PLS 854 Comparative Political Institutions

Spring 2011

Thu. 3:00 - 5:50 PM

S. Kedzie 104

 

Prof. Eric C.C. Chang

Email: echang@msu.edu

Office: 313 S. Kedzie

Office Hours: Tue. 12:45-2:45 PM.

 

Course Description

 

This course surveys seminal and recent political institutions literature from a comparative perspective. More specifically, this course will discuss the causes and the consequences of institutional arrangements in contemporary democracies. Topics include: neo-institutionalism, regime types, electoral systems, forms of government, veto players, federalism, and other major institutional structures (such as mixed electoral systems, semi-presidentialism, and informal institutions). Methodologically, this course is rooted in the rational choice tradition, but it also incorporates other perspectives. Empirically, most topics will be discussed in the context of advanced democracies. The objective is to acquaint you with the seminal ideas and to help you identify research opportunities and/or narrow down your dissertation direction.

 

Course Requirements and Evaluation

 

Grading will be based on class participation, three review essays, and one research proposal.

 

1.       Class participation: The readings for each week will be divided between class members as evenly as possible. Each student will write a 2-page intellectual reaction paper for the reading s/he chooses, and the reaction paper should be organized in the following format:

a.       A three-sentence summary of the reading.

b.       A short description of the dependent variable, and the key independent variable(s) (specifically, discuss the theoretical concepts these variables represent and empirically how they are operationalized), and the causal mechanism that tie them together.

c.       The relevance to the weekly theme and/or to the literature in general.

d.       One (or more) innovative testable hypothesis from the weekly readings.  This is the focus of our class discussion, and how a new potential research project starts.  Please be creative and ambitious. Borrowing insights from Buffett - be skeptical when others are certain and be certain when others are skeptical.  The natural starting point is to extend some of the arguments from the readings.  For instance:

                                                   i.      Why the argument/findings may not hold or are simply wrong and what are your proposed answers or

                                                 ii.      Why the results should be driven by alternative causal mechanisms instead of the ones proposed in the readings, or

                                                iii.      What are other theoretical consequences or further implications that have not been adequately explored?

 

Keep in mind that you need to demonstrate the significance of your new hypothesis. Always ask yourself if you contribute something new or you are simply replicating something trivial.  You should also discuss what kind of empirical strategy or research design you can employ to substantiate your own argument.  Your reaction paper should be sent to everyone no later than 12 PM on the Wednesday before each Thursday class. Everyone is expected to read all of the background and required readings before class and participate actively in the class.  Late submission will be discarded.

2.       Review essays (5-page; due on May 6): Students should select and write critical review essays for three of the course’s topics. The essay is a think piece that critically assesses the readings. Specifically, you will have to:

a.       Identify its central research question and/or key puzzle

b.       Summarize the causal propositions

c.       Critically evaluate the theoretical and empirical strengths and weaknesses.

                                                   i.      Are the assumptions and the logic behind them reasonable?

                                                 ii.      Are the key theoretical propositions coherently organized and logically persuasive?

                                                iii.      Are the methods appropriately employed in answering the research questions?

                                               iv.      Does the evidence fully support the conclusions?

d.       Discuss potential directions for future research.

 

3.       The research proposal (10-pages): you should develop a promising research agenda that can be pursued after the class. In your research proposal, you should:

a.       State your question of inquiry. (What is it that you want to solve?)

b.       Review the current literature, and explain why, despite the extant literature, there is still something that needs to be done. (Why is your question interesting? What is your contribution?) Alternatively, you can identify (and seek to solve) an empirical puzzle that no one has ever successfully explained.

c.       Propose your theory, elaborate the logic behind it, and restate your proposition in a falsifiable form. (What is your solution?)

d.       Discuss how you plan to test your hypothesis and, at a minimum, present some preliminary empirical evidence.

In your research proposal, it is crucial that the logical connections are stated clearly and coherently. The bar for the research proposal is to be presented at a national level conference once expanded into a complete research paper in the near future.  For detailed instructions regarding how to write a class paper, read “How to Write a Publishable (Class) Paper” by Gary King.  The first draft of the research proposal is due on April 22. Please submit one electronic copy to me. Your drafts will be exchanged and commented on by your fellow classmates. In the last class, you will make a short, conference-like, presentation. You will receive comments from me, the discussants (assigned by me, and the discussant will be evaluated based on how helpful s/he is), and your classmates as a whole. After receiving comments, you will have to revise and resubmit the final version by May 6, together with a memo summarizing how you responded (or why you choose not to respond) to the comments.

 

Suggested Books

·          Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

·          Cox, Gary. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

·          Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. Political Institutions under Dictatorship. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

·          Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries.  New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

·          Norris, Pippa. 2004. Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

·          Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2003. The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

·          Shugart, Matthew S., and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds. 2001. Mixed-Member Electoral Systems - The Best of Both Worlds? Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

·          Tsebelis, George. 2002. Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.


Schedule

The reading might be modified as our interests evolve.

 

Week 1 (1/13): An Overview

 

Background Reading:

·          Hall, Peter, and Rosemary Taylor. 1996. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms.” Political Studies 44: 935-57.

·          March, James, and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life.” American Political Science Review 78: 734-49.

 

Suggested Reading:

·          Carey, John. 2000. “Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions.Comparative Political Studies 33 (6-7): 735-61.

·          Engerman, Stanley L., and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2008. Debating the Role of Institutions in Political and Economic Development: Theory, History, and Findings.” Annual Review of Political Science 11: 119-35.

