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**Having in Mind**

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“In my own reading and rereading of Donnellan’s article I always find it both fascinating and maddening. Fascinating, because the fundamental distinction so clearly reflects an accurate insight into language use, and maddening, because…the notion of *having someone in mind* is not analyzed but used….

David Kaplan, “Dthat”

I. Donnellan’s Distinction

Donnellan, in “Reference and Definite Descriptions,”¹ deepened Strawson’s classic critique of Russell’s theory of descriptions. For Russell, definite descriptions involve generality and quantification; one is speaking in the general way that quantifiers facilitate. Strawson insisted by contrast that there was singularity here; descriptions characteristically function as singular terms referring to individuals.

Donnellan endorsed and developed the singularity idea, but additionally made room for another kind of use of definite descriptions, an “attributive use,” something closer to what Russell mistakenly thought was their only use. When definite descriptions are used “referentially,” the speaker wishes to draw attention to a particular item and uses a definite description to **enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about**. In the contrasting “attributive use,” no attention is drawn to what Russell would have called a particular particular but instead to whoever or whatever it is that has the relevant property.

Donnellan’s account of referential use emphasizes the speaker’s other-directed intention: the speaker uses the description so as to **enable his audience**. At the same time, successful reference does not for Donnellan depend upon audience uptake. In “Speaker Reference, Descriptions, and Anaphora,” written more than a decade later, Donnellan repeats this characterization of referential use but adds what he calls a more fundamental characterization: “[The speaker] intends that truth or falsity shall be a function, in part, of the properties of the [indicated] person or thing....”

This latter characterization seems problematic; it appears to posit intentions that are directed to truth conditions. But speakers presumably don’t have any direct control of truth conditions of the sentences they utter. If we allow ourselves the apparatus of singular propositions—Donnellan seems to endorse the idea here and there although it’s not a major, focused upon, piece of his intellectual arsenal—we can put the point this way: in the referential use, the proposition is the singular one, the subject constituent of which is the indicated individual. In the attributive use, the proposition is the general one, the subject constituent being some sort of other semantic value (sense, e.g) of the definite description.\(^3\) To say that the speaker asserts a singular proposition is very close to the idea that she intends that truth and falsity depend upon the properties of the indicated person. This as opposed to the

\(^2\) In *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language* (University of Minnesota Press, 1979), pp. 28-44.

\(^3\) For simplicity, I speak of general propositions as involving a semantic value like a sense. Donnellan is open to a Russellian account of general propositions that eschews senses and indeed semantic values of definite descriptions, in favor of an analysis in terms of quantifiers, etc.
general proposition in which case truth and falsity depend upon the properties of whoever fits the description.

I turn to what has evolved as *the* question about the referential attributive distinction, its semantic significance. As we will see, it is relatively uncontroversial that Donnellan has directed attention to a genuine and important distinction, that there are two ways definite descriptions may be used. But Donnellan’s opponents insist on a single semantic analysis that applies to both uses. They agree that a speaker may convey different propositions depending upon whether the description is used referentially or attributively. But “to convey” a proposition, they insist, is not necessarily for that proposition to count as the semantic content of the sentence or utterance. We manage to convey lots of things by our utterances, and only some of them are determined by the semantics of the language.

Donnellan, however, clearly sees his distinction as having semantic bite; sentences containing definite descriptions have different semantic analyses depending on whether the descriptions are referential or attributive.4 “Reference and Definite Descriptions” explicitly enters the semantic terrain of Russell vs. Strawson, and it attempts to create substantial alteration that terrain.

Kripke’s central point is his critique of Donnellan in “Speaker Reference and Semantic Reference is that Donnellan has failed to make the case for a semantic difference between referential and attributive uses. But Kripke also suggests, somewhat surrisingly, that Donnellan stops short of explicitly advancing the thesis of semantic dualism between referential and attributive uses. If there were any doubt about Donnellan’s own sense of the matter, his later paper quoted above in which he remarks on distinctive truth conditions for the two uses should settle the matter.

