I. Administrative

A. General Questions?

II. Reference as Meaning

A. Meaning as reference

1. This is what we have seen articulated in Swift

2. It is a seductive option, recommended by emphasizing the physico-linguistic third of the meaning triad we looked at with Grice

3. But it is problematic because it does not appear comprehensive, both by failing to be sufficient (e.g., “Hesperus is Phosphorus”) and by failing to be necessary (e.g., ‘and’, ‘Santa Claus’)

B. Alternative theories of meaning – what (more) is needed?

1. Meaning as concrete: Locke, Grice (Carroll)

2. Meaning as abstract: Frege, Russell (this week)

III. Frege on Meaning

A. Meaningful pieces of language have two levels of meaning, their sense and their reference.

1. The sense of a word is how its reference is presented.
   a. It is the mode of presentation of the reference.
   b. Frege tends to describe the sense as if it is descriptive in character, using descriptive language to unpack how a referent (e.g., Aristotle) is presented by its name.

2. References are whatever is nominated by a linguistic item. They can be names objects (in the case of names and other singular terms), truth
values (in the case of sentences), and even senses (in the case of linguistic items in opaque contexts). The objects can even include images.

B. The nuts-and-bolts of this theory are presented in the latter 2/3 of the paper, where he considers a variety of linguistic contexts.

1. In normal, transparent contexts, words/phrases have their usual senses and references.

2. In opaque contexts (i.e., contexts where you cannot substitute words/phrases *salva veritate*, such as belief contexts), words/phrases refer to their typical senses with the help of second-order senses.

3. Combinations of words/phrases in clauses (e.g., subjective, relative, and conditional clauses) result in complex but regular functional combinations of sense and reference.

C. Adding the sense addresses the second set of problems directly, by supplementing the insufficient reference. It also helps with the first set of problems by serving up something that can be a semantic stand-in for reference when reference fails. (Examples)

D. There are *many* detailed developments of this view, and it is still a predominant view in the philosophy of language.

E. *Problems:*

1. Too vague—what is a sense?

2. If senses are modes of presentation of the referent, what are we to make of cases in which there are no referents to present?

3. The descriptive approach to sense seems to get various referential phenomena wrong.