

# Learning about Democracy in Africa: Awareness, Performance, and Experience

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*Conventional views of African politics imply that Africans' political opinions are based either on enduring cultural values or their positions in the social structure. In contrast, we argue that Africans form attitudes to democracy based upon what they learn about what it is and does. This learning hypothesis is tested against competing cultural, institutional, and structural theories to explain citizens' demand for democracy (legitimation) and their perceived supply of democracy (institutionalization) with data from 12 Afrobarometer attitude surveys conducted between 1999 and 2001. A multilevel model that specifies and estimates the impacts of both individual- and national-level factors provides evidence of learning from three different sources. First, people learn about the content of democracy through cognitive awareness of public affairs. Second, people learn about the consequences of democracy through direct experience of the performance of governments and (to a lesser extent) the economy. Finally, people draw lessons about democracy from national political legacies.*

On what basis do Africans form attitudes toward democracy? Conventional interpretations of African politics assume that people form their political opinions based on either enduring cultural values or fixed social circumstances. Analysts rarely consider that people may choose whether or not to support political regimes on the basis of what they learn about their content and consequences.

By probing the origins of mass attitudes to democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, we extend the analysis of public opinion into understudied contexts and also contribute to an understanding of regime consolidation. Public attitudes toward democracy shape the prospects for regime consolidation through the process of political legitimation. Democracies become consolidated only when, in Linz and Stepan's incisive turn of phrase, all significant elites and an overwhelming proportion of citizens see democracy as "the only game in town" (1996a, 15). In other words, a sustainable democracy requires citizens who *demand* democracy, a feature that can be measured in public attitude surveys.

But democratic consolidation is also widely explained as a consequence of the capacity of political institutions to *supply* democracy (e.g., Colomer 2001; Fukuyama 2005; Grindle 2000; Rose and Shin 2000). Democracy, above all, is a system of rules and procedures by which leaders, groups, and parties compete for power, and in which free and equal people elect representatives to make binding decisions. A consolidated democracy is one in which these arrangements develop into permanent, consistent, and autonomous institutions governed by justiciable rules (Karl 1990). "Institutionalization" proceeds to the extent that these structures effectively and impartially fulfill their functions, whether to make laws, oversee the executive, prosecute criminals, or deliver public services (Huntington 1968).

As well as measuring legitimation, public opinion data also offer a valuable vantage point on institutionalization, a critical element of which is whether citizens believe that their political institutions *produce an acceptable degree of democracy*. No matter how well or badly international aid donors or academic think tanks

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rate the extent of democracy in a given country, this form of regime will only consolidate if ordinary people believe that democracy is being supplied. For the most part, people are good judges of qualities such as the availability of freedom, the fairness of elections, and the extent of democracy. It is possible, of course, that uncritical citizens may be overly generous toward underperforming institutions, or conversely that inflated popular expectations outstrip the capacities of a country's political institutions. But in either case, citizens' perceptions of the supply of democracy will be more salient to democracy's actual prospects than any objective scores ratings compiled by experts.

In sum, democracy has a low probability of breakdown where two conditions are met, namely that large majorities of citizens demand democracy as their preferred political regime, and judge that their leaders have internalized and follow democracy's institutional rules. Aggregate indicators of the popular demand for democracy and mass perceptions of its supply (as well as trends in these indicators over time) should therefore provide insight into the prospects for the consolidation of democracy. Following Przeworski et al. (1996), democracy is consolidated when there is little or no probability of reversal or breakdown (also see Schedler 1998). This article tests theories about the microlevel processes that underlie and account for these aggregate dispositions. Why do Africans demand democracy and how do they judge whether they are being supplied with it?

## Data

Competing theories of attitude formation are tested against an original set of public opinion data known as the Afrobarometer. Round 1 of the Afrobarometer was conducted between mid-1999 and mid-2001 in 12 sub-Saharan African countries that had introduced a measure of democratic and market reforms: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in Southern Africa; Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria in West Africa; and Tanzania and Uganda in East Africa. The findings for each country are based on nationally representative random, stratified, area-probability cluster samples (a minimum of 1,200 respondents) and a total of 21,531 face-to-face, local-language interviews using a standardized questionnaire instrument.<sup>1</sup> While the findings accurately portray each country's adult population, the Afrobarometer does not represent sub-Saharan Africa as a whole:

it undersamples countries with official languages other than English; it ignores unreformed autocracies; and it does not take account of countries embroiled in civil war. With these caveats, the Afrobarometer casts light on popular attitudes to democracy among Africans, a subject on which almost nothing is otherwise known.

## Measuring Demand for and Supply of Democracy

In a transitional society, popular demand for democracy (or legitimation) takes the form of a choice between competing regime types with which people have some degree of familiarity. Thus, survey questions should preferably not ask people how much they like democracy in the abstract (for example, through agreement or disagreement with one-sided Likert scale statements). Instead, they should offer respondents realistic choices between democracy and its alternatives. In this article, a battery of such questions measures *demand for democracy*. The first component is a question widely used in cross-national research (e.g., Dalton 1999; Lagos 2001) to track preference for democracy that asks: "Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? (A) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government; (B) In certain situations, a nondemocratic government can be preferable; or (C) To people like me, it doesn't matter what form of government we have."

But while it is necessary for committed democrats to profess a preference for democracy, it is not sufficient. Respondents may have differing ideas of what democracy actually is, limiting the comparability of any two responses. Or their ideas may differ from those of the analyst, limiting our ability to infer the meaning of the response. Democrats must therefore go beyond paying lip service to democracy; they must also reject real-world alternative regimes. To measure these attitudes, we adapt a scale developed by Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer (1998) and remind respondents that "our current system of governing with regular elections and more than one political party" is not the only one this country has ever had. Noting that "some people say we would be better off if we had a different system of government," respondents are then asked to approve or disapprove a range of nondemocratic alternative regimes. Specifically, the scale items ask about one-party rule, military government, and presidential dictatorship, all forms of government with which most Africans are familiar and to which they can form experience-based responses. In this formulation, a committed democrat is someone who *both* believes that

<sup>1</sup>For further details on sampling and fieldwork, see Appendix B.

democracy is always preferable *and* rejects all three forms of authoritarian rule.<sup>2</sup>

We next measure the perceived *supply of democracy* (or institutionalization). To restate: public opinion is used not as a proxy in lieu of conceivably better measures of the institutional supply of democracy. Rather, in the final analysis, citizen *beliefs* about whether their institutions deliver democracy are what ultimately matters. The Afrobarometer measures the extent of democracy by asking people whether “the way” their country is governed is, “on the whole,” “a full democracy,” “a democracy with minor problems,” “a democracy with major problems,” or “not a democracy.” The second component is the commonplace measure of satisfaction with democracy, which asks people how satisfied they are with “the way that democracy works” in their country.<sup>3</sup> In this formulation, a citizen is supplied with democracy if he or she *both* believes that the country is completely or mostly democratic *and* is very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy works there.<sup>4</sup>

## Demand and Supply in Africa: Findings

Democracy enjoys a significant base of popular support in the 12 African countries surveyed circa 2000. More than two out of three citizens (70%) say that they prefer democracy to other forms of government. A majority expresses

<sup>2</sup>Factor analysis (Maximum Likelihood) extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.01) which explains 50.1% of the common variance with a reliability coefficient (Cronbach's Alpha) = .66. The item loadings on the common factor are the following: reject one-man rule (.76), reject military rule (.65), reject one-party rule (.58), and prefer democracy (.30). These results are sufficiently robust across countries (see Appendix A).

<sup>3</sup>While satisfaction with democracy (SWD) has been criticized because it blurs distinctions between regime and incumbent support (Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2002; but see the rejoinder by Anderson and Guillory n.d.), the real confusion stems from mistaken attempts to use SWD as part of some generalized notion of system support that forces together regime preferences (legitimacy, or demand) and regime evaluations (satisfaction, a component of supply). Once one explicitly distinguishes these concepts, SWD is a defensible measure of satisfaction with what the regime supplies, and as such, measures a crucial part of a loop in which system “outputs” such as political and economic goods feed back and shape “inputs.” For corroborating empirical evidence of the distinction between democratic preferences and satisfaction in seven new democracies in Asia, South America, and southern Europe, see Gunther, Montero, and Torcal (2006).


<sup>4</sup>The perceived extent of democracy and satisfaction with democracy are sufficiently correlated (Pearson's  $r = .45$ ) to form a reliable (Alpha = .63) two-item average construct of perceived supply of democracy. These results are sufficiently robust across countries (see Appendix A).

support in 11 out of 12 Afrobarometer countries, with Botswana, Tanzanians, and Nigerians being most supportive (above 80%). This distribution marks a solid base of pro-democracy sentiment in post-transition regimes on a continent that is usually held to lag behind the rest of the world in indicators of democracy and development. The mean preference score for democracy for the Afrobarometer falls between the mean scores for older democracies in Western Europe (80% in the 1990s), and newer democracies in Latin America (59% in 2000) and East Asia (56% in 2001–2003) (Chu 2003; Dalton 1999; Lagos 2001). As in Latin America and East Asia, however, cross-country variance in country scores is wider than in Western Europe, suggesting an African region whose populations have yet to agree fully about the virtues and vices of democracy (ranging from 39% in Lesotho to 83% in Botswana).

