W. Lloyd Warner and the Anthropology of Institutions: An Approach to the Study of Work in Late Capitalism

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Abstract

W. Lloyd Warner is re-interpreted as an institutional anthropologist whose approach to the study of work in a capitalist context has relevance to contemporary disciplinary problems and issues. The essay traces the development and influences upon Warner’s thought and research strategies from their origin in Durkheim’s sociology and Warner’s fieldwork among the Murngin, to the Hawthorne Project, where Warner held an intermittent yet significant consultancy, and on to the seminal contributions of the Yankee City Series where, it is argued, the anthropological approach to contemporary institutions took its initial form. Warner’s approach to the study of work in formal organizations at Yankee City was ground-breaking because it led away from the more conventional strategy of confining ethnography to a single organization (e.g., Hawthorne) by examining social relations and meanings that cross-cut the larger society and in which all formal organizations are embedded (i.e., class, rank, and status). Warner’s commitment to rigorous empiricism, and to engaging the problems of an era, led him beyond functionalist theory to the hallmarks of an institutional approach to work in late capitalism that still resonates today.

Keywords: Hawthorne Project, institutions, organizations, W. Lloyd Warner, Yankee City

Introduction

On this occasion of the Conrad Arensberg Award lecture,1 I would like to honor Arensberg by dedicating the lecture to his mentor and colleague, W. Lloyd Warner. The names of Conrad Arensberg (1910 to 1997)2 and W. Lloyd Warner (1898 to 1970)3 are entwined in the history of American anthropology. While the focus of this lecture is on W. Lloyd Warner and his role as an early institutional anthropologist, it is also fitting to comment briefly upon Warner’s relationship with Conrad Arensberg and its place within the development of our discipline. By way of introduction, I will review three reasons why I believe...
W. Lloyd Warner should be considered a significant figure in anthropology, each of which will be expanded upon in the lecture.

First, Warner had a visible hand in reshaping and transforming American anthropology from a field focused more or less exclusively on preliterate, non-European societies to a discipline that staked a claim in the heart of contemporary, complex societies, and their most fundamental institutions, such as social class, ethnicity, and formal work organizations (i.e., those created explicitly for a purpose). Warner initially made this leap when he reconceptualized the ethnographic field methodology that he and Radcliffe-Brown constructed for his dissertation research among the Murrin of northeastern Arnhem land (Australia) to frame his multiyear ethnographic study of Yankee City (Newburyport, MA) in the early 1930s. Warner was convinced that anthropological concepts and methods were relevant to all societies, regardless of their complexity, and he set for himself the goal of developing a framework for inquiry that would enable him to engage in a wide range of cross-cultural comparisons. Following this vision, he became a pioneer in the anthropological study of contemporary American communities. Before Warner, the only community study carried out in the United States had been sociological (i.e., Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd’s Middle town, 1929). Conrad Arensberg developed his initial approach to community studies while working with Warner in setting-up that portion of the Yankee City Series that later was published as The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups (Vol. III, Warner and Srole 1945). Warner strengthened anthropological research in contemporary communities when he directed the social anthropology component of Harvard’s Irish Survey in Clare County, Ireland, patterned after his Yankee City investigations. This research became Conrad Arensberg’s dissertation (The Irish Countrymen 1937), a landmark publication that helped to shift the image of anthropology in European studies toward that of a modern interdisciplinary player (Comitas 1999).

Warner is also significant for his influence on the ethnographic study of industrial work. On his way from Australia to Yankee City, Warner’s path diverged briefly to Cicero, IL, where – at Western Electric’s Hawthorne Works – he helped to create the methodological design for industrial ethnography. In doing so, he became the first American anthropologist to explore the notion of work in the context of modern formal organizations (Gillespie 1991). Arensberg was engaged with Warner in this effort, and it first inspired his interest in workplaces, communities, and their problems. Warner’s contributions to Hawthorne set the standard for anthropological studies of work in corporations for the remainder of the century (with
the exception of studies conducted by insiders). Yet ironically, by moving on from Hawthorn to Yankee City, Warner was making what turned out to be a brilliant (if iconoclastic) move. He did not fully join the Human Relations School of organizational theory that Elton Mayo founded in part on his (Warner’s) methodological innovation at Hawthorne (a school that ultimately failed), but instead took his own team off to Newburyport, MA to investigate American community life, a move that may have had a more lasting influence on anthropology over time.

Third, we arrive at Warner’s role in the development of institutional anthropology. At the start of the Yankee City Series, Warner was a structural-functionalist, as described in Yankee City Vol. I (21–37). He considered institutions to be a component of social organization, which included “the forms of interrelationships which constitute the organizational system, the conceptual recognition of these forms (secular logics), and the sanctions which individuals in the system use to regulate the ordinary behavior of the members” (Warner and Lunt 1941:22). Warner’s initial structural-functionalist viewpoint regarding institutions was influenced by Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown, Elton Mayo, and other social scientists of his time. Yet, considering that structural-functionalism is obsolete in anthropology, one may question why such an approach to institutions should be relevant today. There are two principal responses to this challenge.

The first relates to the intellectual genealogy of institutionalism in the social sciences. The notion of institutions is one of the oldest ideas in the history of social thought, with roots in the late 19th and early 20th centuries that may be traced to Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner (Scott 2008:8–9). The first conceptualization of institutions was that of specialized, functional “organs” that enable an evolving society to adapt to its context. That this basic notion persisted in Warner’s work is not surprising, nor should it necessarily represent a criticism of Warner’s work if placed in historical context. The idea of a social institution is venerable, ubiquitous, and complex, meaning that the history of this idea necessarily encompasses a lengthy legacy of scholarship, and understanding it requires diverse minds and different theoretical perspectives (e.g., see Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 2008). An important point in this lecture is that Warner was not strictly bound by any theory, but was able to make original observations through a commitment to understanding the social realities of his research participants and to empirical data. As a result, he went beyond structural-functionalism to see farther than his peers.

A second response to a challenge on Warner’s place in the annals of institutional scholarship relates to his substantive contributions. While there is no agreement across disciplines on the nature or significance of institutions today, there is a tradition with which Warner may be associated, and that is the Chicago School, which claims an unbroken line of inquiry and thought related to institutions and their significance for formal organizations over much of the 20th century (Abbott 1992; Scott 2008). This tradition emphasizes relations among social actors, “interpenetration of self and other, of institution and person, of culture and social structure . . . (and) the active construction of social life in interaction,” in contrast to an emphasis on “disembodied ‘properties’ of social actors” (Abbott 1992:755). Warner’s study of the workers, managers, and owners within Yankee City’s shoe-making factories, analyzed and written while he was a Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago, may be viewed as a representation of the Chicago tradition of institutionalism. His principal focus in the Yankee City study was on class relations among social actors, particularly as these cut across particular work organizations to integrate (or disintegrate) an entire community.4 Warner’s work is important because it broke away from the more conventional notion of confining ethnography inside the boundaries of a single organization (much as anthropologists once remained within a single culture), and examined social relations that interpenetrated the organization. That innovation is significant to the anthropology of organizations today, which is in need of new approaches to understanding organizational change (or the lack thereof). In Yankee City, Warner examined how social class relations change, both within and beyond work organizations, during troubled economic times. He did this by virtue of a rigorous methodology, long immersion in the field, symbolic analysis, and historical reconstruction of the context—the hallmarks of Warner’s brand of institutional anthropology.

W. Lloyd Warner may be viewed as a transitional figure in anthropology. He studied with the ancestors who founded our discipline, while transfiguring their conceptions for a contemporary American context. A close examination of his work reveals that he transcended classical anthropology and reached through to the modern era, struggling with the questions we confront today. He brings us both the roots and the branches of institutional anthropology, that we may recover them for our own purposes.

Reinterpreting W. Lloyd Warner

In the anthropology of work, W. Lloyd Warner is perhaps best known for his contributions to the Western Electric Company’s Hawthorn Project based in Cicero, IL, research dedicated to the improvement of industrial productivity through experimental changes in working conditions within a large formal organization (Roethisberger and Dickson 1939). Warner was a
In brief, the BWOR phase was designed to open a new line of inquiry in the Hawthorne Project. Instead of examining the influence of a single variable on production, as had been the case in earlier phases of the research, the BWOR focused upon the influence of workers’ social interactions and collectively held ideation upon productivity (see Schwartzman 1993). Warner, who influenced the design of the BWOR, emphasized the importance of solidarities and antagonisms within and among workgroups and how these related to social structure, as well as the importance of such a methodological approach in all anthropological research, both traditional and contemporary (Gillespie 1991:157). Warner guided the design of this part of the Hawthorne study, and so he may be thought of as the anthropologist who conceptualized the first efforts toward ethnographic practice inside American companies. The BWOR research represented “the first new approach to the study of work since the time-and-motion studies of industrial engineers,” and this approach continues to provide a model for ethnographic studies of work in corporations today (Kimball 1979:782). It also conferred legitimacy on social science accounts of workplace phenomena (Finlay 1991).

