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Civic Values Learned in School: Policy and Practice in Industrialized Nations

JUDITH TORNEY-PURTA AND JOHN SCHWILLE

International trade in educational ideas has been important since the Middle Ages and, to a lesser extent, before. Sometimes imports have flourished, whereas in other cases they have failed. In still other instances, foreign and national practices have come to coexist. Foreign influences have been especially important in shaping broad educational goals and new institutional structures. This exchange continues: once again, in the 1980s, reports of high student achievement in other nations have fueled proposals for educational reform in the United States.

There has, however, been little comparative concern with values in education. One reason for this lack of explicit concern for how values are taught and learned in other countries may be the long-standing tendency of U.S. Americans to view their educational system's impact on civic or moral values as responsive to unique historic and cultural circumstances and to claim superiority for U.S. methods of civic and moral education. In 1899, for example, the Committee of Seven of the American Historical Association conducted a study of education in Europe. Although they identified some promising practices, they concluded that "German and French schools regard pupils as subjects rather than citizens, while English instruction was chaotic and entirely lacking in attention to civil government." One can find opinions not too different in recent writing.

By the late 1800s, two trends in the United States had, in fact, made American schools different from those in Europe. The first was the rapid growth of the free public high school operated under local control, financed by taxation, and open to students of a wide range of backgrounds. This institution was notably different from the more centralized (often religious)

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schools of Europe, which provided one type of education for a minority of university- and profession-bound students and quite another for the mass of workers. The second differentiating trend was brought about by massive waves of immigration. The school was given responsibilities to both “civilize” and Americanize.

These differences between the United States and other nations have greatly diminished. In the last 30 years, the educational systems of Western Europe have been faced with demands for public comprehensive education, and there has been substantial growth in secondary school enrollments. Within the last 20 years, the countries of Northern Europe have also taken in many “guest workers.” Explicit attention has been given to moral and civic education for immigrants.

As problems of education in other countries have become increasingly similar to those in the United States, Americans have become increasingly dissatisfied with the quality of their educational system as related to what they value as citizens. There appears to be an increasing audience in the United States for studies of how values are taught and learned in other countries, especially as these studies can be viewed as a series of naturally occurring experiments relating to possible reform. In this article, we examine both studies comparing several other nations and studies within a single nation as they relate to seven assertions involving the importance of values in education. These assertions have to do with differences in values that are learned, differences in the effectiveness with which values are taught, and differences in the extent to which education concerning values is subject to policy control. Manifest and implicit curricula for the teaching of values are also discussed. The analysis is limited to industrialized countries.

Seven Assertions Concerning Values Education

Assertion 1

*No institution with education as its primary aim can be value neutral.*

No educational system, in fact, tries to be value neutral, except in very limited spheres. Western nations, like non-Western states, have spent substantial portions of their budgets and devoted extensive attention in curriculum guidelines to social education with explicit value goals. Moreover, the school’s role in teaching values is not limited to such explicit intent. Education by its very nature implies the taking of stands laden with values. Teachers consider some things worth learning and others not, some student behaviors constructive and others not. Even in the most concerted attempt to practice neutrality (as in the values clarification movement), values are

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assumed (e.g., the idea that the values of a student are as worthy of consideration as those of the teacher).

Schools and teachers are neutral only in circumscribed areas. In the United States, public schools have been constitutionally enjoined from teaching anything that would amount to an establishment of religion. In France, where teachers range from conservatives to communists, teachers are forbidden to discuss partisan matters in the classroom. They are, however, encouraged to teach loyalty to France's democratic institutions. The extent to which these prescriptions are taken seriously varies. For example, one empirical study of French secondary schools found that teachers in the schools of less prestigious academic status (the colleges of general education [CEGs]) were more likely to observe this neutrality than the teachers in the elite university preparatory schools (lycées).

International studies conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) have shown that teachers differ from country to country and from issue to issue in what they consider acceptable to discuss in the classroom. Some stands were regarded as appropriate by a great majority of the teachers surveyed in nearly all the Western industrialized countries that we studied (West Germany, Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States). For example, the idea that teachers should be free to speak out against racial discrimination in the classroom was endorsed by more than 80 percent of the teachers in each of these countries. There was considerable variation on other issues, such as whether teachers should be free to argue against the censoring of literature, to explain reasons for preferring one party over another, and to allow atheists to express views before school classes. When responses to these items were combined in a scale measuring the desirability of discussing sensitive issues in the classroom, Finnish and Irish teachers considered relatively few of these issues appropriate for classroom discussion, whereas teachers in West Germany, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and the United States were relatively receptive to the discussion of such issues. Teachers in Sweden were unusual in showing wide variation from issue to issue.

