The lectures open with Grice evaluating a certain approach to the evaluation of meaning. He doesn't reject it, but argues that it must be taken with great care. It isn't at all obvious that a condition which influences our semantic intuitions is itself semantic.

P1. “... one begins with the observation that a certain range of expressions E, in each of which is embedded a subordinate expression $\alpha$—let us call this range $E(\alpha)$—is such that its members would not be used in application to certain specimen situations, that their use would be odd or inappropriate or even would make no sense; one then suggests that the relevant feature of such situations is that they fail to satisfy some condition C ...; and one concludes that it is a characteristic of the concept expressed by $\alpha$, a feature of the meaning or use of $\alpha$, that $E(\alpha)$ is applicable only if C is satisfied” (3). Call this the A-Phil Move.

P2. If we accept this, then C becomes a part of the meaning of $\alpha$.

P3. If C is a part of the meaning of $\alpha$, then it is a part of its semantic content.

P4. C is a part of its semantic content iff it is a part of its truth-conditional content.

P5. If C is a part of its truth-conditional content, then when C is violated, $E(\alpha)$ is either false or lacks a truth-value.

P6. C can be violated in many of these cases (e.g., ‘remember’, ‘see’) without $E(\alpha)$ being false or lacking a truth value.

C. We should not accept the A-Phil Move. (modus tollens, P1-P6)

II. Logic and Conversation

After announcing that he plans to examine natural language with a view to explaining meaning, he seeks to (a) avoid the A-Phil Move and (b) avoid committing either to the formal or informal approach to semantics. Instead, he advocates a "middle way" that consists in taking the A-Phil Move to be informative about total content without necessarily informing us about the semantic (or conventional) content.
P1. If the total content of U is the same as the semantic content of U (TC=SC), then we would typically embrace either the formalist or informalist approach.

P2. If formalist, then logic and systematicity are privileged, but context sensitivity, ambiguity, etc. are marginalized.

P3. If informalist, then context sensitivity, ambiguity, etc. are privileged, but logic and systematicity are marginalized.

P4. We should not marginalize any of this if we want an adequate account of language.

5. Don’t go with the formalist or informalist approach.

P6. If we consider TC≠SC, then we can have the best of both worlds.

P7. If we let TC= (SC + PC), then formalists can explain SC (as WIS) and informalists can explain PC (as what is implicated).

P8. It is better to endorse a compromise approach that gets you what you want rather than an alternative that leaves you without something important.

C. Endorse Grice’s view that TC=(SC + PC)

III. Indicative Conditionals

This chapter supplies an especially important case study involving a bit of language that is of crucial importance to theory. The conditional is what Jonathan Bennett calls a "load-bearing" element in theory, as it is used to model inference patterns that tie propositions together into a systematic account. If Grice can't make his story work for these, he's in big trouble. If he can make it work, that is compelling evidence that it will generalize to cover the tough cases.

P1. If the story in "Logic and Conversation" is correct, then we have the semantic content of the indicative conditional supplied by its truth table (i.e., its natural language meaning is the same as its logical meaning).

P2. If the semantic content of the indicative conditional is given by its truth table, other aspects of its typical significance (including the "Indirectness Condition") must be explained using the pragmatic machinery of implicature.

P3. If we use the machinery of "L&C", we can establish these aspects as pragmatic using the tests of non-detachibility and cancelability; further, we can capture important features of the indicative conditional using the maxims to derive the
implicatures.

P4. Two problems remain: (a) we must establish what is special about the conditional as against the disjunction, and (b) we must establish how the conditional functions when negated.

P5. To distinguish it from the disjunction, we demonstrate the different roles played by the conditional and the disjunction in inquiry.

P6. To establish its negated function, we employ the bracketing device that appears to be necessary in any case to handle certain disjunctions; this is not part of the meaning of the negation, but is a reflection of the conversational employment of negated conditionals.

C. All aspects of the TC of the indicative conditional can be modeled using the approach from "L&C", supplying an important piece of evidence in favor of the power of the approach.