There are two points that are relevant with respect to Warner and the anthropologies of work in late capitalism. First, the design of the Hawthorne Project was conducted by Warner as an external consultant to the project, under the overall intellectual leadership of Elton Mayo, a Harvard-based psychologist. Warner did not work on the project directly, and this reflected both his own interests and the stance that some anthropologists at the time were taking with respect to the appropriate relationship between theoretical production and practical engagement. Although this approach appeared to be productive (i.e., significant empirical results emerged from the study, although these have been disputed; see Gillespie 1991; also Blumberg 1968), the long-term outcome of the project with respect to the larger field of ethnography in organizations has been problematic, and remains so at the present time (discussed in a later section).

The second point is that Warner never intended to focus on studies in organizations, per se, but was more interested in conducting research on contemporary American communities. He moved on from Hawthorne to do what was, in the view of many, more significant work in the Yankee City Series, where he was ahead of his time in pursuing his own form of early institutional analysis. In Yankee City (Newburyport, MA), Warner studied social class within the web of institutional and organizational relations enmeshing an entire region of the United States. He examined the transformation of class relationships in a rapidly changing social, economic, and political context, inquiring into the meaning and outcomes of this transformation for people, their work, and everyday lives. From the vantage point of such inquiry, Warner was able to comment cogently on major social issues of his time, especially the emergence of the organized labor movement.

I argue here that Warner gradually transformed himself over the course of the Yankee City Series from a more or less detached observer of contemporary social life to an engaged anthropologist, and he did so through his emerging brand of institutional anthropology. Although Warner’s perspective placed him at the cutting-edge of public intellectuals in America at mid-20th century, this was not to last for a number of reasons and his reputation faded. Yet, I believe that Warner’s work deserves more attention, not only because of its inherent value as scholarship, but because he was one of the first American anthropologists to study contemporary work and society from an institutional perspective, and a reexamination of his work could provide insights toward a new anthropology of institutions.

Today, we are in the midst of a resurgence of interest across the social sciences in new approaches to institutional theory and practice, in part because formal organizations have not displayed behavior that conforms to the rational or efficient expectations of organizational theory (Barley and Tolbert 1997; see also Scott 1998). At the same time, organizational theory has not produced a unifying framework for the conceptualization of change in formal organizations, leaving scholars and practitioners with fragmented and disjointed approaches to an ever more urgent subject. Whether anthropology can join the new institutional endeavor on its own terms, or whether it will become an adjunct to other disciplines (e.g., new institutional economics) remains to be seen. Current treatments of early institutionalism do not recognize anthropologists as contributors to the field (with the possible exception of Pierre Bourdieu; e.g., see Powell and DiMaggio 1991), yet there are calls for anthropologists to move in an institutional direction (e.g., see North 2005). If an institutional approach can contribute to our understanding of work under late capitalism or other subjects of interest to anthropologists (and I will argue that it can), then rediscovering our roots is important.

I will discuss Warner’s pathway, from detached observer at Hawthorne and what was at stake in his
arms-length relationship with that project, to his comparative sociological framework at Yankee City, and why he finally was compelled to turn his emerging institutional approach toward a focus on work and labor-management relations in Yankee City factories during the 1930s and 1940s. Further, I will expand upon ways in which institutionalism is relevant to the anthropology of work in late capitalism, providing a brief illustration from contemporary literature.

**Anthropology at a Distance**

Some treatments of Warner’s role at the Cicero, Illinois-based Hawthorne plant may convey the impression that he was more directly involved in the conduct of research and analysis than actually was the case. In Partridge and Eddy’s (1978:16–17) influential paper on the development of applied anthropology in America, Warner’s involvement is described in a way that appears to place him in a starring role:

Mayo brought Warner into the Committee (on Industrial Physiology) with an appointment in the (Harvard) School of Business and the Department of Anthropology, and together they generated the famous Bank Wiring Observation Room Study . . . Warner utilized for this study the techniques with which he had recorded Murngin funeral rites, marriage ceremonies, gathering expeditions, and hunting (Warner 1941). The systematic analysis of human interaction patterns pioneered by Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown were applied to the least primitive aspects of modern society, and to the very heart of industrial society (Chapple 1953; Arensberg and Kimball 1965). The results demonstrated that fatigue could be reduced through manipulation of interactional variables, and became classic contributions to the field of human relations in industrial organization and business administration (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939) . . . Following his work at the Hawthorne Plant, Warner turned his attention to the utilization of anthropological methods for the study of modern American communities . . .

It would be more accurate to describe Warner as a part-time academic consultant and one of Elton Mayo’s remote field representatives. An insider’s view of Warner’s role at Hawthorne is provided by Richard Gillespie’s (1991) reanalysis of the original experimental records of the Hawthorne Project, as well as archival material related to the project, including the personal papers of the principal researchers (Elton Mayo, Fritz Roethlisberger, and William Dickson). Gillespie’s study shows that as the Hawthorne Project unfolded over time, Elton Mayo became less enamored with the overnight train ride from Harvard to Chicago, and that his personal style did not require more than a “light” approach to oversight of the project. Warner was dispatched by Mayo to make periodic visits to the plant in Chicago (along with a number of other Harvard researchers), as a means to satisfy the need for research guidance emanating from Western Electric.

Warner, who had been appointed tutor and then assistant professor at Harvard in the late 1920s after returning from 3 years of fieldwork in Australia, was initially seeking financial support for an anthropological study of an American community, encouraged by the Middletown study of sociologists Robert S. Lynd and Merrell Lynd (Neubauer 1999). Warner found out about Mayo’s large Rockefeller grant which supported Harvard’s participation in the Hawthorne research (the same Laura Spelman Rockefeller Fund that financed anthropological research in the British colonies), and he outlined his plan for a large-scale study of American society to Elton Mayo. According to Gillespie (1991:155):

Mayo sent Warner off to visit Hawthorne in May 1930 with a letter of introduction to Putnam (an industrial research manager): “I think you will all be interested to hear of his wild experiences with other Australian savages. I think that you will also find that his inquiries unquestionably possess significance for us even if they cannot be directly or immediately applied in the Hawthorne Works.” Putnam was impressed with Warner’s perspective, and he quickly became convinced that the next research should be of the home and social life of the Hawthorne workers. Other projects of a similar nature were also being floated.”

Warner considered Cicero as a possible site for his community study, but rejected it as too “disintegrated” (e.g., the gangster Al Capone had established his headquarters in a hotel near the plant, and organized a “chain of speak-easies, honky-tongs and gambling houses” along the roads near the factory (Gillespie 1991:156). Warner was interested in studying a stable community with strong social traditions, more analogous to those that he believed anthropologists typically investigate.

More significant with respect to Warner’s role in the Hawthorne Project was his arms-length relationship with respect to data gathering and analysis. Crucially, Warner was involved most influentially in the design of the experimental framework at Hawthorne, and then he departed for Newburyport, MA to initiate what became the Yankee City Series in 1931. He did not participate in data collection at Hawthorne, and he was involved only intermittently in
research by sociologists; see Roy 1952; Burawoy 1979)

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riors. Dickson's approach to output restriction was
and systems guarded against such workforce behav-
the time believed that corporate personnel policies
manifestation of their collective social consciousness
ings from Western Electric, suggesting the extent to
which he had garnered the company's trust (and an
indication of Mayo's alignment with the company's
ideological point of view).

Mayo's views of the findings were not without
contest. Gillespie (1991) has carefully reconstructed
the conflicting perspectives regarding the Hawthorne
data that held among the researchers themselves, and
explains what was at stake. William Dickson, who
was the external interviewer in the BWOR and had
worked closely with Warner in the project's design,
clearly believed that the workers deliberately re-
stricted output under the piece rate system as one
manifestation of their collective social consciousness
and stance against managerial policies. This observa-
tion was controversial, as most industry managers at
the time believed that corporate personnel policies
and systems guarded against such workforce behav-
ors. Dickson's approach to output restriction was
unusual due to his (Warner-inspired) social anthro-
pological account of the phenomenon, confirmed by
preliminary interviews with 24 workers, and stated
by him in an 11-page internal memorandum on the
subject issued at Western Electric before the BWOR
test began. Gillespie (1991:163–164) notes:

Restriction of output, Dickson suggested, was a
reflection of group solidarity among the workers,
an indication that workers shared common pur-
poses, ideas, and sentiments. Individual workers,
even those who complained that restricting pro-
duction resulted in lower wages, were prepared
to accept the group norm, even though this might
mean sacrificing individual interests to the group
... Dickson argued that, in such a context, man-
agement intervention to increase production
backfired, for it served only to increase group
solidarity and hence restriction. Rate setting and
cost reduction investigations simply made work-
ers apprehensive and encouraged them to band
gether in the face of pressure from management
... The function of restriction of output, to sum
up, is to protect the worker from management's
chemes.