·          March, James, and Johan P. Olsen. 2005. Elaborating the ‘New Institutionalism’.” Unpublished Manuscript.

·          Schmidt, Vivien A. 2008. Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse.”  Annual Review of Political Science 11: 303-26.

·          Shepsle, Kenneth. 1989. “Studying Institutions. Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach.Journal of Theoretical Politics 1: 131-47.

·          Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 2: 369-404.

·          Weingast, Barry. 2000. “Rational-choice Institutionalism.In Ira Katznelson, and Helen Milner, eds. Political Science: The State of the Discipline. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.

·          Murillo, María Victoria, and Steven Levitsky. 2009. “Variation in Institutional Strength.” Annual Review of Political Science 12(1): 115-133

·          Dellepiane-Avellaneda, Sebastian. 2010. “Review Article: Good Governance, Institutions and Economic Development: Beyond the Conventional Wisdom.” British Journal of Political Science 40(1): 195-224.


Week 2 (1/20): Democracies

 

Background Reading:

·          Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press. Selected Chapters.

·          Dahl, Robert. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press

·          Weingast, Barry R. 1997. “The Political Foundation of Democracy and the Rule of Law.” American Political Science Review 91 (2): 245-63.

 

Required Reading:

·          Desai, Raj M., Anders Olofsgard, and Tarik M. Yousef. 2003. “Democracy, Inequality, and Inflation.” American Political Science Review 97 (3): 391-406.

·          Ross, Michael. 2006. “Is Democracy Good for the Poor?” American Journal of Political Science 50 (4): 860-74.

·          Stasavage, David. 2005. “Democracy and Education Spending in Africa.”  American Journal of Political Science 49 (2): 343-58.

·          Olken, Benjamin A. 2010. “Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia.” American Political Science Review 104 (2): 243-267.

·          Brown, David S., and Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak. 2009. “The Transforming Power of Democracy: Regime Type and the Distribution of Electricity.” American Political Science Review 103 (2): 193-213.

·          Timmons, Jeffrey F. 2010. “Does Democracy Reduce Economic Inequality?” British Journal of Political Science 40(4): 741-757.

 

Recommended Reading:

·          Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2 and 3.

·          Avelino, George, David S. Brown, and Wendy Hunter. 2005. “The Effects of Capital Mobility, Trade Openness, and Democracy on Social Spending in Latin America, 1980-1999.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (3): 625-41.

·          Baum, Matthew A., and David A. Lake. 2003. “The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital.” American Journal of Political Science 47 (2): 333-347.

·          Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Retribution. New York, Cambridge University Press.

·          Brown, David S. 2004. “Democracy and Gender Inequality in Education: A Cross-National Examination.” British Journal of Political Science 34 (1): 137-52.

·          Cheibub, Jose Antonio. 1998.  “Political Regimes and the Extractive Capacity of Governments: Taxation in Democracies and Dictatorship.” World Politics 50 (3): 349-76.

·          Eichengreen, Barry, and David Leblang. 2008. Democracy and Globalization. Economics & Politics 20 (3): 289 – 334.

·          Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

·          Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Papaterra Limongi Neto. 1997. “Modernization: Theories and Facts.” World Politics 49 (2): 155-83.

·          Quinn, Dennis, and John T. Woolley. 2001. “Democracy and National Economic Performance: The Preference for Stability.” American Journal of Political Science 45 (3): 634-57.


Week 3 (1/27): Dictatorship

 

Background Reading:

·          Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. Political Institutions under Dictatorship. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-2, 5.

·          Geddes, Barbara. 2004. Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument. Unpublished Manuscript.

·          Larry Diamond. 2002. “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 21-35.

·          Magaloni, Beatriz, and Ruth Kricheli. “Political Order and One-Party Rule.” Annual Review of Political Science 13: 123-143.

 

Required Reading:

·          Wright, Joseph. 2008. “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Impact Economic Growth and Foreign Aid.”  American Journal of Political Science 52 (2): 322-43.

·          Egorov, Geogry, Sergei Guriev, and Konstantin Sonin. 2009. “Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data.” American Political Science Review 103 (4): 645-668.

·          Malesky, Edmund, and Paul Schuler. 2010. “Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament.” American Political Science Review 104 (3): 482-502.

·          Brownlee, Jason. 2009. “Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (3): 515-532.

·          Reuter, Ora, and Jennifer Gandhi. 2011. “Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic Parties.” British Journal of Political Science 41(1): 83-110.

·          Bunce, Valerie J., and Sharon L. Wolchik. 2010. “Defeating Dictators: Electoral Change and Stability in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes.” World Politics 62 (1): 43-86.

 

Recommended Reading:

·          Acemoglu, Daron. 2006. “Modeling Inefficient Institutions.” NBER Working Paper No. W11940.

·          Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, Konstantin Sonin. 2007. “Coalition Formation in Non-democracies.” Unpublished Manuscript.

·          Boix, Carles, and Milan Svolik. 2007. “The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-sharing in Dictatorships." Unpublished manuscript.

·          Brownlee, Jason. 2007. Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

·          Brownlee, Jason. 2007. “Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies.World Politics 59 (4): 595-628.

·          Dal Bó, Ernesto, and Robert Powell. 2009. “A model of spoils politics.” American Journal of Political Science 53(1): 207–222.

·          Debs, Alexandre, and H.E. Goemans. 2010. “Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War.” American Political Science Review 104 (3): 430-445.

