Development Ethics: Sources, Agreements, and Controversies

International Development Ethics

Development ethicists assess the ends and means of local, national, regional, and global development. National policymakers, project managers, grassroots communities, and international aid donors involved in development in poor countries often confront moral questions in their work. Development scholars recognize that social-scientific theories of “development” and “underdevelopment” have ethical as well as empirical and policy components. Development philosophers and other ethicists formulate ethical principles relevant to social change in poor countries, and they analyze and assess the moral dimensions of development theories and seek to resolve the moral quandaries lurking in development policies and practice.

Sources

One finds several sources for moral assessment of the theory and practice of development. First, beginning in the 1940s, activists and social critics – such as Mohandas Gandhi in India, Raúl Présbisch in Latin America, and Frantz Fanon in Africa – criticized colonialism and orthodox economic development. Second, since the early 1960s, American Denis Goulet – influenced by French economist Louis-Joseph Lebret and social scientists such as Gunner Myrdal – has argued that “development needs to be redefined, demystified, and thrust into the arena of moral debate.” Drawing on his training in continental philosophy, political...
science and social planning as well as on his extensive grassroots experience in poor countries, Goulet was a pioneer in addressing “the ethical and value questions posed by development theory, planning, and practice”\(^5\) One of the most important lessons taught by Goulet, in such studies as *The Cruel Choice: A New Concept in the Theory of Development* (1971), is that so-called “development,” because of its costs in human suffering and loss of meaning, can amount to “anti-development.” Similarly in the influential book *Pyramids of Sacrifice*, Peter Berger argued in 1974 that so-called “development” often sacrificed rather than benefited poor people and what was needed was a marriage of political ethics and social change in the “Third World:”

This book deals with two topics which are intertwined throughout. One is Third World Development. The other is political ethics applied to social change. It seems to me that these two topics belong together. No humanly acceptable discussion of the anguishing problems of the world’s poverty can avoid ethical considerations. And no political ethics worthy of the name can avoid the centrally important case of the Third World\(^6\)

A third source of development ethics has been the effort of Anglo-American moral philosophers to deepen and broaden philosophical debate about famine relief and food aid. Beginning in the early seventies, often in response to Peter Singer's utilitarian argument for famine relief (1972) and Garrett Hardin's “lifeboat ethics” (1974), many philosophers debated whether affluent nations (or their citizens) have moral obligations to aid starving people in poor countries and, if they do, what are the nature, bases and extent of those obligations.\(^7\) By the early eighties, however, moral philosophers, such as Nigel Dower, Onora O'Neill and Jerome M. Segal, had come to agree with those development specialists who for many years had believed
that famine relief and food aid were only one part of the solution to the problems of hunger, poverty, underdevelopment and international injustice. What is needed, argued these philosophers, is not merely an ethics of aid but a more comprehensive, empirically informed, and policy relevant “ethics of Third World development.” The kind of assistance and North/South relations that are called for will depend on how (good) development is understood.

A fourth source of development ethics is the work of Paul Streeten and Amartya Sen. Both economists have addressed the causes of global economic inequality, hunger and underdevelopment and addressed these problems with, among other things, a conception of development explicitly based on ethical principles. Building on Streeten’s “basic human needs” strategy, Sen argues that development should be understood ultimately not as economic growth, industrialization or modernization, which are at best means (and sometimes not very good means), but as the expansion of people's “valuable capabilities and functionings:”

The valued functionings can vary from such elementary ones as avoiding mortality or preventable morbidity, or being sheltered, clothed, and nourished, to such complex achievements as taking part in the life of the community, having a joyful and stimulating life, or attaining self-respect and the respect of others.