Close observation in the BWOR study (and later
research by sociologists; see Roy 1952; Burawoy 1979)
confirmed Dickson's hypothesis. Dickson and the
BWOR internal observer, Art Moore, subsequently is-
issued an internal report on their findings to Hawthorne
that was nothing less than an indictment of the indus-
trial system of personnel management. The report
showed that workers and their first line supervisors
did not reveal their actual production capabilities to
higher levels of management, but provided inaccurate
information about production in order to maintain
what they believed to be acceptable (i.e., restricted)
output levels. According to Dickson, production was
at least 30% below what it might be.

Such an analysis contrasting formal and informal
structures was not aligned with Mayo's view of the
situation. Mayo emphasized the individual worker,
and his psychological adjustment to the "total situa-
tion" (Gillespie 1991:157), a misleading term
which meant (for Mayo) an undifferentiated social
environment. Mayo insisted upon a "psychopathicological"
interpretation of the Hawthorne data, meaning that the
workers were "maladjusted" to industrial production
regimens and responded "illogically" to managerial in-
tensive structures. Mayo believed that the solution was
individual interviewing designed to support psycho-
logical adjustment. Dickson, on the other hand, argued
for a managerial guarantee that piece rates would not be
cut. Yet, Dickson's analysis ran against the grain of
welfare capitalist policies, which were in vogue before
the Great Depression, while Mayo's views were very
much in keeping with such policies. Warner's influence
upon Dickson was apparent, but so was Dickson's
training as an economist, with its emphasis on rational
choice and incentives (Gillespie 1991).

Although Mayo did not have unassailable data
to support his arguments, his views prevailed never-
theless, launching the Human Relations School, with
its view of formal organizations as integrated social
systems, where emotional bonds between humans
were supposed to unite people in harmonious pursuit
of common goals (Burawoy 1979:234). Within the
context of this theory, conflict between management
and workers was seen as pathological, reflecting the
disruption of an equilibrium state, and was to be
ameliorated by making adjustments in the pattern of
interaction among individuals and organizational
structures. Anthropologists who were interested in
research on formal organizations joined this school
(e.g., Chapple, Kimball, and Richardson), conduct-
ing microstudies of individual corporations aimed at
improvements in productivity. Yet, the underlying
theory was flawed, both with respect to its founda-
tional experiments and their interpretation, and in its
relationship to the course of history. Class relations
were shifting in the United States, and the welfare
capitalist views of Elton Mayo did not survive the
rise of the organized labor movement, nor did the

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position of anthropology in studies of American corporations.

One of the serious consequences of these events is that the syndrome associated with output restriction (e.g., productivity lag, information flow distortions, labor-management distrust, and new strategy implementation difficulty; see e.g., Briody and Baba 1991; Baba 1995, 1999; Babson 1995; Vallas 2006a, 2006b) continued to plague American manufacturing enterprise, and to take its toll in job loss and economic decline in the United States and elsewhere. How much different the world of American manufacturing might have been if anthropology had staked its own theoretical claims at the heart of the Hawthorne project. As Finlay (1991:1821) has noted:

It is interesting to speculate what the result might have been had, say, W. Lloyd Warner, who was a better social scientist (than Mayo) and whose anthropological approach was central to the research design of the bank wiring room study, been directly involved in writing the final accounts. My hunch is that we would have seen a better interpretation of the Hawthorne data.

The aloof stance that Warner took in the Hawthorne project is worthy of note because it reflects a prominent school of thought in which he was being trained at that moment; that is, the views of A.R. Radcliffe-Brown and other academics who espoused the notion that anthropologists should not engage directly in any form of activity related to policy decision making or intervention for governmental or other institutions, and that anthropologists should be involved only in “pure” science and allow the decision makers to glean what they could from learned studies. British anthropologists often dispatched their students to work on “applied” projects in the colonies, as they did not see these as particularly interesting or significant with respect to knowledge production, nor did they care to be associated with activities that were under the direction of government bureaucrats (Kuper 1983). British anthropologists extended these policies to industry, as they rebuffed overtures from corporate leaders for assistance following World War II (Mills 2006).

Warner’s views were influenced by Radcliffe-Brown, as much or perhaps more than by any other prominent anthropologist of his time.8 Warner was mentored by Radcliffe-Brown during the time of his fieldwork in Australia, when Radcliffe-Brown was a Professor at the University of Sydney. They shared an apartment (with Charles Baldwin) when Warner returned from his field studies (Warner 1988:32). Radcliffe-Brown’s perspective regarding the quest for knowledge and its priority over other endeavors, and the influence of these views on Warner, were a matter of some controversy at the time that Warner was forming his intention to pursue the study of contemporary American communities as his life’s work. According to Mildred Warner (1988:41):

Before returning to the United States (from Australia), Lloyd discussed with Radcliffe-Brown his dream of applying to the study of a contemporary American community the techniques of research and analysis he had used among the Murngin. He had first brought up his ideas with Chuck (Charles Baldwin, their roommate) when, in discussing what each would do after Australia, Chuck asked what meaning his work there would have when he returned home.

Lloyd wanted to use his knowledge of Murngin social organization to obtain a better understanding of how men in all groups, regardless of place or time, solve the problems confronting them. His investigations of a simple society, he hoped, would equip him to analyze more complex forms of social organization. He also wanted to use it as a kind of screen through which to pass American contemporary industrialized society to ascertain what, if anything, he could find that would be analogous to the primitive, or what had been observed in the primitive, the detail of which might be discernable in the American society. He was quite excited about this research and eager to pursue it.

Radcliffe-Brown, however, was a little less enthusiastic since it seemed to him like a practical application of his science to which he was opposed. Chuck wondered whether the difference in attitude was due to Lloyd’s being a product of an aggressive, pragmatic American society and Radcliffe-Brown’s coming from the conservative British culture, or whether it was that Rex (Radcliffe-Brown), an older scientist, was more interested in science for science’s sake and Lloyd for what it could do for human society.

Mildred Warner goes on to state that she doubted the validity of Chuck’s speculation, as Lloyd Warner typically would respond to queries about the potential application of his research by indicating that “the purpose of the research was the discovery of knowledge and understanding of society, the advancement of learning, that practical application was not a goal” (Warner 1988:41).

The tenacity of the latter inclination, especially among British anthropologists in the 1930s, who had not yet established the security of permanent academic posts, should not be underestimated. To establish itself as an academic discipline with an
unassailable place in the academy, social anthropology had to produce theory, which it had not fully established in the 1930s, while the above events were unfolding. Even though Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski had touted the practical utility of anthropology in addressing colonial administrators’ problems, this position was primarily aimed at their need for funding, and only one of the two (Malinowski) had any interest in carrying through on the promise with practically oriented field research (Stocking 1995). It should be recalled that Malinowski was not British, and his family background was that of the minor Polish aristocracy (Kuklick 1991), thus the influences upon his interests and intentions differed from those of Radcliffe-Brown. Class influences were prevalent in British social anthropology of that period, and those tended to be aligned with a tradition in which abstract thought was associated with the upper echelons of society (Stokes 1997). Radcliffe-Brown appears to have been in an upwardly mobile position (Kuklick 1991), and his stance with respect to the purposes of knowledge and learning is consistent with such an orientation.

Warner did not isolate himself from the anthropologists who comprised the Human Relations School and their studies of individual firms, even though his primary interests lay in understanding the fundamental structures of American society and the role of large, complex institutions such as firms and government agencies and their leadership. Many strands continued to connect W. Lloyd Warner with the Human Relations School and its anthropological practitioners, although the Yankee City studies enabled him to evolve his own unique voice that transcended this school. While Warner was at the University of Chicago, he not only helped to form, but chaired the Committee on Human Relations in Industry, and was involved in establishing the consulting firm Social Research Incorporated (SRI), led by Burleigh Gardner, an outgrowth of the committee (Neubauer 1999). Yet, even in the SRI venture, Warner did not gravitate toward the core of the consulting activity, but remained focused on his academic interests.

In retrospect, it may now be recognized that Mayo’s initial intuition regarding the need for analysis of the Hawthorne workers’ larger social reality was accurate, and his efforts to encourage W. Lloyd Warner to undertake field research in the community around the Hawthorne plant were prescient. Attempting to comprehend the workers’ “maladjustment” through observations and interviews within the plant alone was insufficient, not only because Mayo’s theoretical frame was flawed, but also because the scope of the Hawthorne project was too limited and could not comprehend the gathering storm in the larger social context. A serious weakness of the Hawthorne project was the isolation of the Cicero factory researchers from the world around the plant. Without some understanding of what was happening in the lives of Hawthorne workers, Elton Mayo was free to impose his constructions upon their motivations, claiming that they were psychologically “maladjusted” by taking excerpts out of context from their interviews (e.g., placing emphasis upon a workers’ statement that she was angry with her supervisor because he reminded her of her stepfather; Gillespie 1991:157), when in truth he knew little about the workers.

