I. Administration
   A. Presentation Thursday – David
   B. Endgame
   C. Questions?

II. Do We Need Group Agents? Do We Need Group Subjects?
   A. Group Agents
      1. Petersson argues that Bratman’s view is not sufficient to do justice to robust joint action; in particular, it needs “a notion of collective activity … that does conceive of the group as itself a ‘causal agent’” (121)
         a. A “causal agent” is “an internally structured locus of causal powers” that can serve as the cause of various effects
         b. There isn’t a need to reify this into something abstract and mysterious – all that is necessary is that the group can be understood to have “causal powers or dispositions”
         c. The notion of collective activity rooted in causal agents must, for Petersson, figure into the contents of the intentions of those participating in the joint action
         d. Without this, Bratman’s view collapses into mere strategic interaction
      2. Bratman rejects this conceptual challenge to his view
         a. As such, the challenge can be interpreted as claiming that by cleaving to the continuity thesis, Bratman has failed adequately to model modest sociality; in order to succeed, he
would need to violate that thesis and introduce group causal agents into the contents of the intentions

b. Bratman rejects this idea, arguing that the complaint does not take seriously the fecundity of the planning agency; in particular, the criticism collapses intentions illicitly into expectations

c. Further, he still has the glue he needs to get the job of creating sociality

3. But even so, he allows that there is a sense in which his view does make it possible for us to understand group causal agents as part of the story

a. He cleaves to a distributed “we” that does not involve appeal to shared intentionality, but even so, you can see a group causal agent as resulting from this

b. The group causal agent has internal structure sufficient to answer to the use of “we”, but is not so robust as to be metaphysically immodest (123)

c. This view, then, is “conceptually conservative” but “metaphysically accommodating” (125)

B. Group Subjects

1. Bratman allows for group agents as emerging in collective activity, but do we need group subjects for the shared intention?

2. He concludes that we do not

a. To be a subject, it seems reasonable to Bratman that one must satisfy certain holistic psychological requirements, i.e., one must have a web of attitudes that are mutually supportive

b. Groups do not have this in general; therefore, groups are not in general subjects

c. This does not fly in the face of the Lockean requirement, and it preserves something of the “own-action” condition

d. This highlights the differences between individual and social levels of intentionality