I. Grice’s Second Argument Against Stevenson

P1. An utterance of ‘Jones is an athlete’ seems to imply that Jones is tall.

P2. Causal theories like Stevenson’s must not imply that an utterance of ‘Jones is an athlete’ means that Jones is tall.

P3. Stevenson introduces permissive rules of language to sever this connection.

P4. But these rules are justified because we need to preserve the intuition that ‘nontall athletes’ is meaningful.

P5. But meaningfulness is what we’re attempting to analyze.

P6. Stevenson’s account is circular.

P7. If a theoretical account of meaning is circular, it is not explanatory.

C. Stevenson’s account is not explanatory.

II. Grice’s Argument for the Second Condition of His Analysis of Meaning

P1. The first two conditions of Grice’s analysis are as follows: \( x \text{ means}_{\text{NN}} P \) iff (a) \( x \) was intended by its utterer to induce a belief that \( P \) in her audience, and (b) the utterer intended the audience to recognize the intention in (a).

P2. The adequate analysis of “\( \text{means}_{\text{NN}} \)” must make essential use of the utterer’s intentions and must not be reducible to causal
association (i.e., natural meaning).

P3. The analysis in (P1) is consistent with examples like Herod and Salome, or Mr. X and the photo of Mr. Y, since in both cases the utterer (viz., Herod and Grice) intend their audience (viz., Salome and Mr. X) to form a particular belief and to recognize their intention to get them to form that belief.

P4. However, in these cases, the intention is otiose: all the work is done by the audience seeing the evidence with their own eyes, making this an act of “communication” where the meaning conveyed is natural meaning through causal association.

5. Thus, these examples reveal that the analysis in P1 is not adequate—at least one additional condition is required.

P6. The condition should make the intentions in P1 relevant to the belief formed in P3.

P7. Examples like Mr. X and the drawing of Mr. Y reveal that what is necessary is for the audience’s recognition of the utterer’s intention to be part of what causes their belief.

C. Thus, a third condition should be added to the analysis in P1: (c) the recognition in (b) should be part of what causes the belief in (a).