I. Administration
   A. Presentation on Thursday – Jennifer
   B. MCE review
   C. Cancelling RE #3
   D. Questions?

II. I intend that we $J$
   A. Condition (i): we each intend that we $J$ – see p. 41
   B. Details
      1. First ‘we’ is “the distributed ‘we’” – my state + your state
      2. Second ‘we’ is also distributed, but could refer to a group if the group does not embed shared intentionality
      3. I can identify you as my partner, de re
      4. We have a common conception of $J$
      5. This ensures that “an intention-like commitment to our activity is at work in the practical thinking of each” (42)
      6. This ensures “norm-guided responsiveness of the thought and action of each to the end of the shared activity” (43)
   C. Alternative: can we instead adopt “we each intend to $J$ with the other”?
   D. Concerns about circularity
      1. The content of the intention should not involve shared intentional activity
2. MB believes that you can specify actions in a *neutral* way, with the functionality of explicit intentionality built in by way of “dispositions of tracking, adjustment, and responsiveness” (47) – these are part of the resources of the planning theory of individual intentional action

3. Intentionally loaded contents can then come in later, “in the context of a complex culture” (46)

### III. Interlocking and Reflexive Intentions

A. Condition (ii): we each intend the following: that we *J* by way of the intentions of each that we *J* (and that the route from these intentions to our joint activity satisfies the connection condition) – see p. 52

B. We need to see each other as “intentional co-participants in the shared activity” (48)

1. We “need to be able to know about and respond to relevant aspects” of each other’s minds

2. Instead of obligations and entitlements, which he regards as downstream mental states, he grounds this in Gricean semantically interlocking intentions (49)

   a. These involve a “by way of” element

   b. They also involve an “in part a result of” element – this must be specified without circularity

   c. MB gets the job done here with the connection condition

C. I also want our joint intention to go through by way of and as a result of my own actions, so (ii) will be a reflexive intention; this is due to the need for “interpersonal interlocking in the shared case”, and so does not imply reflexivity in general

D. Concern about modal strength (51)

### IV. Meshing Sub-plans

A. Condition (iii): we each intend the following: that we *J* by way of meshing sub-plans of each of our intentions in favor of *Jing*

B. Meshing is intended to underwrite the “standard social-norm-responsive functioning of the shared intention” (53)
C. Details

1. Sub-plans can mesh but not match
2. There are “mesh-creating mechanisms” – common understanding of the activity, object involvement, negotiation
3. Coercion and deception undermine meshing
4. This is implicit in (ii), given MB’s understanding of the connection condition
5. Can be found in situations where there are asymmetries of power, as well as competition (although not “all the way down”, 56).
6. Meshing entails a rational pressure to help you if you need it in contributing to our joint activity – this is reflected in the “demands of means-end coherence and of consistency” (56)

V. Common Knowledge

A. Condition (vii): there is common knowledge among the participants of the conditions cited in this construction – see p. 58

B. This supports the idea that treating someone like an intention co-participant will require that the pursuit of the joint goal will be “out in the open” (57) – in particular, these things will be out in the open:

1. “intention-like responsiveness of each to the end of the shared action”
2. “pursuit of coherent and effective interweaving of sub-plans”
3. “minimal dispositions to help” (57)

C. Details

1. MB wants this to work with most any analysis of common knowledge, although he does supply one
2. Common knowledge of our commitment to J is a part of the shared intention to J
3. There are differences between the knowledge I have in my own case of my intention and what I have in the shared case, e.g., non-evidential and immune to error through misidentification