THE ORIGINS OF NOMINAL GRADABILITY

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Something we think we understand (Kennedy & McNally 2005, Rotstein & Winter 2001, others):

(1)  

a. rather \(
\begin{cases}
\text{transparent} \\
\text{straight} \\
\text{long}
\end{cases}
\)

b. perfectly \(
\begin{cases}
\text{transparent} \\
\text{straight} \\
\#\text{long}
\end{cases}
\)

c. partly \(
\begin{cases}
\#\text{transparent} \\
\#\text{straight} \\
\#\text{long}
\end{cases}
\)
Something we definitely don’t understand:

(2) 

a. real \{ \begin{align*} &\text{idiot} \\
&\text{smoker} \\
&\text{sportscar} \end{align*} \}

b. big \{ \begin{align*} &\text{idiot} \\
&\text{smoker} \\
&\text{#sportscar} \end{align*} \}

c. utter \{ \begin{align*} &\text{idiot} \\
&\text{#smoker} \\
&\text{#sportscar} \end{align*} \}

(\# indicates ill-formedness on a degree reading)
Big-picture questions:

- How does nominal gradability come about?
- What makes certain nouns more easily gradable than others?
- How do nouns differ from adjectives with respect to gradability?
- What does this reveal about gradability in general?
Guiding ideas:

- Nouns are only indirectly gradable.
- Nouns lack a degree argument, but...
- ... some are nevertheless associated with scales.
- A major axis of variation among degree-modified nouns: how a scale is retrieved from a noun meaning.
Adnominal degree modifiers
- Nominal gradability and degree arguments
- Prototypicality modifiers
- Size adjectives and their kin
- The *utter* class
- Broader considerations
- Conclusion
Adnominal Degree Modifiers: They Exist

The modifiers in (3) are not actually (ordinary) adjectives (Morzycki 2009, de Vries 2010, Xie 2010; cf. Constantinescu 2011):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{true} & \quad \text{real} \\
\text{slight} & \quad \text{total} \\
\text{utter} & \quad \text{disaster} \\
\text{absolute} & \quad \text{idiot} \\
\text{outright} & \quad \text{magic} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{true} & \quad \text{real} \\
\text{slight} & \quad \text{total} \\
\text{utter} & \quad \text{disaster} \\
\text{absolute} & \quad \text{idiot} \\
\text{outright} & \quad \text{magic} \\
\end{align*}
\]
The size adjectives in (4) are adjectives, but doing something special:

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ & \text{big, huge, colossal, humungous} \} & \text{idiot} \\
\{ & \# \text{small, little, diminutive} \}
\end{align*}
\]
Not the same meaning as homophonous adjectives:

- *true bullshit* would, on the usual meaning of *true*, be contradictory
- Daniel Dennett (in a 2003 TED talk): *real magic* is the kind that isn’t real, and *fake magic* is the kind that is
- *total idiot* but not *partial idiot*
- some don’t even have adjectival homophones: *utter, downright, out-and-out, straight-up, outright*
No predicative use:

\[
\text{(5) } \# \text{That } \{ \text{disaster, idiot, magic, bullshit} \} \text{ is } \{ \text{true, real, utter, absolute, outright} \}.
\]

Even worse with *seem*, a classic diagnostic of adjective-hood:

\[
\text{(6) } \# \text{That } \{ \text{disaster, idiot, magic, bullshit} \} \text{ seems } \{ \text{true, real, utter, absolute, outright} \}.
\]
Can’t support their own degree modification:

(7) \#some \{ absolutely true, completely real, very utter, quite absolute, fully outright \} \{ disaster, idiot, magic, bullshit \}
Broadly similar facts in various other languages (additional examples welcome!).

Japanese:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{mattaku-no} & \quad \text{utter} \\
\text{kanzen-na} & \quad \text{absolute} \\
\text{kanpeki-na} & \quad \text{outright} \\
\end{align*}
\]
Japanese counterparts also lack a predicative use:

(9) #Ano-baka-wa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>that idiot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mattaku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kanzen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absolute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kanpeki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outright</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-da .