The issues confronting Western Electric in their Hawthorne plant could not be addressed through more counseling or a human relations “adjustment” based on welfare capitalist ideology. In all likelihood, the company needed fundamentally new human resource policies and practices, but the corporation never received such advice, due in large part to Mayo’s personal and political dominance. The approach of the Human Relations School – to decontextualize research and focus on individuals and individual companies, working intensively in each one and providing piece-meal recommendations for company managers – meant that anthropologists were out of touch with crucial aspects of the social realities that connected the companies to the larger world. Failing to establish contact with class relationships beyond the plant, the labor movement, and social institutions more broadly, was ironically the Achilles heel of the Human Relations School.

If Warner had been willing to study the workers’ communities around the Cicero plant, then two critical weaknesses of the Hawthorne Project may have been averted. First, Mayo’s interpretation of the Hawthorne workers’ practices and ideologies as “maladjusted” may have been countered by interpreting them more fully in relation to larger social realities that would enrich their understanding, rather than insisting on interpreting them only within the context of the plant as an isolated organization. Warner may have been the only individual connected with the Hawthorne study who had the capacity to undertake such a study, however, he was fixated on the notion of studying a “traditional” community, and thus an early opportunity to link plant-based and community studies was missed. Secondly, if Warner had agreed to study Cicero or other adjacent communities where workers lived, his commitment to the anthropological analysis of the Hawthorne findings at Harvard would have been ensured, and the weight of his judgment could have been added to that of Dickson, which might have changed the course of history with respect to the development of the Human Relations School and organizational theory. That is, a larger or richer social context perspective might have...
been embedded more deeply within organizational theory, rather than being more or less washed away from it.

Early Institutional Anthropology Version 1: Comparative Sociology

During the first year of the Yankee City study, there were frequent research seminars at Harvard where members of the Hawthorne Project interacted with members of the Yankee City team and provided the latter with their initial interview methodology. It was acknowledged within this intellectual grouping that workers in industrial settings should be studied in a broader social context beyond the factory, and this is what Warner intended to do at Newburyport, Massachusetts (Warner 1988:51). Warner and Lunt (1941:1–2) noted:

... those of us who are attempting to understand human relationships in action (find) that a large number of the relationships of a worker in the plant, his activities, and his attitudes can be better understood by knowing the place the worker occupies within the immediate or larger context of the factory. Although his relations with fellow workers and with management are of very great importance, they are but part of the total number of interrelations which make up the worker’s behavior and tie him not only to the factory but to the total community. The many thousands of interviews gathered from workers in the Chicago factory all clearly demonstrated that the worker brought his outside life with him into the factory; and when he returned home at night to his family and friends, he took part of his factory life with him.

The Yankee City study was designed by Warner to explore these ideas, which continued questions posed by Durkheim much earlier: what happens to human beings when great institutions become major forces in their daily lives (Kimball 1979)? This was essentially the thorny and unexamined issue at Hawthorne; the study focused on the relationships among men and women at work, but how did their work experience interact with the rest of their lives?

Durkheim’s view on the world of work was gained through his perspective on the social integration of different types of human society. Durkheim ([1933] 1984) claimed that human society developed new means of integration following the transition of the industrial revolution. He argued that more complex and vertically stratified societies were integrated through organic solidarity, in which individuals are attracted to one another through different, but complementary, needs for one another. As Durkheim matured, he shifted away from the view that organic solidarity was based upon rational and individualistic negotiation, and came to believe that symbolic systems (shared schema and “collective representations”) lay at the heart of institutions that provided the basis for stability and change in society (Scott 2008:12).

Durkheim’s tradition was organized theoretically around the analysis of social institutions, defined as “certain ways of acting . . . imposed, or at least suggested from outside the individual and . . . added on to his own nature,” which are embodied in successive individuals “without this succession destroying their continuity” (Durkheim 1917; cf., Lukes 1982:5). Individuals perceive institutions as “social facts,” external to themselves, in part because institutions are represented through rituals and ceremonies that have “moral authority” and are backed by sanctions. Durkheim classified “social facts” along a continuum, from maximal to minimal “institutionalization” (how much they have “crystallized” or come into being), pointing toward the possibility of institutional change or change processes.

The institutions that enable social integration in different types of societies were compelling objects of study both for Durkheim and Warner; indeed, Warner referred to himself as a comparative sociologist (Warner 1941:786). For Durkheim, occupational communities represented important institutions through which an industrial society might attain integration (see van Maanen and Barley 1984). Warner, on the other hand, was interested in class and rank, institutions that were controversial, both with respect to their capacity for social integration in American society, and by mid-century, their very existence. Yet, as the Yankee City Series was to reveal, social class and changes in class relations were fundamental to an understanding of emergent workplace phenomena.

Warner selected Yankee City for his community study much for the same reason he rejected Cicero, IL. He believed that Newburyport, MA was a stable, traditional community that would legitimize the accommodation of anthropological methods, and comparison with other societies studied by anthropologists. According to Warner and Lunt (1941:5):

If we were to compare easily the other societies of the world with our own civilization, and if we were readily to accommodate our techniques, developed by the study of primitive society, to modern groups, it seemed wise to choose a community with a social organization which had developed over a long period of time under the domination of a single group with a coherent tradition. In the United States only two large sections, New England and the deep South, we believed, were likely to possess such a commu-
nity. Despite the many ethnic migrations to its shores, New England still contains many towns and cities whose Puritan tradition remains unshattered, communities which are still capable of meeting the crises of modern life without revolutionary adaptations in social structure.

Warner further elaborated upon his position regarding selection of his research site, distinguishing between the sociological and anthropological approach to community studies:

The urban sociologist has tended to emphasize the study of social change and social disorganization. He has, therefore, selected areas where phenomena such as crime, delinquency, divorce, family disorganization, gang behavior, ethnic conflict, suicide, and insanity are most prevalent. From the anthropologist’s point of view, the smaller and larger towns where the social tradition has been little disturbed and the ways of life are more harmonious and better integrated have perhaps been neglected by the sociologist. The selection of communities to be studied by anthropologists was determined by criteria which accented harmonious adjustment, high integration, and well-organized social relations. The problem of American social equilibrium rather than disequilibrium was of paramount interest. [Warner 1941:787]

Although Warner had eschewed Mayo’s proposal of studying the Cicero community around the Hawthorne plant due to its “disorganization,” clearly he still was impressed by the equilibrium theory espoused by Mayo and others in the social and natural sciences, and sought a research site that displayed the characteristics of a community “in equilibrium” for purposes of comparison with other (supposedly) traditional societies that anthropologists studied.

Initially, Warner’s conceptual and methodological framework for investigating Yankee City reflected a synthesis of Mayo’s equilibrium theory, Durkheim’s sociology, and his own unique interest in class, rank, and status as integrating and differentiating mechanisms in complex societies. Warner had been influenced by Durkheim via his training with Radcliffe-Brown.11 Durkheim saw a place for ethnography in the study of institutions, and believed that inquiry into “primitive” social groups could support our understanding of more advanced societies, an idea Warner was eager to expand upon.

Among the Murngin, Warner had examined kinship as a social institution that, in his view, integrated the entire society (Warner 1930). At Yankee City, Warner was intent upon demonstrating the relevance of anthropological methods and concepts toward the understanding of institutions that integrate complex, vertically integrated societies. There, he believed, the dominant dimension or fundamental structure of integration was social class or rank order. Warner defined social class as “two or more orders of people who are believed to be, and are accordingly ranked by the members of the community, in socially superior and inferior positions” (Warner and Lunt 1941:82). A rank order placed all individuals within the community on higher or lower levels of social participation, and these levels were assumed to cross-cut the entire community (just as kinship cross-cut Murngin society). Warner’s sojourn in Yankee City revealed that class and rank are not determined strictly by economic factors, as initially thought, but by a complex array of social and economic influences, including family, the neighborhood in which s/he lived, occupation, income, memberships in cliques, associations, and other types of relationship.

Warner and his team developed a methodology for assigning individual research subjects to social classes or ranks (six classes – lower, middle, and upper, each with a lower and upper tier; see for discussion Warner and Lunt 1941:81–90) through interviews and observations. He then attempted to determine each of his subjects’ interactions in a set of relations in the various secondary associations or institutions of the community (e.g., family, cliques, church, and so forth). These secondary institutions are not dominant with respect to the society as a whole and do not cross-cut the entire community, but still are significant. Within these secondary social structures, an individual is likely to interact with members of his/her own class or rank, and also may interact with members of other classes, some higher, some lower. Warner explained (1941:793):

(As) an individual moves from one status to another in the daily round of life, he must give attention to different social situations, change his attitudes, and ordinarily modify his behavior . . . An individual, talking and acting as a member of an ‘aristocratic’ discussion group, ‘naturally’ behaves in a different fashion when he is talking and acting as a member of a group whose membership includes all classes. He is much more likely to use social values and symbols which are ‘democratic’ in the latter context than he is in the former. By virtue of his interaction with other members of the group in each situation, the same individual occupies two different statuses. His statuses (positions as here defined) depend on (1) belonging to a particular class and (2) being a member of a social structure (family, clique, association, etc.).
Warner defined “status” as any position in a society, whether it was ranked or not. He claimed that once he had determined the total number of statuses (positions) in each class and in the whole community, he would be able to count the number of memberships in each of the statuses. A complete study would require a determination of how the various statuses within a class are interconnected and the amount of interconnection that exists between each status and all others within a class (Warner 1941:794). Being able to see a society as a “total system of interdependent, interrelated statuses” would represent the social system of the “total community,” much as the map of a good cartographer might reflect the physical reality of a geographic body of land or sea (Warner 1941:796).