But does a professed preference for a regime Africans understand as democracy signify a preference for the practices commonly associated with democratic rule, such as civilian leadership, elected government, multiparty competition, and an executive restrained by the legislature? Put another way, does preference for democracy mean a firm rejection of nondemocratic alternatives that have often enjoyed the label of “democracy” in Africa, such as a “people’s democracy” under the enlightened guidance of a dictatorial strongman or a vanguard party? Based on the responses to each item, as many or more people reject various forms of nondemocratic rule than prefer democracy. Eight of out 10 Africans (81%) repudiate military rule and presidential “one-man” dictatorship (80%). The proportion that rejects one-party rule (69%) is statistically indistinguishable from the proportion that says democracy is always preferable. Several decades after political independence, citizens in many African countries appear to have arrived at the conclusion that government by military or civilian strongmen is no longer tolerable.

However, these sizeable proportions overestimate the degree of consistent opposition to authoritarian alternatives. Many Africans pick and choose among varying types of authoritarian rule and are willing to live with some but not others. When the proportions that disavow *all* alternatives to democracy are recalculated, just 58% of Afrobarometer respondents reject all three forms. Thus, many of those who agree that “democracy is preferable to any other form of government” are willing to tolerate one or more forms of nondemocratic rule. And recalculating the proportions that *both* say democracy is preferable *and* reject all three authoritarian alternatives finds that only a minority (48%) can be labeled as “committed democrats.” This result warrants a sober assessment of the depth of democratic legitimacy in Africa.

**FIGURE 1** The Consolidation of Political Regimes, 12 African Countries



Turning to the perceived supply of democracy, the Africans interviewed by the Afrobarometer have a relatively realistic impression of recent political progress. Overall, less than one-quarter (23%) say that their own country is fully democratic. Added together with the 27% who say that it is “a democracy with minor problems,” one-half of all respondents rate their country as relatively democratic. Another one-fifth (21%) feel that while their political system is still a democracy, it has “major problems,” and an additional 10% bluntly tell us that their country is “not a democracy.”<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, almost six in 10 are very (21%) or somewhat (37%) satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. Combining these measures reveals that 45% of respondents feel fully supplied with democracy, meaning that they both perceive their country to be acceptably democratic and are relatively satisfied with how democracy works.

While a fuller discussion of cross-national variations in response lies beyond the scope of this article (see Afrobarometer Network 2002), Figure 1 depicts how each of the 12 Afrobarometer surveys (Botswana) are there both relatively high levels of democratic legitimacy and relatively high levels of perceived democratic institutionalization. Other than that, we simply point to the quite substantial cross-

national variations in the distribution of demand and supply, an issue to which we now turn.<sup>6</sup>

## Explaining Demand for and Perceived Supply of Democracy

Conventional accounts of African politics provide a standard set of explanations that would account for individual preferences for and evaluations of democracy. Attitudes are generally held to emanate from individuals’ deep values and orientations, their position in the social structure, or their degree of incorporation into (or marginalization from) the polity. In contrast, we argue that attitudes result from both individual and national differences in what citizens learn from short-, medium-, and long-term experience about what democracy *is* and what it *does*.

### Cultural Values?

At the macro level, the theory of political culture argues that cross-national differences in aggregated individual attitudes result from long-standing differences in norms and values, orientations that are embedded in

<sup>5</sup>Across these 12 countries, aggregated popular evaluations of the extent of democracy are strongly correlated with Freedom House status of freedom scores (Pearson’s  $r = .70$ ).

<sup>6</sup>“Country” explains 11.4% ( $\text{Eta}^2$ ) of the individual-level variance in demand for democracy ( $p = .000$ ), and 9.5% ( $\text{Eta}^2$ ) of its perceived supply ( $p = .000$ ).

national or ethnic cultures and transmitted across generations through socialization (e.g., Almond and Verba 1963; Eckstein 1988; Inglehart 1988). Thus, at the micro level, it would predict that an individual's regime preferences and evaluations would be shaped in important ways by his or her personal norms and values.

But which norms or values? We operationalize and test five dimensions of orientations widely identified as salient by analysts of African politics. First, scholars have suggested that an emphasis on communal good over individual destiny leads Africans to think and act as passive, deferential, and dependent subjects of external forces rather than as agents, or democratic citizens, with some degree of control over their lives or the wider polity (Chazan 1993; Etounga-Manguelle 2000; Mamdani 1996). Thus we measure the extent to which Africans have developed (1) a sense of *individual responsibility* for personal well-being and (2) a sense of *risk tolerance*.

Second, democracy presumes at least some prior agreement on the identity of the political community that is to govern itself (Rustow 1970). Yet colonial mapmakers divided and recombined Africa's homogenous local communities into heterogeneous national societies. Scholars of African politics argue that Africans' putatively primordial social identities have resisted post-independence initiatives to construct new overarching identities, thus denying young democracies the necessary "political glue" and turning every element of political contestation into a zero-sum, group-based conflict (Connor 1990; Horowitz 1985). Thus, we measure Africans' sense of (3) *national identity*. And because people with strong, group-based identities may be more likely to develop antipathies to "others" and less likely to accept a democracy that necessarily includes competing groups (Gibson and Gouws 2003), we measure the extent to which people still define themselves in terms of a (4) *traditional* (based on language, ethnicity, or hometown) *versus modern social identity* (such as class or occupation).

Finally, a parochial rural culture may limit the radius of interpersonal trust to the immediate scope of the village, neighborhood, or clan, reducing civic cooperation and participation and creating bonding forms of social capital rather than the bridging type seen as necessary to plural democracies (Putnam 1993). Accordingly, we measure respondents' degree of (5) *interpersonal trust* in their fellow citizens.

### Social Structure?

While the behavioral literature on public opinion has moved on, many scholars of Africa and the developing

world are still influenced by an older approach that holds that people's values, preferences, and behaviors are a function of their material, demographic, or other life circumstances. Modernization theory in particular focuses on the factors that account for social mobility and, in turn, promote the adoption of progressive mass attitudes (Inkeles and Smith 1974; Pye 1990).

To explain Africa's lack of democratic progress, scholars routinely point to factors such as widespread poverty, small middle classes, and a population that is disproportionately young and rural (where people—especially women—remain repressed by customary law, traditional authority, and patriarchy), all of which limit the size of the public with a stake in stable democratic rule (Mamdani 1996; Niemi and Barkan 1987). Others point to Africa's comparatively high levels of ethnic fractionalization and division of society into numerically and/or politically dominant versus minor social groups (Du Toit 1995; Easterly and Levine 1997; Horowitz 1985). Thus, we measure each respondent's (1) *class position*, extent of (2) *lived poverty*, (3) *age*, (4) *rural/urban* status, and (5) *gender*, and whether or not belong he or she to a (6) numerically *dominant ethnic group*.

### Institutional Influences?

A third theoretical approach argues that mass attitudes to democracy are a *consequence* of the organizing principles of formal and informal institutions and the degree to which people have been incorporated into a modern democratic polity. Pro-democratic skills and attitudes are learned through membership in civic or religious organizations (Cohen and Rogers 1992; McDonough, Shin, and Moisés 1998; Putnam 1993). Satisfaction with the democratic system might also be enhanced by partisan identification, especially with the winning party (Anderson and Guillory 1997). Repeated participation in various democratic processes can also deepen a person's skills, interest, and efficacy and can build support for democracy (Finkel, Sabatini, and Bevis 2000). Thus, we measure whether respondents are (1) *members of religious or civic organizations*; have developed a sense of (2) *partisan identification*; and whether they (3) *identify with the winning party*. We also measure respondents' previous records of participation by asking them whether they (4) *voted in the most recent election*, (5) *took part in forms of political participation between elections* (such as *working for a candidate or political party, attending election rallies or community meetings or joining with others to raise issues, or contacting elected or informal leaders*), or (6) *took part in a demonstration*.

## Performance Evaluations?

A very different theoretical approach assumes that people demand democracy and evaluate its supply based pragmatically on the actual performance of democratic institutions and leaders. Whereas political culture theory argues that democracy works because people possess democratic norms, rational choice theory says people develop attachments to democracy because democracy works (Evans and Whitefield 1995). Individual behavior is purposive and considered, rather than random or determined by larger social forces. People compare the costs and benefits associated with different regimes and align themselves with arrangements that best serve their individual and collective interests. If citizens feel that elected governments fulfill campaign promises of prosperity, support will increase, not only for the government of the day, but also for democracy. If, however, they suffer inflation or unemployment, support will decrease. Such predictions resonate well with prevailing perspectives on African politics as the “politics of the belly” (Bayart 1993).

In general, approaches based on rationality have focused on people’s short-term evaluations of the government’s ability to deliver economic goods (Elster 1993; Przeworski et al. 1995), and particularly on their perceptions of the equity of transitions from command to market economies (Anderson 1995; Dalton 1994; McDonough, Barnes, and Pina 1994). Thus, we measure respondents’ (1) present, past, and future *micro and macro economic evaluations*, their evaluations of (2) *government policy performance*, and their perceptions of whether (3) *structural adjustment creates inequality*.

## Toward Political Learning

However, there are strong reasons for skepticism of the validity of all of these approaches. First of all, Africans’ cultural values are caught in a state of transition between tradition and modernity and therefore less coherent than portrayed in theories of political culture. Culture, by definition, consists of a deep, enduring set of values that cannot explain short-term shifts in attitudes, such as those that occur during intense periods of social volatility, like democratic transitions. Democratic reform agendas have disturbed prevailing views of authority in Africa and created normative flexibility. Moreover, democratic reformers are not easily identified with contending sides of any cultural cleavages. Thus, Eckstein predicts that “changes in political cultures that occur in response to social discontinuity should initially exhibit considerable formlessness” (1988, 796).

As for a social structural approach, the demographic categories that comprise social structure only crudely represent the complex characteristics of various social actors. Any observed correlations between demographic factors and political preferences do not explain those preferences; rather, the correlations themselves need to be explained. Demographic variables provide clues, rather than answers, and social scientists need to specify other, more proximate factors that make some groups of people think or act differently than others (Achen 1992).

