Lecture Eleven: Sociality and Planning Agency

Philosophy 462
October 28, 2014

I. Administration
   A. Presentation on Thursday – Kevin
   B. Any long paper questions? There is a handout posted about this.
   C. Questions?

II. Shifting from Breadth to Depth
   A. This is a version of functionalism
   B. It is a contribution to the folk psychological theory of mind
   C. Focused on the causal roles, but also on the norms that must be satisfied by rational agency
   D. He is interested in accomplishing conceptual, metaphysical, and normative goals
   E. Methodology:
      1. Conceptual analysis, involving quite a lot of necessary and sufficient conditions evaluation
      2. Interested in sufficient conditions and not necessary conditions
      3. Runs what amounts to a “pudding” argument

III. The Logical Space
   A. He defends a conservative, reductivist theory of modest sociality, resting it on the resources needed for individual agency – it is a form of “augmented individualism”
B. Positioning his theory
   1. This is not a game theoretic, “strategic equilibrium within common knowledge” view
   2. It is not a mutual entitlement view (e.g., Gilbert)
   3. It is between these

C. He embraces the “continuity thesis” – modest sociality is continuous with structures of individual planning agency. This differs from non-continuity views, such as those of Searle and Gilbert

IV. Individual Agency
   A. Builds on previous theory of individual intentions and individual agency
   B. See the book on this

V. Shared Agency
   A. Three guiding ideas:
      1. Shared intentions are aspects of mind that can be specified in terms of roles and norms
      2. These can be cashed out in terms of individual intentions understood as elements in partial, coordinating plans
      3. Creature construction
   B. He rests his account on an account of shared intentions
      1. These intentions – “I intend that we J” – are (a) not reflexive, (b) violate the own-action condition, and (c) do not require resources over and above what is required in the individual case
      2. “Both intending to act and intending that we act are forms of intending, as that is characterized by the planning theory” (14)
C. He embraces constructivism about shared intention—“shared intention consists in a structure of relevant and suitably interrelated attitudes of the participants in a suitable context” (33)