I. Ryle on the Cartesian “Myth”

A. Ryle is out to do “logical geography” of concepts, which amounts to working out the logical relations among propositions (e.g., what propositions imply, and what they are implied by) within a particular area of inquiry—this is paradigmatic analytic philosophy

B. Ryle focuses his critical eye on the mind/body problem as handled by Descartes

C. The Official (Cartesian) Doctrine: interactive, substance dualism

D. The Absurdity of the Official Doctrine:
   1. *Category mistake:* The mind/body distinction is a category mistake – the conjunction, “body and mind,” exhibits the same absurdity as the conjunction, “left-hand glove, right-hand glove, and pair of gloves”
   2. The result is that the “Doctrine of the Ghost in the Machine” is absurd, and that the mind as the “not-body” does not exist. Dualism is false

II. Behaviorism

A. What is the body? As before, it is an external “soft machine” that is best understood via scientific inquiry

B. What is the mind?
   1. The mind is constituted by *dispositions to behave*, which are *conditionally specifiable properties* attributed to people: If A happens, B will behave in such-and-such a way
   2. These are not states or causes or even causal factors—they are simply conditional facts about the organism
3. Ryle introduces dispositions in order to respond to the objection that behaviorism can't account for the fact that we can have thoughts that do not issue in behavior.

4. The further point is a linguistic one: mental talk and behavioral talk are two different ways of talking about the same class of things.

C. What is the relation between them? The mind is reduced to aspects of the person’s physical behavior, so the mind is reduced to the body—this is a version of materialism.

D. Problems:

1. But isn't there something going on in a very real and robust sense when I think? Surely there is something there that must be explained by an account of the mind, and a dispositional account that is couched in terms of conditionals surely won't get it done. (Armstrong)

2. It is surely unnatural to say that the mind is the behavior—it may be expressed through behavior, but it shouldn't be identified with it.

III. Identity Materialism (Also Physical State Materialism)

A. What is the body? As before.

B. What is the mind?

1. D. M. Armstrong (whose view is representative) rejects behaviorism, but he thinks the idea of looking at the mind through behavior is a good one. Armstrong's idea is to identify dispositions to behave with internal states of the organism. Thus, the mind is constituted by internal states of the organism—indeed, it makes physicalism of the kind he endorses possible.

2. Mental states can now be regarded as causes, or causal factors, that produce (or are apt to produce) a certain range of behavior.

   a. Note that this is a view developed in reaction to behaviorism and not dualism; indeed, this conclusion is quite compatible with dualism.
b. Armstrong's own view, though, is that of current science: the character of the states is to be specified in physico-chemical terms.

C. What is the relation between them?

1. The mind is reduced to the body, and so this is a version of materialism.

2. Armstrong embraces a materialist view that has two parts. To be in a particular mental state is:
   a. To be in a particular physical state (in us, a state of the central nervous system) that
   b. Occupies a certain causal role
   c. Both of these identifications are contingent; that is, both could have been otherwise

D. Problems

1. Can this account for consciousness? Armstrong suggests that is can, in terms of an internal state that is the perception of our internal goings on. (Does this work?)

2. What of differences between brains? Does this threaten identification?