I. Administration
   A. Presentation today – Mitch
   B. Endgame
   C. Questions?

II. Do We Need Mutual Obligation?
   A. Review the view: pp. 109-110
      1. The model explains the bargaining and/or shared deliberation that we engage in to fill out our plans (108-9)
      2. It explains rational stability due to “a kind of mutual stabilization” (109)
      3. Can accommodate significant differences in reasons (109)
   B. Bratman aims to develop a sufficient condition for modest sociality that establishes its continuity with individual planning agency. He acknowledges that there are cases in which it goes beyond this, but the fundamental cases (from his perspective) require nothing more than is already present in the individual case
   C. But what about mutual obligation? Don’t cases of modest sociality generate assurances or encouragement that generate obligations to stay committed to the joint action?
      1. Bratman argues that the answer here is “no”
      2. Not necessary
         a. Modest sociality can be exhibited in cases where the agents involve explicitly indicate that there are no obligations, and
that they can change their minds – this doesn’t undermine the mutuality if things go through

b. Also, consider “accidental” cases or cases that involve elements that would appear to be undermine the preconditions for obligation

3. Not sufficient

a. We can take on obligations to one another to do something – perhaps by promising to do it – without really intending to do it. Here there are obligations, but no commitment and, unless things change, no joint action

b. Obligation will often create a context within which modest sociality can occur, but there must be additional elements related to the intentions of the individuals in place as well

III. More Details

A. The kind of commitment that modest sociality requires is found in Bratman’s view in the contents of the intentions (they mention the other agent) as well as mutual responsiveness, meshing, and persistence interdependence – i.e., the content and functional structure of the individual agents’ intentions

B. Persistence interdependence comes in types – feasibility-based, desirability-based, and obligation-based – one of which involves obligation. Further, Bratman allows that in adults, joint intention and shared agency will typically come with obligations to one another. But while his view makes room for obligation, it doesn’t require it

C. He speaks to the complex interaction between this view and moral obligation

1. Not all obligation involved here is moral

2. For adults, shared agency will often involve moral obligation – persistence interdependence is, as he puts it, “contingently morally realizable” (113)

D. The view has three theoretical advantages:

1. Philosophical division of labor – let further normative theory handle mutual obligation
2. Acknowledges the important role of morality without making shared agency essentially moral

3. Cleaves to the continuity thesis

E. Rejects much of what Gilbert defends

1. Doesn’t see the need for *joint commitment* taken as a primitive – his view is more nuanced and can accommodate more complexity; further, Ockham’s razor enjoins us to reject her view in favor of his

2. Rejects the disjunction condition and the concurrence condition, arguing that those rest on a conflation of shared intention with mutual obligation

3. *Need to think about how the dialectic works here*