Furthermore, the extent to which political institutions are capable of shaping political behavior in Africa’s poorly institutionalized polities is debatable. Can African political institutions reliably influence individual behavior and attitudes under conditions where the capacity of the state is weak and declining? Can fledgling political parties and a nascent civil society effectively and reliably incorporate citizens into a polity?

And while ordinary Africans are above all pragmatic, a strict form of rational choice theory—as typically applied—suffers a range of limitations. Most importantly, conventional theories of public choice tend to be based on an image “of a person motivated primarily by short-term self interest” (Tyler 1990, 166). But voters who base their commitment to and evaluation of democracy solely on the short-term economic performance of a particular elected government would operate on a very naïve form of rationality. Put simply, rational behavior should not lead people to throw out the democratic baby with the economic bathwater.

While Africans do learn about the performance of democratic government through their own immediate and national economic conditions, voters use a broader range of performance criteria. First, they take account of the delivery of political goods as well as the quality of prevailing economic conditions. Second, they learn about democracy by drawing lessons from comparisons with previous authoritarian regimes or even from the longer political legacy of the postcolonial period. Third, and finally, to the extent that they possess sufficient cognitive awareness about politics and understand democracy as a set of procedural political guarantees, they may develop intrinsic attachments to democracy that are quite independent of any considerations of performance. It is this combination of (1) short- and medium-term political performance evaluations, (2) longer-term political legacies, and (3) cognitive awareness that we call *political learning*. Individual differences in demand for and perceived supply of democracy should reflect individually specific, but nationally shaped, learning experiences. We now review each of these dimensions in greater depth.

*Political Goods.* Linz and Stepan argue that citizens are able to make “separate and correct” distinctions between “a basket of economic goods (which may be deteriorating) and a basket of political goods (which may be improving)” (1996b, 442). For people all too familiar with repressive and kleptocratic military and civilian dictators or racial oligarchies, the human dignity provided by basic civil liberties may be a fundamental need in Africa. To be sure, it may not be possible to eat political liberties; but these rights may be as important to one’s sense of dignity and quality of life as eating. To the extent that new democracies can protect people’s ability to speak their minds without fear, to move about without being asked for identity documents or harassed by police roadblocks, or to conduct business with the state free of extortion, citizens will calculate that democracy is in their interest. In Evans and Whitefield’s words, “citizens’ commitment to democracy may be less a function of how the market is perceived to work than of how democracy itself is experienced . . . [P]eople support democracies because they are seen to work . . . rather than on the basis of a simple ‘cash nexus’” (1995, 501).

From this perspective, citizens judge democracy not so much on the delivery of improved material welfare, but on the basis of whether they judge elections to be free and fair, they feel able to speak their minds freely, they are treated fairly and equally, or whether their government is riddled with corruption. In fact, those researchers who have included political factors in their multivariate statistical models of support for democracy have consistently found that they have stronger impacts than economic factors, and that the influence of economic variables is always considerably reduced (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Gibson 1996; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; Shin 1999). Thus, we measure respondents’ evaluations of (1) the *freeness and fairness of their most recent national election*, (2) their perceived *ability to speak their minds freely*, (3) whether people (especially their own identity group) receive *fair treatment*, their perceptions of (4) the *level of government corruption*, (5) *government responsiveness*, (6) the *performance of elected representatives*, (7) the *performance of the president*, and the (8) *trustworthiness of state institutions*.

*Comparing Regimes.* Rather than simply looking to the current performance of the new regime and asking, “What have you done for me lately?” (Popkin et al. 1976), voters in emerging democracies will also draw on medium-term calculations that compare the relative performance of old and new regimes. This is what Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer (1998) call the “Churchill hypothesis”: regardless of what people think about the performance of the current democratic regime, they will support it if

it performs better than its predecessor. Thus, we measure respondents’ perceptions, relative to the previous non-democratic regime, of (1) *improved quality of life* and (2) *increased political rights*, whether they (3) *feel safer*, and whether they see (4) *less government corruption*. Even in the low-information environments of Africa, citizens are quite capable of assessing these things. Such considerations are profoundly important to people’s lives, and people are able to attribute any perceived shifts in freedom and safety directly to the performance of the new regime.

*Political Legacies.* Citizens are also able to draw lessons about *both* authoritarian *and* democratic rule from the long-term performance of previous regimes. A history of competitive politics—especially multiparty competition—should have a positive impact on current citizens’ levels of demand and supply. Precisely how they draw these lessons, however, is a matter of long-standing debate. According to a “generational learning” model, the most salient lessons about a political regime are learned during formative periods of late adolescence and early adulthood: lessons that then structure or filter subsequent political learning (Easton and Dennis 1969; Eckstein 1997; Mannheim 1952). If true, there should be significant and considerable differences in regime preferences between cohorts, or “generations” who grew up under different types of regimes (Bahry 1987). In contrast, a “lifetime learning” model argues that people constantly acquire new information, developing a running tally of lessons about political regimes accumulated over an entire lifetime (Achen 1992; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998). If true, regime preferences and evaluations should differ not by generation, but according to cumulative individual experience with a range of differing regimes.

Finally, a theory of “collective learning” points to historical “period effects” that impart a set of common lessons to all people in a country regardless of age or generation (Barner-Barry and Orenwein 1985). The dramatic events of political transitions, such as the breakdown of the institutions and value structures of the *ancien regime*, or the founding election of a new regime, may create a common *resocialization* across all people and a society-wide transfer of regime loyalties (Bermeo 1992). As such, the macro-level crystallization of mass public attitudes in a new democracy may resemble the types of micro-level attitude change that occur in early adulthood in stable regimes (Gibson and Gouws 2003; Jennings 1989).

To measure regime effects on political learning, we employ a classification of African postcolonial regimes initially developed by Bratton and van de Walle (1997),

who found that the success rate of African transitions from authoritarian rule to free and fair founding elections was largely a function of the previous postcolonial regime type. They distinguished between multiparty rule, one-party regimes that allowed some degree of internal competition, dictatorships with noncompetitive plebiscites, military regimes, and settler regimes that limited political participation to Europeans.

We measure (1) *generational learning* with individual-level dummy variables that indicate under which regime type the respondent turned 18 years of age. We measure (2) *lifetime learning* by calculating the total number of years (past the age of 18) that each respondent had lived under various regimes. And we measure (3) *collective learning* by ascertaining the dominant postcolonial regime type for each country, indicated by a national-level dummy variable for four of the five regime types.<sup>7</sup>

*Cognitive Awareness.* Poorly informed people can use “low information reasoning” (Popkin 1994), drawing inferences from immediate circumstances to arrive at short-term economic and political performance evaluations. However, most other forms of political learning require a wider set of cognitive skills that we call cognitive awareness (or others call “civic literacy”; see Milner 2002). In general, formal education should increase popular support for democracy by increasing citizens’ knowledge of the way that governments work; by diffusing values of freedom, equality, and competition throughout the population; and by boosting the confidence of individuals to engage in public life (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). Increased news media use should enhance attitudes to democracy by expanding the range of considerations people bring to bear in making political judgments (Mutz 1998). News media tell people about not only the outcomes of political competition (e.g., the delivery of economic and political goods), but also the processes by which these outcomes occur. People gain some basic awareness of procedures such as candidate nominations, the working of electoral systems, cabinet deliberations, parliamentary debates, and

judicial scrutiny. Media impacts may be even greater during periods of rapid social change, like political transitions, when people increase their dependence on news sources for information, orientation, and certainty (Ball-Rokeach and De Fluer 1976). Thus, we measured cognitive awareness through respondents’ levels of (1) *formal education*, (2) *news media use*, (3) *cognitive engagement with politics*, (4) *political efficacy*, and (5) *political information*.

Perhaps the most fundamental cognitive step in political learning about democracy is that people attain a basic awareness of democracy so that they can attach some kind of meaning to the concept. Beyond basic awareness, however, much depends on the content that people project onto the regime. Many analysts expect that Africans will have very high expectations of democracy because they see it in substantive terms (Ake 1996; Owusu 1992; Schaffer 1998). Given Africa’s enduring economic crisis, substantivists should be less likely to say their country is democratic because of its inability to deliver material benefits broadly and equally throughout society. But at least some Africans have come to develop a more modest understanding of democracy as a set of political procedures for limiting the power of the state by guaranteeing civil liberties, convening competitive elections, and enabling people to have a voice in how they are governed. Proceduralists should be relatively easier to satisfy and more likely to demand democracy because they believe it is worth pursuing in its own right. Thus, we measured respondents’ (6) *awareness of democracy*, and the extent to which they hold (7) *substantive* or (8) *procedural understandings of democracy*.

## Determinants of Attitudes to Democracy

Competing explanations were tested as follows. All concepts identified in the foregoing discussion were operationalized using factor and reliability analyses to guide the creation of multi-item indices where appropriate.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup>Starting at 1957, the date of Ghana’s independence, “plebiscitary regimes” were the dominant postcolonial regime in Mali (1960–68, 1979–91), Uganda (1967–71, 1980–96), and Lesotho (1970–86); “competitive one-party regimes” led in Tanzania (1962–90), Malawi (1964–80), and Zambia (1972–91); and “settler regimes” were the primary regime type for Zimbabwe (1957–79), Namibia (1957–89), and South Africa (1975–94). “Multiparty regime” was the dominant regime type in Botswana (1966–99) and Ghana (1957–64, 1969–72, 1979–81, and 1992–99). While “military regimes” dominated in Nigeria (1966–79, 1983–99), it is the only one of the 12 countries to fall in this category and thus does not help us follow Przeworski and Teune’s (1970) admonition to replace proper names with variable names. But its second most frequent regime was a “multiparty regime” (1960–66, 1979–83, and 1999–2000) and is coded as such.