These four sources have been especially influential in the work of Anglo-American development ethicists. In addition, when practiced by Latin Americans, Asians, Africans and non-Anglo Europeans, development ethics also draws on philosophical and moral traditions distinctive of their cultural contexts. See, for example, the writings of Luis Camacho (Costa Rica), Godfrey Gunatilleke (Sri Lanka), and Kwame Gyekye (Ghana), Bernardo Kliksberg
Areas of Consensus

Although they differ on a number of matters, development ethicists exhibit a wide consensus about the commitments that inform their practice, the questions they are posing, and the unreasonableness of certain answers. Development ethicists typically ask the following related questions:

- What should count as (good) development? What are clear examples of “good” development and “bad” development? How well are various regions, societies, and locales doing in achieving “development?”

- Should we continue using the concept of development instead of, for example, “progress,” “economic growth,” “transformation,” “liberation,” or “postdevelopment alternatives to development”? How, if at all, does (good) development differ from “developmentalism?”

- If development is defined rather neutrally as good socio-economic change, what basic economic, political, and cultural goals, and strategies should a society or political community pursue, and what values or principles should inform their selection?

- What moral issues emerge in development policymaking and practice and how should they be resolved?

- How should the benefits and harms of development be conceived and distributed? Is the most fundamental category GDP (income), utility, social primary goods (Rawls), access to resources, human capabilities and functionings (Sen), human flourishing or human rights? Is some composite measure of development success basic, such as economic...
growth or economic efficiency, or does social justice require maximizing the least well-off, getting all above a threshold, or reducing inequality?

- Who (or what institutions) bear responsibility for bringing about development – a nation’s government, civil society or the market? What role – if any – do or should more affluent states, international institutions, and nongovernmental associations, and poor countries themselves have in development?

- How should development duties be understood? As duties based solely on promises, general positive duties of charity (which permit donor discretion with respect to specific beneficiaries), specific general duties to aid (any needy rights-bearer), negative duties to dismantle unjust structures or halt injurious action, or duties to make reparation for past wrongs?

- What are the virtues and vices of various development agents? How good is honesty and how bad is deception?

- What are the most serious local, national and international impediments to and opportunities for good development? How should blame for development failures be apportioned among global, national, and local agents? What are the most relevant theories and forms of globalization and how should the promise and risks of globalization be assessed from a moral point of view?

- To what extent, if any, do moral skepticism, moral relativism, national sovereignty and political realism pose a challenge to this boundary-crossing ethical inquiry?

- Who should decide these questions and by what methods? What are the respective roles of theoretical reflection, public deliberation, and “learning by doing”? 

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In addition to accepting the importance of these questions, most development ethicists share at least ten beliefs or commitments about their field and the general parameters for ethically based development. First, development ethicists typically agree that -- in spite of global progress with respect to outlawing or reducing slavery and achieving higher living standards – there are still grave deprivations for many in contrast to the elevated affluence of a few. Pogge’s cool expression of moral outrage is typical:

How well are the weak and vulnerable faring today? Some 2,800 million or 46 percent of humankind live below the World Bank’s $2/day poverty line – precisely: in households whose income per person per day has less purchasing power in $2.15 had in the US in 1993. On average, the people living below this line fall 44.4 percent below it. Over 1,200 million of them live on less than half, below the World Bank’s better-known $1/day poverty line. People so incredibly poor are extremely vulnerable to even minor changes in natural and social conditions as well as too many forms of exploitation and abuse. Each year, some 18 million of them die prematurely from poverty-related causes. This is one-third of all human deaths – 50,000 every day, including 34,000 children under age five.

Such severe and extensive poverty persists while there is great and rising affluence elsewhere. The average income of the citizens of the affluent countries is about 50 times greater in purchasing power and about 200 times greater in terms of market exchange rates than that of the global poor.15

Second, development ethicists contend that development practices and theories have ethical and value dimensions and can benefit from explicit ethical analysis, criticism, and construction. Although important, ascertaining the facts and their likely causes and effects cannot take the place of morally assessing what has been, is, and should be.

