I. Administration
   A. Distribute written work
   B. Presentations on Thursday – Scott and Monica & Laura
   C. Any long paper questions? There is a handout posted about this.
   D. Questions?

II. Video Clip, RE: Morgan’s Presentation:
    http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xqrt0g_i-heart-huckabees-clip-get-in_shortfilms

III. From Metaphysics to Mind
   A. Heil’s Metaphysics in Review
      1. All that really exists are simple substance(s), which are various ways
         – i.e., substances that exhibit properties
         a. There are no “levels of being”
         b. Substances could be one or many
      2. Properties are “powerful qualities”, which is to say that they are both
         dispositional and qualitative at the same time.
         a. Be careful – these aren’t aspects of properties, but rather the
            property itself considered in two different ways
         b. It is not the case that all predicates (e.g., “is a Royals fan”) correspond to properties
      3. Complex objects (e.g., brains) are composed out of simple
         substances, and so derive their “Episcopalian properties” from the
         arrangement of the properties of their simple substantial components
a. “… every property contributes in a distinctive way to the qualities and dispositionalities of objects possessing it” (212)

b. We need to distinguish between (i) qualities of an experience and qualities of an object experienced, and (ii) qualities of an experience and qualities of an experience of an experience.

4. Causality in the universe is understood in terms of networks of dispositions and reciprocal disposition partners.

B. Heil’s Desiderata for a Theory of Mind

1. Privacy and privileged access to mental states – EXPLAINED
   a. These are afforded by the fact that brain states are ours
   b. There is a difference between being in a state and observing the state

2. Qualitative characteristics of experience (i.e., qualia) – EXPLAINED
   a. These are grounded in the qualities of the complex brain states we’re in, as experienced by us
   b. Various states fill certain functional roles because they have the qualities they have, and not vice versa

3. Mental causation – EXPLAINED AWAY
   a. As a problem, this arises because of the idea that there are levels occupied by mental states (the “realized”) and physical states (the “realizers”), with the former being superfluous parts of the causal story
   b. However, on his view, this is not correct
      i. The qualitative, mental characteristics that impress us as being “higher level” are not really separate from the dispositional characteristics that exert causal influence
      ii. The qualitative and dispositional characteristics are just different ways of thinking about the properties that compose the mind/brain
      iii. This is very much in line with identity theory
4. Multiple realizability – *EXPLAINED AWAY*

   a. The key to appreciating his response to this is to recognize that not all predicates correspond to properties

   b. To say that *pain*, for example, is multiply realizable is to say that the predicate “is in pain” is true of a variety of organisms by virtue of the arrangement of the properties of their substantial parts

   c. There is no property of *being in pain* that is multiply realized, since the predicate “is in pain” does not express a property

5. Ceteris paribus laws – *EXPLAINED*

   a. These are the “other things being equal” laws of the special sciences; these laws admit of exceptions and are “loose”

   b. They are grounded in the fact that different objects can have very similar properties (or more strictly: similar predicates are true of them by virtue of the arrangement of the properties of their substantial components), which will imply that they behave in similar ways in similar circumstances by virtue of the dispositional character of those properties

6. Zombies – *EXPLAINED AWAY*

   a. There can be no such thing, since the possibility of zombies presupposes that you can separate the dispositional and qualitative character of the properties of substances

   b. On Heil’s view, these are unseparable characteristics of the properties arrangement of which constitute the character of complex human objects

7. Intentionality -- *EXPLAINED*

   a. Intentionality in the relevant sense is *aboutness*, i.e., the way in which certain representations and representational states are *about* something.

   b. The intentionality of a state is supplied by its *content*, which is often characterized in propositional terms
c. For Heil, the story of intentionality is tied to the role of images, which are rooted in perception → they are perceptual states brought about not by the object of perception, but by something internal

d. For Heil, all conscious thought is imagistic, and images are critically important to planning and anticipation – to practical and theoretical intelligence

e. You get intentionality by allowing that there is a role played by images in thought
   i. These are rooted in a complex set of dispositions which “constitute the creature’s states of mind” and ground the projectivity associated with aboutness and meaning
   ii. Dispositions are projective in the sense that they “aim” for realization in the context of complex disposition partners

C. Related Issues

1. Heil is happy to consider his view a form of neutral monism, which is the view that there is only one kind of thing and there is no “mental-material chasm to be bridged” → this is a “distinction of conception” and not a “real distinction” (242)

2. He is congenial to panpsychism, as you might expect

3. He is also congenial to identity theory, so long as you shed the idea that for every predicate there must be a property → this is clearly exhibited in his way of dealing with the “problem” of mental causation