I. Administrative

A. General Questions?

II. Reference as Meaning – review

A. What is the referential position?
B. What can be said for it?
C. What are the problems it faces?
D. How does Russell respond to those problems?

III. Modifying RTM, II: Frege

A. Meaningful pieces of language have two levels of meaning, their sense and their reference.

1. The sense of a word is how its reference is presented.
   a. It is the mode of presentation of the reference.
   b. Frege tends to describe the sense as if it is descriptive in character, using descriptive language to unpack how a referent (e.g., Aristotle) is presented by its name.

2. References are whatever is nominated by a linguistic item. They can be names objects (in the case of names and other singular terms), truth values (in the case of sentences), and even senses (in the case of linguistic items in opaque contexts). The objects can even include images.

B. The nuts-and-bolts of this atomistic theory are presented in the latter 2/3 of the paper, where he considers a variety of linguistic contexts.

1. In normal, transparent contexts, words/phrases have their usual senses and references.

2. In opaque contexts (i.e., contexts where you cannot substitute
words/phrases *salva veritate*, such as belief contexts), words/phrases refer to their typical senses with the help of second-order senses.

3. Combinations of words/phrases in clauses (e.g., subjective, relative, and conditional clauses) result in complex but regular functional combinations of sense and reference.

C. Adding the sense addresses the second set of problems directly, by supplementing the insufficient reference. It also helps with the first set of problems by serving up something that can be a semantic stand-in for reference when reference fails. (Examples)

D. There are *many* detailed developments of this view, and it is still a predominant view in the philosophy of language.

E. *Problems:*

1. Too vague—what is a sense?

2. If senses are modes of presentation of the referent, what are we to make of cases in which there are no referents to present?

3. The descriptive approach to sense seems to get various referential phenomena wrong.