Third, development ethicists tend to see development as a multidisciplinary field that has both theoretical and practical components that intertwine in various ways. Hence, development
ethicists aim not merely to understand the nature, causes and consequences of development – conceived generally as desirable social change – but also to argue for and promote specific conceptions of such change. Fourth, although they may understand the terms in somewhat different ways, development ethicists are committed to understanding and reducing human deprivation and misery in poor countries and regions. Fifth, a consensus exists that development institutions, projects, and aid givers should seek strategies in which both human well-being and a healthy environment jointly exist and are mutually reinforcing.\(^\_1\)\(^\_6\)

Sixth, these ethicists are aware that what is frequently called “development” – for instance, economic growth – has created as many problems as it has solved. “Development” can be used both descriptively and normatively. In the descriptive sense, “development” is usually identified as the processes of economic growth, industrialization, and modernization that result in a society’s achievement of a high or improving (per capita) Gross Domestic Product. So conceived, a “developed” society may be either celebrated or criticized. In the normative sense, a developed society – ranging from villages to national and regional communities as well as the global order – is one whose established institutions realize or approximate (what the proponent believes to be) worthwhile goals – most centrally, the overcoming of economic and social deprivation. In order to avoid confusion, when a normative sense of “development” is meant, the noun is often preceded by a positive adjective such as “good,” “authentic,” “humane,” “just,” or “ethically justified.”

A seventh area of agreement is that development ethics must be conducted at various levels of generality and specificity. Just as development debates occur at various levels of abstraction, so development ethics should assess (1) basic ethical principles, such as justice,
liberty, autonomy, solidarity, and democracy; (2) development goals and models, such as “economic growth,” “growth with equity,” “a new international economic order,” “basic needs,” and, most recently, “sustainable development,” “structural adjustment,” and “human development” (United Nations Development Programme); and (3) specific institutions, projects, and strategies.

Eighth, most development ethicists believe their enterprise should be international or global in the triple sense that the ethicists engaged in this activity come from many societies, including poor ones; that they are seeking to forge a cross-cultural consensus; and that this consensus emphasizes a commitment to alleviating worldwide deprivation.

Ninth, although many development ethicists contend that at least some development principles or procedures are relevant for any poor community or polity, most agree that development strategies must be contextually sensitive. What constitutes the best balance or principles and the best means – for instance, state provisioning, market mechanisms, civil society and their hybrids – will depend on a political community’s history and stage of social change as well as on regional and global forces, such as globalization and international institutions.

Tenth, this flexibility concerning development models and strategies is compatible with the uniform rejection of certain extremes. Ethically-based development is not exclusive: it offers and protects development benefits for everyone in a society – regardless of their religion, gender, ethnicity, economic status, or age. Moreover, most development ethicists would repudiate two models: (1) the maximization of economic growth in a society without paying any direct attention to converting greater opulence into better human living conditions for its members, what Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze call “unaimed opulence” and (2) an authoritarian
egalitarianism in which physical needs are satisfied at the expense of political liberties.

**Controversies**

In addition to these points of agreement, one also finds several divisions and unsettled issues. A first unresolved issue concerns the scope of development ethics. Development ethics originated as the “ethics of Third World Development.” There are good reasons to drop – as a Cold War relic – the “First-Second-Third World” trichotomy. However, no consensus exists on whether or how development ethics should extend beyond its central concern of assessing the development ends and means of poor or traditional societies. Some argue that development ethicists should criticize human deprivation wherever it exists, including in rich countries and regions since they too have problems of poverty, powerlessness, and alienation and so properly fall within the scope of development ethics. Some argue that perhaps the socioeconomic model that the North has been exporting to the South results in the underdevelopment of both. Moreover, just as the (affluent) North exists in the (geographic) South, so the (poor) South exists in the (geographic) North. Yet others restrict development ethics to poor countries by arguing that attention to Northern deprivation diverts development ethicists and agents from the world’s most serious destitution (in poor countries) and the ways in which rich countries benefit from the current global order.