Part of Kripke’s argument is that Donnellan, in “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” issues various hesitations about “the statement made” by the referential use of descriptions. And some of those remarks seem at odds, says Kripke, with the thesis that referential uses are semantically distinct. But a close look

4 This is shorthand, here and elsewhere in the paper, for “referentially used,” “attributively used.” The distinction is always one of use.
at the context of those remarks reveals that Donnellan is worried not about whether
the distinction has an impact on the propositions expressed by the relevant
sentences—he clearly thinks it does. His hesitations about “the statement made”
reflect very different concerns, for example about the proper form of indirect
discourse reports of utterances that involve referentially used definite descriptions.

I turn to a related question, whether Donnellan’s distinction reflects an
ambiguity, and if so of what kind. Donnellan, struggling to characterize what he sees
as a new and very different sort of semantic phenomenon, denies that the distinction
reflects either a syntactic or semantic ambiguity. But how, Kripke asks, can the
distinction be a semantic one if there is no semantic ambiguity? To posit a semantic
ambiguity, moreover, would require for Kripke is plainly implausible, lexical
ambiguity in the definite article. Donnellan, however, approaches the matter very
differently: referential and attributive uses have different impact on the semantic
content, even though the definite description has a single lexical meaning.

Perhaps, as Kripke seems to presume, there is incoherence here. Perhaps the
only road to a difference in semantic content is lexical ambiguity. There may be deep
issues at stake here, about the nature of semantics, perhaps about compositionality.
But Kripke does not pursue the matter, other than simply to deny Donnellan’s
position, and Donnellan in his later responses does not pursue it either.

Rejecting both syntactic and lexical ambiguity, Donnellan writes, ”perhaps
we could say that the sentence is pragmatically ambiguous… a function of the
speaker’s intentions.” If one wants to press the ambiguity idea, Donnellan seems to
be saying, one might call it “pragmatic.” But to say this is not to say more than
Donnellan has said already, that an unambiguous sentence containing a definite
description can be used in these two (semantically distinct) ways.

Donnellan’s hesitant gesture towards “pragmatic ambiguity” has probably
encouraged the view that Donnellan’s distinction is somehow pragmatic rather than
semantic; that truth conditions, propositions, semantic contents are not affected by
the difference in uses, referential and attributive. But as noted this is not Donnellan’s
conception of the matter. This is not to say that Kripke’s positive arguments that the
distinction is not semantic but is rather pragmatic rest upon this infelicity on
Donnellan’s part. But certainly it has not helped Donnellan’s cause that he refers to it as a pragmatic ambiguity.

It is striking that in “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” Donnellan offers little in the way of argument for the semantic significance of the distinction. In his paper, “Speaker Reference, Descriptions, and Anaphora,” written subsequent to Kripke’s attack on the semantic significance thesis, there is such a direct argument, but not in the original piece. I will turn in a moment to what might be construed as an argument in the original paper, but it is not formulated as an argument, and indeed construed that way it begs relevant questions. Donnellan presents it as simply a way to bring out the distinction he has in mind.

There are several factors that contribute the Donnellan’s lack of felt need for more of an argument. Excited about the distinction he has discovered, Donnellan hardly anticipates the reaction of Kripke and others that there is such a distinction but it is not semantic. Second, the examples, as Donnellan presents them, have considerable intuitive power. As with the later discussions of proper names and indexical expressions, there is much intuitive power to the direct reference idea even if one has not yet hit upon anything like a decisive argument against the perspectives of Frege and Russell.5

Finally, the atmosphere surrounding the publication of “Reference and Definite Descriptions” is significant. While the core intuition—definite descriptions as devices of singular reference—was present some 15 years earlier in Strawson’s “On Referring,” until Donnellan’s paper that intuition was not much developed. Instead much attention was paid to the Strawson-Russell debate concerning the truth values (or lack thereof) of sentences with non-referring definite descriptions and the contrast between presupposition and assertion. With “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” a movement is launched. The paper is perhaps the first announcement of what will become a new program, one that seized the imagination of philosophers of language for the remainder of the century.