For further discussion of these points, see C. M. Hamm and L. B. Daniels, "Moral Education in Relation to Values Education," in The Domain of Moral Education, ed. D. B. Cochrane, C. M. Hamm, and A. C. Kazepides (New York: Paulist, 1979); and A. Oldenquist, "Moral Education without Moral Education," Harvard Educational Review 49 (May 1979): 324–47. Whether one looks at the teaching of values from the sociological perspective of structural functionalism or conflict theory, neither of these perspectives sees our society as one in which children choose their own values.

3 From the political point of view, the republican elementary school teacher, while cultivating a love of the Republic, must refrain, in teaching, from taking a partisan position (Code scolaire: La livre des instituteurs, 45th ed. [Paris: Société universitaire d'éditions et de librairie, 1975], p. 34, our translation).


6 Ibid., pp. 76–78.
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Assertion 2

Countries differ in the values that characterize their political cultures and their stated educational goals.

Even among Western industrialized countries, there are important differences in the values of adults. For example, Hofstede has reported on a survey of 3,000 adult employees from 40 countries. In the United States, Britain, and other English-speaking countries, respondents stressed motivation by personal, individual success in the form of wealth, recognition, and self-actualization. In Japan, German-speaking countries, Greece, and some Latin countries, respondents stressed motivation by personal, individual security in the form of personal wealth acquired through hard work. In France, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Chile, and certain other Latin and Asian countries, respondents were motivated by security and belonging; to them individual wealth was less important than group solidarity. In Northern European countries (especially the Netherlands and Scandinavia), respondents were motivated by both success and belonging; they valued not only collective success but also the quality of human relations and of the living environment.9

When 10,000 university students in 11 countries were sampled by Klineberg, Zavalloni, Louis-Guerin, and Ben-Brika, three rather distinct orientations were identified. The "nationalist" orientation was characterized by opposition to limitations of national sovereignty, perception of the need for control of immigration, and distrust of supranational organizations; it was most typical among Tunisians and Nigerians. The second orientation, called "internationalist," combined attitudes favorable to immigration, to the elimination of nationalism, and to the establishment of strong international organizations; this orientation was most characteristic of Austria, Japan, and Spain. The third orientation was somewhat intermediate; it included some hope for the elimination of nationalism along with some distrust of world government and some support for limitation of immigration; it was most typical of the United States, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Australia.10

Weeren surveyed official statements of educational policy regarding moral education in the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Canada, and Japan. There was considerable similarity across countries in the recognition that moral education is an important function of the public schools in certain of the common values advocated (e.g., respect and concern for others) and in pedagogy. However, there were also substantial differences—for example, "the United States stresses individuality and

10 O. Klineberg et al., Students, Values and Politics (New York: Free Press, 1979). These are differences between statistical averages; there are certainly Austrians who are nationalistic and Nigerians who are internationalists.
freedom far more than the Soviet Union, which places much greater emphasis on service to the community.\textsuperscript{11}

\textit{Assertion 3}

\textit{No Western industrialized country has had a uniformly high level of success in transmitting civic values, perhaps because subtle incompatibilities between goals exist. Approaches stressing role and ritual appear to be counterproductive.}

The evidence for this assertion is drawn from a cross-national study of civic education conducted by the IEA. In designing this study, an international committee collected materials from participating countries describing the objectives of civic education. The reports from all countries put so much stress on attitudes and values that about half of the final instruments were devoted to these outcomes. The resulting questionnaires and tests were answered by 10-year-olds, 14-year-olds, and students in the last year of preuniversity education in the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States (although not every country tested every age group).\textsuperscript{12}

The attitude scales formed from this survey were factor analyzed separately for each age group in each nation. The clustering of scales was very similar in each country, forming three meaningful but independent clusters. The first cluster, \textit{support for democratic values}, included scales measuring anti-authoritarianism, support for women’s rights, support for civil liberties, and support for equality. The second cluster, \textit{support for the national government}, included scales measuring evaluation of and perceived responsiveness of the national government along with sense of political efficacy. The third cluster, \textit{civic interest/participation}, included scales measuring participation in civic activities, political discussion, and interest in current events on television. In short, these analyses showed that students who scored high in anti-authoritarianism also tended to score high on other scales in the cluster concerned with support for democratic values; in contrast, knowledge of how these students scored on scales in the democratic values cluster did not allow an accurate prediction of how they stood on the scales in the other two clusters.