Yankee City thus was grounded in the concept of interactions among two or more individuals and the social relations within which such interactions took place (Warner and Lunt 1941:12). These ideas, which echo those that resounded in the Hawthorne Project, were derived in part from Georg Simmel, who stated that “society exists whenever a number of individuals enter into reciprocal relations,” further elaborating: “The group is a unity because of processes of reciprocal influencing between the individuals” (Spykman 1925:27).

Insights emerged from Warner’s approach to the study of class, rank, and status – findings that would not have been possible without his theoretical framework and methodological rigor. For example, Warner’s team determined through analysis of social interactions that shoe operatives in Yankee City’s factories were more likely to orient their associations downward in the overall class hierarchy compared with the general adult population of their social class (Warner and Low 1947:159). This finding drew Warner to the rather pessimistic conclusion that factory workers were losing status as a group, and that they were finding solidarity in their group itself, because it did not appear that they could rise any higher in the class ranking. Warner believed that the institutionalized character of labor-management antagonism meant that the working class had little hope for upward mobility. Education was the pathway toward class mobility, yet even this means of ascent was slowed for the working class as positions in the upper strata already were filled by the sons and daughters of those at the top (Warner and Low 1947:182).

Warner’s fascination with social class, rank order, and status has been the subject of a good deal of commentary and controversy (Kimball 1979). He has been sharply criticized for his approach to class at the expense of historical analysis (Mills 1942; Ternstrom 1964). Perhaps this is one reason why later volumes of the Yankee City Series (e.g., Vol. IV, published in 1947) incorporate more historical analysis than earlier volumes, published before Mills’ critique. Other observers have noted that the failure of Warner’s oeuvre to gain the attention it deserves may be the result of a conflict between his emphasis on social class and the timing of his major contribution, coming as it did when the trajectory of American popular culture was tending toward a deemphasis of social class (e.g., class divisions supposedly were disappearing with increasing postwar affluence; the Cold War notion of a “classless” society; Easton 2001). Yet, such arguments do not explain Warner’s initial intentions with respect to the dominance of class and rank. He too was American, and yet apparently was not caught up in the tenor of the times. Perhaps the 3 years he spent in Australia with Radcliffe-Brown and his later years with Elton Mayo at Harvard, together with the gravitas of the Hawthorne project, were more influential than has been recognized. Both of his mentors, in different ways, were highly sensitive to class and rank (see Gillespie 1991; Kuklick 1991), and each shaped Warner’s thinking during his formative years (Warner 1988). The Hawthorne Project was also a study in social class relations, cloaked in psycho-experimental terms, while failing to acknowledge the relevance of differences in class interests. Through the eyes of ersatz-elite British and Australian intellectuals, Warner may have perceived Yankee City in terms that others of his generation could not see.

Early Institutional Anthropology Version 2: Warner Finds His Voice

Although Warner’s attention in Yankee City was not focused initially upon work, occupations, and labor-management relations, disjunctive shifts in the fabric of community life due to the Great Depression eventually demanded that he devote an entire volume of the Yankee City Series to discussing and explaining these aspects of life in Newburyport, MA (see The Social System of the Modern Factory, Vol. V; Warner and Low 1947). In the course of this discussion, Warner had to relinquish the original rationale for selection of Yankee City as a research site (i.e., traditionalism, stability), and in the process he transformed his own research agenda, creating a unique voice for early institutional anthropology, one that still resonates today.

The unexpected turn of events that marked the beginning of Warner’s interest in the study of factories and factory work in the context of the Yankee City community (i.e., a highly crystallized form of institution in Durkheim’s terms) was a month-long strike in 1933 by all of the workers in the seven shoe-making factories of Yankee City. The strike was followed by the unionization of all of the factories, which in turn falsified Warner’s hypothesis regarding Yankee City society meeting crises without “revolutionary adap-
tations in social structure” – previously, conventional wisdom held that Yankee City workers could not be organized. The strike and unionization were truly unanticipated events. Warner and Low (1947:2) describe the critical incident:

On a cold March day in the worst year of the depression all the workers in all the factories of the principal industry of Yankee City walked out. They struck with little or no warning; struck with such impact that all the factories closed and no worker remained at his bench. Management had said their workers would never strike because the workers of Yankee City were sensible and dependable, and had proved by a long peaceful history that they would always stay on the job. Union men outside the city said the Yankee City workers would not strike because Yankee City had never been and could not be organized and, furthermore, the shoe workers of Yankee City were obstinate and ‘always stupid enough to play management’s game.’ Many of the workers had told us that there would be no strike ... But foreigners and Yankees of ten generations, men and women, very old and very young, Jews and Gentiles, Catholics and Protestants – the whole heterogeneous mass of workers left their benches and in a few hours wiped out most of the basic production from which Yankee City earned its living. Not only did they strike and soundly defeat management, but they organized themselves, joined an industrial union, and became some of its strongest members.

Warner and Low’s (1947) analysis of this strike and subsequent factory unionization consisted of three interrelated elements, some of which were facilitated by Warner’s initial conceptual framework, and others which had to be cobbled together from novel sources.\(^{15}\)

**Seeing with class, rank, and status**

The Yankee City methodology had the advantage of examining relationships among people identified as members of classes or ranks cross-cutting the entire community, while also following them into their varied statuses as members of numerous institutions that were not necessarily class-delimited. This methodology enabled Warner’s team to “see through” factory walls and to explore interactions among specific individuals of given classes and ranks (as well as people representing such classes/ranks), both at their places of employment, and when they were in other venues in town where they might hold statuses as members of churches, volunteer organizations, or other institutions. Warner’s concepts and methods enabled him to observe subtle shifts in the way specific individuals or classes of people interacted through their varying statuses over time, and therefore he was able to see how relationships among classes and statuses changed as a result of turmoil in the macroeconomic context (i.e., the Great Depression). As a result, he could connect what happened inside the factory with what happened in the community, and link patterns he observed to other phenomena at larger scales. Such understanding would not have been possible if Warner had been devoted to an organizational study in the shoe-making industry.

Warner noted that no union had ever been able to organize the Yankee City factories previously because factory workers of the “lower-lower” rank (“Riverbrookers” as they were called, because they lived along the river where they might also fish and dig for clams) were so poor that they could not sustain a strike and would always refuse to participate. Thus, even though they worked under the same difficult conditions as others in the factory, the “Riverbrookers” typically would not join their fellow workers in a strike.

At the same time, the members of the “upper” ranks who had founded the factories initially favored paternalistic policies that served the interests of Yankee City residents. The founders lived in the town, and in Calvinist fashion reinvested profits for the town’s benefit. They held positions of esteem in the community, and were members of many civic, philanthropic, and corporate boards, using their wealth and influence to enhance services and amenities for the entire community (e.g., libraries, hospitals). This meant that members of other classes who came to be associated with the factory owners through their statuses in Yankee City institutions, even if not members of the upper classes, supported the owners and would not condone a strike by factory workers.

The arrival of the Great Depression in the 1930s, however, accentuated the social and economic distance between wealthy and impoverished residents of Yankee City, and expanded the numbers of poor residents, whose situation became more desperate. Warner learned that some of the poor were forced to burn their furniture for warmth, and lived in fear of starvation. Anger turned into blame as the poorer residents blamed the wealthy for not spending more of their funds to help the needy or appeared insensitive to poorer residents’ concerns. For example, one factory was closed down and moved out of town because wealthy families in the neighborhood complained that it made too much noise. Women and youth had no prospects for work, although there were press reports of young women being forced into unsavory relationships with managers to attain employment.
Some workers believed that the wealthy deliberately (conspiratorially) engaged in practices designed to enrich themselves at the expense of others. One practice that was believed to be at the core of this "conspiracy" was the use of technology to replace factory labor. Factory payment policies also were indicted. Warner learned that workers across Yankee City’s seven shoe-making factories had three specific grievances related to unfair payment policies: (1) they were not paid enough to live on; (2) they were forced to wait all day in the factory for a few hours work; and (3) they had to make new kinds of shoes, but received no extra pay. Workers in different factories also discovered that employers paid varying rates for the same kind of shoes. These discoveries were made as workers talked to one another outside of the workplace. The workers in the factory that paid least staged a two- and one-half-week strike that netted them some gains. Warner noted that all of the workers took notice and then began to think about what would happen if they all went on strike together. Even the "Riverbrookers" started to listen and talk of unionizing. One “Riverbrooker” said (Warner and Low 1947:29):

We were always against the union but not this time; we’re with the union now.

