I. Administration
   A. Presentations on Thursday – Morgan and Brandon
   B. Reading essays due Thursday
   C. Comments on long papers & presentations – need standard form on everything from now on
   D. Questions?

II. Reflections on Our Theoretical Work
   A. As we saw last Thursday with Monique’s and Rachel’s presentations, there are options available to us if we are willing to set aside certain pre-theoretic concerns
      1. Both overdetermination and epiphenomenalism can be developed in ways that address concerns, but does that make them attractive?
      2. To some extent, as Heil notes, every theory has its strengths and its weaknesses, and whether we focus on one or the other has to do with our predilections and what concerns are in vogue at the time
   B. It can seem a bit like we’re chasing our tail – that the problems which were once solved become problems yet again, in a kind of infernal recurrence
   C. Our role, though, is to supply a “suitable [conceptual] structure within which to locate empirical truths”, or put differently, “a unifying framework within which claims issuing from the several sciences can be plotted” (Heil 201)
      1. We balance the inclinations of common sense against the results of empirical investigation, looking to do justice to both
2. The staying power of a theory will be a function of its “capacity to provide a sensible overall account of how things stand” (Heil, 201); that is, when it comes to philosophical theories of the sort we’re attempting to develop, the proof of the pudding is in the eating.

3. Think of this as a “picture”, not a series of axiomatic arguments.

III. Heil’s Metaphysics

A. Heil is very clear that he takes himself to be addressing the metaphysics of mind in this book, and this chapter is devoted to laying out a metaphysical story that he finds attractive.

1. In particular, he is out to sketch a theory of the ontology of our theory of mind, enabling it to both support and systematize what science has to say about the mind and do justice to at least some of common sense.

2. One could do the same for the epistemology of mind, perhaps focusing in particular on the problem of subjective vs. objective access.

B. The View

1. **Substances:**
   
   a. “Simple” in the sense that they lack parts that are themselves substances.

   b. They are “non-dependent” entities, in the sense that they do not depend for their existence on the existence of anything else, as a composite whole might on its parts.

   c. They are propertied – they must have properties; they can be distinguished from their properties in thought via abstraction (i.e., “partial consideration”) but cannot exist apart from their properties.

   d. They exist in space and are not infinitesimals; thus, they have spatial parts but not substantial parts.

   e. Science (presumably physics) will tell us what these are – e.g., fundamental particles, fields, strings.
2. **Properties:**

   a. These are particularized ways that substances can be (i.e., *accidents, modes*; cf., *tropes* – see handout), and so are dependent on them

   b. They are not parts of the substance (and so are not tropes)

   c. These can be considered separate from substances in thought, but cannot exist separate from the substances, “floating free”

   d. They are *powerful qualities*, which is to say that they are both qualitative and dispositional at the same time (compare to an ambiguous figure)

   e. There are emergent properties, but they exist at the fundamental level – properties emerge when new substances emerge

3. **Objects:**

   a. Substances are simple objects

   b. Complex objects are arrangements of substances and their properties; they possess no additional properties that are not reducible to arrangements of substances and their properties

4. **The Universe:**

   a. Think of the universe as an “inclusive dispositional network” constituted by dispositions and their reciprocal disposition partners

   b. These are ways substances are, and so the universe is a complex, interconnected network of substances and their properties

   c. Causation, for example, is simply the manifestation of reciprocal disposition partners

IV. **Assumptions and Implications of Heil’s Metaphysics**
A. Assumptions

1. “Were every object made up of other complex objects, there would be nothing to anchor the existence of any object” (Heil, 201)

2. Complex objects cannot have non-reducible properties (Heil, 202)

3. Abstraction as a philosophical technique is “partial consideration” (Heil, 205)

4. There is not a property that corresponds to every significant predicate (Heil, 204)

5. “… objects are not made up of properties in anything like the way a billiard ball is made up of atoms or molecules” (Heil, 207)

6. You can only separate the natures of substances and their properties in thought (Heil, 212)

7. This is an “ontological picture” and not a semantic account of word meanings (Heil, 219)

B. Implications

1. Properties are not universals, although they could be seen to constitute ersatz universals

2. The truthmakers are particular combinations of substances and their properties

3. Normal objects are understood as substances-by-courtesy, and have properties-by-courtesy

4. There are no “levels of being”

5. One can be a realist about Ps without requiring that ‘P’ designate a property