The scores of students in each country were then compared on these three clusters and on a test of civics knowledge. There was no country in which students had an average score that was above the international mean on all three clusters as well as on the civics knowledge test. Among 14-year-olds, the countries that effectively educated children toward support for values such as tolerance, anti-authoritarianism, and equality were less


\textsuperscript{12} Torney et al. These data were collected from national probability samples of students in 1971. More than 30,000 students responded to survey instruments; more than 5,000 teachers replied concerning pedagogical practices; and 1,300 principals and headmasters described their schools.
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effective in promoting support for the national government and interest in civic participation (and vice versa). For example, 14-year-olds in the Netherlands had the highest score on the knowledge test and a high level of support for democratic values. However, their interest in political discussion was low as well as their support for the national government. In contrast, U.S. students expressed strong positive feelings about the national government and its responsiveness to citizens; they were interested in participation. But they had a relatively low level of support for democratic values (the lowest of all the countries in their support for women's rights). These findings suggest possible incompatibilities between the three types of outcomes, incompatibilities with important ramifications for education.

All the IEA studies used a regression analysis of student differences within the country to determine which educational practices were consistently related to high scores on cognitive and attitudinal outcomes. In the civics study, the predictors of group differences across countries were surprisingly similar. After the effects of home background, age, sex, type of school, and type of program had been controlled, a group of predictors that could be called learning conditions was examined. The encouragement by teachers of expressions of opinion in the classroom (a measure of classroom climate) was positively related to high knowledge scores and less authoritarian attitudes. In contrast, students who reported extensive practice of patriotic rituals in the classroom (e.g., saluting the flag, singing patriotic songs) were less knowledgeable and more authoritarian. Both encouragement to express opinions and use of patriotic rituals were consistent predictors of greater participation in political discussion across countries. Finally, in several countries, students who reported extensive use of printed drill materials were less knowledgeable and somewhat more authoritarian.

These findings indicate that the promotion of patriotic loyalty and acquiring knowledge of political institutions and civic processes do not ensure that students will become supportive of democratic values in the sense of believing in equality and the rights of citizens to be critical of government. In fact, stress on patriotism may actually harm support for civil liberties.

A tenet of American political culture is that participation is a critical part of democratic citizenship. The lack of correlation between interest in participation and either knowledge scores or scores indicating that the government is responsive to citizen action is one of the most depressing findings of the IEA study.

Assertion 4

The learning of values is strongly influenced by many factors that are outside the control of educators and educational policymakers, such as national culture and subcultures, economic structures, and unique historical events.
Let us take Japan as an example. Although Japan is increasingly known as a land of high achievement in reading, mathematics, and other academic subjects, Cummings singles out moral education as outstanding. In the 1880s, after a short period of less emphasis during initial Western-oriented reforms, moral education was reaffirmed as a preeminent concern of Japanese education. All students had to memorize an imperial rescript that mandated virtues to which many would still subscribe: harmonious family relations, benevolence to others, modesty, moderation, and diligence in the pursuit of learning. However, this text was also used to promote nationalism and unconditional loyalty to the state. Hence, after World War II, moral education was abolished as a separate subject: the occupation authorities and many Japanese believed that it had contributed to militarism.

After years of debate, the Ministry of Education in 1957 decided to make moral education a separate subject again, 45 minutes per week, in elementary and middle school. Cummings, who observed this special class, admits to expecting the worst: "dull Confucian texts," "sermonizing." However,

Much to my surprise, the class had no text. Rather at the bell, one of the students turned on the television at the front of the classroom. Afterwards, the teacher and the students joined in a discussion to try to identify the moral lessons contained in the drama. . . . The lessons emphasized fundamental matters such as the value of life, the foolishness of fighting, the importance of friendship, the problems of old people. Actually, no drama conveyed a specific message. The lesson was developed through the . . . subsequent dialogue of the teacher and the students.13

Cummings concedes that these classes by themselves would accomplish little, and Shimahara claims that the moral education class is often preempted by academic subjects.14 Yet, moral education pervades other school activities as well:

Expected standards of behavior are high, but explicit punishments are used less than quiet but clear expression of disapproval. Students, in their regular group sessions for self-reflection, are expected to talk about their inadequacies, as when they are insufficiently considerate of each other and of school. On matters considered to be serious, like smoking cigarettes, teachers are likely to visit the student's family or to call the parents into the school.15

13 E. F. Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), chap. 7.
15 Cummings, pp. 115–16.
17 Vogel, p. 178.

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Could one expect positive results if one used the Japanese approach to moral education in U.S. schools? The answer is almost certainly no, for the emphasis on moral education stems from and is congruent with distinctive aspects of Japanese culture and history, especially a preoccupation with correct interpersonal relationships and group solidarity. According to Reischauer, "A group player in Japan is obviously more appreciated than a solo star and team spirit more than individual ambition... Co-operativeness, reasonableness and understanding of others are the virtues most admired, not personal drive, forcefulness and individual self-assertion." The group orientation has roots deep in Japanese history; it is one of those extraordinarily continuous aspects of Japanese life. World War II made for a rare break in this continuity; turning against the discredited wartime leadership, the Japanese were willing to make extensive educational and social changes (discussed in the next section).

