Ch. 1 – Pepp

- Doesn’t provide an account of reference or referring; rather, she is interested in supplying a framework for thinking about issues related to reference and referring.
- Argues that reference/referring isn’t necessarily an instance of relation/action dichotomy—these words can be used in different ways.
- The Framework: Content Approach – linguistic significance should be investigated in terms of the things contained by linguistic items; e.g., sentence contents are understood as propositions.
  - This has two framing questions:
    - The Foundational Question: “What makes utterances or expressions significant?” becomes “What makes them have contents?”
    - The Mechanism Question: “What makes utterances or expressions refer?” becomes “What makes contents be about things?”
  - There are three distinct kinds of projects:
    - Semantics: assign contents to linguistic expressions
    - Metaphysics of Content: provide an account of just what these contents are
    - Metasemantics: address the foundations of semantics, asking questions like, “Why does language have content at all?” and “Why do specific expressions have the contents they do?”
- Within this, she presents the Fregean version and the Direct Reference version, with the latter developed largely in response to the former.

Ch. 9 – Hinchliff

- Argues that the theory of reference has rested on a mistake, at least in part; by this he means that the theory has been developed in part in response to what is really a “non-subject”.
- He helps himself to a number of concepts in order to make this point: semantics/metasemantics, subjectivism/consumerism, speaker’s reference/literal use, reference determination as involving the introduction of a name (i.e., “dubbing”) and determination of the referent of an extant name.
- He argues that both descriptivism and the historical chain picture as developed by Kripke are versions of subjectivism, and for these views, both parts of reference determination are active subjects.
- However, he maintains that for the consumerist, only dubbing is an active subject, since there is no question of determining the referent for an extant name—it already has a referent and so this issue is off the table.
- The problem is that theoretical debates between subjectivists (e.g., descriptivists) and consumerists (e.g., direct reference theorists) have often been couched in terms of making out what should be said about both aspects of reference determination.
- A surprising claim: the point about Kripke is controversial and surprising, esp. that the historical “Kripke chains are subjectivist tools” (249).
Ch. 10 – Azzouni

• Azzouni is interested in making sense out of data involving the use of apparently non-referential terms like ‘Santa Claus’; we don’t feel any difference between uses of those names and uses of non-problematic names
• He argues that semantic theories are ontologically neutral, and in particular, that reference is “ontologically numb” – the idea is that we shouldn’t suppose that just because we have a case of apparently non-problematic reference, this implies that there must be something referred to
• In developing the account, he makes two distinctions:
  o Reference/reference/reference: the first is what we normally use, and it is ontologically numb, which is to say that it doesn’t differentiate between reference, which is the real relation between words and the world, and reference, which is not a real relation but instead only has the “logical form” of a relation and connects a word with a name for that word; important: this is not a form of ambiguity, according to Azzouni
  o Truth-maker/truth-value inducer: the former consists of extant objects that make claims true or false; the latter involves background stories, etc., that are involved in underwriting the truth and falsity of claims when reference is deployed
• Loose ends: he claims that this account can be extended; that it is compatible with singular propositions and with acquaintance; that it can make sense out of the provision of truth conditions when there are no objects involved; and that it does not reduce into a form of Meinongianism

Ch. 12 – Carmichael

• Carmichael asks us to consider the sentence, “Everything is in the car”. In a normal situation, this can strike us as true even though the car doesn’t contain the universe.
• There are two views available here: restrictionism and generalism
  o Restrictionism: this is the view that there are hidden variables or unarticulated constituents that account for the restriction of the quantifier ‘everything’ to just those things relevant to the car trip; it increases theoretical complexity but is supposed to have an intuitive advantage
  o Generalism: this is the view that the claim is false and that the meaning is arrived at through pragmatic means; this is supposed to have a methodological advantage (in that it keeps things simple) but have an intuitive disadvantage
• Carmichael argues that generalism actually has an intuitive advantage, once you consider a more complete range of data; in particular, if you consider the logically equivalent sentence, “It is not the case that there is something that is not in the car”, it is intuitively false; but how can this be, given logical equivalence? Generalism can account for this, but restrictionism cannot. He considers but dismisses the “context-shifting reply”, arguing that this must be explained and that it doesn’t do justice to all the data
• He then concludes by rejecting the Binding Argument, the Availability Hypothesis, and the Scope Principle