I. Administrative
   A. Roll
   B. Group Paper Assignment: How did it go?
   C. Grading plan…
   D. Schedule review
   E. Questions?

II. Belief and Believing
   A. Belief is a relation between a state in an agent and some thing believed.
      1. To avoid circularity, we must be able to cash out what it is to believe without making use of the concept belief. This might be possible in terms of action, focusing on the functional role that certain states of the agent play.
      2. There is a world-mind direction of fit to this relation.
      3. This can come in different forms: strong belief, weak belief, acceptance, commitment, “being sure”, … others? …
   B. Epistemologists typically focus on weaker forms, especially insofar as they relate to propositions.
   C. Perhaps the other types of belief are more appropriate to different types of knowledge? (Hold this thought…)
III. Knowledge

A. To the extent that epistemology is concerned with knowledge—and a very great extent that is—it is concerned with a certain type relation between agents and the world.

1. This relation looks a lot like belief: it involves a state within us, the state represents or corresponds in some way to something to which we are committed, and it has a world-mind direction of fit.

2. By contrast with belief, though, knowledge implies the “right to be sure”. Pushing harder on this, we can say that it is factive.

3. What can we say about the connection that knowledge supplies?
   a. It would appear to be stronger than belief.
   b. Might it be supplied by things other than representational states? For instance, being “in the groove”.

B. Types of Knowledge

1. Propositional knowledge
2. Procedural knowledge
3. Experiential knowledge
4. Interpersonal knowledge

C. Analyzing Knowledge

1. Given what we have said, it would appear that knowledge involves belief.
   a. This seems clear for propositional knowledge—what of the other types?
   b. Can we know without belief?

2. Given that knowledge would appear to be factive, this implies that knowledge involves truth. You cannot be wrong and still in the know.

3. Would this be enough? Is “right opinion” all that is required?
a. In the *Theaetetus*, Plato talks about an “account”; in the *Meno*, he addresses this in terms of being “tied down”.

b. An account, or some kind of reason or “right to be sure” would appear to be required here.

c. Thus, *justification* would also appear to be implied by knowledge. But what can we say about this justification?

4. Call this the “Traditional Analysis of Knowledge” (TAK)—knowledge is justified true belief.

**IV. Challenging the TAK, I: Plato**

A. The excerpt from the *Theaetetus* focuses on aspects of the suggestion that knowledge is “true judgment with an account”. This is an instance of the TAK.

B. The first half of the excerpt concerns an interesting argument that lies at the interface between epistemology and metaphysics.

1. The Claim in Question: Complex things are knowable, but the elements out of which complexes are constructed are not knowable because they cannot be given an account. They “can only be named” (126).

2. Socrates argues that either (a) complexes are mere sums, in which case they are unknowable if the parts are, or (b) they are wholes and just as primitive as their parts, in which the parts are knowable if they are.

3. Thus, there is no epistemically principled difference between complexes and their elements.

4. As Socrates puts it, “So if anyone says that a complex is knowable and expressible in an account, and an element the opposite, let’s not accept it” (129).

C. The second half concerns the primary topic, which is whether knowledge really is true judgment with an account.

1. An assumption: one can have a true judgment without an account

2. Socrates suggests that three types of things might be accounts:
a. *A Narrative of What One Believes*. No—if so, everyone with a true judgment would have knowledge.

b. *A Description of the Thing Known, Element by Element*. No—one can have a grip on all the elements without knowledge, so one can have this plus a true judgment and not have knowledge.

c. *Identification of the Characteristic Feature of a Thing*, i.e., the property that differentiates it from all others. No—this leads either to regress or circularity.

3. **Upshot**: there is no adequate account of *account* and we should be much more cautious about what we claim to know

V. **Challenging the TAK, II: Gettier**

A. Where Are the Troubles with the TAK?

Knowledge $\equiv$ Justified True Belief

Troubles with Justification

Too Strong  \hspace{1cm}  Too Weak

Repairs to Justification

Troubles with Truth

Too Strong  \hspace{1cm}  Too Weak

Repairs to Truth

Troubles with Belief

Too Strong  \hspace{1cm}  Too Weak

Repairs to Belief
B. Gettier Examples

1. Gettier’s examples and their modification

2. A Recipe for Gettier Counterexamples
   a. Take a false claim that the subject has every reason to believe and does believe.
   b. Derive a true claim from that false claim by application of a deductive abstraction rule such as disjunction introduction or existential introduction. (Would others work?)
   c. Assume that the subject is logically savvy and so recognizes that the second, true claim follows from the first claim.
   d. Further, assume the subject believes the second claim.
   e. At this point, you have the subject believing a true claim with justification, but intuition tells us that the subject does not know the claim.

3. Gettier Counterexamples in Argument Form
   P1. For the sake of reductio, assume TAK: I have knowledge if and only if I have justified, true belief.
   P2. The Justified Falsehood Principle: One can be justified in believing a false claim.
   P3. Let p be a false claim that S is justified in believing.
   P4. The Deduction Doesn’t Buy You Much Principle: Claims that are as a matter of fact true can be deductive implications of claims that are as a matter of fact false.
   P5. Let p’ be a true, deductive implication of p. (Underwritten by P4.)
   P7. The Justified Deduction Principle: If a claim A is justified for an agent, then any deductive implication of that claim is also justified for that agent.
8. From P3, P5, and P7, S is justified in believing $p'$.  

9. From P5, P6, and 8, $p'$ is a justified, true belief for S.  

P10. However, S does not know $p'$.  

11. Thus, it is not the case that if you have a justified, true belief, then you have knowledge.  

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C. Therefore, from 11 and P1, $TAK$ is false.  

4. Responding to Gettier  

a. Rejecting the Argument as Unsound  

i. P1, P3, P5, and P6 are “for the sake of argument” assumptions and are not at risk.  

ii. P4 is a feature of deductive logic, and you don’t want to reject deductive logic.  

iii. P10 is rooted in intuition—it is open to rejection, but a compelling argument would probably get you tenure at Princeton. Without a BA.  

iv. So P2 and P7 are the exposed premises. P2 is buttressed by the Same Evidence Principle, according to which the actual truth value of a claim doesn’t affect its justificatory status. P7 is also buttressed by this principle, as well as the character of deductive logic.  

b. Rejecting TAK  

i. The “No False Grounds” Repair  

ii. The “No Defeaters” Repair  

iii. The “No Essential Dependence” Repair  

iv. Reflection on the nature of the logical move: what do we learn about the counterexample by thinking about this?