Assertion 5

Notwithstanding the importance of nonschool and nationally idiosyncratic factors, educational policy has been somewhat effective in bringing about desired changes in values.

In this assertion, there are three interdependent issues: (1) the efficacy of movements consciously directed toward social change and associated changes in values; (2) the contribution that education and educational policy make to these changes; and (3) the effect of foreign models on this process.

Japan.—In little more than a century Japan has responded to contact with the West by changing from a primarily feudal country into a prime contender for the planet's most technologically advanced nation. The Japanese have developed a system of schooling that, by some important indicators, is extraordinarily successful. These indicators include strikingly high levels of academic achievement (the best record of any nation in comparative international studies of mathematics and science),\(^9\) one of the lowest levels of illiteracy in the world (less than 1 percent),\(^5\) the highest proportion of each age cohort completing secondary school.\(^3\)

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\(^5\) Vogel, p. 161.

\(^3\) Ibid.
This is not to say that all indicators are positive. Observers have noted the exceptional level of dissatisfaction expressed by Japanese youth (age 18–24) in an international Gallup survey of 11 countries in 1972. In Japan, 74 percent expressed dissatisfaction with their society as compared with (in the next highest countries) 36 percent in the United States, 35 percent in Sweden, and 34 percent in the Federal Republic of Germany. But it is hard to know how seriously to take this dissatisfaction or how much to blame it on the schools. The percent of Japanese students expressing dissatisfaction with their schools was much lower, though still substantial—45 percent (the next highest country in this case was France at 29 percent).

To what extent do Japanese educational outcomes reflect changes in values? Shimahara emphasizes the continuity of Japanese culture throughout this period of technological change, whereas Reischauer declares that Japan has been modernized but not Westernized. Cummings, however, argues that the Japanese have become more individualistic (e.g., placing higher value on personal satisfaction relative to worldly success), more egalitarian (e.g., in evaluating occupations), and more participatory (e.g., in challenging hierarchical authority). He cites surveys conducted at 5-year intervals.

Another striking change is that, in contrast to the values professed in prewar Japan, democracy is accepted as an ideal by Japanese youth, and peace is even more strongly endorsed. This change in political values is reflected in the heroes of Japanese children. In the early 1900s, Japanese children saw the emperor, above all, and military men, secondarily, as the greatest men in Japan; in the 1960s, children did not agree on any one hero, named no military men, and favored a famous bacteriologist over the emperor and the prime minister.

What accounts for these changes in values and attitudes? Unique cultural characteristics, irresistible social forces, or historical experience? Or must conscious use of educational reform and foreign models be taken into account? Whereas Shimahara emphasizes failures of reforms that were not compatible with the Japanese tradition, Cummings cites Japan as an example of a “society that has been transformed by education.” Other experts take a middle position, which is probably a more accurate

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22 Shimahara, p. 160; Cummings, p. 235.
23 Shimahara, chaps. 1, 9; Reischauer, p. 298; Cummings, chap. 7.
24 According to Massey (p. 67), Japanese social studies textbooks portray Japan as the peace power.
25 Massey, p. 46. It should be noted that in the postwar research reported by Massey, the students were too young to have directly experienced the war; hence, the high value they put on peace was not learned through direct experience with war.
26 Shimahara, chap. 3; Cummings (n. 14 above), p. 5.
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estimate of the importance of foreign models for Japanese education and the importance of education in Japanese society.27

Germany.—The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) have both made ambitious attempts to change their political culture through education. In the German Democratic Republic, education is tightly prescribed and uniform throughout the country. Indeed, the whole country is viewed by its leadership as a vast school for socialist education and for development of the new socialist personality: a person who follows socialist morality, learns to the limits of one's capabilities, and feels responsible to use this knowledge for the good of the collective. In civics, as in other subjects, Marxism-Leninism is considered the only correct way to view reality, and other opinions need not be discussed.28

What are the results of this intensive effort to develop values that are consistent in some ways with those values officially advocated in the West (e.g., value of productive work) and are opposed in others (e.g., extreme intolerance of political diversity)? The question is difficult even though a substantial amount of empirical research has been conducted by East Germans on the effects of political education.29 Given the strong pressures to conform and the sanctions for nonconformity, it is not surprising to find considerable compliance in publicly stated attitudes but also much nonconformist behavior in private.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the goals of postwar reform (as articulated at the establishment of the Federal Center for Political Education in 1952) contrast with those of the German Democratic Republic. They have included strengthening of democratic ideals, promotion of political participation, opposition to fascist and communist totalitarianism, cooperation among nations, and European unification.30

