I. Administrative

A. Readings and writings
B. General Questions?

II. Reading Essay Comments

III. Worksheet on Kripke – 20 minutes

IV. So What & the Big Picture(s)

A. What is the problem in this class?

1. Big Problem 1: We use language all the time and understand it effortlessly, but still understand so little about it. What gives?

2. Big Problem 2: How do thought, language, and the world relate to one another? How is it that we can coordinate these so smoothly?

B. What is the problem we’re focusing on now?

1. Little Problem 1: One way to talk about meaning is in terms of reference – can we come up with a theory of meaning in terms of reference alone?

2. Little Problem 2: Even if reference doesn’t work as a comprehensive explanatory mechanism, surely it is part of the story; if so, though, how do we make sense out of it?

3. Little Problem 3: Given LP2, we should be able to figure out how names work, since they are referring terms sine qua non.

V. The Description Theory, a la Kripke

A. Kripke critiques the description theory, some version of which we have
been getting at in most of our reading.

B. He boils it down to six theses and a general condition (53):

1. To every name or designating expression ‘X’, there corresponds a 
   cluster of properties, namely the family of those properties φ such that 
   A believes ‘φX’

2. One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick 
   out some individual uniquely

3. If most, or a weighted most, of the φ’s are satisfied by one unique 
   object y, then y is the referent of ‘X’

4. If the vote yields no unique object, ‘X’ does not refer

5. The statement, ‘If X exists, then X has most of the φ’s’ is known a 
   priori by the speaker

6. The statement, ‘If X exists, then X has most of the φ’s’ expresses a 
   necessary truth (in the idiolect of the speaker)

7. (C): For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The 
   properties which are used in the vote must not themselves involve the 
   notion of reference in such a way that it is ultimately impossible to 
   eliminate them.

VI. Considering the Theses

A. Thesis 1: A definition

B. Thesis 2:

1. Notice the emphasis on believed by A

2. The properties (which could be expressed by descriptions) must be 
   uniquely satisfied

3. Counterexamples: Cicero, Feynman, Einstein
P1. If Thesis 2, then we could only successfully use ‘Feynman’ to refer to Feynman if we had a property that picked him out uniquely.

P2. People successfully refer to Feynman even if all they know about him is that he is a physicist (or perhaps nothing at all!)

C. Thesis 2 is false.

C. Thesis 3:

1. This isn’t tied to the beliefs of the speaker, or even the speaker at all

2. What counts as a weighted most?

3. Counterexamples: Gödel/Schmidt, Peano/Dedekind, Einstein again

P1. If Thesis 3 is true, then if I use the name ‘Gödel’ successfully to refer and I associate with it the property of being the person who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic, then I refer to the person who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic.

P2. In the Gödel/Schmidt case, I would successfully refer to Schmidt with the name ‘Gödel’.

P3. I can use the name ‘Gödel’ successfully to refer to Gödel even if I associate with it the property of being the person who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic and it was Schmidt who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic.

C. Thesis 3 is false.

D. Thesis 4:

1. The “vote” is what’s discussed under Thesis 3

2. Counterexamples: Cicero, Feynman, Jonah
P1. If Thesis 4 is true, then if most (or a weighted most) of the φ’s I associate with a name ‘X’ are not satisfied by a unique object, then ‘X’ does not refer.

P2. ‘X’ refers even if most (or a weighted most) of the φ’s I associate with it are not satisfied by a unique object, in two ways: (a) there is more than one object that satisfies them (e.g., ‘Feynman’), or (b) there is no one that satisfies them (e.g., ‘Jonah’).

C. Thesis 4 is false.

E. Thesis 5:
   1. To say that the name is known a priori is to say that the speaker needs no experience with X to know that X has most of the φ’s
   2. Kripke allows that names could work like this, and in fact some seem to (e.g., ‘Jack the Ripper’), but most names do not work this way; in most cases, we can reasonably wonder whether a person we name really has the property we associate with him/her, for (almost?) any property
   3. Counterexamples: Gödel/Schmidt (compare reactions with the “Jack the Ripper” case)

P1. If Thesis 5 is true, then I must know a priori that if Gödel exists, then he discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic.

P2. I believe that Gödel discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic, and this belief probably counts as knowledge, but it is certainly not a priori – consider that I would need to rule out possible scenarios like the one involving Schmidt as fanciful and false.

C. Thesis 5 is false.

F. Thesis 6:
   1. This is a metaphysical thesis, concerned with necessity
   2. Necessity for Kripke is made out in terms of possible worlds
3. This thesis is associated with *rigid designation*

4. Kripke denies that one need have a weighted most of the properties associated with one’s name

5. *Counterexamples: Aristotle, Hitler*

   P1. If Thesis 6 is true, then it would be *impossible* (in my dialect) for the X to exist and not have most (or a weighted most) of the properties I attribute to him/her.

   P2. It is possible that Aristotle existed but did not have most or even any of the properties that he is thought to have. (Consider also the Jonah case, as well as the possibility that Nixon might have grown up to be a cabaret singer or an auto mechanic.)

   C. Thesis 6 is false.

G. **Condition (C):**

   1. Consider: “‘Socrates’ refers to the man I call Socrates”

   2. Failure to avoid circularity keeps the theory from getting off the ground

VII. **Kripke’s “Picture”**

   A. Kripke doesn’t offer a theory; rather, he is interested in offering a better “picture” of reference

   B. His picture is contained here: “An initial ‘baptism’ takes place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the reference of the name may be fixed by a description. When the name is ‘passed from link to link’, the receiver of the name must … intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from who he heard it” (63)