I. Administration
   A. Presentations on Thursday – presentation description has been posted; request for moving a couple of presenters?
   B. Reading essay #1 due next Thursday – will post the topics for this today
   C. Questions?

II. Identity Theory – see previous lecture

III. Functionalism
   A. Multiple realizability is a problem for Identity Theory. What to do?
      1. Turn to the computer analogy
         a. The mind is to the brain as the software of the computer is to the hardware
         b. This allows us to see mental states as “realized” by the brain without being identical with them
         c. Thus, one can respond to the multiple realizability argument without giving up on materialism/physicalism
      2. But how? Consider Heil’s comments on abstraction as “partial consideration” (89)
   B. Mental states are identified with functional states, where these are specified in terms of the relational, or functional, properties of internal states. Functional states supervene on physical states, with the same functional state instantiated by multiple physical states.
1. Example – pause to reflect on the ontological categories in play here

2. These properties link the states to other states of mind and to bodily states

3. Focus on extrinsic properties and not intrinsic properties

4. You needn’t be a physicalist to be a functionalist, but most are

C. Relationship with epistemology and metaphysics

1. It satisfies EP, since the causal story told at the psychological level need not map cleanly onto the physical level and may not be derivable from them – there is still work here for the psychological to do

2. This satisfies OP since the physical is still all there is, consistent with the point about abstraction above

D. This can be either anti-reductionist or reductionist, depending on whether functional states are specified using psychological notions or not.

E. This is not behaviorism, since functionalists see internal states where behaviorists see nothing.

IV. Representationalism as a Version of Functionalism

A. Fodor’s view:

1. First thesis: Psychological explanation is typically nomic and is intentional through and through.
   a. Brief interlude on intentionality
   b. The laws that psychological explanations invoke typically express causal relations among mental states that are specified under intentional description

2. Second thesis: “Mental representations” are the primitive bearers of intentional content. (Think here in terms of belief boxes and desire boxes.)

3. Third thesis: Thinking is computation. That is, “mental processes are causal relations among mental representations”
4. **Fourth thesis**: Meaning is information

5. **Fifth thesis**: Whatever distinguishes coextensive concepts is *ipso facto* “in the head”. This means, something like that it’s available to be a proximal cause of mental processes

**B. Heil on Representationalism**

1. Semantic engines
   a. Syntax to semantics
   b. Think here of computers again, or how we process inferences in a symbolic logic course

2. **Language of thought**

**V. Problems for Functionalism**

A. **Circularity**

1. **Charge**: Can you make out a mental state without assuming it?

2. **Response**: Yes – Lewis’ response in terms of *total functional description* (101); “light dawns gradually over the whole”

B. **Chinese Room**

1. **Charge**: Functionalism can’t get understanding, an important mental state.

2. **Response**: Yes it can, but you must not focus on one part of the system

C. **Qualia**

1. **Charge**: Functionalism leaves out *what it’s like to have mental states*.

2. **Response**: Not necessarily...

**VI. Arguments**