In the early years of the Federal Republic, political education was rather conservative. Social studies textbooks of the early 1960s stressed the duty of the individual to find his or her place in the existing social hierarchy as well as the contribution of politics to protecting the prevailing social order.31 Since that time, debate continues among conservative, liberal,

27 Reischauer; Vogel (n. 13 above); see also Bowman.
and more radical groups over how political issues ought to be handled in school.32

In the midst of these political cleavages, adult and youth surveys have shown a steady increase in support for the key values of liberal democracy.33 The IEA studies provide particularly dramatic evidence. The West German students scored as follows: authoritarianism (e.g., disagreement with statements such as “The people in power know best”)—the FRG scored higher than any other country studied among students in the last year of university preparatory schools and was tied for second highest among 14-year-olds; tolerance and civil liberties (e.g., items such as “No matter what a man's color, religion, or nationality, if he is qualified for a job he should get it”)—the FRG scored higher than any other country in both populations; women’s rights (e.g., “Women should stand for election and take part in government much the same as men do”)—German students were equal to the highest in both populations.34 Other studies also indicate that support for democratic norms and values is high and has grown since the founding of the Federal Republic.35 George and Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt argue that only a small group of German youth and adults is basically dissatisfied with the political regime (and that this disaffection has been declining over the past 10 years).36

However, some reservations should be noted. The German students sampled by IEA in 1971 expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of citizen participation in the Federal Republic, ranking the “average person” as having less influence on policy-making than any other institution or official (in contrast, the ranking of the “average person” in the United States by 14-year-olds was sixth out of 10).37 Moreover, recent data cited by Conradt indicate that, although German adults believe that participation is an important part of democracy, only 29 percent believe that citizens have sufficient opportunities for such participation.38 George

34 A. N. Oppenheim, Civic Education and Participation in Democracy: The German Case (London: Sage, 1977), p. 26; see also Torney et al. (n. 7 above).
37 Torney et al. (n. 7 above), plus previously unpublished data.
38 Conradt.
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reports that the proportion of young people who say that they are afraid to express their political opinions has recently increased to about half. 50

The question of how much West German schools have contributed to a high level of support for democratic values is still a matter for debate. Weil confirms, with some qualification, that high levels of education are associated with endorsement of democratic values. He finds, for example, that more highly educated West Germans have become more tolerant of political parties and conflict in general. But the better educated have not been more tolerant of free speech with which they might disagree (e.g., communist or neo-Nazi speakers). 40

Since Weil's extensive analyses do not show what happens to individuals in school as compared with outside school, they do not go very far in explaining why the more educated differ from the less educated. The IEA studies do include more relevant variables, but they, too, are open to dispute with respect to causation. Regression analyses of one of the IEA scales that measured democratic values showed a notable school effect in the Federal Republic. Among 14-year-olds, 11 percent of the variation in anti-authoritarianism was accounted for by learning condition variables once home background and type of school had been controlled for—a substantial proportion for questionnaire research. Current enrollment in civics, teacher's specialization in the subject matter, reported encouragement of independent expression of opinion, lack of patriotic ritual, lack of stress on printed drill, and absence of ability grouping within class were all predictors of more democratic attitudes. 41 Although other interpretations are possible, 42 in our view these findings suggest that schools are important in fostering democratic attitudes. 43

In short, the value outcomes of West German political education seem to be in line with the direction set by educational policy since the beginning of the Federal Republic. As in Japan, the fostering of democratic values in a country with a limited democratic tradition has been remarkable. However, the contribution of formal education in bringing about these outcomes is impossible to disentangle from other social forces such as the implicit curriculum or influences outside the school (e.g., mass media or political movements).

40 George, p. 243.
42 Torney et al. (n. 7 above), chap. 10.
43 It could be, e.g., that the relationship between school characteristics and democratic values is due to a disproportionate tendency for students with certain political beliefs to live in areas where the schools are most likely to have the above characteristics.
44 The conclusion that schools helped develop democratic attitudes contrasts with German studies of the early 1960s that discounted the effects of schooling. See Oppenheim; and also Merritt et al., "Political Man in Postwar West German Education" (n. 31 above), for a discussion of a subsequent swing toward optimism about curriculum reform.
Assertion 6

A number of nations have developed curricular goals (and associated materials) to promote common core values. In some countries, these programs give more importance to collective welfare, in others to individual benefits (though no country completely neglects either).