<sup>8</sup>For full-question wording and results to these questions as well as a description of latent constructs and indices, see Appendix D. The combined effects of a large number of variables, nonresponses for various small subsets of respondents on each question, varying proportions of “don’t knows” across questions, and the fact that some questions were not asked in specific countries necessitated close attention to the problem of missing data. Typical list-wise deletion methods would result in loss of an unacceptably large number of cases from the analysis and also produce biased estimates (King et al. 2001). Wherever possible, “don’t know” responses were recoded to theoretically defensible places on response scales. Remaining

TABLE 1 Demand for Democracy,<sup>1</sup> Explanatory Factors Compared<sup>2</sup>

	r	Level 1 Only			Levels 1 & 2		
		b	S.E.	Beta	b	S.E.	Beta
Constant		-.032 <sup>NS</sup>	.117		.022 <sup>NS</sup>	.064	
<b>Cognitive Awareness</b>							
Procedural Understanding of Democracy	.277	.124	.062	.200	.112	.005	.181
Political Information	.254	.049	.012	.103	.049	.004	.105
Awareness of Democracy	.240	.158	.013	.118	.155	.009	.116
Cognitive Engagement	.202	.059	.013	.070	.047	.006	.056
News Media Use	.152	.026	.007	.074	.026	.003	.074
<b>Cultural Values</b>							
Risk Tolerance	.186	.035	.005	.084	.034	.003	.084
<b>Regime Comparisons</b>							
Increased Political Rights	.182	.097	.017	.134	.096	.005	.132
<b>Political Evaluations</b>							
Government Responsiveness	.177	.031	.054	.090	.031	.003	.090
<b>Economic Evaluations</b>							
Micro-Macro Evaluations	.042	-.038	.009	-.059	-.037	.005	-.057
<b>Collective Learning</b>							
Settler Postcolonial Path	-.206				-.441 <sup>***</sup>	.092	-.361
Competitive one-Party Postcolonial Path	.145				.175 <sup>**</sup>	.125	.177
Multiparty Postcolonial Path	.179				.184 <sup>*</sup>	.083	.150
<b>Interactions</b>							
Settler Postcolonial Path *					.066	.010	.054
Procedural Understanding of Democracy							
Settler Postcolonial Path *					.068	.014	.056
Cognitive Engagement							
<b>Degrees of Freedom</b>				11	8		
<b>Estimated Parameters</b>				12	17		
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup> (Level 1)</b>				.203	.265		
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup> (Intercept)</b>				.280	.742		

All variables  $p = < .001$  unless noted: \* $p = .10$ , \*\* $p = .05$ , \*\*\* $p = .01$ .

N = 21,531

1. The dependent variable is the *index of commitment to democracy* (an average score composed of expressed support for democracy plus rejection of military, one-party, and one-man rule).

2. Hierarchical linear modeling regression estimates.

Items were then grouped theoretically as well as according to whether they tapped an individual- or national-level dynamic. We then regressed the two dependent variables of *demand for democracy* and *supply of democracy* on these variables using a form of model-level modeling called Hierarchical Linear Modeling (see Steenbergen

and Jones 2002). Following Luke (2004), we first tested a fully specified model of the individual-level factors only (or what HLM calls Level 1), and then added national-level factors (Level 2) as intercepts and then as interactions with the Level 1 slopes. Final results are presented in Tables 1 and 2.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup>In order to combine the most exhaustive test with the parsimonious results, we first tested all predictors discussed in the previous section. But because almost all variables are statistically significant with 21,000 cases, we eliminate all variables  $p > .001$ , if necessary through iterative reductions. We then further trimmed the model and eliminated variables that make the smallest substantive contribution as determined by their standardized regression score (Beta).

missing data was imputed through procedures outlined by Honaker et al. (2000) and a data management program known as *Amelia*. Analysis was then conducted on all 21,531 cases. For a fuller discussion of this process, see Appendix C.

TABLE 2 Supply of Democracy,<sup>1</sup> Explanatory Factors Compared<sup>2</sup>

	r	Level 1 Only			Levels 1 & 2		
		b	S.E.	Beta	b	S.E.	Beta
Constant		-.209 <sup>NS</sup>	.169		-.416 <sup>***</sup>	.101	
<b>Political Evaluations</b>							
Performance of the President	.441	.179	.019	.197	.220	.013	.242
Freeness and Fairness of Elections	.383	.126	.019	.143	.125	.010	.142
Level of Government Corruption	-.182	-.090	.011	-.079	-.088	.009	-.077
Trustworthiness of State Institutions	.222	.105	.012	.092	.105	.010	.092
<b>Economic Evaluations</b>							
Government Policy Performance	.379	.128	.021	.117	.130	.011	.119
Micro-Macro Economic Evaluations	.352	.144	.011	.105	.143	.011	.104
SAP Creates Inequality	-.106	-.038	.006	-.053	-.037	.006	-.052
<b>Regime Comparisons</b>							
Increased Political Rights	.313	.152	.029	.099	.146	.015	.095
<b>Institutional Influences</b>							
Identifies with Winning Party	.238	.107	.030	.064	.106	.016	.063
<b>Collective Learning</b>							
Multiparty Postcolonial Path	.187				.787	.157	.303
<b>Interactions</b>							
Multiparty Postcolonial Path * Performance of the President					-.128	.019	-.049
<b>Degrees of Freedom</b>				11	10		
<b>Estimated Parameters</b>				12	14		
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup> (Level 1)</b>				.356	.375		
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup> (Intercept)</b>				.647	.765		

All variables  $p = / < .001$  unless noted: \*\*\* $p = .01$ .

N = 21,531

1. The dependent variable is the *index of supply of democracy* (an average score composed of perceived extent of democracy plus satisfaction with democracy).

2. Hierarchical linear modeling regression estimates.

## Discussion

The most immediate conclusion that emerges from Tables 1 and 2 is that—in statistical terms—the overall model works remarkably well, especially given the fact that surveys were conducted in 12 linguistically and culturally diverse countries marked by low levels of education and literacy and that we asked people about newly formed opinions—including abstract subjects like democracy. Compared to an unconstrained null model, this model improves the explanation of individual-level (Level 1) variance in demand for democracy by 26%, and the ability to account for variance among the country means scores (Level 2) by 74%; with regard to the supply of democracy, the figures are 36% and 77%, respectively. These results are at least as statistically powerful as in other studies of regime preferences in Eastern Europe (Evans and White-

field 1995, 501, 506; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998, 242; Whitefield and Evans 1999, 148, 151) and South Korea (Shin 1999, 157).

More importantly, the pattern of effects provides strong support for a surprisingly elegant and parsimonious explanation of demand for and perceived supply of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. Demand for democracy is largely a principled affair, emanating from a minority of Africans who have developed cognitive awareness of the democratic process and who want it largely because of what it *is*. The perceived supply of democracy, by contrast, is an instrumental, performance-driven attitude based on an appreciation of what democracy *does* (or fails to do). The results also reveal that evaluations of political performance matter far more than economic considerations in shaping both perceptions of supply and demand. Finally, the impact of popular comparisons of

the political performance of the new and old regime, and the impact of collective learning from dominant post-colonial regimes, demonstrate that Africans do not simply evaluate democracy on the basis of what the political regime has done lately, but also bring to bear both medium- and long-term perspectives. We now turn to examine these findings in greater detail.

The single most important individual-level determinant of whether Africans demand democracy is the extent to which respondents see a set of political procedures (a scale consisting of majority rule, free speech, regular elections, and multiparty competition) as “essential” elements of democracy (Beta = .181). It seems that viewing democracy through a procedural lens sensitizes people to the rights and freedoms they can expect and increases the probability they will reject those regimes that cannot provide such guarantees. In contrast, those who believe democracy entails substantive economic outcomes (a scale consisting of education, employment, and a small income gap) are not substantially any more or less likely to demand democracy than those who do not.

Yet simply being able to provide any definition of what democracy means (to a separate open-ended question about the meaning of democracy) independently increases demand (.116). High levels of political information (operationalized as the ability to provide the name of a set of incumbent leaders) also provide cognitive hooks on which they can hang accumulated information gleaned from the news media or everyday experience (Beta = .105). And use of the news media (radio, television, and newspapers; .074) and cognitive engagement (a combined sense of interest in politics and political discussion; .056) develops the cognitive skills that people can use to identify, store, and retrieve data about democracy. In sum, these results strongly suggest that increased cognitive awareness embodies a process of learning that shifts citizens’ focus from the immediate outcomes of the democratic game to the way the game is played. Cognitively aware citizens are less likely to defect from democracy due to adverse short-term trends because they have come to understand democracy as an ongoing game with an ever-extending horizon (Axelrod 1984).

The most startling finding is the near absence of any economic considerations from the explanation of demand for democracy. Variables measuring relative deprivation, government economic policy performance, and the ability of the new regime to improve quality of life are simply missing from the list of substantively important factors. And while evaluations of the performance of the economy do have an impact, the sign is negative (Beta =  $-.057$ ). This suggests that the losers of the economic game—far from walking away from democracy—hope that elected

leaders will achieve better economic management than did failed autocrats in the past. In contrast, two political performance evaluations do have important impacts. Africans are more likely to demand democracy if they feel that the new regime provides more personal freedoms and rights than the old regime (.132) and if they see their leaders as responsive to public demands (.090).