·          Diamond, Larry. 2002. “Elections without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 21-35.

·          Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2006. “Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships.” Economics & Politics 18 (1): 1-26.

·          Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2007. “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.” Comparative Political Studies 40 (11): 1279-1301.

·          Gandhi, Jennifer, and Ellen Lust-Okar. 2009. “Elections Under Authoritarianism.” Annual Review of Political Science 12: 403-422.

·          Greene, Kenneth F. 2010. “The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance.” Comparative Political Studies 43 (7): 807 -834.

·          Kim, Wonik, and Jennifer Gandhi. 2010. “Coopting Workers under Dictatorship.” Journal of Politics 72(3): 646-658.

·          Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2002. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism." Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 51-65.

·          Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. 2003. Autocracy by Democratic Rules: The Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Post-Cold War Era. Typescript.

·          Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2006. “Elections under Authoritarianism. Preliminary Lessons from Jordan.” Democratization 13(3): 456 – 71.

·          Schedler, Andreas. 2002. “Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 36-50.

·          Wintrobe, Ronald. 2007. Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches. In Carles Boix, and Susan C. Stokes, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

·          Wright, Joseph. 2008. To Invest or Insure? How Authoritarian Time Horizons Impact Foreign Aid Effectiveness. Comparative Political Studies 41 (7): 971-1000.

 


Week 4 (2/3): Electoral Systems I: Political Consequences

 

Background Reading:

·          Cox, Gary. 1999. “Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination.Annual Review of Political Science 2: 145-61.

·          Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries.  New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Chapter 8

·          Norris, Pippa. 2004. Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2 and 11.

 

Required Reading:

·          Bhavnani, Rikhil R. 2009. “Do Electoral Quotas Work After They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India.” American Political Science Review 103 (1): 23-35.

·          Calvo, Ernesto, and Timothy Hellwig. 2011. “Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives under Different Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 55 (1): 27-41.

·          Golder, Matt, and Jacek Stramski. 2010. “Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions.” American Journal of Political Science 54 (1): 90-106.

·          Bargsted, Matias, and Orit Kedar. “Coalition-Targeted Duvergerian Voting: How Expectations Affect Voter Choice under Proportional Representation.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (2): 307-323.

·          Dickson, Eric, and Kenneth Scheve. 2010. “Social Identity, Electoral Institutions and the Number of Candidates.” British Journal of Political Science 40 (2): 349-375.

·          Karp, Jeffrey A., and Susan A. Banducci. 2008. “Political Efficacy and Participation in Twenty-Seven Democracies: How Electoral Systems Shape Political Behaviour.” British Journal of Political Science 38 (2): 311-334.

 

Recommended Reading:

·          Amorim Neto, Octavio, and Gary W. Cox. 1997. “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties.” American Journal of Political Science 41 (1): 149-74.

·          Carey, John, and Matthew Shugart. 1995. “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Systems.” Electoral Studies 14: 417-39.

·          Clark, William R., and Matt Golder. 2006. “Rehabilitating Duverger’s Theory: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws.” Comparative Political Studies 39: 679-708.

·          Cox, Gary W. 1990. “Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems.American Journal of Political Science 34: 903-35.

·          Cox, Gary. W. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

·          Hirano, Shigeo. 2007. “Electoral Institutions, Hometowns, and Favored Minorities. Evidence from Japanese Electoral Reforms.” World Politics 58: 51-82.

·          Kittilson, Miki Caul, and Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. 2010. “Engaging Citizens: The Role of Power-Sharing Institutions.”  Journal of Politics 72 (4): 990-1002.

·          Lijphart, Arend. 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

·          Lijphart, Arend. 1997. “Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma.” American Political Science Review 91: 1-14.

·          Naoi, Megumi, and Krauss Krauss. 2009. “Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics Under Alternative Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (4): 874-892.

·          Norris, Pippa. 2004. Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4-10.

·          Ordeshook, Peter, and Olga Shvetsova. 1994. “Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties.” American Journal of Political Science 38 (1): 100-23.

·          Powell, G. Bingham, and Georg Vanberg. 2000. “Electoral Law, Disproportionality, and Median Correspondence: Implications for Two Visions of Democracy.” British Journal of Political Science 30: 383-411.

·          Rae, Douglas. 1967. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

·          Reed, S. R. 1991. “Structure and Behavior: Extending Duverger's Law to the Japanese Case.” British Journal of Political Science 29 (1): 335-56.

·          Taagepera, R., and M. S. Shugart. 1989. Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

·          Van der Hout, Eliora, and Anthony J. McGann. 2009. “Proportional Representation Within the Limits of Liberalism Alone.” British Journal of Political Science 39 (4): 735-754.


Week 5 (2/10): Electoral Systems II: Economic Consequences

 

Background Reading:

·          Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2003. The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapters 1, 2, and 9. Also, see the review essay by Daron Acemoglu.

 

Required Reading:

·          Birchfield, Vicki, and Markus Crepaz. 1998. “The Impact of Constitutional Structures and Collective and Competitive Veto Points on Income Inequality in Industrialized Democracies.” European Journal of Political Research 34 (2): 175-200.

·          Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2006. “Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others.” American Political Science Review 100 (2): 165-81.

·          Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, Roberto Perotti, and Massimo Rostagno. 2002. “Electoral Systems and the Composition of Public Spending.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (2): 609-57.