A number of countries have responded to the need for educational goals that are more specific than simply “promoting democracy” and have put forth clear cut statements regarding values that children ought to learn in school (usually with safeguards against indoctrination).

Sweden.—Among Western nations, Sweden has done the most to define the specific values to be promoted within its highly centralized educational system (where a National Board of Education formulates policy, specifies curricula, and prescribes teaching methods). Sweden, it should be noted, until recently has been one of the most homogeneous of the industrialized societies but now has a substantial population of immigrant workers.

In *Schools and Upbringing*, a report issued by the Swedish Ministry of Education, a set of common core values is endorsed: tolerance, equality of rights, respect for truth, justice, and human dignity. This report forcefully argues that the school is responsible for inculcating these values in order to justify its existence and insure the survival of society. Each student, according to the document, should be free to explore a plurality of values. 

However, relativism—the idea that all values are of equal worth—is not acceptable. The Ministry of Education report gives the following example:

> Some immigrants may have values ... which are incompatible with one of the most fundamental of our own values, e.g., the equality of men and women. In this case, instruction must be dominated by our own view, even if this conflicts with the opinion of a certain pupil and his family. 

Similarly, the report argues that the schools “cannot accept” degrading views of immigrants on the part of pupils from Swedish families.

Freedom and independence are promoted in the curriculum not as ends in themselves but as the foundation for cooperation. Cooperative group experiences and participation in school rule making are advocated as ways to stimulate moral growth.

Britain.—Moral education in England has been greatly influenced by the work of John Wilson, who developed a theory of moral education (in contrast to Kohlberg, whose theory of moral development has been applied to education, mostly by others). The components of Wilson’s approach include regard for other people as one’s equals, empathy with others’

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feelings, knowledge about the consequences of different actions, ability to formulate moral principles, and disposition to take moral action. In one example, he speculates why a teenager might assault a Pakistani in London. The aggressor may not consider Pakistanis as people, may not understand that others feel pain, may act on impulse. According to Wilson, each of these sources of “immoral action” can be addressed by education programs.  

Another British program that has drawn up a short list of values is the Political Education project. Until about 10 years ago, the English put their faith in implicit rather than explicit teaching about democracy. The only students who received systematic civics instruction were those who chose to prepare for an examination on the British Constitution. The lowering of the voting age to 18 and the raising of the school-leaving age increased the pressure to include more explicit political and social education in the secondary curriculum.

A program of publications and teacher workshops was undertaken by the Politics Association. The concept of a politically literate person was the focus of the program:

Somebody who has a knowledge of basic political concepts and of how to construct analytical frameworks within which to judge political questions; can take a critical stance toward political information; has a capacity to try to see things from the point of view of other groups and persons; has the capacity to participate in and change political situations.

Discussion of political issues on which individuals disagree is at the core of the program. Porter notes that “political literacy does not purport to be value free, but . . . depends on a particular set of attitudes, especially the naturalness of political conflict.”

One aim of this program is for students to become committed to five procedural values—freedom, tolerance, fairness, respect for truth, and respect for reasoning. These values are meant to guide political behavior without limiting the content of beliefs in a narrowly ideological sense. The project has been both praised and criticized. Some argue that it promotes the status quo in politics and legitimizes the power of existing

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groups. Others fear that the project will have too much success in arousing citizens.

**Soviet Union.**—In the Soviet Union, moral education is defined as education that contributes to the good of society and that enables the individual to fulfill his or her public duty. Short lists (and not so short lists) of common values have been developed. Dunstan, for example, reports the following objectives: to promote a personal awareness that the child is part of society, dependent on it, and answerable to its demands; to develop moral senses (conscience, honor, duty) and qualities (honesty, courage, consistency); to inculcate a positive and creative attitude to labor, involving purposeful choice of job, the right use of spare time, and the ability to resist incongruities. To achieve these aims, the Soviets advocate the conscious structuring of many aspects of the social environment, including the school, so that the child may come to understand "one's dependence on society and the necessity to harmonize one's conduct with society's demands and interests."

**Assertion 7**

The learning of values in school is not limited to mandated programs of moral and civic education. Students also learn values (especially cooperation, rights of self-expression, respect for others, and respect for authority) from the ways that schools embody these values in organization, teaching practice, and social climate.

In analyzing how this implicit curriculum shapes values, comparative studies are of special interest, since many of these educational practices are more likely to vary between than within countries. By implicit curriculum we mean school practices that influence students without being stated as explicit goals of instruction. Analyses of the implicit curriculum are generally concerned with relationships among individuals in school as well as the rules, norms, and modes of authority that govern these relationships. We have chosen three of many possibilities to discuss: first, setting and enforcing consistent limits on student behavior; second, the balance between competition and cooperation in the classroom; and third, student participation in discussion and decision making.