Economic performance does, however, play a marked role in shaping perceptions of democracy’s supply. Positive individual evaluations of the economy (Beta = .104) and government policy performance improve supply (.119), while the perception that economic structural adjustment has increased inequality decreases the sense of supply ( $-.052$ ). Yet the delivery of political goods has an even larger impact. The performance of the president (measured as a construct of trust and approval) is the single strongest individual-level predictor of whether people think their country is democratic (.242). While this finding reinforces the common wisdom about the central role of the “big man” in African politics, other results demonstrate that Africans do not focus solely on the performance of the president. In fact, people’s evaluations of the freeness and fairness of their most recent elections have a stronger impact on the perceived supply of democracy (.142) than any economic factors. And when considering the quality of their democracy, Africans also look to whether government leaders are corrupt ( $-.077$ ) and whether they can trust state institutions (.092). They also make a Churchillian calculation of whether they are freer with more rights now than under the old regime (.095).

The predominance of political (rather than economic) performance evaluations suggests that people judge the perceived supply of democracy as much in procedural as substantive terms: *how* democracy works is just as or more important than *what* it produces. It suggests that Africans attach value to things like honest elections, clean government, and personal freedoms. It also suggests that Africans will not accept elite claims about the state of democracy simply because they are being fed, nourished, or housed, nor castigate a well-functioning democratic regime simply because leaders fail to deliver economic goods.

The total absence of any cognitive factors from the model of supply also suggests that all people can evaluate the state of democracy in their country regardless of their cognitive sophistication. Even the relatively unaware can draw upon direct experience of personal and local conditions to reason about democratic performance, albeit focusing only on the most salient “low information” cues (Popkin 1994) such as the track record of the president or the quality of the most recent election.

The results also evince a strong, long-term impact of regime legacies on political learning and help us to decide amongst competing theories of learning. There is no evidence for either the generational or lifetime learning hypotheses, but strong evidence for a collective socialization hypothesis. None of the individual-level dummy variables that indicate the regime under which a respondent entered adulthood, and none of the variables that summed each respondent's cumulative experience with each regime type had statistically significant impacts on either demand or supply. In contrast, national-level dummy variables indicating a country's dominant post-colonial regime type (with plebiscitary regime as the excluded category) have very important impacts in both models.

A legacy of multiparty competition, whether continuous (as in Botswana) or interrupted (as in Ghana or Nigeria) has a strongly positive impact on the level of democratic demand in that country (Beta = .150), an issue that has been widely speculated but rarely tested in the literature. Even the legacy of regimes that allowed limited political competition within a one-party framework (as in Zambia, Tanzania, and Malawi) has salutary effects on current demand for democracy (.177). In contrast, above and beyond the impacts of all individual-level characteristics and attitudes, Africans who live in societies with a legacy of settler rule are far *less* committed to democracy (−.361). A history of multiparty competition bequeaths a strong and positive legacy on the perception of democratic supply. Net all other influences, respondents in Botswana, Ghana, and Nigeria are more likely than others to offer positive evaluations of the democratic nature of their governments (.303).

Perhaps as importantly, collective learning from regime legacies makes theoretical sense of the national differences in attitudes to democracy that remain after taking all individual-level factors into account without resorting to a dozen different narratives of national histories. Regardless of age, or generational cohort, people living in countries with similar institutional legacies learn similar lessons that influence how they see democracy. National political legacies not only shape attitudes net all other individual-level factors (reflected by their intercept terms), but also guide their citizens to react distinctively from citizens living in countries with different legacies (as reflected in the interaction terms). In countries with legacies of settler rule, procedural views of democracy (Beta = .054) and cognitive engagement with politics (.055) are even *more* likely to result in the demand for democracy. In contrast, in countries with dominant legacies of multiparty competition, evaluations of presidential

performance (−.049) are *less* important predictors of the perceived supply of democracies.<sup>10</sup>

The final salient findings concern those sets of variables that had little or no utility in explaining demand for, and the supply of, democracy. Reflecting the influence of anthropology and history on African studies, the study of African politics has been dominated by accounts based on the deep structure of society—such as the forging of new nations and the transformation of peasants into urban dwellers—or enduring cultural values and practices. Yet Africans' positions in the social structure, their cultural values, and their institutional influences have little to offer in directly explaining how they think about democracy. Absolutely no structural variables have any direct impact. To be sure, Africans endure high levels of lived poverty and marginalization, yet none of this appears to detract from (or contribute to) demand for or perceived supply of democracy. Cultural variables have a very limited impact. Net all other influences, only those Africans who are willing to take risks are more likely to demand democracy (Beta = .084). Finally, those who support the winning political party (.063) are more likely to offer positive assessments about the supply of democracy, which suggests (reasonably) that partisan considerations color African worldviews. Otherwise, there is no evidence that social affiliations or institutional loyalties have habituated Africans to support democracy or systematically predisposed them to oppose it.

## Conclusions

The combined effects of cognitive awareness, performance evaluations, regime comparisons, and regime

<sup>10</sup>One of the reviewers wondered whether objective political and economic indicators could provide a better explanation of the Level 2 effects than regime history. Thus data was collected for all 12 countries for (1) *freedom* (the reversed and averaged Freedom House scores for political rights and civil liberties), (2) *wealth*, (3) *growth*, and (4) *inflation* (corruption was excluded because Transparency International produced corruption perception index scores for only 10 of the 12 countries circa 2000). Adding each of these four items separately to the final model of each dependant variable and testing for either significant intercepts or slopes produces 16 different tests. There was no significant impact in 15 of the 16 tests. In one instance, freedom has a bizarre negative sign as an intercept on the model of Demand, which is most likely an artifact of too many variables chasing a limited amount of variance amongst 12 country means. But while the limited number of Level 2 cases prevents us from ruling out competing explanations of the Level 2 effects in a conclusive way, any impacts of actual levels of corruption, freedom, and actual economic trends should be more than adequately accounted for in the model through the inclusion of many measures of individual perceptions of these very factors.

legacies detailed in this article provide strong support for a learning model of the origins of popular attitudes to democracy in Africa. By developing greater cognitive awareness of its processes, through direct experience with the fruits of political performance and through national experiences with political competition, people learn both about the content of democracy as well as its consequences.

The lack of any impact of social structure implies the absence of any organized base of social resistance to the democratization project. And the limited role of economic considerations in shaping Africans' attitudes to democracy suggests that, at least for now, the endurance of Africa's nascent democracies does not depend on achieving economic miracles. Rather, elected officials, policy-makers, donors, and educators interested in deepening public commitment to and satisfaction with democracy in Africa need to focus on two things. The first is to enlarge the pool of cognitively sophisticated citizens. More than half of the Africans we interviewed were psychologically disengaged from politics, and a similar proportion possessed low levels of political information. This remains a serious impediment to the development of a more extensive commitment to democracy. Removing these impediments surely requires increased access to formal education and an independent news media. But it may also be

necessary to inject civic education content into the school curricula and mass media, content that both informs people about the players and rules of the democratic game, and reduces unrealistic expectations of what democracy can deliver. In this respect, we underscore the argument first made by Almond and Verba in the early 1960s (1963, 503–504), who warned that the diffusion of democratic values via the socialization process would simply take too long to build popular commitment to the new democracies of the early postcolonial era. Instead, they urged the leaders of new nations to concentrate on the rapid expansion of cognitive skills.

The second objective is that governors must secure the rule of law, protect individual rights and freedoms, control corruption, and ensure that elections are above reproach. While these are issues commonly lumped today under the rubric of "good governance" and associated with external pressures from the World Bank and IMF, they also appear to be very important to ordinary Africans. Put another way, the failure to achieve good governance will imperil much more than access to foreign loans: it will threaten the very prospects of popular support for democracy. To the extent that new democracies can open up and protect space for people to live their lives free of interference by overweening states, they may be able to begin a "virtuous cycle" of democratic development.

## Appendix A

### Validity and Reliability of Dependent Variables, Cross-National Results Compared

#### Index of Demand for Democracy<sup>1</sup>

	Pooled	South											
	Sample	Botswana	Ghana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mali	Namibia	Nigeria	Africa	Tanzania	Uganda	Zambia	Zimbabwe
Rejects	.76	.88	.74	.65	.63	.77	.87	.73	.80	.64	.59	.77	.83
Presidential Dictatorship													
Rejects	.65	.65	.56	.60	.56	.60	.73	.61	.58	.48	.66	.63	.71
Military Rule													
Rejects One-Party Rule	.58	.67	.66	.48	.65	.77	.59	.74	.63	.44	.37	.61	.53
Prefers Democracy	.30	.09	.29	.20	.40	.35	.18	.23	.20	.17	.26	.19	.39
Eigenvalue	2.01	2.08	1.97	1.71	1.94	2.20	2.10	2.03	1.94	1.56	1.67	1.97	2.16
Percent Variance Explained	50.1	51.9	49.2	42.9	48.5	54.9	52.4	50.8	48.6	39.4	41.8	49.1	53.9
Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha)	.655	.626	.643	.532	.643	.715	.655	.653	.620	.462	.520	.629	.704
N =	21,531	1,137	1,985	1,127	1,205	2,089	1,138	3,589	2,200	2,195	1,873	1,167	1,172

1. Index validity is tested through factor analysis using Maximum-Likelihood extraction and Direct Oblimin rotation. Column entries in the first four rows list loadings of each item with the common factor. Reliability is tested through internal consistency with Cronbach's Alpha.

**Construct of Supply of Democracy<sup>2</sup> (Extent of Democracy and Satisfaction with Democracy)**

	Pooled							South					
	Sample	Botswana	Ghana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mali	Namibia	Nigeria	Africa	Tanzania	Uganda	Zambia	Zimbabwe
Pearson's r	.46	.63	.35	.63	.65	.34	.41	.22	.56	.55	.54	.49	.47
Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha)	.63	.76	.52	.77	.78	.50	.58	.36	.71	.71	.70	.65	.64
N =	20,218	1,194	1,633	1,172	1,205	2,005	1,163	3,510	2,200	1,883	1,910	1,166	1,177

2. Because this is a two-item construct, validity is established through face and construct validity, and reliability is tested through inter-item correlation (Pearson's r) and internal consistency (Cronbach's Alpha).