·          Rogowski, Ronald, and Mark Andreas Kayser. 2002. “Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power: Price-level Evidence from the OECD Countries.” American Journal of Political Science 46: 526-39.

·          Shugart, Matthew S., Melody Valdini, and Kati Suominen. 2005. “Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators under Proportional Representation.” American Journal of Political Science 29 (2): 437–449

·          Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2010. “Real Exchange Rates and Competitiveness: The Political Economy of Skill Formation, Wage Compression, and Electoral Systems.” American Political Science Review 104 (3): 601-623.

 

Recommended Reading:

·          Austen-Smith, David. 2000. “Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation.” Journal of Political Economy 108 (6): 1235-69.

·          Bawn, Kathleen, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2006. “Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector.American Journal of Political Science 50 (2): 251-65.

·          Chang, Eric, Mark Kayser, and Ronald Rogowski. 2008. “Electoral Systems and Real Prices: Panel Evidence for the OECD Countries, 1970-2000.” British Journal of Political Science 38: 739-51.

·          Lizzeri, Alessandro, and Nicola Persico. 2001. “The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral incentives.” American Economic Review 91 (1): 225-39.

·          McGillivray, Fiona. 2003. “Redistributive Politics and Stock Price Dispersion.” British Journal of Political Science 33: 367-95.

·          McGillivray, Fiona. 2004. Trading for the Marginals: Political Institutions and Industry Handouts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

·          Morelli, Massimo. 2004. “Party Formation and Policy Outcomes Under Different Electoral Systems.” Review of Economic Studies 71: 829-53.

·          Myerson, Roger. 1993. “Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems,” American Political Science Review 87 (December 1993);

·          Pagano, Marco, and Paolo Volpin. 2005. “The Political Economy of Corporate Governance.” American Economic Review 95 (4): 1005-30.

·          Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 1999. “The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians.” European Economic Review 43 (4-6): 699-735.

·          Scartascini, Carlos. 2002. “Political Institutions and Regulation: An Inquiry on the Impact of Electoral Systems on the Regulation of Entry.” Typescript. Inter-American Development Bank.


Week 6 (2/17): Electoral Systems III: Origins and Consequences of Electoral Reforms

 

Background Reading:

·          Benoit, Kenneth. 2007. “Electoral Laws as Political Consequences: Explaining the Origins and Change of Electoral Institutions.” Annual Review of Political Science 10: 363-90.

·          Boix, Carles. 1999. “Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies.” American Political Science Review 93 (3): 609-24.

 

Required Reading:

·          Calvo, Ernesto. 2009. “The Competitive Road to Proportional Representation: Partisan Biases and Electoral Regime Change under Increasing Party Competition.” World Politics 61 (2): 254-295.

·          Chang, Eric, Mark Kayser, Drew Linzer, and Ronald Rogowski. 2010. Electoral Systems and the Balance of Consumer-Producer Power. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6.

·          Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2007. “Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems.American Political Science Review 101 (3): 373-91.

·          Vowles, Jack. 2010. “Electoral System Change, Generations, Competitiveness and Turnout in New Zealand, 1963-2005.” British Journal of Political Science 40 (4): 875-895.

·          Forum Discussions:

-       Boix, Carles. 2010. “Electoral Markets, Party Strategies, and Proportional Representation.” American Political Science Review 104(2): 404-413.

-       Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2010. “Coevolution of Capitalism and Political Representation: The Choice of Electoral Systems.” American Political Science Review 104 (2): 393-403.

-       Kreuzer, Marcus. 2010. “Historical Knowledge and Quantitative Analysis: The Case of the Origins of Proportional Representation.” American Political Science Review 104 (2): 369-392.

 

Recommended Reading:

·          Andrews, Josephine, and Robert W. Jackman. 2005. “Strategic Fools: Electoral Rule Choice Under Extreme Uncertainty.” Electoral Studies 24 (1): 65-84.

·          Barkan, Joel D., Paul J. Densham, and Gerard Rushton. 2006. “Space Matters: Designing Better Electoral Systems for Emerging Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science 50: 926-939.

·          Bawn, Kathleen. 1993. “The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome.” American Journal of Political Science 37 (4): 965-989.

·          Benoit, Kenneth. 2004. “Models of Electoral System Change.” Electoral Studies 23: 363-389.

·          Bowler, Shaun, Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp. 2006. “Why Politicians Like Electoral Institutions: Self-interest, Values, or Ideology?” Journal of Politics 68 (2): 434-446.

·          Colomer, Josep. 2005. “It’s Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or Duverger’s Laws Upside Down).Political Studies 53: 1-21.

·          Crisp, Brian, and Rachel E. Ingall. 2002. “Institutional Engineering and the Nature of Representation: Mapping the Effects of Electoral Reform in Colombia. American Journal of Political Science 46 (October 2002).

·          Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto, and Beatriz Magaloni. 2001. “Party Dominance and the Logic of Electoral Design in Mexico’s Transition to Democracy.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 13 (3): 271-293.

·          Horiuchi, Y. and J. Saito. 2003. “Reapportionment and Redistribution: Consequences of Electoral Reform in Japan.” American Journal of Political Science 47 (4): 669-682.

·          McElwain, Kenneth Mori. 2008. “Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance.” American Journal of Political Science 52 (1): 32-47.

·          Remmer, Karen. 2008. “The Politics of Institutional Change - Electoral Reform in Latin America, 1978-2002.” Party Politics 14 (1): 5-30.

