I. Administrative
   A. General Questions?

II. Problems to Keep In View for the Semantics of Referring Terms
   A. Reference is not necessary for meaning
      1. Empty names – ‘Santa Claus’
      2. Negative existentials – “Santa Claus does not exist”
   B. Reference is not sufficient for meaning
      1. Frege’s Puzzle – a=a and a=b
      2. Substitutivity in opaque contexts

III. Whose View?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicate whose view is whose: Frege, Searle, Russell, Mill</th>
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<td>A.</td>
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IV. Background Distinctions
   A. Reference vs. meaning → think Alice & Humpty Dumpty
   B. Meaning vs. mechanism → contribution vs. function
V. Mill’s View

A. The Details
   1. General name vs. singular name
   2. Collective name vs. general name
   3. Concrete name vs. abstract name
   4. Connotative name vs. non-connotative name

B. Names are merely tags for their referents

C. Thus, the semantics of names is supplied simply in terms of reference

D. This falls prey to the problems above

VI. Frege’s View

A. Names have both sense and reference, where the sense can often be given by a definite description

B. You can rely on sense to supply meaningfulness when reference is absent

C. You can rely on both to help deal with the problems of insufficiency

D. Problems: This seems to be ad hoc in spots; also, see Kripke

VII. Russell’s View

A. Logically proper names are Millian, but there are vanishingly few of them (e.g., variables of quantification, possibly ‘this’ and ‘that’ used to refer to sense data) – these must have reference

B. Most names, including all the proper names we typically think about in this context, are really disguised descriptions, and so don’t really have reference at all – they are analyzed away, “On Denoting” style

C. As Russell argues, this view solves the problems

D. Problems: it leaves us without reference almost everywhere; it flies in the face of how we use names

VIII. Searle’s View

A. Sides with Frege, but agrees that the limited Fregean view gets us into trouble
B. Thinks Russell’s view ignores the obviously referential character of names, and leaves us only with variables of quantification as referring devices.

C. Modifies Frege by saying that the “sense” is supplied by a “sufficient but unspecified number” of descriptive statements.

D. This gets around some of the troubles for Frege while solving the problems; further it conforms to how we learn and teach names.

E. **Problems:** see Kripke.