## Appendix B

### Sampling Protocol

Afrobarometer surveys are based on national area probability samples representing cross-sections of adult citizens in each country. The goal is to give every individual an equal and known chance of inclusion in the sample via random selection at every stage.

In six countries, a sample of 1,200 individuals allows inferences to national adult populations with a margin of error of no more than plus or minus 2.8% with a confidence level of 95%. When the sample size is increased to at least 2,000 (in five countries), the confidence interval shrinks to plus or minus 2.2% and to 1.6% for a sample of 3,600 (in Nigeria).

The sample universe includes all citizens of voting age. Excluded are noncitizens and anyone under the age of 18 years on the day of the survey. Also left out are people living in institutionalized settings, such as prisons, student dormitories, and hospitals. We also exclude inaccessible areas, such as zones of armed conflict or natural disaster, as well as national parks and game reserves.

The design is a clustered, stratified, multistage, area probability sample. Geographically defined sampling units of decreasing size are selected in four stages:

### Stage One: Selecting Primary Sampling Units (PSUs)

PSUs are the smallest well-defined geographic units for which reliable population data are available. Since the Afrobarometer employs the most recent official national census as a sampling frame, PSUs are usually census enumeration areas. A sampling expert from the national census bureau is usually commissioned to draw the sample to Afrobarometer specifications.

The sample universe is stratified, first by area (region/province) and then by residential locality (urban or rural). The regional stratification increases the likelihood that distinctive ethnic or language groups are included in the sample. The sample is distributed across each locality in each region in proportion to its share in the national population. The total number of PSUs is determined by calculating the maximum acceptable degree of clustering. Because PSUs can be geographically small and socially homogenous, we prefer to accept no more than eight interviews per PSU. A sample of 1,200 therefore contains 150 PSUs; a sample of 2,000 contains 250 PSUs; and a sample of 3,600 contains 450.

PSUs are then sampled within each stratum using random methods. If PSUs have roughly equal populations, then simple random sampling (SRS) is sufficient. If—more commonly—the PSUs have variant populations, then random sampling is conducted with probability proportionate to population size (PPPS), which correctly gives units with larger populations a greater probability of being chosen. In urban areas with extremely diverse housing patterns, an additional layer of stratification may be added to ensure that the sample does not leave out low-density (especially informal) settlements. Using a street map, a city or town is divided into high-, medium-, and low-density areas. PSUs within each area are then represented equally (or better yet, in proportion to population sizes, if these are known) within the sample for that city or town.

Once enumerator areas (EAs) are randomly selected they are plotted on a national map, enabling survey managers to plan travel routes for the fieldwork. In cases where PSUs are inaccessible, substitution is made by randomly drawing another EA. If more than 5% of PSUs require substitution, then the entire Stage One sample is discarded and a new one is drawn. If important minority groups are missed or covered too scantily to allow generalizations, then oversampling is introduced, along with post hoc weighting to correct the data.

## Stage Two: Selecting Sampling Start Points (SSPs)

Within each PSU, field teams (usually consisting of one field supervisor and four interviewers) travel to a randomly selected start point. The SSP determines where interviewers begin random walk patterns (see next stage). The selection of start points further clusters the sample into manageable areas that are reachable on foot or by a short vehicle ride. One or other of the following methods is used.

If a reliable list of all households is available for every PSU, then this is obtained from the national census bureau or the office of district administrator or local government authority. A random numbers table is used to draw a simple random sample of eight households from the list. A detailed map or description matched to the list is required in order to locate the household. If this method is used, it is not necessary to apply Stage Three: Selecting Households; field teams go straight to Stage Four: Selecting Individual Respondents.

If household lists are not available but the census bureau has provided PSU maps, then the field supervisor chooses a start point using a numbered grid. The coordinates on the grid, which identify the SSP, are drawn from a table of random numbers. The SSP is marked on the map and given to the field team for that area, who then locate the nearest housing settlement, if necessary seeking directions from local residents. Because actual conditions on the ground can never be known in advance for all PSUs, supervisors choose a second SSP as a substitute.

If neither household lists nor maps are available, the field supervisor contacts a traditional leader, local government councilor, or government official knowledgeable about the area. This person provides information on the number of settlements (e.g., villages) in the PSU. These settlements must have identifiable boundaries that do not overlap with one another. They are then listed, numbered, and randomly selected.

The logic of random sampling is to avoid any kind of pattern in the units selected at any stage. Thus, at the start point, the supervisor rotates the place where interviewers begin their walk pattern. If the team starts on a main road at one SSP, they start off the road at the next SSP. If the team starts in a central place (like a school) in one PSU, they start in a peripheral place in the next PSU, and so on.

## Stage Three: Selecting Households

Fanning out from the SSP, the field team selects households. The Afrobarometer defines a household as a group of people who presently eat together from the same pot. By this definition, a household does not include persons who are currently living elsewhere for purposes of study or work. And it excludes domestic workers or temporary visitors, even if they ate or slept there on the previous night. In multihousehold dwelling structures (like apartment blocks, housing compounds with multiple spouses, or backyard dwellings for renters, relatives, or household workers), each household is treated as a separate sampling unit. The method for selecting households is as follows:

*In well-populated urban and rural areas, with single-dwelling units:* The supervisor chooses any point (like a street corner, a school, or a water source), randomly rotating the choice of such landmarks. The four interviewers on the field team are instructed to walk away from this point in the following directions: interviewer 1 walks toward the sun, interviewer 2 away from the sun, interviewer 3 at a right angle to interviewer 1, interviewer 4 in the opposite direction from interviewer 3. The team applies a day code to randomly establish an interval (n) for household selection. It is calculated by adding together the numbers in the day of the month: on the 5<sup>th</sup>, 14<sup>th</sup>, and 23<sup>rd</sup> of the month the interval is 5, but on the 6<sup>th</sup>, 15<sup>th</sup>, and 24<sup>th</sup> it is 6, and so on. In every case, the interviewer selects the nth house on the right.

*In well-populated urban and rural areas, with multiple-dwelling units:* If the start point is an apartment block, or if the walk pattern includes such, then the interviewer starts on the top floor and works his or her way downward, stopping at every nth flat on the right. In an exception to the normal walk pattern, which only refers to blocks of flats, the interviewer should only visit *alternate* floors of the block.

*In sparsely populated rural areas, with small villages or single-dwelling farms:* There may be only a few households around a given start point. We do not wish to overcluster the sample by conducting too many (e.g., all eight) interviews in one small village. In these cases, the following guidelines apply: If there are 15 or fewer households within walking distance of the start point, the field team shall drop only one interviewer there. If there are 16–30 households within walking distance of the start point, two interviewers are deployed. If there are more

than 50 households, the whole team can operate in the same locality as usual. When only one or two interviewers are deployed, the rest of the team moves to the nearest housing settlement *within the same EA and closest to the SSP*, where fieldwork proceeds according to the above rules.

Each interviewer obtains two interviews per PSU (four interviewers  $\times$  two interviews = eight interviews, the target for the PSU). After completing the first interview, he or she follows the same procedure as before. He or she continues walking in the same direction and chooses the *n*th dwelling on the right (where *n* = the day code) for the second interview. If the settlement comes to an end and there are no more houses, the interviewer turns at right angles to the right and keeps walking, again looking for the *n*th dwelling on the right. This procedure is repeated until the interviewer finds an eligible dwelling containing an eligible household.

### Stage Four: Selecting Individual Respondents

Once the household is identified, the interviewer randomly selects an individual respondent from within the household. To ensure that women are not underrepresented, the Afrobarometer seeks an equal number of men and women in the overall sample, accomplished by alternating interviews by gender. First, the interviewer determines from the previous interview whether a male or female respondent is required. The interviewer then lists (in any order) the first names of all the household members of that gender who are at least 18 years old, even those not presently at home but who will return during that day. From the list, the interviewer randomly selects the person to be interviewed by asking a household member to choose a numbered card from a blind deck of cards.

The interview is conducted only with the selected person and no one else in that household. If an interview is refused, the interviewer substitutes the household by continuing the walk pattern and again selecting the *n*th dwelling on the right (where *n* = the day code). Note: in the Afrobarometer, we substitute households, not respondents. It is not acceptable, for example, for the interviewer to substitute a spouse, parent, child, sibling—or domestic worker or visitor—for a selected respondent who happens not to be at home at the time.

If, on the first try, the interviewer finds no one at home in the selected household, he or she makes one return call

later in the day. Or, if the designated respondent is not at home, the interviewer makes an appointment to meet him or her later in the day. Again, a return call will be necessary in order to find the selected respondent and to conduct the interview. It is also acceptable for the interviewer to ascertain the whereabouts of the selected respondent (he or she may perhaps be at work) and, if nearby, to walk to that place to conduct the interview.

If the return call is unsuccessful, say because the respondent has still not come home for the appointment, then, and only then, the interviewer may substitute the household. If the house is still empty or the selected respondent is not at home at the time of the callback, the interviewer is permitted to substitute that household with the very next household in the direction of the walk pattern. This slight change of procedure is necessary under these circumstances since the interviewer may already have had a successful call earlier in the day in the household that is located at the sampling interval.

## Appendix C

### “Don’t Know” and Missing Data

When reporting frequency distributions, we simply report the proportion of respondents who chose the “Don’t Know” option along with the proportions choosing other responses as proportions of all valid responses.