·          Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. “Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions.” International Organization 41 (2): 203-223.  Also, Skim Rogowski. 1989. Commerce and Coalitions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

·          Scheiner, Ethan. 2008.  Does Electoral System Reform Work? Electoral System Lessons from Reforms of the 1990s.” Annual Review of Political Science 11: 161-181.

·          Ticchi, Davide, and Andrea Vindigni. 2003. “Endogenous Constitutions.” Typescript.


Week 7 (2/24): Party Systems

 

Background Reading:

·          Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries.  New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Chapter 5.

·          Hug, Simon. 2001. Altering Party Systems: Strategic Behavior and the Emergence of New Political Parties in Western Democracies. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Chapter 4 and 5.

 

Required reading:

·          Ferree, Karen E. 2010. “The Social Origins of Electoral Volatility in Africa.” British Journal of Political Science 40 (4): 759-779.

·          Lowery, David, Simon Otjes, Sergiu Gherghina, Arjen van Witteloostuijn, Gabor Peli, and Holly Brasher 2010. “Unpacking LogM: Toward a More General Theory of Party System Density.” American Journal of Political Science 54 (4): 921-935.

·          Mainwaring, Scott, and Mariano Torcal. 2005. “Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory After The Third Wave Of Democratization.” Working Paper.

·          Morgenstern, Scott, Stephen M. Swindle, and Andrea Castagnola. 2009. “Party Nationalization and Institutions.” Journal of Politics 71(4): 1322-1341.

·          Roberts, Kenneth, and Erik Wibbels. 1999. “Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Latin America: A Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural Explanations.” American Political Science Review 93 (3): 575-90.

·          Tavits, Margit. 2008. “Party Systems in the Making: The Emergence and Success of New Parties in New Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science 38 (1): 113-33.

 

Recommended Reading:

·          Chhibber, Pradeep, and Ken Kollman. 1998. “Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States.” American Political Science Review 92: 329-42.

·          Chhibber, Pradeep, and Irfan Nooruddin. 2004. “Do Party Systems Count? The Number of Parties and Government Performance in the Indian States.” Comparative Political Studies 37 (2): 152-87.

·          Chhibber, Pradeep, and Ken Kollman. 2004. The Formation of National Party Systems:
Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States.
Princeton
, NJ: Princeton University Press.

·          Hicken, Allen, and Heather Stoll. 2008. “Electoral Rules and the Size of the Prize: How Political Institutions Shape Presidential Party Systems.” Journal of Politics 70 (4): 1109-1127.

·          Horowitz, S, and EC Browne. 2005. Sources of Post-Communist Party System Consolidation: Ideology Versus Institutions.” Party Politics 11: 689-706.

·          Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan, eds. 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments. New York, NY:  Free Press.

·          Mainwaring, Scott., and T. R. Scully. 1996. Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

·          Mainwaring, Scott, and Mariano Torcal.  2003. “The Political Recrafting of Social Bases of Party Competition: Chile, 1973-95.” British Journal of Political Science 33: 55-84.

·          Mair, Peter. 1997. Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

·          Mair, Peter. 2002. The West European Party System. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

·          Moser, Robert. 1999. “Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States.” World Politics 51: 359–84.

·          Mozaffar, Shaheen, James R. Scarritt, and Glen Galaich. 2003. “Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages and Party Systems in Africa’s Emerging Democracies.” American Political Science Review 97: 379–90.  Also, See Brambor, Thomas et al. 2006. “Are African Party Systems Different?” Electoral Studies 26 (2): 315-23.

·          Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

·          Strom, K. 1989. “Inter-Party Competition in Advanced Democracies.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 1 (3): 277-300.

·          Kreuzer, Marcus. 2010. “Historical Knowledge and Quantitative Analysis: The Case of the Origins of Proportional Representation.” American Political Science Review 104 (2): 369-392.


Week 8 (3/3): Presidentialism

 

Background Reading:

·          Cheibub, José Antonio, and Fernando Limongi. 2002. “Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered.” Annual Review of Political Science 5: 151-179.

·          Elgie, Robert. 2005. “From Linz to Tsebelis: Three Waves of Presidential/Parliamentary Studies?” Democratization 12: 106-122.

·          Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries.  New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Chapter 7.

 

Required Reading:

·          Baturo, Alexander. 2010. “The Stakes of Losing Office, Term Limits and Democracy.” British Journal of Political Science 40 (3): 635-662.

·          Cheibub, Jose Antonio. 2006. “Presidentialism, Electoral Identifiability, and Budget Balances in Democratic Systems.” American Political Science Review 100 (3): 353-368.

·          Gerring, John, Strom C. Thacker, and Carola Moreno. 2009. “Are Parliamentary Systems Better?” Comparative Political Studies 42 (3): 327-359.

·          Helmke, Gretchen. 2010. The Origins of Institutional Crises in Latin America: A Unified Strategic Model and Test.” American Journal of Political Science 54 (3): 737–750.

·          Kim, Young Hun, and Donna Bahry. 2008. “Interrupted Presidencies in Third Wave Democracies.” Journal of Politics 70 (3): 807-822.

·          Hellwig, Timothy, and David Samuels. 2007. “Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes.” British Journal of Political Science 38: 65-90.

 

Recommended Reading:

·          Clark, Terry, and Jill Wittrock. 2005. “Presidentialism and the Effect of Electoral Law in Postcommunist Systems.” Comparative Political Studies 38 (2): 171-88.