5 Joseph Almog, in several places, speaks of an “argument by ear,” and Donnellan quotes a remark of David Kaplan, that “there was always something suspicious about the idea that proper names were descriptional.”
The thesis that the referential-attributive distinction has semantic significance should be distinguished from another controversial claim that Donnellan makes in the course of the paper. These two claims have proved difficult to keep apart. In informal discussions and even in the literature, “Donnellan’s distinction” is sometimes understood as this second idea. The idea is that in the referential case and only in that case, the description can refer (semantically) even when it fails to apply to the referent in virtue of the description’s literal meaning. When I say, looking at the strangely behaving defendant on the witness stand, “Smith’s murderer is insane,” the description refers to the man I’m pointing out whether or not he actually committed the murder. Similarly, if I speak of the man next to the woman as “her husband”—they seem to be a couple—my words refer to him even if he is not married to her. In the case of referential use, speakers’ intentions—who the speaker has in mind—trump literal meaning.6

If Donnellan were correct about this feature of referential use that would indeed provide semantic punch to the referential-attributive distinction. The same unambiguous definite-description-containing sentence might then have different truth values in referential and attributive contexts.

I have doubts about the correctness of this second thesis, and even about how central Donnellan took it to be. In “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” Donnellan does not mention the intention-trumps-literal meaning idea until well into the paper. He first explains the two uses in a very plain way—nothing about reference in the absence of the description’s literal application. Only later does he add that the distinction can be usefully brought out by examples in which the description fails to apply literally. This makes it tempting to suppose that it’s not the core idea. In my discussion of Donnellan’s distinction in this paper I also did not make mention of this second controversial claim until considerably after articulating what I took to be the core distinction.

6 Lest the idea seem Humpty-Dumptyish—that one can mean by one’s words anything that one wishes—as if one might use the definite description, “The murderer of Smith,” to refer to the number 3, Donnellan argues that there are constraints on what one can intend by such an utterance. See his “Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again, Philosophical Review 77 (2):203-215.
II. Kripke’s Critique: More Detail

Kripke’s rich and careful paper, “Speaker Reference and Semantic Reference,” proceeds, as noted, along a number of tracks. Kripke agrees that there are two uses of definite descriptions. But he introduces new conceptual apparatus—speaker reference versus semantic reference—and argues in the spirit of Gricean work on semantics vs. pragmatics that the two uses are not semantically distinct. One can maintain a Russellian semantic analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions and admit that there are two uses of such sentences, referential and attributive. Furthermore, according to Kripke, nothing Donnellan says should move us to think otherwise; not only that, Donnellan never even clearly states that the semantics of referential and attributive definite descriptions are distinct.

Kripke’s new terminology is not just a matter of terminology. He is suggesting that what’s distinctive about referential use is pragmatic—largely a matter of speakers’ intentions—and nothing about reference in the sense that semantics explores. To say, as Kripke does, that there is in the courtroom case described above a speaker’s reference to Jones, the strangely behaving person on the witness stand, is just to say (so far with Donnellan) that Jones is the person the speaker has in mind, the one to whom he is directing the attention of the auditor. But on Kripke’s view, Jones is the mere speaker’s reference and not the semantic referent of the description, not the referent of primary interest to semantics.

Donnellan, in his later paper, “Speaker Reference, Descriptions and Anaphora,” accepts Kripke’s terminology. His view, he tells us, is that in the case of referential descriptions, the semantic referent just is the speaker’s referent. I am less than certain that Donnellan should have so readily accepted Kripke’s vocabulary. It’s derivative after all from Grice’s speaker meaning vs. word meaning, and that doesn’t bode well for Donnellan’s semantical views.

I have attributed two controversial theses to Donnellan. Kripke is not arguing that both are wrong, or even that either one is. Rather, on Kripke’s view, Donnellan
has not made the case for either. Or as Kripke would put it, Donnellan has not shown the need for an alternative to Russell’s Theory of Descriptions.