When conducting statistical analysis (such as calculating means, or correlation coefficients), the “Don’t Know” category can present special problems. The standard reaction is to set all “Don’t Know” responses as “missing” so as to make them invisible to statistical analysis. One drawback to this option is that it reduces the number of effective cases on which any analysis is based, and thus limits our confidence that the results apply across the entire sample, and thus the entire population that the sample represents (more on this below). The second problem is that “Don’t Know” is usually a legitimate answer and should somehow be taken into account, rather than discarded (King et al. 2001, 50). Our preferred alternative is, wherever possible, to recode “Don’t Know” responses to theoretically defensible spots on the response scale.

For example, for many of the questions about political participation, we assumed that those who did not know whether they ever took a specific course of action have in fact never done so. In other cases, where response scales were already symmetric, or balanced (such as five-point scales that run from strongly agree to strongly disagree),

we recoded the “Don’t Know” responses to the middle, neutral category. With regard to other symmetrical, balanced scales with no original middle category (such as a four-point scale that runs from “1 Very Badly” to “4 Very Well,” we created a middle category, and placed the “Don’t Know” responses there, recoding the entire scale to now run from 1 to 5 with “Don’t Know” set to 3. In both these cases, “Don’t Knows” are assumed to reflect some point of “zero affect” with responses measuring positive or negative affect toward some political or economic object ranging to either side. “Don’t Knows” are reset to “missing” only when one of the above options is not defensible.

Because of the way in which the Afrobarometer project and questionnaire evolved in its early stages, some questions were simply not asked in specific surveys, accounting for the lion’s share of our missing data. Thus, from time to time, data is missing for one or more entire countries.

When trying to assess whether cases with missing data are likely to differ from fully observed cases in any significant way, analysts distinguish between ignorable and nonignorable missing data. Nonignorable missing data means that there are systematic biases in rates of missingness: for example, if those who cheat on taxes are less likely to answer questions about tax compliance, or if lower-class respondents are more likely not to report their occupation. In such cases, we need to know quite a lot about our data in order to model the process by which the data happen to be missing in order to try and fill in the missing information (Allison 2001).

When missing data are “ignorable,” the tendency for one variable to have missing data is unrelated both to the true value of that variable, as well as to observed values of other known predictors of that variable. For example, the probability of offering a response to a question on support for democracy should have nothing to do with whether one is a democrat or authoritarian, nor should it relate to levels of education or approval of the president (this is known as missing completely at random). However, even if authoritarians are less likely to offer an opinion about support for democracy, the missing data may be ignorable if that relationship disappears once we control for, say, education (missing at random).

With few exceptions, the vast bulk of missing data may be regarded as ignorable. While all respondents from a specific country may be missing on a certain variable, this is due to relatively arbitrary factors of the national questionnaire design process, not to anything intrinsic to citizenship in that country.

As was the case with “Don’t Know,” missing data present special problems for statistical analysis, such as correlation and regression. The usual approach in political science is to simply delete all cases that are missing responses on any of the variables in question (listwise deletion). But given the large number of variables used in our analysis, and the fact that a few of the independent variables were not asked in whole countries, listwise deletion results in the loss of unacceptably large proportions of cases. Moreover, recent analyses have demonstrated that such procedures produce inefficient and biased estimates (King et al. 2001, 50).

Thus we use a method known as Multiple Imputation and the imputation program known as *Amelia* to impute values for all missing data and hence conduct the following analysis on all 21,531 cases.<sup>11</sup> By randomly deleting responses from fully observed data sets, and then comparing the imputed values to the known real values, King and his colleagues demonstrate that *Amelia* performs better than all other known procedures for accurately substituting imputed values.

Imputation procedures use known information on a range of other variables to predict the missing values. However, most imputation procedures assume that the values of missing cases are simply a linear combination of their responses across a range of other variables. In other words, they place all missing values directly onto a regression prediction line. However, observed values cluster around a predicted regression line, some closer and some farther away. This error or uncertainty needs to be reflected when we impute the missing values. *Amelia* does exactly this and imputes values reflecting our uncertainty in predicting the missing data. It imputes  $m$  values for each missing response, creating  $m$  completed data sets where the observed values are all the same, but the missing values change slightly across the data sets. All statistical procedures are then performed across these data sets and the results combined (by taking the average of the  $m$  estimates). Ultimately, we created a special data set with the approximately 50 variables that would comprise the hierarchical linear regression analyses reported in Tables 1 and 2. We then regressed each variable with missing data on all the other variables and through an iterative process filled in the missing data, in this case, producing five data sets across which the imputed values varied, reflecting the degree of uncertainty with which they were predicted.

<sup>11</sup>The procedure is outlined by Honaker et al. (2000). This version of the program is freely available at <http://www.Gking.Harvard.edu>.

## Appendix D

### Variables in the Analysis: Item Wording and Construct Statistics

This appendix lists all indicators from the HLM regression used in this article.

Three types of indicators are employed.

- *Single items* are used where a concept is measured with one survey question. We report the verbatim wording of survey questions. The accuracy (validity and reliability) of single-item indicators is based on the correspondence of the item's wording with the underlying concept (face validity), its association with other theoretically expected correlates (construct validity), or, eventually, test-retest reliability through longitudinal analysis.
- We also use several *two-item constructs*, the composition of which is reported here. In this case, validity and reliability are established by the methods already mentioned, but also by examining interitem correlation (Pearson's  $r$ ) and internal consistency (Cronbach's Alpha).
- Wherever possible, we use *multi-item indices*, again reporting how these are constructed. These indices allow us to establish validity through factor analysis (which measures how each observed item relates to a hypothesized latent construct) and reliability analysis (Cronbach's Alpha).

There are many different combinations of factor analysis. To err on the side of caution, we apply the most stringent methods, that is, maximum-likelihood extraction and direct oblimin rotation, guaranteeing that if a factor solution can be found, it will also be found via all other methods. Test statistics from factor and reliability analyses are cited in order to establish the accuracy of all multi-item indices. However, we ultimately calculate simple average—and, in specified cases, additive—index scores. Since the actual factor weightings of individual items may vary across countries and social groups, it is safest to assume that all items contribute to each index equally.

All test statistics reported in the text are ultimately based on a full sample of 21,531 interviews. Test statistics (correlations, factor loadings, reliability coefficients) are calculated on this unweighted sample.

Any descriptive statistics reported in the text (frequency distributions, means, standard deviations), however, are calculated on a weighted sample of 14,397 that reflects both within-country weights (to correct, if necessary, for any disproportionate subsamples) and across-country weights (to standardize country samples equally at  $n = 1200$ ). However, the actual percentage of missing data is also reported.

Unless otherwise noted, all descriptive and test statistics are calculated after omitting missing data and either excluding "Don't Know" answers, or recoding them to theoretically defensible positions on the response scale.

## Variables in the Analysis

### Dependent Variables

		Item Wording	Construct Loading	Missing Data (Percent)
<b>Demand for Democracy<sup>12</sup></b>	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.01) explains 50.1% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .66.		3
		(1) Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? A. Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. B. In certain situations, a nondemocratic government can be preferable. C. To people like me, it doesn't matter what form of government we have. Some people say we would be better off if the country was governed differently. What do you think about the following options?	.30	2
		(2) We should get rid of elections so that a strong leader can decide everything.	.76	1
		(3) If the army came into govern the country? (4) We should have only one political party.	.65 .58	1 <1
<b>Supply of Democracy</b>	Construct	The two items are correlated (Pearson's $r$ ) at .45. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .63.		6
		(1) In your opinion, how much of a democracy is — (your country) today?		5
		(2) Generally, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in —?		3

<sup>12</sup>Committed democrats are those who say, "Democracy is always preferable" or who "strongly oppose" authoritarian alternatives. Partially committed democrats are those who say, "In certain situations, a nondemocratic government can be preferable" or who merely "oppose" authoritarian alternatives. Uncommitted respondents say, "It doesn't matter what form of government we have" and either support, or are noncommittal toward, authoritarian alternatives, or do not express an opinion.

## Independent Variables

		Item Wording	Construct Loading	Missing Data (Percent)
<i>Cultural Values</i>				
<b>Traditional vs. Modern Identity</b>	Item	We have spoken to many—and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, ethnic group, religion, or gender, and others describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, middle class, or a farmer. Besides being—, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost? <sup>13</sup>		14
<b>National Identity</b>	Item	It makes you proud to be called a—.		17
<b>Individual Responsibility</b>	Construct	The two items are correlated (Pearson's $r$ ) at .33. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .50.		1
		People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life Vs. The government should bear the main responsibility for ensuring the well-being of people.		<1
		The best way to create jobs is to encourage people to start their own businesses Vs. The government should provide employment for everyone who wants work.		<1
<b>Risk Tolerance</b>	Item	If a person has a good idea for business, they should invest their own savings or borrow money to try and make it succeed. Vs. There is no sense in trying to start a new business because it might lose money.		25
<b>Interpersonal Trust</b>	Item	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with other people?		9
<i>Social Structure</i>				
<b>Gender</b>	Item	What is the respondent's gender?		1
<b>Age</b>	Item	How old were you at your last birthday?		2
<b>Rural / Urban Status</b>	Item	Type of area in which interview was conducted		2
<b>Lived Poverty</b>	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.63) explains 54.3% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .57.		12
		(1) Food for your family	.65	9
		(2) Water for domestic use	.62	9
		(3) Medical treatment for your family	.42	9
<b>Dominant Ethnic Group</b>	Item	What is your home language? <sup>14</sup>		1
<b>Middle-Class Position</b>	Item	What is your main occupation? <sup>15</sup>		7

<sup>13</sup>Responses are coded as "traditional" if respondents express racial, ethnic, religious, regional, or age identities. Responses are coded as "modern" if they cite occupation, class, country, political party, or individual identities.

