I. Administrative

A. General questions?

II. The Importance of These Distinctions

A. Soames notes that “tracing” modal connections is an important part of philosophical work. Why?

1. “The connections are truth guarantees in which, for various senses of ‘must’, one set of sentences or propositions must be true if other sets of sentences or propositions are true” (131).

2. This is related to logical consequence, and also to necessary truth.

3. Soames associates sentences with the modalities logical and analytic, and propositions with the modalities apriori and necessary, as well as counterfactual consequence.

4. He then lists relatively recent advances in our understanding of modality.

B. This is just another sign that modality is a critical feature of philosophical work. This is reflected in the importance of these distinctions:

1. Necessary/possible (applied to true)

2. Necessary/contingent (applied to exists)

3. Apriori/Aposteriori

4. Analytic/Synthetic

III. Soames on Actuality

A. Actuality is a key part of the story for Soames because of its relation to
modality and to context sensitivity.

B. Actuality receives primary attention in Ch. 6:

1. It figures into an early puzzle involving *apriori* knowledge that is generated by the “failure of apriority to be closed under apriori consequence” (139). Actuality figures centrally into this, since there are “two ways of knowing”.

2. It allows him to generate a way of thinking about the relationship between apriority and epistemic possibility that he believes is correct: if a proposition is knowable at all epistemically possible world-states, it is knowable apriori, but not vice versa (137-138)

3. It allows him to generate instances of the contingent apriori that he believes are legitimate, in contrast with those involving singular thoughts. (These founder on the distinction between *knowing that sentences express true propositions* and *knowing the propositions those sentences express*—140-141.)

4. He joins the ostensible distinction between ‘actually’ as a rigidifier and the ordinary sense of ‘actually’, as in “Actually, I am always late to class!”

IV. **Kitcher on the A Priori**

A. Soames supplies this definition: “A proposition p is knowable apriori iff there is some way of entertaining p such that, when one does so, it is possible to come to know p, without appeal to empirical evidence for justification” (132).

B. This is related to Kitcher, but is not sensitive to the range of issues Kitcher considers.

1. What is experience? Two ways to think about it:
   a. *Relative to knowledge:*
      i. Cannot be required for justification – propositions knowable a priori can be known a posteriori
      ii. Supplies the proposition
iii. Serves as a precondition for any knowledge at all

b. In terms of its composition:

i. Is it constituted by events in which the agent participates (so a causal story?)

ii. Inner/outer – some have understood this to map onto the a priori/a posteriori, but not Kitcher

2. Experience can be rendered inessential by arguing that any experience that one could have generates the knowledge (or could generate it).

C. Kitcher’s Definition of Apriori Knowledge

1. X knows a priori that p if and only if X knows that p and X's belief that p was produced by a process which is an a priori warrant for it.

2. a is an a priori warrant for X's belief that p if and only if a is a process such that, given any life e, sufficient for X for p, then
   a. some process of the same type could produce in X a belief that p
   b. if a process of the same type were to produce in X a belief that p then it would warrant X in believing that p
   c. if a process of the same type were to produce in X a belief that p then p (579).