I. Administrative

A. Extra credit due on Thursday. Papers are due as email attachments to me next Tuesday (Word doc or pdf).

B. Questions?

II. Perry's Dialogue

A. Perry focuses on PI in the context of concern about death.

   1. Personal identity is the relation that secures anticipation and memory; that is, you anticipate the experiences of the person to whom you will be identical, and the same is true of memory, *mutatis mutandis*.

   2. Weirob wants Miller and Cohen to convince her that there is reason to hope that she will not just cease to exist when her body dies; in other words, she wants them to convince her that she will be identical with some person after the death of her body.

B. The Picture:

   ![Diagram]

   **BODY** &lt;---------&gt; **MENTAL STATES** &lt;---------&gt; **SOUL**
   (Consciousness)

   1. These need not be composed of distinct substances---you could maintain that the soul is the mind and that the mind is simply physical, thus collapsing all three into one substance.
2. Nevertheless, you could still make the distinctions necessary to adopt this model.

C. On Night 1, the parties attempt to make the soul the seat of PI; on Night 2, they attempt to make Consciousness the seat; on Night 3, they consider whether it is acceptable to regard the body as the seat of PI.

D. Night One: Miller attempts to convince Weirob that the soul is the seat of personal identity; that is, a person at one time is numerically identical to a person at another time if the persons in question have the same soul.

1. **Problem #1**: You can't see the soul, so you cannot have perceptual justification of a PI judgment.

2. **Problem #2**: The standard would appear to be "Same Body, Same Soul", but you have no independent standard for this given that you cannot perceive the soul.

3. **Problem #3**: In response to Problem #2, Miller notes that we have ignored the evidence of our own experience, and that once you do you can see that it is in the psychological states that we can discern what we need to determine sameness of soul. However, "Same Psychological State, Same Soul" doesn't work as a standard either. Weirob uses the river here, noting that you can have the same river states at the dam even though the water is different; thus you could have sameness of psychological states even though the underlying soul stuff is different.

4. Weirob doesn't believe that the failure of this view threatens PI; rather, it threatens the hypothesis that PI is grounded in sameness of soul.

E. Night Two: On this night, Miller and Cohen attempt to convince Weirob that personal identity is grounded in sameness of psychological states, or consciousness; thus, two persons at different times would be identical if they had the same consciousness.

1. How can we get the psychological relation right? The suggestion is that the two person stages are related via memory.

2. You can't have it depend on identity---that is, you can't say that one has real memory if they are identical with the one who was there at the time the even took place, or you have a vicious circle.
3. One might try to rescue the memory hypothesis with causality, saying that the difference between real and false memory is that real memory is caused in the right way; however, the problem with this is that you either must rely on the body to be the same (i.e., the causality is supported by the same body) or you open yourself up to the duplication argument, according to which you get causal relationships between memories at one time and causally produced memories in a different brain at another time.

F. **Personal Identity:** Perry's Dialogue, Night Three

1. At this point in the dialogue, Weirob has cast doubt on two suggestions: that PI is grounded in sameness of soul or in sameness of consciousness, or psychological states. What remains is consideration of the possibility that PI is grounded in sameness of body, which is the view Weirob advocates.

2. They begin by questioning whether personal identity stays with the brain or with the body in cases of brain transplants. (Weirob believes it is the body.)

   a. It is not a matter of convention.

   b. Can we decide based on the Memory Theory? If so, then personal identity would be determined by sameness of brain.

      i. Problems with real/false memory again; however, in this case the MT seems to work: it avoids the last problem of Night Two because the brain remains identical while retaining its virtues—the asymmetry of anticipation and the ability to judge without the body.

      ii. However, there is the brain rejuvenation problem, which is just another example of the Duplication Argument: if the brain could be rejuvenated (and perhaps even duplicated), where does the person go?