<sup>14</sup>Respondents whose language constitutes the largest segment of a national population are coded as "major"; respondents whose language is not the largest but is spoken by at least 10% of the population are coded as "secondary"; and those whose language is spoken by less than 10% are coded as "minor."

<sup>15</sup>Dummy variables were created for respondents belonging to the middle class, working class, or agrarian occupations.

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**Independent Variables (continued)**

		Item Wording	Construct Loading	Missing Data (Percent)
<b>Social Structure</b>				
<b>Working-Class Position</b>	Item	What is your main occupation? <sup>16</sup>		7
<b>Agrarian-Class Position</b>	Item	What is your main occupation? <sup>17</sup>		7
<b>Institutional Influences</b>				
<b>Member of Religious Group</b>	Item	For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member of that organization? Religious Group		<1
<b>Member of Civic Organizations</b>	Index	The theory of measurement underlying this index is not based on the concept of covariance. Because the organizations we ask about vary widely in nature and purpose, we do not necessarily expect those who belong to one to belong to others. Thus, testing for internal consistency with factor or reliability analysis is not appropriate. What we desire is a simple count of the number of memberships. Thus, we simply summed all memberships to create an index from 0 to 4. We will have to await test-retest data from longitudinal analysis to assess reliability.		
		For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member of that organization?		
		(1) Business Group		9
		(2) Development Group		9
		(3) Labor Union		9
<b>Participation Between Elections</b>	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.16) explains 42.3% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .66.		11
		I will read out a list of things that people sometimes do as citizens. Please tell me how often you, personally, have done any of these things during the last five years. (In Southern Africa, no time period was set.)		
		(1) Get Together to Raise Issue	.64	9
		(2) Attend Campaign Rally	.63	<1
		(3) Work for Candidates / Parties	.56	<1
		(4) Attend Community Meetings	.51	1
		(5) During the past five years, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a problem? (In Southern Africa, the specified time period was one year.) Government Officials	.33	<1

<sup>16</sup>Dummy variables were created for respondents belonging to the middle-class, working-class, or agrarian occupations.<sup>17</sup>Dummy variables were created for respondents belonging to the middle-class, working-class, or agrarian occupations.

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### Independent Variables (*continued*)

		Item Wording	Construct Loading	Missing Data (Percent)
<b><i>Institutional Influences</i></b>				
<b>Participated in Demonstration</b>	Item	I will read out a list of things that people sometimes do as citizens. Please tell me how often you, personally, have done any of these things during the last five years. (In Southern Africa, no time period was set.) Attend a demonstration		9
<b>Contacted Informal Leader</b>	Item	During the past five years, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a problem? (In Southern Africa, the specified time period was one year.) Community Leaders		<1
<b>Partisan Identification</b>	Item	Do you feel close to any political party?		1
<b>Identities with Winning Party</b>	Item	Do you feel close to any political party? (if yes) Which one? <sup>18</sup>		3
<b>Voted in Last Election</b>	Item	Understanding that some (people) choose not to vote, let me ask you: Did you vote in the (most recent national election?)		1
<b><i>Economic Performance Evaluations</i></b>				
<b>Government Policy Performance</b>	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.33) explains 58.3% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .76.		1
		How well would you say the current government is handling the following problems?		
		(1) Improving health services	0.76	<1
		(2) Addressing education needs	0.73	<1
		(3) Jobs	0.61	<1
		(4) Inflation	0.56	<1
<b>Micro-Macro Economic Evaluations</b>	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.55) explains 51.0% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .76.		22
		*How satisfied are you with:		
		(1) Economic conditions in — now compared to one year ago*	.74	1
		(2) Economic conditions in one year's time*	.69	1
		(3) Would you say that your own living conditions are worse, the same, or better than other—s?	.66	9
		(4) The condition of the — economy today?*	.56	1
		(5) Are (your group's) economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in this country?	.45	18
<b>SAP Creates Inequality</b>		The government's economic policies have hurt most people and only benefited a few. Vs. Government economic policies have helped most people; only a few have suffered.		52

<sup>18</sup> Respondents are coded as "winners" if they identify with the party that won the most recent national election, as "losers" if they identified with some other party, and "no party" if they do not identify with any party.

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**Independent Variables (continued)**

		<b>Item Wording</b>	<b>Construct Loading</b>	<b>Missing Data (Percent)</b>
<b>Political Performance Evaluations</b>				
<b>Level of Government Corruption</b>	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.87) explains 62.3% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .69. What about corruption? (Corruption is where those in government and the civil service take money or gifts from the people and use it for themselves, or expect them to pay them extra money or a gift to do their job.) How many — do you think are involved in corruption? (1) Civil Servants (2) Elected Leaders (3) Government Officials	0.78 0.75 0.46	27 17 17 <1
<b>Performance of the President</b>	Construct	The two items are highly correlated (Pearson's $r = .70$ ). Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .82. (1) How much do you trust the president? (2) What about the way the president has performed his job over the past year?		37 17 17
<b>Performance of Elected Repre- sentatives</b>	Construct	The two items are sufficiently correlated (Pearson's $r = .49$ ). Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .66. (1) Local Councilor Performance (2) MP Performance		9 13 1
<b>Trustworthiness of State Institutions</b>	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.69) explains 53.8% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .79. How much do you trust the following institutions? (1) Courts of Law (2) Police (3) National Election Commission (4) National Broadcaster (5) Army	0.72 0.70 0.64 0.59 0.58	18 <1 <1 1 17 9
<b>Government Responsive- ness</b>	Item	The way you vote could make things better in the future. Vs. No matter how you vote, it won't make things any better in the future.		17
<b>Government Performance on Crime and Safety</b>	Item	How well would you say the current government is handling reducing crime?		1
<b>Identity Group Treated Fairly</b>	Item	In your opinion, how often is—(your identity group) treated unfairly by the government?		10
<b>Ability to Speak One's Mind</b>	Item	In this country, you must be very careful of what you say or do with regard to politics.		25
<b>Freeness and Fairness of Elections</b>	Item	On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in—?		1

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### Independent Variables (*continued*)

		Item Wording	Construct Loading	Missing Data (Percent)
<i>Regime Comparisons</i>				
Improved Quality of Life	Item	We are going to compare our present system of government with the former system of —. Please tell me if the following things are better or worse now than they used to be. People have an adequate standard of living.		9
Decreased Government Corruption	Item	How does this (the current level of corruption) compare to the government that this country had under—?		9
Increased Safety	Item	We are going to compare our present system of government with the former system of —. Please tell me whether things are better or worse than they were under the — government: People are safe from crime and violence.		9
Increased Political Rights	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.42) explains 60.4% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .76.		12
		We are going to compare our present system of government with the former system of —. Please tell me if the following things are better or worse than they used to be.		
		(1) People can join any organization they want.	0.83	9
		(2) People are free to say what they think.	0.75	9
		(3) Each person can freely choose who to vote for without feeling pressured.	0.73	9
		(4) Everybody is treated equally and fairly by the government.	0.42	9
<i>Cognitive Awareness</i>				
Formal Education	Item	What is the highest level of education you have completed?		<1
News Media Use	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.84) explains 61.5% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .68.		10
		How often do you get news from		
		(1) Newspapers	.76	1
		(2) Television	.72	9
		(3) Radio	.48	<1
Cognitive Engagement with Politics	Construct	The two items are sufficiently correlated (Pearson's $r = .55$ ). Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .71.		1
		(1) How interested are you in politics and government?		1
		(2) How often do you discuss politics and government with other people?		1

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**Independent Variables (continued)**

		Item Wording	Construct Loading	Missing Data (Percent)
<i>Cognitive Awareness</i>				
<b>Political Efficacy</b>	Item	I can usually understand the way that government works. Vs. The way the government operates seems so complicated that I cannot really understand what is going on.		<1
<b>Political Information</b>	Index	The theory of measurement underlying this index is not based on the concept of covariance. Because we do not necessarily expect those who know one incumbent to know others, testing for internal consistency with factor or reliability analysis is not appropriate. What we desire is a simple count of the number of incumbents respondents are aware of, in order to test for the consequences of awareness. Thus, we simply summed all correct answers to create an index from 0 to 4. We will have to await test-retest data from longitudinal analysis to assess reliability.		
		Can you tell me the name of the		
		(1) Mayor / Local Councilor for this area		16
		(2) Member of Parliament for this area		13
		(3) Minister of Finance		10
		(4) Vice President		13
<b>Awareness of Democracy</b>	Item	What, if anything, does democracy mean to you? <sup>19</sup>		0
<b>Procedural Understanding of Democracy</b>	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.02) explains 50.5% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .67.		20
		People associate democracy with many different meanings such as the ones I will mention now. In order for a society to be called democratic, how important is each of these?		
		Elections are held regularly.	0.70	17
		The majority rules.	0.57	17
		At least two political parties compete with each other.	0.55	17
		Anyone is free to criticize government.	0.52	17
<b>Substantive Understanding of Democracy</b>	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.36) explains 50.1% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .73.		20
		People associate democracy with many different meanings such as the ones I will mention now. In order for a society to be called democratic, how important is each of these?		
		Education for everyone	0.78	17
		Jobs for everyone	0.77	17
		A small income gap between rich and poor	0.43	17
		Everyone enjoys basic necessities like shelter, food, and water.	0.70	17

<sup>19</sup>Respondents who are unable to supply an answer, or who say that democracy is "meaningless" are coded as "not aware"; respondents who are able to provide any definition are coded as "aware."

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