I. Grice’s first argument against Stevenson

P1. Stevenson’s account can be expressed as follows: “for x to mean something, x must have (roughly) a tendency to produce in an audience some attitude (cognitive or otherwise) and a tendency, in the case of a speaker, to be produced by that attitude, these tendencies being dependent on ‘an elaborate process of conditioning attending the use of the sign in communication.’”

P2. My putting on a tail coat because I am going to a dance tends to be produced by the belief that I am going to a dance and tends to induce in my audience the belief that I am going to a dance.

P3. However, when I put on a tail coat for this reason, I am not communicating anything.

4. Given P3, P1 cannot imply that P2 involves communication and be adequate

P5. The only resource in P1 for blocking the implication that P2 involves communication is the “elaborate process of conditioning attending the use of the sign in communication”.

P6. This can’t just mean that the tendency is learned, since that won’t block P1 from implying that P2 involves communication.

P7. It can’t be due to the use of the sign in communication, because then we are trying to block P1 from implying that P2 involves communication by saying that P2 does not involve communication, which is circular.

8. We can’t keep P1 from implying that P2 involves communication.

C. Stevenson’s account is not correct.
II. Grice’s second argument against Stevenson

P1. An utterance of ‘Jones is an athlete’ seems to imply that Jones is tall.

P2. Causal theories like Stevenson’s must not imply that an utterance of ‘Jones is an athlete’ means that Jones is tall.

P3. Stevenson introduces *permissive rules of language* to sever this connection.

P4. But these rules are justified because we need to preserve the intuition that ‘nontall athletes’ is meaningful.

P5. But *meaningfulness* is what we’re attempting to analyze.

P6. Stevenson’s account is circular.

P7. If a theoretical account of meaning is circular, it is not explanatory.

C. Stevenson’s account is not explanatory.
III. Grice’s argument for the second condition of his analysis of meaning

P1. The first condition of Grice’s analysis is: \( x \text{ means}_{\text{NN}} P \) iff (a) \( x \) was intended by its utterer to induce a belief that \( P \) in her audience.

P2. The adequate analysis of “means\(_{\text{NN}}\)” must make essential use of the utterer’s intentions and must not be reducible to causal association (i.e., natural meaning).

P3. The analysis in (P1) is consistent with the example of A leaving B’s handkerchief at a crime scene in order to frame B. Here, the handkerchief is intended by A to induce a belief that B committed the crime in her audience (viz., the police).

P4. However, in this case, but it is clear that A does not mean to be communicating in a full blown way with the police. In order for the framing to work, the police must not associate A with the crime at all. To the extent that meaning is conveyed, it is conveyed due to a causal association of B’s handkerchief with B.

5. Thus, these examples reveal that the analysis in P1 is not adequate—at least one additional condition is required.

P6. The condition should make the intentions in P1 relevant to the belief formed in P3.

P7. The example demonstrates that at least A must intend her audience to recognize her intention to induce the belief \( P \) in them.

C. Thus, a second condition should be added to the analysis in P1: (b) the utterer intended the audience to recognize the intention in (a).
IV. Grice’s argument for the third condition of his analysis of meaning

P1. The first two conditions of Grice’s analysis are as follows: $x \text{ means}_N^N P$ iff (a) $x$ was intended by its utterer to induce a belief that $P$ in her audience, and (b) the utterer intended the audience to recognize the intention in (a).

P2. The adequate analysis of “means$_N^N$” must make essential use of the utterer’s intentions and must not be reducible to causal association (i.e., natural meaning).

P3. The analysis in (P1) is consistent with examples like Herod and Salome, or Mr. X and the photo of Mr. Y, since in both cases the utterer (viz., Herod and Grice) intend their audience (viz., Salome and Mr. X) to form a particular belief and to recognize their intention to get them to form that belief.

P4. However, in these cases, the intention is otiose: all the work is done by the audience seeing the evidence with their own eyes, making this an act of “communication” where the meaning conveyed is natural meaning through causal association.

5. Thus, these examples reveal that the analysis in P1 is not adequate—at least one additional condition is required.

P6. The condition should make the intentions in P1 relevant to the belief formed in P3.

P7. Examples like Mr. X and the drawing of Mr. Y reveal that what is necessary is for the audience’s recognition of the utterer’s intention to be part of what causes their belief.

C. Thus, a third condition should be added to the analysis in P1: (c) the recognition in (b) should be part of what causes the belief in (a).