**Teacher expectations for student behavior.**—Teacher expectations for student behavior and personal interest in students have been demonstrated to be important aspects of the implicit curriculum. For example, the National Institute of Education's (NIE) Safe Schools Study in the United States


60 Ibid., p. 195.

assessed patterns of crime and violence using questionnaires, on-site surveys, and case studies. Highly disciplined schools where policies were consistent and perceived as fairly enforced had low rates of violence in contrast to those where rules were perceived as arbitrary and discipline as unfair. The sense of impersonality in schools where teachers had contact with a large number of students each week was a negative factor.34

The importance of clear expectations for student behavior and, within these limits, tolerance or encouragement of student individuality is evident in studies from other countries. Rutter et al., in an extensive study of 10-year-old pupils in England, indicated the importance of both expectations for responsible behavior and positive models of behavior provided by teachers (especially when they showed interest in students as individuals).35 Similarly, an ethnographic study of an elementary school in southern Germany concluded, "The limits of behavior are clearly drawn and punishments predictable, but within these limits a wide range of behaviors are tolerated."36 Not only were the tasks clearly structured but the students were also prepared to comply, since they regarded the teachers' approval as important.

Cooperation versus competition in student interaction.—In the Soviet Union, as in Japan, the phrases "warm" and "teacher centered" are frequently used to describe elementary classrooms. These factors are considered important in getting individuals to subordinate their desires to the moral claims of the group:

Discipline ... should be based on the collective's perception of its common interests as awakened and guided by the educator, so that ... the pupils become their own tutors and the individual voluntarily identifies his own desires with those of the group.37

To achieve these aims in the Soviet Union, a socialist pedagogy for teaching values has been elaborated. (1) The behavior of each individual is evaluated primarily in terms of its relevance to the goals and achievements of the group. However, individuals are not interchangeable "cogs" but persons who can make different and valuable contributions to the aims of the group. (2) Competition between groups, not individuals, is the principal means of motivating students to achieve the goals set by adults. Records of conduct, cleanliness, and achievement are kept by classroom row; rewards and punishments are frequently given on that group basis. (3) Social control is chiefly a matter of public recognition and public criticism, with

37 Dunstan, p. 194.
explicit practice in these activities. Each member of the group is encouraged to observe deviant behavior by his fellows and to report these observations to the group. Students are trained for self-criticism in the presence of their peers.58 Research by Bronfenbrenner suggests that Soviet children are more willing than their Western European counterparts to help their peers (even when it goes against their interests) and that they engage in relatively little antisocial behavior.59 Nevertheless, among teenagers, group collectives seem somewhat less effective than for younger children.60

Conclusions about classroom interaction in the United States parallel those in other nations. For example, according to an extensive evaluation of law-related education programs, certain of these programs have achieved significant decreases in reported delinquency among students. Effective programs were characterized by teaching strategies for fostering cooperative work among students as well as changes in peer relationships (e.g., breaking up student groups that reinforced each other's antisocial behavior).61 This finding is consistent with Johnson's review of many research studies in which students in cooperative rather than competitive situations showed increased ability to take the perspectives of others and an enhanced desire to win the respect of others in positive ways.62

The issue of competition versus cooperation is also important in assessing the climate of Japanese secondary schools. Competition is engendered primarily by the university entrance examinations, which put university preparatory students under great stress. The secondary schools are ranked and categorized in terms of how successfully they prepare students for these exams.63 All upper-secondary schools are not equally affected, however. Shimahara's study of three schools and Rohlen's study of five schools are illustrative of the diversity in school climate that one can find, even among academic programs.64 Shimahara says that the system "coerces adolescents to cultivate uniformity, self-denial, perseverance and achievement for the sake of the entrance examinations."65 According to Cummings, however, although the adolescent suicide rate is often cited as a consequence of the system, it was already high before the examination system developed

59 Bronfenbrenner, Two Worlds of Childhood (n. 1 above).
63 Cummings (n. 14 above), chap. 8; Shimahara (n. 16 above), chap. 4; Rohlen (n. 18 above), chap. 3.
64 Shimahara (n. 16 above), chap. 5; Rohlen (n. 18 above), passim.
65 Shimahara (n. 16 above), p. 161
and has been declining since 1955, although examination pressures have remained high. Vogel asserts that the desire to succeed on the examinations in fact maintains group solidarity. In the examinations, a student’s competition is not with a small circle of classmates but with thousands of unknown students who want to enter a particular university.