When striking shoe factory operatives from nearby Harrington marched into town on March 10, 1933 and shouted for their brethren to join them, nothing happened. But the next day, the Shoe Workers Protective Union set-up a headquarters at a Yankee City hotel and proposed a city-wide strike, and on March 12, Yankee City workers began to leave their jobs. After that, hundreds of workers followed them. At a mass meeting, crews from various factories selected committees to represent them in the strike. Out of a seemingly amorphous mass (or, at least a mass that had not been organized in this fashion previously), a social structure emerged in preparation to join the Shoe Workers Protective Union (Warner and Low 1947:33).

Various institutions of Yankee City were instrumental in enabling support for the strike, or at least not shutting it down. The mayor of the town granted the workers the use of City Hall for meetings. Voluntary associations of the town lined up for or against the strike, based upon their memberships; the Chamber of Commerce was divided in its loyalty, with some of its members sympathetic to the strikers. The town newspaper attempted to play both sides of the struggle, afraid to lose business from the factory owners or the townsfolk. According to Warner, then-current owners of the factories, who now resided outside of Yankee City, called in the police to control the strikers, but since members of the police were friendly with those who worked inside the factories, not much “control” took place.

Many of the townsfolk who once seemed to admire the paternalistic owners of the shoe-making factories joined ranks with the working class laborers and supported the formation of an industrial union. Why had it happened, and more to the point, what had happened to the traditionally stable institutions and their mutually supportive relationships? These questions were the subject of Yankee City Series IV, The Social System of the Modern Factory. In this work, Warner acknowledged that the traditional classes, ranks, and statuses of Yankee City had been altered, and he focused on the occupations, labor-management relations, and work within corporations, trying to understand how the “Puritan tradition” was finally shattered.

**Occupational, technological, and economic history**

A classic element of Yankee City Series IV is Warner’s interweaving of several interconnected histories (prompted, perhaps, by Mills’ critique in 1942), beginning in the 1600s and continuing to the early-20th century, helping to contextualize change within Yankee City’s shoe-making factories and their relationships with larger-scale phenomena. These histories include the following (Warner and Low 1947:65):

- **Technology** of shoe-making, which evolved from a few simple, basic hand tools that accompanied craft work, to the development of machine applications and assembly-line mass production.
- **Division of labor** in the shoe-making industry, which emerged from the local cobbler role at first embedded within families, to highly skilled craftsmen supported by apprentices, to a factory-based, machine tending role.
- **Ownership and control** of the means of producing shoes, which started with families of the cobbler owning all the necessary means, and evolved to ownership of local shoe-making factories, and finally shifted to external control by distant capitalists.
- **Producer-consumer relations**, which evolved from family-based or locally oriented production and consumption, to regional ownership and sales, followed by national retail chains with the factory being only one source of supply.
- **Worker relations** changing from family and kin-based to informal relations of craftwork to the rise of industrialized unions.
- **Economic relations**, from simple consumption of goods produced by families or neighbors, to local hierarchies, to distant centers of financial dominance.
The complex interrelationship of technology, occupations, and economics that Warner relates in these six histories helps to explain the alteration of social alliances that were observed during the Great Depression in Yankee City, finally culminating in the formation of an industrial union across the seven shoe-making factories. Shoe-making had once been a craft-based occupation in which young apprentices gradually took their place as full-fledged masters of a trade that was respected within the town (Warner likens this institution to an age-grade formation in a traditional society). Advances in technology reduced the skill and pride of the craftsmen, leaving a less differentiated mass of unskilled workers who no longer could command respect for their knowledge. At the same time, the rise of national retail markets for shoes meant that local shoe-making factories became mere nodes in vast financial networks owned and controlled by financial interests that were no longer local, but were more likely to be based in large and distant cities. The managers of local factories might be related (kin) to the capitalists of old, but they were only the agents of the “real” owners, who held the actual (decision-making) power. Labor-management relationships inside the factory thus changed profoundly, from that of masters and apprentices, or local owners who resided in town and cared about “their” workers, to mere agents of distant owners with masses of undifferentiated and low-skilled machine operators.

In the meantime, the townsfolk no longer knew the distant factory owners personally, the latter being strangers and “foreigners” (the scare quotes denote an ethnic group that was not favored by some of Yankee City’s residents). Such “foreigners” were viewed with disdain. Said one lady from an old family:

> The men who run the shoe factories now don’t even live in town. They drive down in the morning, and spend the day making criticisms, then drive back at night, and no one knows how they live, how many automobiles or what kind of houses or how many children they have. They [the owners] don’t know who their employees are or anything about them. [Warner and Low 1947:140]

During the Great Depression, the relative impoverishment of shoe-making factory workers and other residents of the town, and the tendency to blame those who were perceived to be wealthy, including distant factory owners who no longer were investing their profits in Yankee City, encouraged alliances between factory workers and town residents against factory owners. Warner’s data points toward the role of racial and ethnic discrimination as a factor in these shifting alliances and antagonisms, yet also insists that race and ethnicity must be considered within the context of class.

Warner conceptualized the geographic expansion in scope and scale of macroeconomic networks and financial flows that enmeshed Yankee City as but one small, local node, and the disempowerment of the town as a result of its entrapment in what appeared to be the vast nationalization of great consumer and financial markets (see for diagram Warner and Low 1947:198, appendix 1). Meanwhile, the town was left behind, on the ground so to speak, as a feeble local feeder of low skilled workers, unable to move or to do anything much except be pushed down into greater impoverishment. Yankee City foreshadowed the fate of many small- and medium-sized towns in America that would be abandoned by industries and corporations whose managers and owners no longer cared what happened to them, and what that lack of caring would mean; first the labor movement, and then the rise of international, transnational, and global markets for labor and other commodities and the domestic aftermath of these phenomena.

**Symbolic analysis**

The power of Warner’s analysis in Yankee City Series IV cannot be appreciated without recognizing that Warner was a master of symbolism. From his study of the Murngin, Warner came to the point of view that local groups everywhere possess technical, social, and symbolic systems which are mutually interdependent (Warner 1930). In his study of Murngin society, Warner had examined the symbolic role of totems in the social integration of a clan. Symbolic analysis of “ancestors” also proved fruitful in explaining the outcome of the Yankee City strike. According to Warner, a form of mythology had emerged in relation to the memory of the original founders of Yankee City’s shoe-making factories. Since they were no longer alive, it was possible to attribute all manner of virtuous characteristics to them, especially if it served one’s interests. Warner and Low (1947:134) explain the importance of the ancestors:

> Three dead men played powerful, important, and, at times, decisive roles in the outcome of the strike. Paradoxically, although they were former owners and managers of the factories, their influence materially aided the strikers and helped defeat management. Throughout the struggle, the owners, managers, and most of Yankee City continued to recognize the great wisdom of these dead owners and managers and always bowed to their judgments. The authority of these men accordingly was constantly quoted by each side to gain approval for what it said and did and to stigmatize the words and actions of its antago-
nists. The peacemakers quoted the deeds and sayings of the three as parables and precepts to force the warring parties to come to agreement. It is unlikely that the actual behavior of these three men corresponded to the symbols into which they had been fabricated by those who remembered them after their deaths. But it is certain that the values inherent in them as collective representatives ordered and controlled much of the thinking of everyone and greatly contributed to the workers’ winning the strike.

Those who wished to portray the current factory owners and their agents as less than generous and worthy of blame created a heroic narrative of the dead, making certain that no living mortal could ever live up to their imagined stature. In this way, the memory (actual or manufactured) could influence what happened to the living (a form of analysis Warner learned when he was studying the Murngin).

The original factory founders were envisioned to be wise men whose decisions usually had proven to be correct, and they were quoted often as a means to stigmatize the workers’ antagonists. Local managers, even those who were kin to the founders, were made to appear weak in comparison to the giants of the past. These managers were unable to lead in the shadow of their glorious ancestors, either because they did not hold real power, or because they had been symbolically weakened by their foes.

For example, a story was told repeatedly during the strike about one of the founders, Mr. Pierce, meeting one of the cutters, Sam Taylor, on the stairs. Sam Taylor said, “Good morning, Mr. Pierce,” and Mr. Pierce said, “Sam, you went to school with me, you called me Mr. Pierce on the stairs just now. You always used to call me William, and I want you to continue to call me William just as you always did.” After that, whenever there was trouble in the cutting room, Sam would go to William’s office and they would talk about it and work it out (Warner and Low:1947:139).

