I. Administration
   A. Presentations on Thursday – Monique and Rachel
   B. Comments on the reading essays
   C. Questions?

II. Substances, Properties, Events
   A. Substances as independent entities
   B. Properties as ways substances can be
   C. Events as coming to have or lose a property at a time

III. Historical Background
   A. Descartes and substance dualism
   B. Spinoza and property monism
   C. Property dualism as a way out…
      1. Compare with Descartes and Spinoza
      2. Functionalism as an example

IV. Non-reductive Physicalism
   A. What?
      1. Mental properties cannot be reduced to physical properties, although they are dependent on them.
2. In particular, they *supervene* on physical properties; to avoid multiple realizability concerns, we can cast this in terms of the global supervenience of the mental on the physical.

   a. We get this by weakening the identity required by reductivism (or perhaps just the biconditionality) in favor of conditionality.

   b. This is set against the backdrop of scientific nonreductivism, according to which higher-level scientific theories are not reducible to lower level theories. (See Dennett’s work on the “Intentional Stance”.)

3. *Emergentism* is a variant that focuses on how the higher level properties emerge out of complex arrangements of lower level properties.

   B. *Arguments In Favor*

      1. **Qualia.** This view supplies the resources for dealing with qualitative experience.

      2. **Avoid Problems Inherent in Reductivism.** Multiple realizability is handled, since we are not reducing properties.

   C. *Argument Opposed*

      1. **Downward Causation.** In order to get mental properties to be causally efficacious, we must have downward causation, but this would imply either causal overdetermination or epiphenomenalism. The latter is problematic, as it would appear to deprive mental properties of reality. (Dretske’s distinction between structuring and triggering causation might help here.)

      2. **Naming, Not Explaining.** Perhaps we give ourselves room to explain qualia, but we have done little else. Certainly naming properties “mental” does not explain their character.

V. **Concerns about Mental Causation**

   A. Does this approach render mental properties causally irrelevant?

   B. What of overdetermination?
C. Can the move from properties to terms help?