What I take to be Donnellan’s most fundamental idea—referentially used definite descriptions as genuine singular terms, devices of singular reference—Kripke mentions in passing in the Introduction to his paper, without clearly distinguishing this idea from the second fundamental idea. Kripke seems to assume, and as mentioned he is not alone here, that at its heart, Donnellan’s key idea is that intention trumps literal meaning. As I said, my intuitions on this second question are with Kripke, but that leaves the first thesis intact, even if so far unargued.7

Interestingly—perhaps surprisingly—Kripke says some positive things, both in the Introduction and in the Conclusion of his paper about Donnellan’s intuitions. Indeed, he speculates that in the final analysis a demonstrative expression like “that crook” used to speak of someone who is not a crook might well semantically refer to the non-crook in question. The point of his paper is thus not the incorrectness of Donnellan’s views, but the inadequacy of Donnellan’s arguments.

Rather than try to adjudicate the various issues at stake between Kripke and Donnellan—I think a great deal of it hangs on the differing intuitions about intention vs. convention—I will lay out Kripke’s analytical apparatus, for doing so will put us in a position to assess Donnellan’s thinking about “having in mind,” my main interest here.

There are two key distinctions in Kripke’s treatment: Speaker reference vs. semantic reference, and simple vs. complex cases.

**Speaker reference vs. semantic reference:**

“What is Smith doing over there?” “It’s hard to see; I think he is raking the leaves.” It turns out that it’s not Smith. It was Jones all along that we saw in the distance; we took him to be Smith. Whatever we say about the truth value of the

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claim that Smith is raking the leaves, it is clear that the speaker was speaking about the guy over there, actually Jones. Kripke says that the name “Smith” has as its semantic referent, its conventional referent, the person, Smith, that it always has as conventional referent. Jones, the guy actually pointed out, the one the speaker mistakenly took to be Smith, is the “speaker’s referent.” Donnellan’s controversial claim can now be put this way: speaker reference determines semantic reference.

Kripke emphasizes that the linguistic phenomenon to which Donnellan draws our attention is not limited to or specific to definite descriptions. The intention vs. convention issue arises for all sorts of singular terms. This is of interest for several reasons, neither of which will be my focus. First, one might wonder in the spirit of Donnellan whether there is a “referential use” of proper names. Now in one sense of course there is; they are devices of singular reference. But do they submit, on Donnellan’s view, to the “intention dominates convention” phenomenon? The other question, only to be mentioned here, is why Kripke thinks that this point is so telling against Donnellan. Perhaps this reflects Kripke’s view that Donnellan must be arguing for semantic, i.e. lexical, ambiguity. If we can assume that Donnellan is so arguing, and if we further note that the Donnellan-phenomenon is not specific to definite descriptions, but is found with proper names and other referential devices, that would make the lexical ambiguity thesis much less thinkable. After all, the fact that I can use the name Jones when I mean to speak of Jones but also when I mistakenly suppose that I’m seeing Jones, this hardly suggests that the name “Jones” is lexically ambiguous.

**Simple vs. Complex Cases**

First for the simple cases. I want to say something about our colleague, Jones, that he is a good philosopher. I intend to use the name in its conventional way, as a name of Jones. Kripke calls this a general intention; he means—as David Kaplan pointed out a long time ago—that the speaker has no special intent other than to use the name conventionally. Similarly for descriptions, I want to say something about

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8 This is the one that I have been arguing is really the second and less fundamental claim. But it is Kripke’s focus.
whoever it is that killed Smith. I use the expression, “the murderer of Smith,” with no intention other than to use it in line with it’s lexical meaning.

Turning to complex cases, I want to talk about a particular individual, maybe someone in view or someone whom we have been discussing. I believe that “Jones” is his name. So I use that name both with the general intent of referring to it’s conventional referent, and in addition with the specific intent of pointing out that guy over there. If things go well, the intentions are coordinated; they determine the same individual. If not, we have a Donnellan case. And similarly for definite descriptions.

III. Having in Mind

When Donnellan’s distinction was news, there was the sense—widespread I think—that the distinction was suggestive but obscure. The quote from Kaplan at the head of this paper puts it well. It might seem surprising then that Kripke seems to have no special problem with what was supposed to be the issue, having in mind. Kripke, that is, seems to approach speaker reference as unproblematic, no more obscure than any talk of intention. This seems just right to me.