My own view is that restricting development ethics to “developing” countries is defective in three ways. It falsely assumes that the most severe deprivation occurs in poor countries when in fact, as Sen points out, “the extent of deprivation for particular groups in very rich countries can be comparable to that in the so-called third world.” Second, Northern and Southern poverty reduction are linked; migrants from the South making money in the North send valuable
remittances to their families back home. Third, there is the increasing prevalence of applying “best practices” learned from development in the South to destitution in the North (as well as vice versa). For example, the United States Agency for International Development is applying – through its Lessons without Borders program – to destitute U.S. cities lessons learned from overseas development efforts. Development agents in different societies often face similar problems -- such as unemployment, racism, violence, and powerlessness – and benefit from innovative ways of solving them.

It is also controversial whether development ethicists, concerned with rich country responsibility and global distributive justice, should restrict themselves to official development assistance or whether they also should treat such topics as international trade, capital flows, migration, environmental pacts, terrorism, military intervention, humanitarian intervention, and responses to human rights violations committed by prior regimes. The chief argument against extending its boundaries in these ways is that development ethics would thereby become too ambitious and diffuse. If development ethics grew to be identical with all international ethics or even all social ethics, the result might be that insufficient attention would be paid to alleviating poverty and powerlessness in various communities. Both sides agree that development ethicists should assess various kinds of North-South (and South-South) relations and the numerous global forces, such as globalization, that influence poverty as well as economic and political inequality in poor countries. What is unresolved, however, is whether development ethics also should address such topics as trade, security, the internet, drug trafficking, military intervention, the conduct of war, peace keeping, and the proposed international criminal court when – or to the extent that – these topics have no causal relationship to absolute or relative poverty or
powerlessness.

Development ethicists also are divided on the status of the moral norms that they seek to justify and apply. Three positions have emerged. Universalists, such as utilitarians and Kantians, argue that development goals and principles are valid for all societies. Particularists, especially communitarians and postmodern relativists, reply that universalism masks ethnocentrism and (Northern or Western) cultural imperialism. Pro-development particularists either reject the existence of universal principles or affirm only the procedural principle that each nation or society should draw only on its own traditions and decide its own development ethic and path. (Anti-development particularists, rejecting both change brought from the outside and public reasoning about social change, condemn all development discourse and practice). A third approach -- advanced, for example, by Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, Jonathan Glover, Seyla Benhabib and David A. Crocker -- tries to avoid the standoff between the first two positions. Proponents of this view insist that development ethics should forge a cross-cultural consensus in which a political community’s own freedom to make development choices is one among a plurality of fundamental norms. Further, these norms are sufficiently general to permit and also require sensitivity to societal differences.

One must also ask a further question related to the universalism/particularism debate: to what extent, if any, should development ethicists propose visions committed to a certain conception of human well-being or flourishing, and how “thick” or extensive should this vision be? There is a continuum here: at one end of the range, one finds a commitment to the values of individual choice, tolerance of differences, and public deliberation about societal ends and means; on the other end, one finds normative guidance and institutional guarantees with respect
to the good human life but less tolerance for individual and social choice.

Even supposing that development principles have some substantive content (beyond the procedural principle of self-determination, that each society or person should decide for itself), there remain disagreements about that content. If one accepts that societal development concerns human development, one still must explore the moral categories crucial to human well-being and development. Candidates for such fundamental moral notions include, as we have seen, utility (preference satisfaction); social primary goods (Rawls), such as political liberty, income, wealth, and self-respect; negative liberty (Nozick and Bauer); basic human need (Streeten); autonomy or agency (O’Neill, Sen); valuable capabilities and functionings (Sen, Nussbaum, Little); and rights (Pogge, United Nations Development Programme). Although some think that a development ethic ought to include more than one of these moral concepts, development ethicists differ about which among these values ought to have priority. The alternative that I favor endorses the development of an understanding of minimal human well-being (not flourishing) that combines, on the one hand, a neo-Kantian commitment to autonomy and human dignity, critical dialogue and public deliberation with, on the other hand, neo-Aristotelian beliefs in the importance of physical health and social participation. Development duties might then flow from the idea that all humans have the right to a minimal level of well-being, and various institutions have the duty to secure and protect this well-being as well as restore it when lost.

