I. Administrative
   A. Roll
   B. Books
   C. Questions?

II. Materialism: The General Sketch
   A. The dominant paradigm in philosophy of mind is materialism, i.e., the rejection of "mental substance" and the attempt to account for the mind exclusively in terms of the body. This is a reductive theory, since the mind is reduced to the body.
   
   B. Materialism in its prevailing form is known as physicalism because physical science is given the last word on questions pertaining to the mind.
   
   C. Physicalist theories of the mind are grounded in two commitments:
      1. Ontological Physicalism (OP): one must account for what it is to have a mental state in a way that does not involve appeal to any events or properties that fall outside the ontological purview of physical science.
      2. Explanatory Physicalism (EP): one must give the mental a causal explanatory role that is consistent with the fact that all events can be given a complete causal explanation in physical terms.
   
   D. As philosophers, we should keep the following distinctions in mind here as in other locations:
      1. Epistemology / Metaphysics
      2. Language / World
E. Arguments in Favor:

1. *Privileged access* – see below

2. *Clean solutions.* Physicalism supplies us with a clean solution to the mind/body problem. There is no problem after all – mind and body are one. Everything else is noise.

3. *Parsimony.* If you can get by with one instead of two, then we are in a theoretically superior position.

4. *Dovetails with science.* We are able to hitch the wagon up to the very powerful engine of science.

III. *Behaviorism*

A. Getting to Behaviorism

1. Problems with Cartesian Dualism
   
   a. Inability to make sense out of causal interaction between mind and body
   
   b. Does it explain the mind, or just make room for it?
   
   c. The problem of other minds – we believe that others have minds, but what evidence have we?
   
   d. *Beetle in a box.* This argument of Wittgenstein’s trades on the ostensible fact that we have privileged access to the states of our own mind. Given this, we can’t be sure that we are talking about the same things when we discuss the mind; however, success would suggest that we are, so we must not be talking about something internal.

2. If we want to reject Cartesian dualism, we can:
   
   a. Reject the commitment to *substance,* and instead take there to be one kind of thing (e.g., material objects) and understand minds and bodies as involving different *properties* – check back in later for this
   
   b. Reject the *dualism,* embracing either idealism or materialism.
B. Types of Behaviorism

1. **Logical** – philosophical behaviorism, which is primarily a view about the meaning of mental terms and, through, that a view about the mind

2. **Ontological** – mental phenomena just are behavioral phenomena; this follows from the logical position, but one needn’t be committed to logical behaviorism to be an ontological behaviorist; this includes *psychological* behaviorism, which is an empirical approach driven by the desire to make psychology respectable

3. **Methodological** – attend to behavior as a way of studying the mind; this is an epistemological thesis, and one that dualists and monists of all types subscribe to

C. Philosophical Behaviorism

1. Mental states are behavioral states, i.e., states specified operationally in terms of the outward behavior of an organism, as well as its dispositions to behave. There is no "inner life of the mind" – the mind is completely externalized.

2. This satisfies OP, since the body and its behavior can be given materialist descriptions, and it satisfies EP since psychological explanations are simply alternative ways of describing physical events that could be given purely materialist causal explanations.

3. This differs from *psychological behaviorism*, which is an empirical methodology.
   
a. Philosophical behaviorism is a thesis about the meaning of terms.
   
b. Psychological behaviorism is a thesis about scientific practice.
   
c. Even though they differ, they do dovetail quite closely

D. Problems with Behaviorism

1. **Consciousness** – how can we do justice to the qualitative character of mental states?

2. **Circularity** – for the philosophical behaviorist, it appears that the
project is bankrupt

3. *The Need for Cognitive Structure* – the argument from language

4. *Characterizing Behaviors and Stimuli* – it seems the only way to make sense out of these is to beg the question