‘That idiot is utter/absolute/outright.’
Japanese counterparts also can’t support their own degree modification:

(10) #

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ & \text{tometo, very, kanari, pretty, motto, more} \} \\
\{ & \text{mattaku-no, utter, kanzen-na, absolute, kanpeki-na, outright} \} \\
\{ & \text{baka, idiot} \}
\end{align*}
\]
Adnominal degree words often have ad-adjectival cognates:

(11)  
  a. true ~ truly
  b. real ~ really
  c. utter ~ utterly
  d. slight ~ slightly
  e. absolute ~ absolutely
  f. outright ~ outright (e.g., *outright dead*)
  g. flat-out ~ flat-out (e.g., *flat-out dead*)
  h. downright ~ downright (e.g., *downright dead*)
So, these adnominal modifiers:

- syntactically & semantically distinct from ordinary adjectives
- analogous to degree morphemes in AP such as *more*, *very*, *less*, *really*
ROADMAP

☑ Adnominal degree modifiers
  - Nominal gradability and degree arguments
  - Prototypicality modifiers
  - Size adjectives and their kin
  - The *utter* class
  - Broader considerations
  - Conclusion
Nouns support more structurally complicated degree constructions too:

(12) a. Clyde is more phonologist than phonetician.
    b. Clyde is more of an idiot than Floyd.

(13) a. Clyde is a bigger idiot than Floyd.
    b. Clyde is as big an idiot as Floyd.
Reasons to think nouns have a degree argument:

- Nouns have specialized degree words.
- Nouns support comparatives and equatives.
- Gradability is crosscategorial (Sapir 1944, Bolinger 1972, Abney 1987, Doetjes 1997, others).

Slap on a degree argument and go home?
Nagging worry: nouns aren’t as gradable as adjectives.
Bierwisch (1988a,b, 1989) suggests adjectives come in two flavors:

- dimensional adjectives: *tall, heavy, hot*
- evaluative adjectives: *stupid, ugly, lazy*

Crucial intuition: evaluative adjectives are ‘less clearly delimited and less systematically structured’ (Bierwisch 1988a).
Dimensional adjectives come in positive-negative antonym pairs:

(14)   a. tall $\leftrightarrow$ short
        b. heavy $\leftrightarrow$ light
        c. hot $\leftrightarrow$ cold
        d. deep $\leftrightarrow$ shallow
Evaluative adjectives lack a single clear antonym:

(15) a. \{ brave, bold, courageous \} ↔ \{ cowardly, timid, fearful \}

\{ clever, bright, shrewd, intelligent, brilliant \} ↔ \{ stupid, idiotic, foolish, bone-headed \}

\{ pretty, beautiful, gorgeous, attractive, handsome \} ↔ \{ ugly, unattractive, hideous, repellant, grotesque \}

\{ lazy, indolent, unproductive \} ↔ \{ hard-working, industrious, workaholic \}
Evaluative adjectives have minimal standards (in the Kennedy & McNally 2005 sense):

(16) **dimensional:**
    a. Clyde is taller than Floyd. **doesn’t entail**: Clyde is tall.
    b. This board is longer than that one. **doesn’t entail**: This board is long.

(17) **evaluative:**
    a. Clyde is stupider than Floyd. **entails**: Clyde is stupid.
    b. Clyde is lazier than Floyd. **entails**: Clyde is lazy.
Evaluative adjectives are compatible with *slightly* (a diagnostic for minimal standards; Rotstein & Winter 2001):

(18)  
   a. #Clyde is slightly tall.  
   b. #This board is slightly long.

(19)  
   a. Clyde is slightly stupid. 
   b. Clyde is slightly lazy.
Bierwisch: Only dimensional adjectives have a degree argument and are directly gradable.

But evaluative adjectives are gradable too!

\[
\begin{align*}
(20) & \quad \text{a. Clyde is } \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{uglier} \\ \text{stupider} \\ \text{braver} \\ \text{lazier} \end{array} \right\} \text{ than Floyd.} \\
& \quad \text{b. Clyde is very } \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{ugly} \\ \text{stupid} \\ \text{brave} \\ \text{lazy} \end{array} \right\}.
\end{align*}
\]

Bierwisch: a type shift makes these gradable indirectly.
Nominal gradability and degree arguments: 
Back to nouns

Maybe nouns are (mostly) like evaluative adjectives?
Therefore:

- No degree argument.
- Not directly gradable.
- But gradable indirectly.
Most nouns lack a single clear antonym:

(21)  

a. \{idiot, moron, cretin, halfwit, imbecile\} ↔ \{genius, prodigy, mastermind\}  

b. \{disaster, catastrophe, calamity\} ↔ \{triumph, stroke of luck, godsend, boon\}  

c. \{sportscar, race car, roadster\} ↔ \{jalopy, clunker, lemon\}  

Straining slightly at the positive end. Not sure why.
Important systematic exception: nominalized dimensional adjectives:

(22)  

a. tallness $\leftrightarrow$ shortness  
b. possibility $\leftrightarrow$ impossibility  
c. heat $\leftrightarrow$ cold(ness)  
d. depth $\leftrightarrow$ shallowness
Nouns seem to have minimal standards:

(23) Clyde is \[ \begin{cases} 
\text{a bigger idiot} \\ 
\text{more of an idiot} 
\end{cases} \] than Floyd.  
\textbf{entails}: Clyde is an idiot.

(24) This is a bigger disaster than that is.  
\textbf{entails}: That is a disaster.

(25) This is (even) bigger bullshit than that is.  
\textbf{entails}: That is bullshit.
Often compatible with *slight* (which might be like *slightly*):

(26) a. Clyde is a slight \{idiot, jerk\}.
    
b. There was some slight bullshit on page 12, but overall this paper is pretty reasonable.
Possible answer to why adjectives more suited to gradability than nouns:

- some adjectives are dimensional and have degree arguments
- no nouns are, so no nouns do
Roadmap

- Adnominal degree modifiers
- Nominal gradability and degree arguments
  - Prototypicality modifiers
  - Size adjectives and their kin
  - The *utter* class
  - Broader considerations
  - Conclusion
Project from here on: degree morphemes in the absence of degree arguments.

*Real* and *true* occur relatively freely (see also Constantinescu 2011):

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ \text{real} \} & \quad \{ \text{disaster}, \text{idiot}, \text{smoker}, \text{basketball fan}, \text{American}, \text{sportscar} \} \\
\{ \text{true} \} & \quad \{ \}
\end{align*}
\]

Similar freedom in Japanese (*hontoo-no* ‘real’).
Analytical intuition: *real* and *true* use scales of prototypicality. A *real idiot* is an especially prototypical one.

Prototypicality is a bit slippery. Predictions?

NPs with no prototypes (Kamp & Partee 1995) should be odd with *real*:

\[
(28) \text{Floyd is a } \{ \text{real} \} \{ \text{false} \} \{ \text{male nurse} \} \{ \text{#non-Methodist} \} \{ \text{#resident} \}.
\]
Real sportscar (roughly): ‘very similar to the prototypical sportscar’.

Ingredients:

- **prototype** maps a noun denotation to its prototype
- **similar**\(^c\) maps an individual and a prototype to the (maximal) degree of their similarity (in \(c\))
- **standard**\(^c\)(\(N\)) = the degree of similarity to a prototype sufficient to count as a member of extension of \(N\) (in \(c\))
- \(\gg\_c\) is a vague ‘considerably exceeds’ relation
*Real* requires exceeding the standard considerably (like *very*):

(29) a. $[[\text{real}]]^C = \lambda f \lambda x. \text{similar}_c(x, \text{prototype}(f)) \gg_c \text{standard}_c(f)$

b. $[[\text{real sportscar}]]^C$

$= \lambda x. \text{similar}_c(x, \text{prototype}(\text{sportscar})) \gg_c \text{standard}_c(\text{sportscar})$
Unmodified noun:

(30)  \[ \text{[ the sportscar]} = \nu x [\text{sportscar}(x)] \]

Assuming (31):

(31)  \[ \text{sportscar}(x) \iff \text{similar}_c(x, \text{prototype(sportscar)}) > \text{standard}_c(\text{sportscar}) \]
These are doubly ruled out:

(32) a. #That sportscar is real.
    b. #a very real sportscar

Wrong category, wrong type.
Contrast with *more of a*, which is also relatively free:

(33) a. This is more of a \{ disaster \\
    idiot \\
    smoker \\
    basketball fan \\
    American \\
    sportscar \}.

b. Floyd is more of a \{ male nurse \\
    non-Methodist \\
    ?resident \} than Clyde.