One also finds an ongoing debate about how development’s benefits, burdens, and responsibilities should be distributed within poor countries and between rich and poor countries. Utilitarians prescribe simple aggregation and maximization of individual utilities. Rawlsians advocate that income and wealth be maximized for the least well-off (individuals or nations).
Libertarians contend that a society should guarantee no form of equality apart from equal freedom from the interference of government and other people. Pogge broadens the libertarian notion of harm (and rights) and argues that rich elites and nations should refrain from harming the vulnerable. Capabilities ethicists defend governmental and civil responsibility to enable everyone to advance to a level of sufficiency (Sen, Crocker) or flourishing (Nussbaum, Little) with respect to the valuable functionings.

Development ethicists also differ about whether (good) societal development should have – as an ultimate goal – the promotion of values other than the present and future human good. Some development ethicists ascribe intrinsic value – equal or even superior to the good of individual human beings – to such human communities as family, nation, or cultural group. Others argue that non-human individuals and species, as well as ecological communities, have equal and even superior value to human individuals. Those committed to “ecodevelopment” or “sustainable development” often fail to agree on what should be sustained as an end in itself and what should be maintained as an indispensable or merely helpful means. Nor do they agree on how to surmount conflicts among environmental and other competing values. Stiglitz clearly recognizes that these and other value disagreements are sometimes implicit in factual or policy disagreements:

There are important disagreements about economic and social policy in our democracies. Some of these disagreements are about values – how concerned should we be about our environment (how much environmental degradation should we tolerate, if it allows us to have a higher GDP); how concerned should we be about the poor (how much sacrifice in our total income should we be willing to make, if it allows some of the poor to move out of poverty, or to be slightly better off); or how concerned should we be about democracy (are we willing to compromise on basic rights, such as the rights to
association, if we believe that as a result, the economy will grow faster).22

An increasingly important disagreement concerns not values directly but the roles of various experts (judges, political leaders, development agents, philosophers), on the one hand, and popular agency, on the other, in resolving moral conflicts. On the one hand, popular participation and democracy are suspect insofar as majorities (or minorities) may dominate others and insofar as people’s beliefs and preferences are deformed by tradition, adapted to cope with deprivation, and subject to demagogic manipulation. Moreover, experts often excel at “know how” if not “know why.” On the other hand, rule by experts or guardians can lead to new tyrannies, and many experts themselves affirm Sen’s “agent-oriented view” of development:

With adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own destiny and help each other. They need not be seen primarily as passive recipients of the benefits of cunning development programs. There is indeed a rationale for recognizing the positive role of free and sustainable agency – and even of constructive impatience.23

Finally, controversy also exists with respect to which agents and structures are largely if not exclusively to blame for the present state of global destitution and unequal opportunity. Charles Beitz states the empirical aspects of the issue well: “There is a large, complex, and unresolved empirical question about the relative contributions of local and global factors to the wealth and poverty of societies.”24 Some development ethicists, such as Pogge, tend to assert that the global order is both dominated by affluent countries and unjustly tilted against poor countries.25 This global order and the process of globalization amounts, claims Pogge, to a
“strong headwind” against which any poor community must struggle and which is largely responsible for development failures: “national policies and institutions are indeed often quite bad; but the fact that they are can be traced to global policies and institutions.” Other development ethicists and policymakers tend to ascribe development failure much less to global and foreign sources and much more to national and local causes – such as elite capture of power, widespread corruption, and the lack of democratic values.

How might we modify Pogge's “headwind” metaphor in a way that captures a more balanced and flexible view about the relative and changing weight of external (global structure, rich country role) and internal (developing country role) factors in causing global poverty? Sailors know that the headwind against which they sail is an important but constantly changing and sometimes ambiguous factor and that getting to their destination requires skill and good judgment as well. The headwind is not always steady. Sometimes it gusts and sometimes it lulls (depending on the wind and whether their boat goes behind an island and is temporarily protected from the wind). Likewise, the impact of the global order (and rich country impact) increases and decreases from time to time and place to place.

