I. Administrative
   A. Presentation assignments
   B. Talk this afternoon: Trevor Pearce, Convergence versus Parallelism: Environmental Determinism in Evolution, 338 Natural Resources, 3-4:30
   C. General Questions?

II. Liar Arguments from Tuesday

III. Theorizing Language, Leveraging Concepts – [figure on the board]

IV. Davidson’s Approach to the Theory of Meaning
   A. Motivation
      1. Language acquisition \(\rightarrow\) compositionality
      2. Need also to do justice to communicability
      3. Need to have a ToM that produces a meaning for every meaningful sentence in a language – semantics vs. metasemantics
   B. Arguments for the T-sentence Approach – [See handout]
   C. Nuances
      1. Davidson’s view embraces meaning holism (p. 93)
      2. A theory of meaning, so understood, is an empirical theory
      3. Responds to the Liar Paradox in a way that seems to reject Tarski’s strict
regimentation

4. Is natural language too “confused and amorphous” to admit of explanation in formal terms?

III. Soames’ Response to Davidson

A. The “Semantical Definition of Truth” Is Not Semantical

1. Tarski is truth in terms of meaning, and you can’t make it work the other way

2. Tarski-truth, as a consequence, is not cut out to be the foundation of a theory of meaning

3. Other problems: reject analyticity, synonymy, etc.

B. Can a Theory of Truth Help Us Identify a Theory of Meaning?

1. The Justification Argument

2. Foster’s argument and Davidson’s response

IV. Arguments

A. Opening section of Davidson

B. The “Slingshot Argument”

C.