Suggests that *more of a* not about prototypes.
Potential problem?: a real sportscar might not be a typical sportscar.

Further possibilities:

- Spell out prototypicality intensionally?
- Or maybe this is all about intensionality rather than prototypicality (so, quantify over closest worlds with more stringent standards)?
 ✓ Adnominal degree modifiers
 ✓ Nominal gradability and degree arguments
 ✓ Prototypicality modifiers
 ■ Size adjectives and their kin
 ■ The utter class
 ■ Broader considerations
 ■ Conclusion
Degree readings of size adjectives (and major) more restricted:

\[(34) \begin{align*}
\{ \text{big, huge, major} \} & \quad \{ \text{disaster, idiot, smoker, basketball fan} \} \\
& \quad \{ \#\text{American, #sportscar} \}
\end{align*}\]

The idea: no degree argument, but certain nouns are inherently conceptually associated with scales.
Similar move necessary to reflect polysemy in adjectives:

(35)  a. The US is bigger than Canada. \hspace{1cm} \text{(population)}
b. Canada is bigger than the US. \hspace{1cm} \text{(area)}

*Big’s* lexical entry must make available multiple dimensions:

(36) \[ \text{dimensions}(\text{big}) = \{ \text{size-by-population, size-by-area, \ldots} \} \]
Another notion of multiple dimensions in adjectives (Sassoon 2007b, 2013):

(37)  a. Clyde is happy in every way.
       b. Clyde is healthy except for the migraines.
           ‘healthy in every dimension except migraines’

Sassoon’s one-dimensional adjectives:

(38)  #The table is long in all respects.
To be big, it is sufficient to exceed the standard on just one dimension.

Sassoon: this depends on the adjective (*healthy* requires all dimensions).
Standard assumption about simple adjectives: an unpronounced degree morpheme POS (Cresswell 1976, von Stechow 1984, Kennedy 1997, and many others). Possible implementation:

\[
\text{(39)} \quad [\text{POS}]^c = \lambda g \lambda x. \exists D \left[ D \in \text{dimensions}(g) \land \mu(D)(x) \geq \text{standard}_c(D) \right]
\]

\ldots where \( \mu(D) \) is the measure function associated with the dimension \( D \).

\[
\text{(40)} \quad [\text{Canada is POS big}]^c = \exists D \left[ D \in \text{dimensions}(\text{big}) \land \mu(D)(x) \geq \text{standard}_c(D) \right]
\]
Nouns may specify dimensions too:

(41) a. \text{dimensions}(\text{basketball-fan}) = \\
\{ \text{attention-devoted-to-basketball}, \text{enthusiasm-for-basketball}, \text{knowledge-about-basketball}, \\
\text{frequent-attendance}, \ldots \}

b. \text{dimensions}(\text{smoker}) = \\
\{ \text{frequency-of-smoking}, \text{enthusiasm-for-smoking} \ldots \}
For *chair*, though, it would be hard to articulate dimensions. No salient gradable quality is sufficient to be a chair.

So, **dimensions(chair)** is undefined.
On its degree reading, *big* requires that the measure of an individual along a lexically-determined dimension be large (treating *big* as a degree head, even though it isn’t one):

(42) a. \[
\text{\texttt{[big]}^c} = \lambda f \lambda x . \exists D \left[ D \in \text{dimensions}(f) \land \text{large}_{c}(\mu(D)(x)) \right]
\]

b. \[
\text{\texttt{[Clyde is a big smoker]}^c} = \exists D \left[ D \in \text{dimensions(smoker)} \land \text{large}_{c}(\mu(D)(\text{Clyde})) \right]
\]

NB: Still no degree argument for nouns: \([\text{smoker}]\) is \langle e, st \rangle; \([\text{big}]\) is \langle\langle e, st \rangle, \langle e, st \rangle\rangle.
How does this ensure that (43a) entails (43b)?

(43)  

a. Clyde is a big smoker.

b. Clyde is an smoker.

It doesn’t. Could add requirement of exceeding standard by a large amount:

(44)  

\[ \left[ \text{Clyde is a big smoker} \right]^c = \exists D \left[ D \in \text{dimensions(smoker)} \land \text{large}_c(\mu(D)(\text{Clyde}) - \text{standard}_c(D)) \right] \]
...but, a more interesting hypothesis:

(45) On their degree readings, nouns have minimal standards.