Moreover, sometimes there are crosswinds, some of which aid the helmsman and some of which impede his progress, and a good sailor must take advantage of the former and adjust to the latter. Likewise, the global order opens up opportunities for poverty reduction and democratization as well as impedes them, and wise leaders/peoples discern the difference.

Furthermore, the good sailor tacks back and forth in the face of the wind, taking advantage of it for forward progress and not bucking it directly. Likewise, a developing country can find ways to take advantage of normally adverse global factors. For instance, a cutback on U.S. aid in Costa
Rica enabled Costa Rica to be less dependent on the US. Additionally, sometimes a head wind changes and becomes a tail wind. Then the global forces and rich country impacts coincide with and supplement internal development efforts. Finally, just as some boats are better than others with respect to resourcefulness, navigability, and stability, so some countries, owing to such things as natural endowments, governance, and human and social "capital," develop further and faster than others.

The moral of this nautical story is clear: Just as the national development efforts vary and from time to time and place to place, so do the impacts of the global order and the rich countries that dominate this order. While the wind is always a factor in sailing (sometimes more, sometimes less, sometimes good, sometimes bad, often both), so is the skill of the captain and crew (and their ability to work together). Empirical investigation is important to determine which way and how hard the wind is blowing and how best to use national skills and resources to reach a society’s destination. Pogge recognizes the variability of internal factors; in his less careful formulations, he fails to recognize the variability and complexity of external factors, the changing balance between external and internal factors, and the always important and sometimes crucial role of internal factors.

This debate over the chief causes of development failure segues to sharp disagreements over the moral appraisal of globalization and the identification of “agents of justice.” Does globalization doom or guarantee good national and local development? Does globalization offer blessings and opportunities as well as miseries and risks? Is it up to developing national and local communities to seize the good and avoid the bad of a globalizing world? Or should the main “agents of justice” be the rich nations, transnational corporations, and global institutions?
shall follow Stiglitz and argue that “today, the challenge is to get the balance right . . . between collective action at the local, national, and global levels.”

Notes


9 Paul Streeten, Shavid Javed Burki, Mahbub al Haq, Norman Hicks, and Frances


Three groups devote themselves to ethics and development: (1) the International Development Ethics Association, founded in Costa Rica in 1984 (http://www.development-ethics.org/); (2) the Inter-American Initiative on Social Capital, Ethics and Development, established by the Inter-American Development Bank in 2000 (http://www.iadb.org/etica/ingles/index-i.cfm); and (3) the Capability Group, which starting holding conferences in 2001 and is forming an association (http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~freedoms).


For a sample of such moral dilemmas or challenges, see David A. Crocker, “Toward Development Ethics.”


20 See Nussbaum and Glover, eds., *Women, Culture and Development*.

Ethics: The New Agenda, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press., 1998); David A. Crocker,
Florecimiento humano y desarrollo internacional: La nueva ética de capacidades, San José,
Costa Rica: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 1998); Amartya Sen, Development as
Freedom; Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Sabina Alkire, Valuing Freedoms: Sen’s
Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Bernardo
Kliksberg, ed. Etica y desarrollo: La relación marginada (Buenos Aires: Editorial Al Ateneo and
BID, 2002); Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity
Press, 2002); Daniel Little, The Paradox of Wealth and Poverty: Mapping the Ethical Dilemmas
of Global Development (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2003); Des Gasper, The Ethics of
Development: From Economism to Human Development (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, forthcoming).


23 Sen, Development as Freedom, 11.


25 Pogge, World Poverty, 15, 21, 112---16, 141---45.

26 Ibid., 143.

27 Pogge himself formulates a more balanced view in hypothetically discussing Brazil: “If
a particular underfulfillment of human rights – hunger in Brazil, say – comes about through the
interplay of global and national factors and could be remedied through global as well as through
national institutional reforms, then the responsibility for this underfulfillment lies with both institutional schemes and therefore also with both groups of persons: with all those involved in upholding the global or the Brazilian basic structure” (Ibid., 50).