Student participation in discussion and decision making.—In acknowledging the importance of teacher expectations and enforcement of standards for student behavior, it is important not to neglect the consequences of giving students an opportunity to discuss their own opinions and to participate in the making of school decisions. This point is amply documented in the IEA cross-national studies of civic education previously discussed. The analyses of Torney, Oppenheim, and Farnen have suggested that the extent to which teachers respected students’ opinions and allowed them to be expressed was a consistent positive predictor of more knowledge of civics and less authoritarian attitudes (even when other factors, such as socioeconomic status, were held constant).

More recently, the IEA data regarding the implicit curriculum have been reanalyzed in several countries. Torney-Purta and Phillipps, in an analysis of New Zealand data, replicated the finding that student perceptions of encouragement to express their own opinions were positively related to civics knowledge and support for democratic values. They also demonstrated that in schools where teachers reported that they were prepared to discuss controversial issues and were willing to involve young people in curriculum and disciplinary decisions, students had both relatively low authoritarianism and relatively high support for women’s rights.

Using IEA data from the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, Nielsen analyzed indices of tolerance for dissent in political life. He found the following to be the most significant predictors of high tolerance for dissent in the United States: (1) students’ report that knowing causes or explanations of events was more important than memorizing names or dates in their social studies class, and (2) students’ report that they frequently brought current events up for discussion in class. In the Federal Republic of Germany, reported stress on causes and explanations was the strongest predictor; the second most important predictor was the scale measuring the extent to which independence of opinion was encouraged by the teacher. Thus, all the analyses undertaken so far of the IEA data corroborate the U.S. research (reviewed by Ehman) that is sup-

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66 Cummings (n. 14 above), pp. 217–19, 228–32.
68 Torney et al. (n. 7 above), chaps. 6, 10.
portive of a classroom environment in which students are free to express their ideas on issues. In analyzing related data collected by IEA in Finland, Karvonen found that schools where student participation was higher were characterized by greater liking for school by students, higher levels of achievement motivation, and lower levels of alienation and radicalism.

Conclusion

These seven assertions demonstrate the importance of comparative analysis in values education. Educators often justify their failure to pay serious attention to what other countries are doing on the following bases: (1) every country's practice is determined by its unique cultural, historical, and political traditions, and (2) every country's practice is best for it. We agree that to understand a particular country, it is necessary to know its cultural, historical, and political traditions. But to see these traditions as unchangeable, unsusceptible to foreign influence, or necessarily superior to foreign practice is unwarranted and contrary to historical evidence.

The assertions in this paper suggest issues that cross-national analysis of values education ought to address. These include variation in teacher neutrality, differences in dominant societal values, differential effectiveness of values education, possible incompatibilities between goals, and the importance of particular historical circumstances as opposed to conscious attempts to bring about change. Cross-national analysis also highlights the fact that countries differ in their stress on individuality or collectivity, their focus on cooperation or competition, and their readiness to adopt, in the presence of a heterogeneous population, a short list of core values to be taught.

In recent decades, comparative education has shied away from taking other countries as models. Yet any careful attempt to analyze educational processes and outcomes across countries leads to ideas on how to improve education in one's own country. For example, consideration of values education in Sweden, the Soviet Union, and Japan raises the question of whether collective loyalty or solidarity might not be emphasized more in the United States. Oldenquist and others have argued that greater attention, in the United States, to primary group loyalty and the common good, although it might clash with classic individualism, would reduce alienation among young people and contribute to a more positive social order. A review of international research lends support to the Oldenquist position.

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Likewise, research on the implicit curriculum in a variety of countries supports efforts to avoid the extremes of authoritarianism and permissiveness in schools. This research suggests that warm relations with students and standards for acceptable behavior, with allowance for student autonomy and initiative, are important in bringing about responsible behavior (however "responsible" is defined in these industrialized countries). Teachers who show personal concern for students, who do not play favorites, who are consistent in their expectations, who administer rules fairly, and who stress cooperation among students contribute to an implicit curriculum with positive consequences such as decreased violence and increased empathy for others. Opportunities for students to make school decisions also seem to lead to decreased alienation. In social studies classes, from about age 10, other benefits such as less authoritarianism and greater tolerance for diversity appear to result from encouraging students to discuss a variety of issues in the classroom (including those that are controversial) and from stressing the causes of problems discussed, not merely requiring students to memorize facts or participate in patriotic rituals.

If Japanese policymakers in the nineteenth century had decided that Western culture was so different from their own that they had nothing to learn from the West, the history of Japan, and indeed the world, would have been different. One of the strengths of the Japanese has been their ability to study other countries thoroughly, to adapt and make use of foreign practices in ways that are congruent with what they want to achieve and with their own distinctive traditions. In our view, no country can afford to do less.