If nouns are evaluative in Bierwisch’s sense, expected, but not explained.
As with *chair*, `dimensions(sportscar)` not defined. Rules out `#big sportscar` (on degree reading):

\[
(46) \quad \left[ \, # \text{This is a big sportscar} \, \right]^c = \exists D \, [\, D \in \text{dimensions(sportscar)} \land \text{large}_c(\mu(D)(\text{this})) \, ]
\]

(A worry: `#big bullshit`?)
ROADMAP

- Adnominal degree modifiers
- Nominal gradability and degree arguments
- Prototypicality modifiers
- Size adjectives and their kin
- The *utter* class
- Broader considerations
- Conclusion
**THE utter CLASS:**
**A SINGLE DIMENSION**

More restricted still:

\[
\begin{aligned}
\text{utter} & \quad \text{disaster} \\
\text{complete} & \quad \text{idiot} \\
\text{total} & \quad \#\text{smoker} \\
\text{absolute} & \quad \#\text{basketball fan} \\
\text{outright} & \quad \#\text{American} \\
\text{flat-out} & \quad \#\text{sportscar}
\end{aligned}
\]
Japanese:

\[ (48) \]

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{mattaku-no} \\
&\text{utter} \\
&\text{kanzen-na} \\
&\text{absolute} \\
&\text{kanpeki-na} \\
&\text{outright} \\
&\text{baka} \\
&\text{idiot} \\
&\text{#sutampu-zuki} \\
&\text{stamp-lover}
\end{align*}
\]
What’s special about disaster, idiot?

- Being a basketball fan is complicated.
- Being an idiot is simple.
Some nouns specify only one dimension:

\[(49) \begin{align*} 
    \text{a. } \text{dimensions}(\text{idiot}) &= \{\text{idio}cy\} \\
    \text{b. } \text{dimensions}(\text{disaster}) &= \{\text{disastrousness}\} 
\end{align*} \]
Utter presupposes that its noun is unidimensional:

\[
(50) \quad \text{a. } \left[ \text{utter} \right]^c \\
= \lambda f \lambda x \cdot \text{large}_c(\mu(\iota D[D \in \text{dimensions}(f)])(x))
\]

\[
\text{b. } \left[ \text{Clyde is an utter idiot} \right]^c \\
= \text{large}_c(\mu(\iota D[D \in \text{dimensions}(\text{idiot})])(\text{Clyde})) \\
= \text{large}_c(\mu(\text{idiocy})(\text{Clyde}))
\]

Requires that the measure of Clyde along the idiocy scale be large.
What goes wrong in \#utter smoker?

- failure of presupposition
- there are multiple dimensions specified by \textit{smoker}
- so \( \nu D[D \in \text{dimensions(smoker)}] \) is undefined
What goes wrong in \#utter sportscar?

- same as in \#big sportscar
- failure of presupposition
- there are no dimensions specified by sportscar
- so dimensions(sportscar) is undefined
Adnominal degree modifiers
Nominal gradability and degree arguments
Prototypicality modifiers
Size adjectives and their kin
The *utter* class

- **Broader considerations**
- Conclusion
Accusation: You’re simply equivocating about types!

- nouns don’t have a degree argument
- but are ‘associated’ with a degree-based dimension
We could just stipulate dimensions lexically, as another level of meaning. Lexical entry:

(51)  a. $\text{TRANSLATION}(\text{idiot}) = \text{idiot}$
     b. $\text{dimensions}(\text{idiot}) = \{\text{idiocy}\}$

Comparable to the e.g. ordinary and focus semantic values ($[\cdot], [\cdot]^f$).
But this would miss something:

- Dimensionality is a fact about the concept of idiocy, not the word *idiot* (or *basketball fan* etc.).
- Could we have a word just like *idiot*, but with different dimensions?
But *how* does one go from the concept ‘idiot’ to the dimension idiocy? One option:

- Doetjes et al. (2011) suggest that nominal gradability in general works this way.
- Does this get us any farther, though?
Standard criticism leveled against degree analyses of adjectives:

- If an adjective always has a degree argument, a null morpheme \( (\text{POS}) \) will often be needed to saturate it.
- But it seems to be null more often than not. Suspicious!
- More generally: truth conditions of the positive form based on the comparative.
Perhaps, a middle ground:

- Adjectives denote simple properties after all, but may be associated with dimensions.
- Dimensions come into play only when overt degree morphemes are present.
- Reflects what language seems to be telling us: to manipulate a degree argument, you have to do something to an adjective.

