietro Pomponazzi, were seen as employing or as coming dangerously close to employing the double truth. Not only is the double truth heretical in itself as a device for philosophers, but perhaps more importantly, because of the popular public philosophical disputations, it also represented a threat to the larger body of the Christian faithful.

Apostolici regiminiis, although in part a product of philosophical hostilities, is not itself a philosophical bull. Nonetheless, the philosophical hostilities towards the secular Italian Aristotelians played an important role in its creation. These hostilities helped sensitize clerical opinion to philosophical doubts about immortality and may have predisposed the clergy to see certain philosophers as advocating the "double truth." Hostilities towards the secular Aristotelians also helped to mobilize an impressive collection of intellectuals and scholars from a variety of schools of thought behind a common cause. Thus a pope with Platonist leanings was able to call on a number of prominent churchmen from a variety of scholarly backgrounds who were receptive to his philosophical views on the soul to sit at the drafting commission or otherwise support this decree. However, because the bull was aimed at the double truth and not at any particular philosophical school or doctrine per se, Leo X was also able to call on a number of other prelates—most notably Cajetan—who, although they might not have shared his particular philosophical views on the soul, nonetheless could also support this dogmatic decree against the double truth.

Another possibility that bears investigation is that Quirini and Giustiniani, perhaps by virtue of their student days at Padua or through their mutual friendship with Gasparo Contarini (who held Pietro Barozzi in high esteem and in 1517 would write a treatise on immortality against his former master Pomponazzi), were among those who effected or supported the bull based on a common hostility to Pomponazzi and other Paduan Aristotelians. On the friendship of Quirini, Giustiniani, and Contarini see Ross, "Gasparo Contarini and His Friends."
Appendix
The Bull *Apostolici regiminis* of the Eighth Session
of the Fifth Lateran Council, 19 December 1513

The official acts of the Fifth Lateran Council were first edited and published in Rome in 1521, by Cardinal Antonio del Monte, acting on the orders of Pope Leo X. The title of this edition is *Sacrum Lateranense concilium novissimum sub Iulio II et Leone X celebratum*. This 1521 edition was used in various collections, the editions currently most readily available being J. D. Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio* (Paris, 1773), vol. 32: cols. 649–1002, and Norman P. Tanner, SJ., *ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils* (Washington, D.C., 1990), 1:595–655. These are the two editions followed here for the Latin text of the decree *Apostolici regiminis*. The Tanner edition, at 1:605–6, was used for the main body of the decree; the Mansi edition, vol. 32, cols. 842–43, was used for several passages following the main text of the bull, which were not included in the Tanner edition.

Following the practice of the Tanner edition, the subtitle of the decree, here in boldface and within brackets, is from the 1521 edition's summary of decrees, but is not a part of the bull proper. Intertextual references citing biblical passages or previous counciliar decrees, in brackets, also are taken from Tanner. The numbering throughout the text, in brackets and boldface, is added by the author of this essay.

**Sessio VIII**
19 DEC, 1513

[Damnatur omnis assertio contraria veritati christianae fidei illuminatae]

[1] Leo episcopus servus servorum Dei, ad perpetuam rei memoriam, sacro approbante concilio. [2] Apostolici regiminis sollicitudo nos assidue pulsat, ut medendis animarum languoribus, quarum nos ex alto omnipotens Auctor curam habere voluit, iis potissimum qui instantius fideles nunc urgere cernuntur, salutifero olei et vini medicamine ad instar samaritani in evangelio [see Luke 10:34] solicitam operam impendamus, ne nobis illud Ieremiae obiiciatur: *Non quid res intem non est in Galaad, aut medicus non est ibi* [Jer. 8:22].

[3] Cum itaque diebus nostris (quod dolenter ferimus) zizaniae seminator, antiquus humani generis hostis [see Luke 13:25, 28], nonnullos perniciosissimos errores a fidelibus semper explosos in agro Domini super seminare et augere sit ausus, de natura praesertim animae rationalis, quod instantius fideles nec urgere cernuntur, salutifero olei et vini medicamine ad instar samaritani in evangelio [see Luke 10:34] solicitam operam impendamus, ne nobis illud Ieremiae obiiciatur: *Non quid res intem non est in Galaad, aut medicus non est ibi* [Jer. 8:22].

