Cartesian Responses: these are predicated on the idea that the mind and body are distinct entities, and that the body is a physical mechanism open to complete objective examination; further, these approaches adopt an external, objective perspective on the mind that is fundamentally informed by scientific practice.

I. Constitutive: qualia are explained by intrinsic properties of the system.

A. Monist

1. Physical constitution of the organs that instantiate the states account for the character of the experience by the agents.

2. This can be nestled inside a broadly functionalist model.

3. Problem: there is still no reason why we should think that the physical nature of the states stands in any explanatory nature with the way those states feel.

B. Property Dualist

1. There are phenomenal properties that do not supervene on physical properties, and these are what give experience its characteristic feel.

2. Problem: this runs afoul of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, in addition to being ontologically prodigal. If these are properties available only to the person experiencing them, in what sense is it possible for them to be understood by anyone?

C. Eliminativist

II. Functionalist

A. Internal Monitoring: reflexive consciousness is a functional state, and qualia consists in our being conscious of our experiential states as having certain properties.

1. We monitor our states and make judgements about them, where the content of the judgments is the qualia.

2. Problems: why should reflexive consciousness
render experiential states conscious in the required sense? Does having experience require conceptualization? (The perceptual alternative to this is untenable.)

B. **Intentionalism**: reflexive consciousness is a functional state, and the associated judgments pick out states by their intentional character--this is how we get at qualia.

   1. Are there non-intentional aspects of experience?
   2. Perhaps there are, but consideration of this appears to force one into a constitutive response.

**Anti-Cartesian Responses**: This is the view that our authors develop and defend, following Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. It is predicated on the rejection of the Cartesian framework, particularly the deep division between body and mind and the excessive reliance on the objective perspective. It combines direct interpretationalism, modified psychological causalism, and perspectivalism. It is not a form of physicalism, since the conception of the body that it offers does not reduce to and is not derivable from the scientific conception. Some further aspects of this view:

I. **Perspectivity**: experience presents the world to us from a particular point of view, and this point of view is an essential and non-detachable part.

   A. We must account for experience in terms of concepts that are essentially subjective--these are the concepts that we use to understand it as we live it, and so these must figure into our account of it.

   B. There is thus an essential connection between the world and the character of our experience: experience represents the world as being a certain way from a particular perspective. To understand the experience, we must understand the point of view, and to understand this, we must take its subjective character seriously.

II. **Intersubjectivity**: this is possible for those who share a point of view.

   A. The world from a point of view is not a private thing; rather, it is public and can be discussed.

   B. To gain this, we must be able to put ourselves in another's shoes and see their reaction as the sort we would have. This requires biological and cultural commonality.

III. **Normativity**: we come to understand an experience when we come to see the agent's reactions to having the experience as reasonable and/or normal; what it is like to have these experiences is understood through a grasp of how they furnish reasons for belief.
and action.

IV. *Embodied Mind:* specific experiences are available only because bodily experiences are.

A. The qualitative character of an experience is constituted by providing a reason for the bodily expression of that experience.

B. Experience is tied to expression because it gives us a reason for desires and evaluative beliefs.

VI. *Self-Knowledge:* understanding experience requires that we understand it in our own case as well as in the case of others.

A. We must see a distinction between how the world is from a particular perspective and how it appears to that perspective.

B. Even so, our judgments of our own experiences are incorrigible, since what we take our world to be will consist in how we conceptualize it.