·          Gerring, John, Strom Thacker, and Carola Moreno. 2005. “Centripetal Democratic Governance: A Theory and Global Inquiry.American Political Science Review 99 (4): 567-81. Also, skim their book: A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance. Cambridge University Press, 2008.

·          Hochstetler, Kathryn. 2006. “Rethinking Presidentialism: Challenges and Presidential Falls in South America.” Comparative Politics 38 (4): 401-18.

·          Lijphart, Arend, ed. 1992.  Parliamentary versus Presidential Government. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

·          Linz, Juan. 1990. “The Perils of Presidentialism.” Journal of Democracy 1: 51-69.

·          Mainwaring, Scott.1993. ‘‘Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy -- the Difficult Combination.’’ Comparative Political Studies 26 (2): 198–228.

·          Moe, Terry M., and Michael Caldwell. 1994. “The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 171-95.

·          Negretto, Gabriel. 2009. “Political Parties and Institutional Design: Explaining Constitutional Choice in Latin America.” British Journal of Political Science 39 (1): 117-139.

·          Strøm, Kaare, et al., eds. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

·          Shugart, Matthew S., and John M. Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2-3, 5-8.

·          Shugart, Matthew S., and Scott Mainwaring. 1998. “Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal.” Comparative Politics 29: 449-72.

·          Stepan, A., and C. Skach 1993. ‘‘Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation—Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism.’’ World Politics 46 (1): 1–22.

·          Tsebelis, George, and Eduardo Aleman. 2005. “Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America.World Politics 57 (3): 396-420.

 

Week 9 (3/10): Spring Break

 

Week 10 (3/17): Parliamentarism

 

Background Reading:

·          Laver, Michael. 1998. “Models of Government Formation.” Annual Review of Political Science 1: 1-25.

·          Laver, Michael, and Kenneth Shepsle. 1990. “Coalitions and Cabinet Governments.” American Political Science Review 84: 873-90.

·          Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries.  New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Chapter 6.

 

Required Reading:

·          Franchino, Fabio, and Bjørn Høyland. 2009. “Legislative Involvement in Parliamentary Systems: Opportunities, Conflict, and Institutional Constraints.” American Political Science Review 103 (4): 607-621.

·          Kam, Christopher William T. Bianco Itai Sened, and Regina Smyth. 2010. “Ministerial Selection and Intraparty Organization in the Contemporary British Parliament.” American Political Science Review 104 (2): 289-306.

·          Martin, Lanny, and Randolph Stevenson. 2001. “Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science 45 (1): 33-50.

·          Martin, Lanny, and Randolph  Stevenson. 2010. “The Conditional Impact of Incumbency on Government Formation.” American Political Science Review 104 (4): 503-518.

·          Volden, Craig, and Clifford J. Carrubba. 2004. “The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science 48: 521-37.

·          Warwick, Paul. 1999. “Ministerial Autonomy or Ministerial Accommodation? Contested Bases of Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science 29 (2): 369-94. Also read the exchange between Warwick and Laver and Sheplse, British Journal of Political Science 29 (2): 395-412.

 

Recommended Reading:

·          Baron, David. 1991. “A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems.” American Political Science Review 85 (1): 137-164.

·          Baron, David. 1998. “Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments.” American Political Science Review 92 (3): 593-609.

·          Baron, David, and John Ferejohn. 1989. “Bargaining in Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 83: 1181-1206.

·          Golder, Sona. 2006. “Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science 36: 193-212.

·          Huber, John D. 1996. “The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies.” American Political Science Review 90 (2): 269-882.

·          Huber, John D., and Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo. 2008. “Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies.” American Political Science Review 102 (2): 169-180.

·          King, Gary, et al. 1990. “A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science 34: 847-871.

·          Laver, Michael, and Kenneth Shepsle. 1996. Making and Breaking Governments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

·          Laver, Michael, and Kenneth Shepsle. 1998. “Events, Equilibria, and Government Survival.” American Journal of Political Science 42 (1): 28-54.

·          Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield. 1998. Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

·          Strom, Kaare, Ian Budge, and Michael Laver. 1994. “Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science 38 (2): 303-335.

·          Warwick, Paul. 1994. Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

·          Warwick, Paul, and Jamie Druckman, 2001. “Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments.” British Journal of Political Science 31: 627-649.

·          Tavits, Margit. 2008. “The Role of Parties' Past Behavior in Coalition Formation.” American Political Science Review 102 (4): 495-507.

·          Tsebelis, George. 2007. “Coalition Theory: A Veto Players Approach.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Chicago, IL: Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers


Week 11 (3/24): Veto Players

 

Background Reading:

·          Tsebelis, George. 1995. “Decision Making in Political Decisions: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartism.” British Journal of Political Science 25: 289-325. Also, skim Tsebelis, George. 2002. Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

 

Required Reading:

·          Basinger, Scott, and Hallerberg Mark. 2004. “Remodeling The Competition For Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases The Race To The Bottom.  American Political Science Review 98 (2): 261-276.

·          Gehlbach, Scott, and Edmund J. Malesky. 2010. “The Contribution of Veto Players to Economic Reform.”  Journal of Politics 72 (4): 957-975.

·          Keefer, Philip, and David Stasavage. 2003. “The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy.American Political Science Review 97 (3): 407-423.

·          Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2007. Vetoing Cooperation: The Impact of Veto Players on Preferential Trading Arrangements. British Journal of Political Science 36 (4): 403-432.