In comparison, Mr. Pierce’s son, Cabot Pierce, did not receive much respect. A shoe worker remarked:

Cabot Pierce has no brains. He has been to about six schools, but he didn’t learn anything. His father took him in, but he couldn’t seem to amount to much. He used to take the men away from their work to play cards with him. When his father discovered it he scolded the men but didn’t say anything to Cabot. I think he won’t last long on this job. [Warner and Low 1947:145]

Schools play interesting roles in these symbolic tales of the living and the dead, revealing the interrelationships of class and status, as Warner saw them. In the first instance, the deceased ancestor (i.e., factory founder) went to a local school with one of his workers. Although they were members of different classes, the two men also held statues in the same local educational institution when they were boys, placing them on a first name basis in the factory as well. The symbolic lesson is that dead capitalists were such great men that they were able to over look class differences in favor of local status bonds, and this enhanced productivity (thereby enhancing the prestige of the ancestors). In the second instance, the founder’s son Cabot (who is living) attended several schools (some probably distant) but membership in such schools was not shared with anyone in Yankee City (thus, no status bonds were forged). However, it is indicated that later Cabot sought to forge bonds within the factory through attempts to play cards with the men, but these bonds are scoffed, because they only amounted to recreational activity for him. In other words, living capitalists are such weak men that their extensive schooling does the factory no good. The latter instance also symbolizes the situation of the distant factory owners, who “do no good” for the town with their profits.

**Warner’s Brand of Early Institutionalism and Work in the Context of Late Capitalism**

Although the Yankee City Series had not focused initially upon work in a capitalist context, the rise of the union movement as a response to shifts in relations among classes was a logical outgrowth of Warner’s interests, and this empirical phenomenon forced Warner to explore several work-related institutions as a means to explain the disruption of his Yankee City idyll (e.g., the division of labor, ownership and control of production, worker relationships, producer-consumer relationships). Some of his discoveries regarding work under capitalism (e.g., break in the skill hierarchy) have become classic features of management literature, so fundamental that few recognize they were discovered by an anthropologist.

Warner witnessed the rise of a new (within context) institution in Yankee City, the industrial union, and the forces that brought forth the power of mass unionization in America. The union was an institution that mediated the opposing interests of class (the same theme Warner faced at Hawthorne, and for him, still the primary institution). The union arose as a response to institutional change (i.e., shifts in relations among classes, such as stronger affinity among the lower ranks, and greater antagonism between lower and upper ranks; and/or changes in class structure, such as the relative reduction in rank of former “upper classes” as distant capitalists took power over them). Warner explicitly acknowledged that the power of
unions was related to changes in capitalism that altered class relationships not only at places of work, but within the whole of society as well. His work also pointed toward the crucial role of racial and ethnic biases that forged new class alliances prior to World War II.

Of particular importance was Warner’s recognition of advances in the development of capitalism that transformed Yankee City from the isolated community that he once thought it was to a node in a complex web of commercial and financial exchanges, no longer under the control of local peoples. It was this process, reflecting an expansion in the scope and scale of the capitalist economy – from the local, to the regional and national levels, complemented by the rise of large urban financial and political centers – that Warner later referred to as the emergence of a “great society” (Warner 1962). By this, he meant not a society that “wages war on poverty” (Lynden Johnson style), nor a classical liberal society (in Adam Smith’s sense [1776] 1994:745), but one whose economy and politics are organized and coordinated on a “great” or grand scale (i.e., translocally). Warner’s ability to carefully record the influence of such rising economic and political systems upon local communities and institutions during a time of economic crisis was an important achievement for early institutional anthropology.

One of Warner’s most original contributions to early institutional theory was his insight that institutional agents creatively manipulate narratives, memories, and images of dead ancestors as symbolic representations of their specific interests, and juxtapose these to contrasting projections of the living in order to heighten solidarity and/or antagonism, emphasize boundaries, and otherwise gain advantage in contexts of work under capitalism. This particular aspect of institutionalism had not been emphasized by Durkheim and could be considered distinctly anthropological, as it relates more or less directly to the “comparative” aspect of social science that Warner was keen to pursue after his work among the Murngin.

Another of Warner’s achievements was to transcend the organization-bound thinking and practices of the Human Relations School. Warner understood that formal organizations (i.e., those created for an explicit purpose) are interpenetrated by myriad other institutions (e.g., class, family, and neighborhood), and the latter have a profound influence on human beings, their motivation, thinking, and action. People participate not only in formal work organizations, but simultaneously in kin-based, religious, political, and voluntary institutions, and the past, present, and future of these forms are simultaneously interacting with each other at all times. These were advances in understanding why work organizations and their workers changed in the ways Warner observed.

The Yankee City Series was in many ways more sophisticated than the Hawthorne Project, where the researchers’ encasement in a single organization facilitated an ideological interpretation of findings by dominant personalities linked to a politically prominent point of view (i.e., Mayo, the Rockefeller Foundation, and welfare capitalism as practiced at Western Electric). Although still under the influence of Mayo et al., Warner circumvented their doctrine by taking his own empirical findings seriously, and following them to their logical conclusion. In doing so, Warner “problematized” the changes in people’s lives by focusing on turbulent events taking place within the local community, and then altered his research agenda to place greater attention on the social problems identified in his research. In this way, Warner represents an anthropologist who integrated both fundamental inquiry with a focus on critical problems and issues, a “third way” that was neither “pure” nor “applied,” but creatively combined both of these dimensions (Stokes 1997).

Warner’s inquiry suggests that understanding of what is going on in a formal organization requires an intellectual scope that transcends the organization per se, something that is difficult to do if one is too closely aligned with or reigned-in by an organization and its requirements and constraints (e.g., funding contracts, nondisclosure agreements, access negotiations). Anyone who works “for” or “with” an organization as an employee or a consultant will acknowledge this reality, and it is one of the contradictions we face as anthropologists practicing in organizations; they sometimes do not provide sufficient scope or flexibility necessary to understand, or speak out freely on, our subject matter. While there may be no clear-cut solution for each and every case, the anthropology of work in organizational contexts as a field should take stock of the situation and ponder the future.

The new institutionalism (Scott 2008), which encompasses contemporary epistemology, theory, and methodology from multiple social science disciplines in the study of institutions and organizations (although the various perspectives are not in agreement, and have no logical coherence at this point), represents an opportunity for anthropologists to examine work in the context of late capitalism, more holistically and with higher degrees of intellectual freedom than has been the case when studies of work are set within the context of organizations alone. New institutionalism represents the emergence of a field of study that is more resonant with anthropological history and literature than the preceding domain of organization theory. Many of the institutions that retain or are expanding their influence on work in late capitalism (e.g., family, policy and law, NGOs) also exist in “exotic” societies that anthropologists may
prefer to focus their attention upon (Shankman and Ehlers 2000). An institutional approach to the study of work in late capitalism is a natural point of entry for anthropologists to gain an edge in perceiving and attempting to understand the changing nature of work in 21st century society. No discipline as yet has a lock on new institutionalism; indeed, it is a quintessentially interdisciplinary domain. There are indications that other disciplines may be reluctant to inquire into the so-called “informal” side of institutional structures, rules, regulations, norms, and schemas (Menard and Shirley 2005). Anthropology, on the other hand, has the epistemological, methodological, and ethical depth and orientation requisite to formation of its own niche in this emerging domain.

**New Institutional Anthropology: Constructing a Discipline**

If the anthropologies of work in late capitalism were to contemplate a turn toward new institutionalism, what might they look like? One potential candidate could be a recent ethnography by Caitlin Zaloom (2006), entitled *Out of the Pits*, a study of futures traders in Chicago and London. This study focuses on the transformation of the Chicago traders’ work, from the physical form of open out-cry trading in the pits at the Chicago Board of Trade to more technologically dependent electronic trading, which has disassembled in many ways a work community and the social bonds and ethics that held it together.

This excellent ethnography is both institutionally and problem oriented, merging disciplinary problems with the problems of others. It places a historically grounded work community within the context of a situated social and geographical place (Chicago is the primary focus), taking a broadly historical and institutional approach to its subject matter. The study envisions relationships among its primary occupational community and other institutions, such as various financial markets, the farmers and ranchers of the Midwest, the trading houses of Europe, the very concept of financial risk, which is in itself an institution of the cognitive kind, while also taking care not to lose sight of the futures traders themselves as individual persons with meaningful lives. A number of Warner’s innovations – seeing with institutions that cross-cut contemporary society (such as financial markets), examining occupational, economic and technological history, and incorporating symbolic systems (e.g., architecture), all are features of this outstanding work. Further, some of the key issues facing the discipline of anthropology – such as globalization, technological transformation, morality and ethics of persons working in business, and the need for multisited work – are squarely faced.

