So here are the “take home” messages about Frege and Davidson:

**Frege**

- Linguistic meaning is *two-tiered*: all linguistic items have sense and reference. These are the aspects of meaning that semantics concerns; other aspects, including imagery, are matters for psychology. This applies to names, phrases/clauses, and sentences.
  - Senses are *expressed* by linguistic items, and they serve to *present* references. They are objective modes of presentation. (With names, think of senses as descriptions; with sentences, they are propositions.)
  - References are whatever is *nominated* by a linguistic item. They can be names objects (in the case of names and other singular terms), truth values (in the case of sentences), and even senses (in the case of linguistic items in opaque contexts). The objects can even include images.
- The nuts-and-bolts of this atomistic theory are presented in the latter 2/3 of the paper, where he considers a variety of linguistic contexts. In normal, transparent contexts, words/phrases have their usual senses and references. In opaque contexts (i.e., contexts where you cannot substitute words/phrases *salva veritate*, such as belief contexts), words/phrases refer to their typical senses with the help of second-order senses. Combinations of words/phrases in clauses (e.g., subjective, relative, and conditional clauses) result in complex but regular functional combinations of sense and reference. (More on this in a later handout, hopefully.)
- This move is motivated by a desire to solve the co-reference and no-reference problems. (These are introduced and evaluated using a substitutional methodology that depends on notions of synonymy.)

**Davidson**

- Linguistic meaning is given holistically at the level of the sentence. A ToM assigns truth conditions (via T-sentences) to each sentence of a language in a way that respects PC, and in so doing, discharges its responsibility. The result is a specification of what must be known to know the language.
  - A ToM will be axiomatic, involving axioms that specify primitive characteristics
of linguistic types and inference rules. The T-sentences for sentences in the language will be derived from these axioms in proofs that display how their meanings are built up from the meanings of the parts. The bulk of the work of the semanticist is to specify these axioms and work out the representative theorems. (See handout.)

- It must presume logic and a certain range of analyses that bear on semantic concepts such as truth and reference.

- The focus of this ToM is to provide an account of the significance of linguistic structure—i.e., grammatical combinations that depend on PC. The role of a semantic theory is not to specify the meanings of words—that is the job of the specific domains that introduce and depend on those words (e.g., aesthetics, chemistry, etc.). But those meanings will need to respect the roles played by the words in the language at large.

- This ToM will need to be supplemented by a theory of force and a pragmatic theory in order to do justice to language in communication, but that would need to be provided in any case.

- Co-reference and no-reference problems are not an issue here, since not all items need have reference. In his paper, the outlines of this theory are motivated by the failure of atomistic approaches.