·          Saeki, Manabu. 2009. “Gridlock in the Government of the United States: Influence of Divided Government and Veto Players.” British Journal of Political Science 39 (3): 587-607.

·          Scartascini, Carlos, Ernesto Stein, and Mariano Tommasi. 2008. “How Do Political Institutions Work? Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions, and Policy Adaptability.” Manuscript.

 

Recommended Reading:

·          Bawn, Kathleen. 1999. Money and Majorities in the Federal Republic of Germany: Evidence for a Veto Players Model of Government Spending. American Journal of Political Science 43 (3): 707-736.

·          Crepaz, Markus M.L. 2001. Veto Players, Globalization and the Redistributive Capacity of the State: A Panel Study of 15 OECD.” Journal of Public Policy 21: 1-22.

·          Cunningham, David E. 2006. Veto Players and Civil War Duration.” American Journal of Political Science 50 (4): 875–892

·          Ha, Eunyoung. 2008. Globalization, Veto Players, and Welfare Spending.” Comparative Political Studies 41 (6): 783-813.

·          Haggard, Stephen, and Mathew McCubbins, eds. 2001. Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

·          Hallerberg, Mark. 2002. Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions.” International Organization 56 (4): 775-802.

·          Hallerberg, Mark, and Scott Basinger. 1998. Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries. The Importance of Domestic Veto Players. Comparative Political Studies 31 (3): 321-352.

·          Hammond, Thomas H. 2003.Veto Points, Policy Preferences, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in Democratic Systems.” In George A. Krause, and Kenneth J. Meier, eds. Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

·          Hammond, Thomas, and Gary Miller. 1987. “The Core of the Constitution.” American Political Science Review 81(4): 1155-1174.

·          Henisz, Witold J., and Bennet A. Zelner. 2006. Interest Groups, Veto Points, and Electricity Infrastructure Deployment.” International Organization 60: 263-286.

·          Henisz, Witold J., and Edward D. Mansfield. 2006. “Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness.” International Studies Quarterly 50 (1): 189-212.

·          O’Reilly, Robert F. 2005. Veto Points, Veto Players, and International Trade Policy.” Comparative Political Studies 38 (6): 652-675.

 

Week 12 (3/31): Midwest

 


Week 13 (4/7): Federalism and Decentralization

 

Background Reading:

·          Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries.  New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Chapter 10.

·          Rodden, Jonathan. 2004. Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement. Comparative Politics 36 (4): 481-500.

·          Eaton, Kent. 2008. “Federalism in Europe and Latin America: Conceptualization, Causes, and Consequences.” World Politics 60 (4): 665-698.

·          Weingast, Barry. 1995. “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Federalism, Markets, and Economic Development.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11:1-31.

 

Required Reading:

·          Huang, Yasheng, and Yumin Sheng. 2009. “Political Decentralization and Inflation: Sub-National Evidence from China.” British Journal of Political Science 39 (2): 389-412.

·          Rodden, Jonathan. 2002. “The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World.” American Journal of Political Science 46 (3): 670-87.

·          Rodden, Jonathan and Eric Wibbels. 2002. “Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multi-tiered Systems.” World Politics 54 (4): 494-531.

·          Treisman, Daniel. 2000. “Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action, or Continuity?” American Political Science Review 94 (4): 837-57.

·          Wibbels, Eric. 2000. “Federalism and the Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance.American Journal of Political Science 44: 687-702.

·          Gervasoni, Carlos. 2010. “A Rentier Theory of Subnational Regimes: Fiscal Federalism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Argentine Provinces.” World Politics 62 (2): 302-340.

 

Recommended Reading:

·          Buchanan, James. 1995. “Federalism as an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitutional Reform.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 25 (2): 19-28.

·          Garman, Christopher, Stephan Haggard, and Eliza Willis. 2001. “Fiscal Decentralization: A Political Theory with Latin American Cases.World Politics 53: 205-36.

·          Peterson, Paul. 1995. The Price of Federalism. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

·          Riker, William. 1964. Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. London: Little, Brown.

·          Rodden, Jonathan. 2003. “Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government.” International Organization 57: 695-729.

·          Rodden, J. A. 2003. Hamilton’s Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

·          Rodden, Jonathan, and S. Rose-Ackerman. 1997. “Does Federalism Preserve Markets?” Virginia Law Review 83 (7): 1521-72.

·          Scheiner, E. 2005. “Pipelines of Pork: Japanese Politics and a Model of Local Opposition Party Failure.” Comparative Political Studies 38 (7): 799-823.

·          Tiebout, Charles. 1956. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.” Journal of Political Economy 64: 416-24.

·          Treisman, Daniel. 2006. Decentralization, Fiscal Incentives, and Economic Performance: A Reconsideration.” Economics and Politics 18 (2): 219-35.

·          Treisman, Daniel. 2007. The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

·          Wibbels, Erik. 2005. Federalism and the Market: Intergovernmental Conflict and Economic Reform in the Developing World. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.


Week 14 (4/14): Hybrid Institutions

 

Background Reading:

·          Shugart, Matthew S. 2005. Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns.” French Politics 3 (3): 323-51.

·          Massicotte, Louis, and André Blais. 1999 “Mixed Electoral Systems: A Conceptual and. Empirical Survey.” Electoral Studies 18: 341-366

·          Schleiter, Petra, and Edward Morgan-Jones. 2009. “Review Article: Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism Beyond Duverger and Linz.” British Journal of Political Science 39 (4): 871-892.