Zaloom relates her experience of apprenticing herself to Chicago pit traders, and what she learned from this experience about the relationship between face-to-face social relationships and financial risk. One of her many counter-intuitive insights was that local pit traders took on more-or-less certain financial *losses* in order to establish themselves as worthy members of the trading floor community. An iconic aspect of the architecture of the trading “pit” is an ascending staircase arranged in an octagonal shape, upon which the traders arranged themselves to make their trades. One could not move up the stairs to gain a better vantage point of the trading floor until one was “accepted” by the other traders and allowed to ascend physically, and part of this acceptance was the willingness to take on larger financial risks, which included losses. Some losses were taken to establish reciprocal bonds with larger brokers. A smaller local trader would deliberately accept a larger broker’s loss, in hopes of establishing a social bond with him and later gaining a boon from him in the form of a favorable trade. This was part of the social network within the pit, and also part of what “made the market” (i.e., contributed to a specialized effect that improved the efficiency or liquidity of the futures market in the local area) and claimed to be Chicago’s advantage as a trading center. One may think of the traders as men who make a lot of money and live large, but Zaloom’s ethnography shows the downside of the losses traders must face on a daily basis, and the failures that also come out of the pits and must be accepted by these men and their families (virtually all of Zaloom’s traders were men; for an institutional view of women on Wall Street, see Fischer 2004).

With the rise of electronic trading came the decline of social rituals in the trading pits, and with it the special morality such trading engendered. Chicago futures traders had claimed that face-to-face trading was a way to sense and stop financial disaster. Would global finance capital have collapsed if it had not gone electronic? That may be a bridge too far, given that trades often originated in other financial institutions where the complex “innovations” such as collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps were born (see Tett 2009), and it is doubtful that pit traders would have been able to anticipate or halt those phenomena. Yet the issues framed by Zaloom’s work, particularly the alteration of social relations and ethics by electronic media and its manifestations, are highly relevant for our time.

Zaloom notes that she “problematized” the shift from open out-cry trading to electronic trading as this was the traders’ problem, and she embraced it as her own. Once she had come to know them, she did not see an analysis of them, their work, or their institution necessarily as a work of cultural criticism. Her re-
research is fundamentally ethnographic and empathetic, while also being historically grounded, broadly contextualized within contemporary society, and potentially a turn toward new institutional anthropology.

Conclusion

Warner’s pathway from Australia to Hawthorne to Yankee City and beyond shows one way in which anthropological sensibilities may interrogate the study of work in the context of capitalism through the lens of contemporary institutions. While Warner was a pioneer, his approach was also classic in the sense that its fundamental elements remain relevant today, including his commitment to an engaged anthropology.

From the basis of the Yankee City study, Warner became one of the best known anthropologists and public intellectuals in America, and was highly sought after as a distinguished author and lecturer. Yet, because he was something of an iconoclast, focusing on subjects that were not popular in anthropology or in American policy circles, his work has not been much studied in our discipline.

This discussion of Warner’s contributions to anthropology and early institutionalism is intended to suggest that his work is more significant than has been appreciated and should be read and studied more widely.18

Notes

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented as the Conrad Arensberg Award Lecture, entitled “Anthropologies of Work in Late Capitalism: Constructing a Discipline for Warner’s Quadrant,” at the Society for the Anthropology of Work, 107th Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, San Francisco, CA, November 21, 2008. The author would like to acknowledge contributions to the manuscript gained from critical commentary by Lawrence Busch, Douglas Caulkins, and Michael Chibnik, and research and bibliographic assistance from Maria Raviele and Christine LaBond.


4 Unlike Warner, who believed that social class was the core institution integrating modern society, Arensberg viewed the community itself as a master institution, the key to understanding society, and perhaps the most important model of culture (Comitas 1999).

5 The BWOR also yielded the discovery of informal organization (i.e., social structures spontaneously constructed by organization members, not planned by management), and it probably was one of the first social science research projects that utilized an early form of network analysis (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1934).

6 Eventually, as Warner began the Yankee City Series, four-fifths of his salary and all of his research expenses were covered by Mayo’s Rockefeller grant (Gillespie 1991:156).

7 Dickson believed that a special group rate system may have been a significant factor in sustaining high productivity in one of the early phases of the Hawthorne Project (the Relay Assembly Test Room experiment).

8 Although Warner knew and was influenced intellectually both by Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski, as well as Lowie and other important founding figures in anthropology, his association with R-B was stronger at the start of his professional career, not only due to his fieldwork in Australia, which coincided with R-B’s appointment as a Professor at the University of Sydney (Warner’s fieldwork in Australia took place from 1926 to 1929, while R-B was a Professor in Sydney from 1925 to 1931), but also as a result of R-B’s appointment at the University of Chicago from 1931 to 1937 (Warner was appointed to the faculty in 1935). His association with Malinowski took place when M lectured at Berkeley during the summer of 1926, when Warner was a graduate student there. R-B decamped from Chicago for an appointment at Oxford in 1937, leaving Warner to evolve on his own (although the two men maintained correspondence for at least a decade). It should be borne in mind that Warner was American, born in California, and he conducted no part of his formal training in Great Britain.

9 This innovative company became the first in the world to engage anthropological methods and ideas (e.g., symbolism) in consumer research and marketing for individual companies, conducting the earliest qualitative study ever undertaken at Coca Cola (Easton 2001).

10 The most institutionalized were the “morphological facts” constituting the “substratum of collective life,” such as the distribution of society over the earth’s surface, the communications network, architectural designs (this grouping seems to combine what we might refer to as material and demographic phenomena). Next were institutionalized norms such as legal and moral rules, financial systems, and religious ideation (combining structural and ideological phenomena). Finally were the least “crystallized,” the social currents, which may be represented by opinions, movements, or “outbreaks” in a public gathering (Luxes 1982:5).

11 Radcliffe-Brown avowed that he was the first Briton to accede to the epistemological orientation expressed by Durkheim in *Annee Sociologique*, reflecting the French approach to sociology. Durkheim held that social phenomena such as myths and rituals should not be explained by speculating about the intellectual ideas which first gave rise to them, nor should they be explained psychologically, by invoking overt motivations of individuals taking part in the social drama. Rather, the explanation should involve currently operative social entities that have the same epistemological status as the phenomenon in question, and which would elucidate the function of the phenomenon within the broader frame-
work of the society. This was the method that R-B employed in his study of the Andaman Islanders, and what later became integral to structural-functionalist theory (Langham 1981:267–270).

12 The kinship system of Australian tribes had recognizable statuses, although rank was not present (according to Warner 1941:786). A society with classes could have a larger number of equal statuses at any given class level.

13 The influence of methodological constructs from the Hawthorne Project in the Yankee City Series should not be surprising, given that Mayo’s Rockefeller grant was supporting Warner during his early years in Newburyport, MA, and that reciprocal influences between the two projects were taking place during periodic seminars at Harvard (Warner 1988).

14 These factories were owned by a number of different companies, but the workers went on strike together.

15 Evidence for Warner and Low’s (1947) study of the strike was collected during two periods of field work, one in 1930 to 1935, and the second in 1945 before the publication of Yankee City Series Vol. IV (Warner and Low 1947:5–6), during which Warner validated his arguments and collected additional data to support them.

16 Yankee City Series IV includes quotations by Yankee City residents regarding then-current factory owners’ ethnicity that today would be considered unprintable (140–150). That Warner and Low (1947) did not comment upon or contextualize these quotations is unfortunate, and reflects the 1930s and 1940s environment in the United States, which embedded racial, ethnic, and religious prejudice (see for another example Glass 2009). Yet, the inclusion of such material without comment may also be one of the reasons that Warner’s work, and particularly Yankee City Volume IV, faded from view after World War II, when Americans became more self-conscious regarding racial and ethnic discrimination.

17 Clearly, Warner’s view of Yankee City as an ideal traditional community was inaccurate from the start. Even during the mid-19th century, remote towns in the West were connected to major trading centers such as Chicago by commercial and financial exchanges (see Cronon 1991). I owe this observation to Lawrence Busch.

18 The appreciation of Warner’s writing must be carefully contextualized, and some of the implicit racial overtones in sections of Vol. IV should be examined further and criticized as warranted.

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From Polychronicity to Multitasking: The Warping of Time Across Disciplinary Boundaries

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Abstract

Anthropologist Edward T. Hall’s contrast between polychronic and monochronic orientations toward time has stimulated research in the business and management sciences. While Hall’s approach to time is ethnographic, the business and management sciences measure polychronicity with a survey instrument, the Inventory of Polychronic Values (IPV). An examination of the IPV and the results it has yielded, however, indicate that it is not measuring polychronicity in the ethnographic sense. The IPV remains firmly within monochronic time and thus fails to seriously engage cultural difference. The transformation of the ethnographic meaning of polychronic to a conceptual one raises methodological and analytical questions of general relevance to the cross-cultural study of work.

Keywords: polychronic time, monochronic time, cross-cultural management, cross-cultural business, distributed teams, virtual teams, computer-mediated communication

Introduction

In the world of business and management, Edward T. Hall has emerged as resident anthropologist. Widely cited for his attention to proxemics, paralinguistics, and the contrast between high context and