Some time ago there was a debate current about the reference of demonstratives. Some proffered a causal theory, some an account that made reference depend upon the intention of the speaker. I preferred an account that emphasized a social dimension, the cues available to the competent auditor concerning the relevant individual. While I was thus not a fan of the account that gave priority to speaker intentions, I never would have thought to criticize it solely on the ground that it made use of the idea of speaker intention. Intention, of course, is a philosophically interesting and in some ways puzzling notion. But no more so than lots of other ideas that we take to be serviceable, ideas like causation, belief, and action, and many more.

In retrospect, then, I don’t really understand why people took Donnellan’s idea to be particularly obscure. At the same time, I’m not sure that I’m doing justice to Donnellan’s thinking about having-in-mind. I do believe that my relatively light reading of that concept is all that one needs to make sense of Donnellan’s basic idea,
his basic examples, as well as all one needs to understand the Kripke-Donnellan
debate. But there are, I think, other strands to Donnellan’s thinking.

Why suppose so? In Section VI of “Reference and Definite Descriptions,”
Donnellan discusses reference failure. Someone asks, “Is the man carrying the
walking stick the professor of history? Donnellan considers several cases, one where
the man is carrying an umbrella. He says, just as we would expect, that this is a case
of referential use, where reference succeeds despite the fact that the description fails
to apply. Next he considers a case where there is no one there, no man with a
walking stick, no man at all, no woman, merely a rock that somehow appeared to be
a man. Still, says Donnellan, reference is successful—the rock is the referent—even
in such a case where the description misses its mark radically.

The use of the verb, “to refer,” is flexible enough so that it’s not outlandish to
suggest that in such a case, the speaker, (in some sense, perhaps mistakenly) referred
to the rock. But surely there is strain in supposing that the speaker had the rock in
mind, or that he intended the rock, or that he wished to call attention to the rock, to
paraphrase some of Donnellan’s earlier characterizations.

Donnellan goes on to consider a case of reference failure—there is not even a
rock there, nothing that the speaker confused with a man. But we might consider an
intermediate case. Say the appearance of a man was a consequence of strange
lighting, perhaps a shadow. Would Donnellan want to say that the person referred
to the shadow? Certainly none of these cases, from the rock to the shadow, is
trivially the same as the Smith’s murderer case, or the “Her husband is kind to her”

What then connects these cases for Donnellan, the original uncontroversial
examples of speaker reference, and cases like that of the rock (and maybe the
shadow)? There is something, I want to suggest, in Donnellan’s thinking abut
having-in-mind than is not captured in my light reading of “having in mind.
IV. Donnellan’s Russelianism

In his later paper, “The Contingent A Priori and Rigid Designators,” Donnellan explores Kripke’s idea of introducing a proper name by specifying a definite description that merely fixes its reference. The contrast is with the introduction of a proper name as abbreviating a definite description. According to Kripke, a name introduced by a reference-fixing description is Millian, a tag for its referent and pointedly not a synonym for the introducing definite description. One who so introduces a name is merely dubbing the item with the name; the description merely indicates which item is in question.

Donnellan takes the Kripkean name-introduction procedure to be coherent. But he is bothered by it, for it entails that one can introduce a name for something with respect to which one is entirely causally and epistemically/cognitively removed, a future object, for example; let “Newman 1” be the name of the first child born in the 22nd century,” to update Kaplan’s example. Another such example: “Let “Cali” be the name of the person closest to the point at the geographical center of California at this moment.”

What exactly, asks Donnellan, is the status of a name so introduced? Can one use such a name to refer, to assert singular propositions about the item so named? Can one believe propositions de re about the item? Imagine, says Donnellan, (someone, not likely one of us) meeting Newman 1 in 2115. Can one having introduced the name earlier by the formula, say to him or her, “I was thinking about you during the last century”? Donnellan thinks not. Still, one has introduced a name. The situation is unstable.