 

Required Reading:

·          Ferrara, Federico, and Erik S. Herron. 2005. “Going It Alone? Strategic Entry under Mixed Electoral Rules.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (1): 16-31.

·          Kirschke, Linda. 2007. “Semipresidentialism and the Perils of Power-Sharing in Neopatrimonial States.” Comparative Political Studies 40 (11): 1372-94.

·          Pekkanen, Robert, Benjamin Nyblade, and Ellis S. Krauss. 2006. “Electoral Incentives in Mixed-Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan.” American Political Science Review 100 (2): 183-93.

·          Siaroff, Alan. 2003. “Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-Presidential and Parliamentary Distinction.” European Journal of Political Research 42 (3):287-312.

·          Schleiter, Petra, and Edward Morgan-Jones. 2010. “Who’s in Charge? Presidents, Assemblies, and the Political Control of Semipresidential Cabinets.” Comparative Political Studies 43 (11): 1415-1441.

·          Shugart, Matthew S., and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds. 2001. Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

 

Recommended Reading:

·          Benoit, Kenneth, Daniela Giannetti, and Michael Laver. 2006. “Voter Strategies with Restricted Choice Menus.” British Journal of Political Science 36: 459-85.

·          Colton, Timothy J., and Cindy Skach. 2005. “A Fresh Look at Semipresidentialism: The Russian Predicament.Journal of Democracy 16 (3): 113-26.

·          Duverger, Maurice. 1980. A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government.” European Journal of Political Research 8 (2): 165-87. Also, see the subsequent nomination comments by Lijphart and Pasquino in European Journal of Political Research 31 (1-2): 125-46.

·          Elgie, Robert, ed. 1999. Semi-Presidentialism in Europe. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

·          Elgie, Robert. 2004. “Semi-Presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences and Contesting Explanations.Political Studies Review 2 (3): 314-30.

·          Gschwend, Thomas. 2007. “Ticket-splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules: Evidence from Germany.” European Journal of Political Research 46: 1–23.

·          Moser, Robert. 1999. “Electoral Laws and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States.” World Politics 51: 359-84.

·          Moser, Robert, and Ethan Scheiner. 2004. “Mixed Electoral Systems and Electoral System Effects: Controlled Comparison and Crossnational Analysis.” Electoral Studies 23: 575-99.

·          Reilly, Benjamin. 2007. “Democratization and Electoral Reform in the Asia-Pacific Region: Is There an Asian Model of Democracy?” Comparative Political Studies 40 (11): 1350-1371.

·          Sartori, Giovanni. 1994. Comparative Constitutional Engineering. New York, NY: New York University Press.

·          Stratmann, Thomas and Martin Baur. 2002. “Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German Bundestag: How Incentives to Pork-Barrel Differ Across Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 46 (3): 506-514.

·          Skach, Cindy. 2006. Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

·          Thames, Frank, and Martin S. Edwards. 2006. “Differentiating Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: Mixed-Member Majoritarian and Mixed-Member Proportional Systems and Government Expenditures” Comparative Political Studies 39 (7): 905-927.


Week 15 (4/21): Clientelism and Informal Institutions

 

Background Reading:

·          Scott, James C. 1972. “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia.” American Political Science Review 66 (1): 91-113.

·          Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000. “Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities.” Comparative Political Studies 33 (6-7): 845 -879.

·          Piattoni, Simona. 2001. “Clientelism in Historical and Comparative Perspective.” In Simona Piattoni, ed., Clientelism Interests, and Democratic Representation, pp. 1-30. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

 

Required Reading

·          Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2008. “Beyond Clientelism.” Comparative Political Studies 41 (4-5): 638 -673.

·          Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steve Wilkinson, eds., Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. New York: Cambridge University Press.  Selected Chapters.

·          Nicher, Simeon. 2008. “Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot.” American Political Science Review 102 (1): 19-31.

·          Stokes, Susan C. 2005. “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina.” The American Political Science Review 99(3): 315–325.

·          Wantchekon, Leonard. 2003. “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin.” World Politics 55 (3): 399-422.

 

Recommended Reading:

·          Brusco, Valeria, Marcelo Nazareno, and Susan Stokes. 2004. “Vote Buying in Argentina.” Latin American Research Review 39 (2): 66-88.

·          Calvo, Ernesto, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2004. “Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in Argentine Electoral Market.” American Journal of Political Science 48 (4): 742-757.

·          Fisman, Raymond. 2001.  “Estimating the Value of Political Connections.” American Economic Review 91 (4) :095-1102.

·          Fox, Jonathan. 1994. “The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship.” World Politics 46 (2): 151-84.

·          Keefer, Philip, and Razvan Vlaicu. 2008. “Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 24 (2): 371-406.

·          Keefer, Philip. 2007. “Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (4): 804-821.

·          Lemarchand, René. 1972. “Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building.” American Political Science Review 66 (1): 68-90.

·          Mainwaring, Scott. 1999. “Chapter 6: Patronage, Clientelism, and Patrimonialism.” In Scott Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil, pp. 175-180. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

·          Robinson, James, and Thierry Verdier. 2003 “The Political Economy of Clientelism.” Typescript.

·          Tsai, Lily. 2007. “Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China.” American Political Science Review 101 (2): 355-72.

·          Papers presented at the conference on Redistribution, Public Goods and Political Market Failures, Yale University, April 9-10, 2010.

 

Week 16 (4/28): Student Presentation

 

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