... but then we’d lose the adjective-noun type difference.
Adnominal degree modifiers
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Summary:

- Nouns support a rich and varied array of degree modifiers.
- Only indirectly gradable.
- Some adnominal degree modifiers involve prototypicality scales (*real, true*).
- Others involve scales provided indirectly by the noun.
  - Some presuppose a single scale (*utter, complete*).
  - Others don’t (*big, huge, major*).
- Major axis of variation among adnominal degree modifiers: how they extract a scale from noun.
- Yields a typology of adnominal degree modifiers, and therefore also of nouns.
Things I’ve said nothing about:

- scale structure
- expressive meaning (as in a fucking goat)
- extremeness (as in extreme adjectives like gigantic)

Big-picture issues:

- Where precisely does this leave adjectives?
- Independent diagnostics for dimensions?
Thanks!

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For adjectives, scale structure is crucial. How far would that have gotten us here?

- nothing here to suggest that scale structure isn’t important for nouns too
- probably not relevant to presence or absence of a degree argument
- probably not relevant to *real/true*
- what about *big* vs *utter*?
**Utterly** may require upper-closed scales:

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ \text{utterly, completely, absolutely} \} & \quad \{ \text{impossible/\#possible} \} \\
& \quad \{ \text{closed/\#open} \} \\
& \quad \{ \text{full/\#empty} \}
\end{align*}
\]

Nominalizations:

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ \text{utter, complete, absolute} \} & \quad \{ \text{impossibility/\#possibility} \} \\
& \quad \{ \text{?closure/\#openness} \} \\
& \quad \{ \text{transparency/opacity} \} \\
& \quad \{ \text{??fullness/emptiness} \}
\end{align*}
\]
But:

(54) a. \[
\begin{align*}
\{ & \text{utter} \\
\{ & \text{complete} \\
\{ & \text{absolute} \\
\{ & \idiot \\
\{ & \text{disaster} \\
\{ & \text{idiotic} \\
\{ & \text{disastrous} \\
\end{align*}
\]

b. \[
\begin{align*}
\{ & \text{utterly} \\
\{ & \text{completely} \\
\{ & \text{absolutely} \\
\{ & \text{idiotic} \\
\{ & \text{disastrous} \\
\end{align*}
\]

So: scale structure remains important, but probably not an account of the contrast.
A class of cross-categorial degree modifiers that occur with ‘extreme’ predicates (Morzycki 2012):

\[
\begin{aligned}
&\text{outright} \\
&\text{flat-out} \\
&\text{straight-up} \\
&\text{out-and-out} \\
&\text{downright}
\end{aligned}
\quad \begin{aligned}
&\text{huge/\#big} \\
&\text{fantastic/\#OK} \\
&\text{excessive/\#appropriate}
\end{aligned}
\]

Are unidimensional degree modifiers actually just extreme? Would explain \#utter heap.
But nominalizations again:

$$\scriptsize\{\begin{array}{ll}
\text{complete} \qquad & \text{impossibility} \\
\text{absolute} \qquad & \text{transparency} \\
\end{array}\qquad \begin{array}{ll}
\text{opacity} \\
\text{fullness} \\
\text{emptiness} \\
\end{array}\normalsize$$

Are these really extreme (lexically or even wrt a particular context)?

Would this help with #complete basketball fan?
(57) Clyde didn’t see a fucking goat.

(58) Clyde didn’t see a(n) \{ idiot, disaster, genius \}.
(59) Clyde thinks he saw \( \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
a \text{fucking goat} \\
\text{that bastard Floyd}
\end{array} \right\} \).

(60) Clyde thinks he saw a \( \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\text{absolute} \\
\text{utter}
\end{array} \right\} \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\text{idiot} \\
\text{disaster} \\
\text{genius}
\end{array} \right\} \).
References


