I. Administration
   A. Presentations Thursday – Matt and Alyssa
   B. Questions?

II. The Basic Thesis
   A. Eight “building blocks” for construction of modest sociality – p. 85-6 – constitute shared intention. (1
      1. These are compressed in §8 into:
         a. Intention condition
         b. Belief condition
         c. Interdependence condition
         d. Common knowledge condition
         e. Mutual responsiveness condition
      2. Remember: together these constitute a sufficient condition on shared intention; they are not to be seen as individually necessary
   B. Modest sociality is “joint activity that is appropriately explained … by such shared intention” (85)
      1. Explanation deserves special consideration here
         a. Reflect on the modal character of the story, in particular
         b. “… a fundamental kind of human activity … essentially involves a distinctive explanatory role of relevant aspects of mind” (86)
      2. Norms are also important
C. *The Basic Thesis*: “…that shared intention and modest sociality consist, at least in central cases, in appropriately interrelated public structures of individual planning agency” (87)

1. One main idea here is that this construction establishes the continuity thesis

2. Bratman acknowledges that the Common Knowledge Condition is not really part of the individual planning agency account

III. Social Glue

A. This is supplied by *interconnected* planning agency as grounded in this construction

B. These interconnections are grounded in:

   1. The “intentional interconnection and interpersonal support”, as well as the “semantic interrelations”, built into the Intention condition

   2. Interlocking beliefs about “success and interdependence” in the Belief condition

   3. Actual interdependence in the Interdependence condition

   4. The “cognitive glue” of common knowledge in the Common knowledge condition

   5. The “mutual responsiveness in sub-intention and action” in the Mutual responsiveness condition

   6. Normative pressures from social rationality that bind these together

      a. There are the standard individual normative pressures

      b. These also give rise to social norms: social agglomeration, social consistency, and social coherence (89), as well as diachronic stability (90)

C. The “quasi-Lockean” character of this account is reflected in the social glue, and these give rise to social ties (97-98)

D. This account also supports a social network construction, with overlapping, pairwise shared intentions that bind groups together into collectives (98-100)
IV. Details

A. Much of our sociality is *partial* since we rarely have the same reasons for doing things. In fact, MB endorses the “*pervasiveness of partiality in our sociality*” (91)

B. This is not merely strategic interaction in the context of common knowledge – that needn’t involve intention, but could get by simply on expectation or prediction

C. While we are required to treat each other as means in this construction – a potential ethical problem, at least for Kantians – we are also required to treat ourselves as means; MB argues that this is “compatible with full-blown individual intentional agency”, and so while we are treating each other as means, this does not violate the ethical stricture

D. There can be shared intention and mutual sociality in the case of some coercion and deception – e.g., if there is deception about reasons, but these don’t matter to the other party

E. Is this too demanding for, say, young children?
   1. Perhaps, but this is an empirical question
   2. Could be “stand-by” factors and not “active” control – *could they?*
   3. Perhaps some of what is needed is not reflected in the contents of the intentions
   4. All you need is already contained in the individual case

F. This is a qualitatively parsimonious account and not (perhaps) a quantitatively parsimonious account