[4] cum illa non solum vere per se et essentialiter humani corporis forma existat, sicut in canone felicis recordationis Clementis papae V praedecessoris nostri in generali Viennensi concilio edito continetur [Council of Vienne, see Tanner, *Decrees*, 1:360–61], verum et immortalis, et pro corporum quibus infunditur multitudine singularitatis multiplicabils, et

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87 On the various editions of the decrees of the council, see especially Minnich "Paride de Grassi's Diary," 370–71, and Tanner, *Decrees*, 593–94.


[10] Insuper omnibus et singulis philosophis in universitatis studiorum generalium, et alibi publice legentibus, distinctius praecipiendo mandamus, ut cum philosophorum principia aut conclusiones, in quibus a recta fide deviare noscuntur, auditoribus suis legerint, seu explanaverint, quae sine revelatae veritatis lumine in errorem quandoque magis inducantur, quam in veritati elucidationem: ad tollendam omnem in praemissis errandi occasionem, hanc salutari constitutione ordinamus et statuimus, ne quisquam de cetero in sacris ordinibus, saecularis vel regularis, aut alius ad illas a iure arctatus, in studiis generalibus, vel alibi publicae audiendi, philosophiae aut poesis estudia aliqua, aut fidelius tandem, aut seorsum, aut theologiae, aut sacris canonibus operam navaverit, ut in his sanctis et utilibus professionibus sacerdotes Domini inveniant, unde infectas philosophiae et poesis radices purgare et sanare valeant.

[11] Et cum non sufficiat aliquando tribulorum radices praesencindere, nisi et, ne iterum pullulent, funditus evellere, ac eorum semina originalesque causas, unde facile oriuntur, removere, cum praecipue humanae philosophiae studii diuturniora, quam Deus, secundum verbum Apostoli, evacuavit et stultam fecit [see 1 Cor. 1:19–20], absque divinae sapientiae condimento, et quae sine revelatae veritatis lumine in errorem quandoque magis inducantur, quam in veritati elucidationem: ad tollendam omnem in praemissis errandi occasionem, hanc salutari constitutione ordinamus et statuimus, ne quisquam de cetero in sacris ordinibus constituutis, saecularis vel regularis, aut ad illas a iure arctatus, in studiis generalibus, vel alibi publicae audiendi, philosophiae aut poesis studia aliqua, aut seorsum, aut theologiae, aut sacris canonibus operam navaverit, ut in his sanctis et utilibus professionibus sacerdotes Domini inveniant, unde infectas philosophiae et poesis radices purgare et sanare valeant.

[12] Verum dicto exacto quinquennio, si ex illis studiis insudare voluerit, liberum sit ei, dum tamen simul et seorsum, aut theologiam, aut sacris canonibus operam navaverit, ut in his sanctis et utilibus professionibus sacerdotes Domini inveniant, unde infectas philosophiae et poesis radices purgare et sanare valeant.


[16] Datum Romae in publica sessione, in Laterensi sacrosancta basilica solemniter celebrata anno incarnationis dominicæ 1513. XIV. Kalendas Januarii, pontificatus nostri anno primo.

[17] Qua perfecta, petit, an placenter paternitatis suis contenta in schedula. [18] Et omnes responderunt simpliciter placere, excepto reverendo patre dominio Nicolao episcopo Bergomensi, qui dixit, quod non placebat sibi, quod theologorum imponerent philosophiam dis-
Constant / Reinterpretation of "Apostolici regiminis" (1513)

putantibus de veritate intellectus, tamquam de materia posita de mente Aristotelis, quam sibi
imponit Averrois, licet secundum veritatem talis opinio est falsa. [19] Et reverendus pater
dominus Thomas generalis ordinis Praedicatorum dixit, quod non placet secunda pars bullae,
praecipiens philosophis, ut publice persuadendo doceant veritatem fidei.

[20] Deinde reverendus pater dominus Joannes Vincentiuis archiepiscopus Senensis
ascendit ambonem, et legit quamdam schedulam super pace tenoris infra scripti.

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