Summmer 2018 News: I will participate in the King's College London Economic Theory seminar (May 16th); the U. New South Wales Economic Theory seminar in Sydney (July 5th); and the Australian Political Economy Network workshop in Canberra (July 9th).
Here are some selected papers published (or accepted for publication) since I joined Michigan State in August 2014.
'Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information', with A. Llorente-Saguer, R. Morton and A. NicolÚ. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 109, pages 465-483 (2018).
Blurb: We propose an equilibrium selection criterion (to pick the one that holds for the largest set of beliefs). It works better than alternatives in experiments on vertical contracting and electoral competition.
'Social Welfare with Net Utilities', with D. Xefteris. Forthcoming, Special Issue in Honor of Ken Arrow, Public Choice.
Blurb: A preference relation over utility vectors satisfies a collection of desirable axioms if and only if it is representable by a function with a particular "sum of power functions" functional form.
'Discrimination and Assimilation at School'. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 156, pages 48-58 (2017).
Blurb: A theory on the strategic incentives to assimilate and to discriminate against those trying to assimilate, which explains 'acting white' as an equilibrium outcome.
'Slicing and Bundling', with O. C‚mara. Journal of Politics, Vol. 79, N.4, pages 1460-1464 (2017).
Blurb: A theory of legislative agendas and policy-making, based on the idea that one can slice policies into smaller components.
'Asset Pricing and Asymmetric Reasoning', with E. Asparouhova, P. Bossaerts and B. Zame.
Journal of Political Economy, Vol 123, N. 1, pages 66-122 (2015).
Blurb: Theory and experiments on asset trading with a mix of boundedly rational agents, some more rational, some more bounded, than others.
You can find previous publications scrolling below or on my SSRN or Google Scholar profiles, and a complete list on my CV.
'Information and Targeted Spending', with A. Nicolo. Merges and supersedes SSRN wp 1931040 and wp 2274699. Revise and Resubmit (7/2017) at Theoretical Economics.
Blurb: An electoral theory of targeted public good provision with imperfectly informed voters.
'Regime Change' (May 2017).
Blurb: A theory of multilateral conflict with ideologically motivated countries, with an application to the intervention in Afghanistan (2001-14).
'Tactical Extremism', with F. Giovannoni. Revise and Resubmit (3/2018) at American Political Science Review.
Blurb: An explanation of why and when mainstream political parties choose to embrace extreme policies.
'k-proper Equilibria', with A. NicolÚ (2014). SSRN wp 2531741.
Blurb: We introduce a family of equilibrium refinements that are stronger than Selten's trembling hand perfection but weaker than Myerson's proper equilibrium.
'Bargaining with Outside Options', with K. Binmore (2016).
Blurb: We survey theories of bargaining over a cake, including dynamic bargaining with an endogenous status quo. It is published as a chapter in an edited volume.
Early Career Publications
A selection of publications prior to August 2014, arranged by topic.
'A Spatial Theory of Party Formation',
Economic Theory, Vol. 49, N. 3, pages 549-570 (2012).
Blurb: Legislators have incentives to form voting blocs. An equilibrium with two opposed voting blocs emerges.
'Endogenous Parties in an Assembly',
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, N. 1, pages 16-26 (2011).
Blurb: My theory of party formation, in a more accessible version, and with a solution concept that is robust to coalitional deviations.
'United We Vote.' Journal of Public Economic Theory 9(4): 1-33 (2007).
-On voting and elections:
'Citizen Candidates under Uncertainty.' Social Choice and Welfare 29(2): 317-331 (2007).
'Contested Elections in a Citizen Candidate Model.' Economics and Politics 18: 95-102 (2006).
-On utility theory:
'On the Spatial Representation of Preference Profiles',
Economic Theory, Vol. 52, N. 1, pages 103-128 (2013).
Blurb: Commonly used quadratic Euclidean utilities with n>1 agents are characterized by three axioms: separability, single-peakedness, and something utterly implausible.