What has gone wrong? Donnellan here appeals to a general theme in the direct reference literature: what’s missing is some sort of real connection, something

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9 In Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, eds. French, Uehling, and Wettstein (University of Minnesota Press, 1979), pp. 45-60.
like a causal or historical connection to the denotation. His preferred story is the historical one: for one to express a \textit{de re} belief by the use of a name the referent must be historically connected in the right way to the current use of the name.\(^{10}\)

At the end of the paper, Donnellan raises the question of why there should be such a requirement on reference and the \textit{de re} attitudes:

\begin{quote}
…I find myself wanting to ask the question, why, if it is indeed true, is one in a position to assert and know [things] \textit{de re} about an entity when that entity becomes (in the right way) part of the history of one’s use of the name? What does that accomplish …? But perhaps that is a misconceived question. Perhaps the only answer is that that is just when we do ascribe \textit{de re} propositional attitudes. Perhaps the only task we can perform is the one Kaplan was attempting, to make sure that we have spelled out as exactly as possible the conditions under which such attitudes are correctly ascribed.\(^{11}\)
\end{quote}

Donnellan’s agnosticism is puzzling. There is the scent of Russell here, a Russelian intuition at odds with Frege’s. It is the idea that reference—as opposed to mere denotation—requires a cognitive connection to the referent. Notwithstanding Donnellan’s just quoted remark, it remains the case that his discussion at the end of that paper is framed by Kaplan’s idea, endorsed by Donnellan, that the \textit{de re} attitudes require the speaker or thinker to be \textit{en rapport} with the referent. Kaplan specifies several conditions for being \textit{en rapport} but Donnellan says that the only such condition he endorses is Kaplan’s third one, and he only endorses it in general terms. That third condition becomes in Donnellan’s hands the historical requirement mentioned above. Quite clearly, a speaker/thinker’s historical connection to an individual is playing some sort of epistemic or cognitive role for Donnellan, an idea that at least in rough terms he endorsed to me in conversation.

Donnellan is well-known for his rejection of descriptivism, what he calls the principle of identifying descriptions. One might have supposed, then, that he rejects what I’ve called the cognitive fix requirement, the idea that a speaker using a name

\(^{10}\) Here’s how he puts in his later paper, “Speaking of Nothing”: “...successful reference will occur when there is an individual that enters into the historically correct explanation of who it is that the speaker intended to predicate something of.”

\(^{11}\) P. 58.
must stand in a privileged cognitive relation to the referent of the name. Not so. What he rejects is on one hand, Russell’s extreme version of this requirement in terms of direct acquaintance. And on the other, Frege’s idea that the possession of a uniquely denoting conception is sufficient. Donnellan’s rejection of Frege underlies his negative response to Kripke’s idea that one can introduce and use a name the reference of which is fixed by a description; mere descriptions are never sufficient to connect a name to a referent. Which is to say that for one to have something in mind, a real cognitive connection, i.e. the right sort of historical connection, is needed; a mere descriptive characterization is not sufficient.

V. Conclusion

There is, I’ve been arguing, a Russellian strain in Donnellan’s thinking about reference. Reference and the reference-involving de re attitudes require an appropriately strong cognitive connection to the referent. Mere conceptual satisfaction, a la Frege, is not sufficient. Let’s now go back and re-read “Reference and Definite Descriptions” in this light.

When a speaker uses a description referentially, the speaker’s intentions trump conventional meaning. What the speaker has in mind is, ipso facto, the referent. So far, “Reference and Definite Descriptions.” But the later material inclines one to interpret this as reflecting something deeper, specifically the history-oriented view about what it is to have something in mind: look to the historical genesis of the current speech act to discern its referent. The speaker may have used the phrase “her husband” but the person he is appropriately connected with, the one who prompts the utterance, is the man in front of him who he mistakenly takes to be her husband.


