I. Administration
   A. Presentations on Thursday – Josh & Yvonne
   B. Questions?

II. Meta-philosophical and Methodological Distinctions
   A. Metaphysics/Epistemology
      1. Metaphysical: what consciousness is
      2. Epistemological: what we know about consciousness
      3. This is essentially the ontological/methodological distinction—what it is and how you study it
   B. Notion/Nature
      1. Notion
         a. Social/Individual
         b. Under individual, we have moral/nonmoral
         c. Under nonmoral, we have transitive (consciousness of) and intransitive (consciousness).
      2. Nature
         a. Appearance/Reality: there is no gap.
         b. Physical substrate/Phenomenal feel: there is a huge gap.
   C. Objective/Subjective
      1. This distinction is usually cashed out in terms of point of view: if an
issue/object/phenomenon/etc. depends for its characteristics on a particular point of view, then it is subjective; otherwise, it is objective. (This is too rough-and-ready, but it will do for our purposes.)

2. Related Distinctions: (Divided according to topic, perspective, and method.)
   a. **Topic**: Causal Consciousness/Phenomenal Consciousness, What Consciousness Does/How Consciousness Feels, Access Consciousness/Phenomenal Consciousness (Block), Easy Problems/Hard Problem of Consciousness, Creature consciousness/Mental state consciousness, Relational/Intrinsic
   b. **Perspective**: Third-person perspective/First-person perspective
   c. **Method**: Observation/Introspection

D. The first element in each of these corresponds to the objective, and the second to the subjective. (1) is ontological in character, whereas (2) and (3) are epistemological.

### III. Getting Philosophical: Two Kinds of Minds

#### A. Psychological Mind vs. Phenomenal Mind

1. The **psychological mind** is the mind understood to be the seat of states that play a causal functional role in the cognitive life of a rational agent.

2. The **phenomenal mind** is the seat of consciousness, of subjective experience, of “what it is like to be”. This distinction lines up with the objective/subjective distinction.

3. This duality underpins much of what we call “mental”. For example, mental concepts typically exhibit both a psychological side and a phenomenal side. That is, a side that has to do with their functional role in the organism, and a side that has to do with how they are experienced. From our desiderata:

   a. **Pain**
b. The difference between the feeling of sensation and the content of perception

c. Mental imagery

d. Qualia/Subjectivity of experience

e. Phantom limb syndrome

f. Déjà vu

g. Memory

B. Consciousness also exhibits this duality.

1. Psychological: We often use the word “consciousness” to refer to certain psychological processes that are closely related to phenomenal consciousness, among them are awareness, knowledge, self-consciousness, introspection, reportability, awareness. → creature consciousness

2. Phenomenal: This type of consciousness is characterized in terms of subjective experience, qualitative aspects of experience (qualia), and what it is like to be some organism. It is closely associated with awareness as its psychological counterpart. There some complexities associated with Phenomenal Consciousness: → mental state consciousness

a. Qualia: This relates to the properties of PhC → the raw feels of Tolman

   i. Qualia as ineffable, intrinsic, private, and directly accessible, transparent (?)

   ii. Treat these as non-existent? As existent but epiphenomenal? As existent and ubiquitous?

b. Subjectivity: This relates to our way of accessing PhC. Two specific aspects of this involve privacy and point of view.

c. Knowledge: This concerns the type of facts there are about PhC—are there first person facts about PC that we cannot come to know simply by coming to know all the objective facts about it? That is, is there special epistemic access associate with PC? (The “Mary Argument”
IV. Problems, Easy and Hard

A. Easy Problems of Consciousness

1. These problems arise primarily in connection with the psychological mind.

2. They concern specification of functional I/O behavior exhibited by the mind, and so include a variety of tricky problems, e.g., awareness, information processing, reasoning, the nature of life (?), knowledge and subjectivity (to some extent), etc.

3. Note that these are not easy, by any means; what makes them “easy” in this place is that we have an idea of how to deal with them. That is, we agree about a methodology to use in investigating these, even though our investigations could last centuries.

B. The Hard Problem of Consciousness

1. This is associated with phenomenal consciousness.

2. It concerns the relationship between the phenomenal character of our mental life and the physical character of mental life. In particular, what is it about the latter that makes the former possible? Or put another way, how does the former arise from the latter?

3. What makes this so hard is that we really have no idea about how to answer it. It seems like it should admit of an objective answer, but the phenomena involved seem irreducibly subjective. How can we capture the latter in a way that is at all scientific? Thus, there is no methodological agreement, and so no starting point for the investigation.

V. Solutions, Better and Worse

A. Reductivist Solutions

1. Standard Physicalist Approach: provide functional specification up front and then find the thing that fills the role, a la water/H\textsubscript{2}O, and heat/molecular motion. Problem: if qualia are essentially intrinsic, this approach will not get off the ground.
2. **Functionalist Approach**: consciousness is inner awareness of our own state of mind, supplied by the operation of an executive module. This is an approach that requires higher-order states of consciousness, and this would appear to be neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness, as we typically ascribe it. Further, it would appear to be mute about qualia.

3. **Representationalist Approach**: consciousness is supplied via how we represent the world to ourselves – it is a feature of the representational medium of thought.

4. **Higher-order Thought Approach**: like functionalism – consciousness “is a matter of representing a representational state” (179) But is this necessary? Is it sufficient?

B. **Non-Reductivist Solutions**

1. **Dualism**: is it really a solution, or just a way of calling attention to the problem?

2. **Epiphenomenalism**: It exists, but is not causally active

3. **Panpsychism**: consciousness is everywhere – a fundamental feature of the universe, at least in reduced forms that can become fully “conscious” when arranged in certain structural combinations

C. **Ahh, to hell with it...: Eliminativist Solutions**

1. **Theoretical Eliminativism**: no objectivity, no theoretical relevance

2. **Philosophical Eliminativism**: compelling evidence that zombies walk amongst us and, further, have tenured positions in Philosophy Departments