As Kripke points out in footnote 28 of “Speaker Reference and Semantic Reference,” cases in which (on Donnellan’s approach) intention trumps conventional meaning (or on Kripke’s approach, speaker and semantic reference come apart) will be cases of mixed intentions; the
Clearly I’m speculating here in identifying the deeper roots of Donnellan’s early (1966) thinking about having-in-mind. Perhaps only the germ of the historical view was present in “Reference and Definite Descriptions.” Or perhaps the genesis-oriented account only emerges from Donnellan’s reflection on the earlier work. Donnellan’s rock example in “Reference and Definite Descriptions” may be helpful here since it may suggest that the historical/causal way of thinking was already doing some work. Not that Donnellan’s take on that example is somehow trivial once one adopts the historical perspective on having-in-mind. Even with that perspective Donnellan’s view that the speaker refers to the rock remains dicey. But one can now see how such a thought emerges, for the rock is arguably the historical/causal point of origin.

If I am on the right track, having-in-mind is certainly more tricky than I suggested earlier. Donnellan’s thesis that in the referential use intention trumps convention is relatively tame, even if controversial. Perhaps he is mistaken about it, but the thesis seems clear enough, no worse than other appeals to intention in philosophy. Indeed it was that idea that Kripke develops as “speaker’s reference,” hardly terribly obscure.

It now appears that, however, that there is an additional strand to Donnellan’s thought. Having-in-mind involves a real connection, a cognitive connection historically based, between the referent and the current speech (or perhaps mental) act. Such an account, even if not a strictly causal, has strong analogies to various causal theories in philosophy. Unlike the typical motivation for causal theories, Donnellan’s is fueled not by reductionism but rather by neo-Russellian intuitions about the role of the cognitive in reference. Despite the motivational difference, it is not clear that Donnellan’s approach fares better than causal theories with respect to the difficulties they prompt, for example about the specification of the point of genesis of the chains, about deviant causal chains, etc.

Speaker to some extent intends her husband and to some extent the man in front of him. So in a more refined account of these cases one would distinguish a primarily from a secondarily intended individual.

Whether or not Donnellan’s genetic account proves durable, we have entered more contentious, even murkier, waters.

Appendix: The Role of Causation and History in Donnellan and Kripke

Kripke, famously, in the Second Lecture of Naming and Necessity refers to his account as a causal account. Subsequently in several public discussions Kripke qualified or reformulated the idea. He was not, he emphasized, proffering a reductive account, trying to reduce reference to causation, or anything of the sort. He may have even said that his was not really a causal theory. Still he emphasizes the “chain of communication” that seems to do the work of connecting the word in the mouth of the current speaker with the referent. This appears to be a sketch, or as Kripke calls it, a picture; a preliminary to a theory of the reference of names.

The First Lecture of Naming and Necessity would seem to lead us elsewhere. There Kripke quotes with approval the remarks of J. S. Mill; the idea is a very simple one: proper names are “purely denotative.” There is no talk of chains of communication, causation, or anything of the like.

One natural way to develop such a picture is as follows. Once a name has entered the language—paradigmatically by some sort of dubbing or its equivalent—its semantics is, so to speak, fixed and complete. The name is a Millian tag and there is no more to its semantics that the fact that it stands for its bearer. The subsequent communicational history is semantically irrelevant; in the way that one’s teaching the word “table” to one’s child does not constitute any alteration in the word’s semantics. Once the name takes hold, the semantical story is over.

It was never clear how Kripke’s remarks in the Second Lecture about chains of communication—understood causally or not—were to be integrated with Kripke’s remarks about Mill in Lecture One. The Millian spirited suggestion I’m making derives from a remark of David Kaplan in “Demonstratives” that the causal history constitutes part of the “pre-semantics” of names. See his discussion there for details; what’s clear is that for Kaplan, the causal history is no part of the semantics. This suggestion was clarified and developed in Joseph Almog’s very suggestive
paper, “Semantical Anthropology,”¹⁵ It seems to me likely that it represents a strand in Kripke’s thinking, one that I find very attractive.

Like Kripke, Donnellan is not wedded to anything causal. But this is not because of the sort of Millian approach I have been sketching. Donnellan’s focus is the question of what connects a current utterance with a referent. Putting the matter that way—emphasizing the utterance—signals another difference with Kripke, whose interest is less in the utterance, more in the semantics of the name as a part of the language.¹⁶


¹⁶ Thanks to Richard Mendelsohn for comments on an earlier draft.